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ABSTRACT 
Policy makers are increasingly drawing on practices in other jurisdictions when developing 
immigration law and policy. This is due in part to the fact that the objectives of governments are 
converging as they seek to attract what they perceive as ‘good’ migrants, such as skilled workers and 
investors, and to deter ‘bad’ migrants, such as asylum seekers and irregular arrivals. In this thesis, I 
examine transfers of law and policy that have the objective of deterrence. I focus on the transfer of 
three measures between the United States and Australia. These are long-term mandatory detention, 
maritime interdiction, and extraterritorial processing of asylum claims. I compare and analyse the 
history and implementation of these measures. Referring to interviews carried out with key policy 
makers, I argue that the similarities in the way these policies have been implemented in the United 
States and Australia are the result of a process of legal and policy transfer.  
The analysis of these case study transfers is undertaken with a view of developing a deeper 
understanding of the transfer process and providing lessons for policy makers involved in future 
transfers. In particular, I examine the factors which contribute to the success or failure of transfers. I 
focus on the ‘legal dimension’ of success—that is, the ability of transferred law and policy to survive 
judicial challenges in the receiving jurisdiction.  
I also raise general concerns about transfers of restrictive immigration measures. I criticise the 
opaque nature of the forums in which these transfers occur and question the quality of the information 
relied upon by policy makers in the transfer process. I argue that at times, transfers of restrictive 
immigration measures are motivated by competition, as countries seek to outdo the deterrent 
measures introduced in comparator jurisdictions. This competition has given rise to a ‘race to the 
bottom’ that has the potential to unravel the international refugee protection regime. 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
Of all the legal changes that occur, perhaps one in a thousand is an original innovation. 
Moreover, true originality does not usually receive the fanfare that accompanies imitation. 
One could collect in an anthology of the grotesque the praise for originality and novelty that 
has accompanied every imitation of legal rules and institutions. 
—Rodolfo Sacco1 
Legal transfers have long been a feature of law reform and the development of legal systems. More 
than 2300 years ago, Aristotle openly used the different ways in which Greek cities governed 
themselves as the basis for his theories on politics and social organisation.2 More recently, Roscoe 
Pound observed: ‘the history of a system of law is largely a history of borrowings of legal materials 
from other legal systems and of assimilation of materials from outside the law.’3 At a practical level it 
makes good sense to examine the experiences and policy responses of other jurisdictions. Why 
reinvent the wheel when there are existing tried and tested models operating elsewhere? The 
incidence of legal borrowing has been made all the more acute by the process of globalisation. In an 
increasingly inter-connected world, the diffusion of law, policy and of many other things has become 
common place. Indeed, it is to be expected.4  
The regulation of migration is an area of law and policy where governments are particularly concerned 
about what other jurisdictions are doing. An obvious reason for this lies in the very nature of the 
migratory process. Changes in the immigration policy of one country almost inevitably have 
implications for the immigration policy of other nations. As Rogers Brubaker notes: ‘a person cannot 
be expelled from one territory without being expelled into another, cannot be denied entry into one 
territory without having to remain in another.’5 Lavenex and Uçarer observe that a more permissive 
policy in one state can lead to a reduction of immigration flows in neighbouring states, while a more 
restrictive policy may increase the number of migrants seeking entry into other states.6 This 
                                                   
1 Rodolfo Sacco, 'Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment II of II)' (1991) 
39 American Journal of Comparative Law 343, 398. 
2  Charles Donahue, ‘Comparative Law before the Code Napoléon’, Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 4, 4. 
3  Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law (Little Brown & Co, 1938) 94, quoted in Rudolf B 
Schlesinger, Hans W Baade, Peter E Herzog and Eduard M Wise, Comparative Law – Cases, Text, 
Materials (Foundation Press, 6th ed, 1998) 10, n 26. 
4  David Westbrook, ‘Theorizing the Diffusion of Law in an Age of Globalization: Conceptual Difficulties, 
Unstable Imaginations, and the Effort to think Gracefully Nonetheless’ (2006) 47 Harvard International 
Law Journal 489, 490. 
5  Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard University Press, 1992) 
26. 
6  Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer, 'The External Dimension of Europeanization: The Case of 
Immigration Policies' (2004) 39 Cooperation and Conflict 417, 425. 
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interrelationship motivates the transfer of migration policies in two distinct ways. Transfers are 
occurring in the immigration policy sphere as the result of cooperation and harmonisation efforts 
between states. At the same time, transfers are also being driven by competition as states compete 
for what may be loosely termed ‘desirable immigration outcomes’. 
There is a growing realisation among governments that effective policy to control migratory flows 
depends on multilateral action. Recent years have seen the rapid proliferation of regional and 
international initiatives, activities and structures dedicated to international migration policy and 
practice.7 States have come to recognise that they can benefit from cooperation on migration issues 
and are increasingly willing to converge in informal, non-binding ways. Implicit in such actions is a 
realisation of the limits of strictly national or unilateral policies in controlling irregular migration; and the 
interrelation between migration and other transnational issues.8  
Somewhat paradoxically, at the same time as governments seek to foster greater cooperation, they 
also appear to be competing with each other in a bid to secure what they perceive as beneficial 
migration outcomes. Western developed nations generally have very similar policy objectives: to 
attract ‘good’ migrants such as skilled workers and investors and to deter ‘bad’ migrants such as 
asylum seekers and irregular arrivals. In a context where governments are competing to attract or 
deter, the borrowing of laws that are perceived as successful in other jurisdictions becomes inevitable. 
The propensity to borrow is even greater in the area of refugee and asylum law, where governments 
are confined to operating under a single framework created by the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its subsequent Protocol.9 Ayelet Shachar contends that states are competing 
to attract the best and brightest migrants.10 I will argue that there is strong evidence of states 
observing (and copying) the policies of comparator countries because they are also competing to 
deter irregular migrants. It is this type of borrowing or transfer that is the focus of this thesis. 
Controlling and regulating the flow of irregular migrants has come to dominate the political discourse 
of both developed and developing states around the world. Even countries that are generally relaxed 
about large-scale immigration have moved to introduce measures aimed at exerting greater control 
over their land and sea borders. Australia and the United States, the two countries chosen as 
comparators in this thesis, have been at the forefront of this trend. Irregular migrants seeking asylum 
raise particular concerns in this quest for greater control. While sovereignty generally empowers 
states to exclude or deport irregular migrants, the ability to deal with asylum seekers is complicated by 
obligations contained in the Refugee Convention and Protocol, and other human rights instruments. 
                                                   
7  See, Colleen Thouez and Frédérique Channac, 'Convergence and Divergence in Migration Policy: The 
Role of Regional Consultative Processes' (Global Migration Perspectives No 20, Global Commission on 
International Migration, January 2005) 3. 
8  Colleen Thouez and Frédérique Channac, 'Shaping International Migration Policy: The Role of Regional 
Consultative Processes' (2006) 29 West European Politics 370, 372. 
9  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugee Convention’); Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (‘Protocol’). 
10  Ayelet Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes’ 
(2006) 81 New York University Law Review 148. 
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In this thesis I examine the approaches adopted in the United States and Australia to circumvent and 
mitigate obligations owed to refugees and asylum seekers. I study measures taken to maximise the 
power of the political branches of government to deal with irregular migrants (including asylum 
seekers) and the extent to which the two states have emulated one another in policy making.11 I will 
show that there has been a tendency for successive governments in both countries to introduce 
similar modes of control and exclusion. For example, both have developed highly complex legislative 
regimes to regulate the cross-border movement of non-citizens,12 and have adopted remarkably 
harsh, even punitive measures to prevent and deter irregular migration. 
Three migration control measures implemented in the United States and Australia have been of 
particular concern due to their human rights implications. These are: long-term mandatory detention; 
maritime interdiction; and the extraterritorial processing of asylum claims. I compare and analyse the 
history and implementation of these policies. I argue that the similarities in the way these case study 
policies have been implemented in the United States and Australia are the results of a process of 
legal and policy transfer. I contend that policy makers in Australia and the United States have 
carefully monitored developments in each other’s migration control policies and have borrowed laws 
and policies perceived as being successful.  
Of course, policy borrowings have not just occurred between the United States and Australia. 
Mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing have been considered and/or 
implemented in other jurisdictions in recent years. Canada and New Zealand have adopted 
mandatory detention regimes modelled on Australian and US practices.13 In May 2015, European 
leaders were considering aspects of Australia’s interdiction and offshore processing regime as 
potential mechanisms to stem asylum seeker flows across the Mediterranean Sea.14 In that same 
month, Malaysian, Indonesian and Thai authorities carried out maritime interdiction and push-back 
operations against vessels carrying Rohingya and Bangladeshi asylum seekers. Acknowledging, if not 
embracing, its status as regional role model, Australia resolutely refused to criticise the actions 
taken.15 When the scale of the unfolding human tragedy ultimately led to countries in the region 
agreeing to allow boats to land and for asylum claims to be processed, Australia was equally firm in its 
refusal to participate.16 
                                                   
11  The term ‘political branches’ is used in this paper to describe the executive and legislative arms of 
government. 
12  Stephen Legomsky has described the US Immigration and Nationality Act (‘INA’) as a ‘hideous creature’ 
that contains hundreds of pages of ‘highly technical provisions that are often hopelessly intertwined’: 
Stephen Legomsky, Immigration Law and Policy (Foundation Press, 1st edition, 1992) 1. This 
observation could equally apply to Australia where the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Migration Act’) 
currently contains more than 550 provisions and over 1900 pages of regulations.   
13  See Chapter Ten, Part 10.1.3. 
14  See Chapter Ten, Part 10.1.1. 
15  Sid Maher and Peter Alford, ‘Stand Firm on Boats, Says Tony Abbott’, The Australian (online), 18 May 
2015 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/stand-firm-on-boats-says-tony-
abbott/story-fn9hm1gu-1227358293135>. Also see Chapter Ten, Part 10.1.2.  
16  Mungo MacCallum, ‘Is this How a Civilised Country Responds to the Rohingya Crisis? Nope Nope 
Nope’, ABC’s The Drum (online), 26 May 2015 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-26/maccallum--is-
this-how-a-civilised-country-should-respond/6497048>. 
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The sad reality is that the phenomenon of forced migration shows no signs of abating. If anything, 
such migration is set to increase in response to new push factors such as crisis events induced by 
climate change.17 In this context, it seems inevitable that countries will continue to engage in copycat 
behaviour when making laws and policies. The analysis of the case study transfers between the 
United States and Australia in this thesis is undertaken with a view of developing a deeper 
understanding of the borrowing process and providing lessons for policy makers involved in future 
transfers.  
The legality of the case study policies under international law has been examined at length 
elsewhere.18 While acknowledging the criticisms made, it is not my intention to revisit this debate. 
Rather, the focus is on tracking the spread of these policies between Australia and the United States 
and exploring the nature, implications and ramifications of the transfer process. 
1.1  Research Questions 
The transfer of restrictive immigration control measures is occurring in an environment that is under-
explored and under-theorised. A number of scholars from various disciplines have observed that 
‘borrowing’ is occurring across different areas of migration law and policy. Eytan Meyers cites 
emulation as one factor explaining the extraordinary similarity between the immigration control polices 
of industrialised democracies.19 In similar vein, Patrick Ongly and David Pearson identify interchanges 
between Australian, Canadian and New Zealand immigration officials as a reason for the historical 
similarities between the migration policies of those countries.20 James Walsh observes that aspects of 
                                                   
17  See Jane McAdam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (Oxford University Press, 
2012). 
18  In relation to mandatory detention, see inter alia, Daniel Wilsher, Immigration Detention: Law, History, 
Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 119-70; Daniel Ghezelbash and Mary Crock, ‘Out of Sight, 
Out of Mind? The Myths and Realities of Mandatory Immigration Detention’ in Diego Acosta Arcarazo 
and Anja Wiesbrock (eds), Global Migration: Old Assumptions, New Dynamics (Praeger International, 
2015) vol 2, 23; Mary Crock, 'You Have to be Stronger than Razor Wire: Legal Issues relating to the 
Detention of Refugees and Asylum Seekers' (2002) 10 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 33; 
Catherine Skulan, 'Australia's Mandatory Detention of “Unauthorised” Asylum Seekers: History, Politics 
and Analysis under International Law' (2007) 21 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 61, 93-110. In 
regard to interdiction and extraterritorial processing, see inter alia, Michelle Foster, 'The Implications of 
the Failed “Malaysian Solution”: The Australian High Court and Refugee Responsibility Sharing at 
International Law' (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International Law 395; Savitri Taylor, 'Offshore 
Barriers to Asylum Seeker Movement: The Exercise of Power without Responsibility' in Jane McAdam 
(ed), Forced Migration, Human Rights and Security (Hart, 2008) 93; Azadeh Dastyari, Out of Sight, Out 
of Right?: The United States’ Migrant Interdiction Program in International Waters and in Guantánamo 
Bay (PhD Thesis, Monash University, 2013); Stephen Legomsky, 'The USA and the Caribbean 
Interdiction Program' (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 677; Angus Francis, 'Bringing 
Protection Home: Healing the Schism between International Obligations and National Safeguards 
Created by Extraterritorial Processing' (2008) 20 International Journal of Refugee Law 273. 
19  Eytan Meyers, 'The Causes of Convergence in Western Immigration Control' (2002) 28 Review of 
International Studies 123, 124. 
20  Patrick Ongley and David Pearson, 'Post-1945 International Migration: New Zealand, Australia and 
Canada Compared' (1995) 29 International Migration Review 765, 786. 
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Canadian and Australian immigration policies have been emulated by a wide variety of states.21 In the 
area of skilled migration, Ayelet Shachar argues that leading destination countries attempt to emulate 
and exceed the skilled migration recruitment efforts of their international counterparts.22 In the field of 
refugee law, Lambert, McAdam and Fullerton edit a volume devoted to tracking the impact of 
European practice on other jurisdictions.23 This includes a chapter by Jane McAdam examining the 
impact of European laws in Australia;24 and a chapter by Maryellen Fullerton examining European 
influence in the United States.25 In regard to extraterritorial processing, Azadeh Dastyari argues that 
Australian practices are modelled on US activities in the Caribbean.26 Finally, in relation to mandatory 
immigration detention, a recent report by Michael Flynn of the Global Detention Project examines the 
diffusion of this policy across the globe.27  
These studies commonly make assertions about the existence of transfers based on anecdotal 
evidence. The main ‘proof’ offered is the existence of similarities across jurisdictions. McAdam, 
Fullerton, Shachar, and Flynn probe a little deeper by examining parliamentary materials and/or the 
pathways facilitating the transfers.28 However, few have sought to demonstrate and evaluate, in a 
systematic fashion, the inter-country transfer of migration laws and policies. By relying solely on 
similarities in law and policy, there has been a failure to exclude other hypotheses, such as the 
possibility that governments serendipitously devise similar policies to tackle a common problem.29 Nor 
have existing works paid sufficient regard to the process underlying transfers30 and the factors which 
lead to their success or failure. In this thesis, I seek to fill the gap in the literature by focusing on two 
central research questions. The first relates to how legal and policy transfers are being utilised by 
migration policy makers as a tool for developing restrictive immigration control measures. The second 
asks why some transfers succeed, while others fail. 
Research Question 1: How are transfers used by policy makers to develop restrictive 
immigration control measures? 
                                                   
21  James Walsh, 'Navigating Globalization: Immigration Policy in Canada and Australia, 1945-2007' (2008) 
23 Sociological Forum 786. 
22  Shachar, above n 10. 
23  Hélène Lambert, Jane McAdam and Maryellen Fullerton (eds), The Global Reach of European Refugee 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
24  Jane McAdam, ‘Migrating Laws? The “Plagiaristic Dialogue” between Europe and Australia’ in Hélène 
Lambert, Jane McAdam and Maryellen Fullerton (eds), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 25. 
25  Maryellen Fullerton, ‘Stealth Emulation: The United States and European Protection Norms’ in Hélène 
Lambert, Jane McAdam and Maryellen Fullerton (eds), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 201. 
26  Azadeh Dastyari, 'Refugees on Guantanamo Bay: A Blue Print for Australia's “Pacific Solution”?' (2007) 
79 Australia Quarterly 4.  
27  Michael Flynn, ‘How and Why Immigration Detention Crossed the Globe’ (Working Paper No 8, Global 
Detention Project, April 2014). 
28  See for example, McAdam, above n 24, 50-66; Fullerton, above n 25, 207-10. Shachar, above n 10, 
176, 190. 
29  In fact, Meyers cites this tendency, rather than emulation, as the primary explanation of convergence in 
immigration policies: Meyers, above n 19. 
30  McAdam, above n 24 and Fullerton, above n 25, are notable exceptions to this.  
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The lack of scholarly research on the transfer of restrictive immigration control measures means that 
even the most basic questions on the practice remain unanswered. In four steps, I seek to construct a 
rich description of how legal and policy transfer is being utilised as a tool for developing restrictive 
immigration control measures. First, I identify where policy makers are engaging in the transfer of 
restrictive immigration control measures. Second, I examine the apparent motivations of the actors 
involved. Third, I explore the forums facilitating the process. Finally, I analyse the information sources 
policy makers draw on when engaging in transfers. 
Research Question 2: Why do transfers of restrictive immigration control measures succeed 
or fail? 
The second aim of the thesis is to answer the causal question of why some transfers of restrictive 
measures succeed, while others fail. I begin with the assumption that transfers can be an effective 
tool for the development of law and policy. When faced with a problem, it makes sense to examine 
the practice of comparator jurisdictions. My concern, however, is that states may be adopting 
migration control measures devised by other countries, without effective evaluation and study of the 
laws and policies in question.  
Any attempt to evaluate transfers or predict success begs the question of what is meant by ‘success’ 
or ‘failure’. As Bovens, ‘t Hart and Kuipers argue, ‘policy evaluation is an inherently normative act’.31 
Success is invariably a subjective and potentially multi-variable concept. Reflecting my background as 
a legal scholar, my choice is to focus on what I call legal success. This relates to the way an imported 
law or policy is received by the legal system of the adopting state. As David Nelken observes, ‘the 
best evidence of success of a legal transfer would be its complete absorption into the legal and 
political culture which has imported it.’32 At the opposite end of the spectrum, I argue that legal 
transfers fail when the relevant law or policy is rejected by the legal system of the importing state. This 
can occur through a judicial finding of unlawfulness, or through a judicial interpretation that frustrates 
the original intention of the law or policy. This type of legal failure is particularly relevant in the context 
of restrictive immigration measures. Such policies often push the boundaries of domestic and 
international legal protections and so are challenged in domestic courts. In this study I use a detailed 
analysis of the case law challenging mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing 
in the United States and Australia as a vehicle for this exploration. My quest is to articulate the factors 
that need to be considered when engaging in transfers to ensure relevant measures survive judicial 
challenges in the receiving legal system.  
Of course, legal success is only one perspective from which success can be measured. The public 
policy literature deals with at least three other dimensions of success: programmatic, political and 
                                                   
31  Mark Bovens, Paul ‘t Hart and Sanneke Kuipers, 'The Politics of Policy Evaluation' in Michael Moran, 
Martin Rein and Robert Goodin (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy (Oxford University Press, 
2006) 319, 319. 
32  David Nelken, 'The Meaning of Success in Transnational Legal Transfers' (2001) 19 Windsor Yearbook 
of Access to Justice 349, 352. 
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process.33 Programmatic success relates to whether a policy achieves its intended outcomes; political 
success measures whether it is politically popular in the sense that it boosts the government’s 
approval ratings; and process success relates to the quality and legitimacy of the process underlying 
the development of the policy.34 While acknowledging the programmatic and political dimensions of 
success, measuring these requires complex quantitative analysis that is beyond the remit of my 
inquiry. As Marsh and McConnell note:  
[t]here are significant methodological difficulties posed by lack of information and the problem of 
attempting to identify causal effect of a policy, compared to other independent variables, such as 
overlapping policies, media influences, economic forces, and so on.35 
In the course of documenting the case study transfers, I do explore the process dimension of success 
by critically examining the quality and legitimacy of the actions of the agents involved. This includes a 
critique of the quality of the information relied upon by officials in the receiving country about the 
programmatic and political success of the transferred policy in the source jurisdiction.  
1.2  Objectives of the Thesis 
Objective 1: Initiate an interdisciplinary dialogue on legal and policy transfers  
This thesis builds on a growing body of literature that seeks to enhance the discourse on legal 
transfers by drawing on developments in other fields.36 Examples of relevant interdisciplinary 
endeavours include the embrace of sociological literature on diffusion of innovations,37 sociology of 
law,38 economics39 and anthropological signalling theory.40 This dissertation augments these studies 
by drawing on developments in public policy scholarship on policy transfer and international relations 
scholarship on diffusion. While there have been studies comparing the policy transfer and diffusion 
                                                   
33  See Mark Bovens, Paul ‘t Hart and B Guy Peters, ‘Analysing Governance Success and Failure in Six 
European States’ in Mark Bovens, Paul ‘t Hart and B Guy Peters (eds), Success and Failure in Public 
Governance: A Comparative Analysis (Edward Elgar, 2001) 12, 21 (focusing on programmatic and 
political success); David Marsh and Allan McConnell, 'Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy 
Success' (2010) 88 Public Administration 564, 572; Allan McConnell, Understanding Policy Success: 
Rethinking Public Policy (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 40 (both advocating for the addition of process as a 
dimension for evaluating policy success). 
34  Marsh and McConnell, above n 33, 571. This is discussed further in Chapter Two, Part 2.3. 
35  Ibid 581. 
36  On the importance of such endeavours to the future of comparative law, see Ugo Mattei, 'An 
Opportunity Not to be Missed: The Future of Comparative Law in the United States' (1998) 46 American 
Journal of Comparative Law 709. See also, Otto Kahn-Freund, 'Comparative Law as an Academic 
Subject' (1966) 82 Law Quarterly Review 40. 
37  William Twining, 'Social Science and Diffusion of Law' (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 203. 
38  David Nelken, 'Comparatists and Transferability' in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday (eds), 
Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 437.  
39  Ugo Mattei, 'Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics' (1994) 14 
International Review of Law and Economics 3; Ralf Michaels, ‘Make or Buy – A Public Market for Legal 
Transplants?’ in Horst Eidenmüller (ed), Regulatory Competition in Contract Law and Dispute 
Resolution (Beck, 2013) 27. 
40  Assaf Likhovski, 'Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal Transplants and Signaling' (2009) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 619. 
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approaches and identifying lessons from each discipline,41 to date, the legal scholarship has 
developed in relative isolation.42 Given the close similarity in the subject matter examined, the lack of 
dialogue is surprising. It is ironic that bodies of literature devoted to studying the transfer of ideas 
across jurisdictional borders have been resistant to the transfer of ideas across disciplines. This thesis 
aims to bridge this long-standing interdisciplinary gap. 
Legal scholars can learn from policy transfer and diffusion literature by mapping the mechanisms 
which drive transfers across jurisdictions. They can also profit from the methodologies devised to 
identify individual instances of transfer. At the same time, I argue that in evaluating success or failure, 
public policy scholarship has neglected the dimension of legal success, and thus may draw valuable 
lessons from legal literature. 
(a) Constructing a new typology of mechanisms driving inter-jurisdictional legal and policy 
transfers 
To interrogate how policy makers are carrying out transfers of migration control measures, it is 
important to establish the reasons why they are engaging in such action. Through an interdisciplinary 
literature review, I draw on policy transfer, diffusion and legal transfer scholarship to develop a 
typology of the mechanisms and forces driving inter-jurisdictional transfers. I identify five overlapping 
mechanisms: efficiency, prestige, coercion, cooperation and competition. This provides a broad 
context for the case study transfers between Australia and the United States that are the focus of this 
study. 
(b) A new method for identifying instances of legal and policy transfer 
Identifying legal transfers is not always a straightforward task. While a wholesale verbatim adoption of 
an entire foreign legal system may be easy to identify, more subtle diffusion of discrete legal rules or 
mechanisms can be harder to recognise. Transfers cannot be accurately identified through simple 
comparisons of legislation and other legal instruments. Laws that appear similar on paper may be the 
result of independent development, rather than transfer. Conversely, laws that appear different may 
be the result of dynamic transfers, where the legal rule or institution may have undergone changes, 
both during and after the diffusion process. While these difficulties in determining whether a transfer 
has taken place have been identified in the legal literature,43 no framework has been suggested to 
                                                   
41  See, for example, David Marsh and JC Sharman, 'Policy diffusion and Policy Transfer' (2009) 30 Policy 
Studies 269; Adam Newmark, 'An Integrated Approach to Policy Transfer and Diffusion' (2002) 19 
Review of Policy Research 151. 
42  In fact it is very rare to see legal scholars cite the policy transfer or diffusion literature at all. For a 
notable exception, see Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 193-4 
(acknowledging the fact that political scientists are asking very similar questions to legal scholars in 
regard to inter-jurisdictional transfers). 
43  Jörg Fedtke, ‘Legal Transplants’ in Jan Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Elgar, 
2006) 434, 436; Michele Graziadei, 'Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions' in 
Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2006) 441, 454 (stating ‘Quite often… it is not easy to determine who produced the 
initial innovation that becomes a model’); Holger Spamann, 'Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal 
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tackle the issue. I propose an original framework for identifying instances of transfer that involves both 
the detailed legal comparison traditionally carried out by comparative lawyers and more process-
oriented analysis inspired by the approach of policy transfer scholars. The framework combines 
desktop research with interviews carried out with key government officials. The identification of 
transfers is not seen as an end in itself. Rather, I argue that identification is essential for 
understanding processes and pathways of exchange; explaining why transfers are occurring; and 
articulating factors that lead to success or failure. 
(c) ‘Legal success’ as a new dimension in evaluating the success or failure of transfers 
By focusing on what I call legal success I highlight a dimension of success generally neglected by 
public policy scholars. As noted, evaluation of success in the public policy literature has focused on 
three main dimensions of success: programmatic, political and process. None of these dimensions 
pay sufficient regard to how a law or policy is received by the legal system of the importing state. 
Legal success clearly has a bearing on the three dimensions of success identified in the public policy 
literature. Legal failure in the form of a law or policy being struck down by the courts will obviously 
impact on whether a policy can meet its programmatic goals. Legal failure may also influence public 
sentiment towards a government and hence impact political success. The quality of the process 
adopted in developing and implementing the law or policy will have a bearing on the likelihood of legal 
success or failure. However, the evidence used to assess legal success is very different to evidence 
examined in the context of assessing programmatic, political and process success. Rather than 
quantitative data bearing on policy outcomes or political polling, or qualitative data relating to process, 
assessing legal success requires detailed examination of case law. As such, I argue that it warrants 
separate analysis.  
Objective 2: Identify case study transfers between the United States and Australia  
Utilising my original identification framework, I study a number of instances in which the United States 
and Australia appear to have engaged in legal and policy transfers. I argue that the US policies for the 
interdiction and extraterritorial processing of maritime asylum seekers at Guantanamo Bay inspired 
Australia’s use of interdiction and offshore processing known as the ‘Pacific Solution’. In contrast, the 
development of immigration detention policy in Australia and the United States seems to have been 
more nuanced. I argue that this process is best characterised as a two-way affair, with Australia and 
the United States both learning from each other’s experiences.  
Objective 3: Examine factors contributing to the legal success or failure of transferred 
restrictive immigration measures 
The case study policies have pushed the boundaries of what is acceptable under both international 
and domestic law. They have been the subject of numerous judicial challenges in the highest courts in 
the United States and Australia. I examine the case law to determine the similarities and differences in 
                                                                                                                                                              
Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law' (2009) 6 Brigham Young University Law Review 1813, 
1823. 
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the challenges made and the ways in which these have been treated by the respective judicial bodies. 
Examining curial responses to functionally equivalent policies in different jurisdictions facilitates 
consideration of how different legal structures and political contexts impact judicial decision making—
and consequently affect the legal success or failure of transferred law or policy. I explore the impact of 
differences in the relevant legal structures between the United States and Australia. These include 
variations in constitutional design and common law principles of statutory interpretation. I then look at 
extra-legal political factors and the extent to which these might be influencing judicial responses to the 
imported policies. In particular, I examine the possible impact of national security concerns, and public 
opinion towards immigration and asylum seekers.  
1.3 Case Study Selection 
1.3.1 Policies: Interdiction, Extraterritorial Processing and Mandatory Long-Term Detention 
The first of my three case studies concerns the mandatory detention of certain classes of asylum 
seekers in the United States and Australia. I adopt Michael Flynn’s definition of immigration detention 
as ‘the deprivation of liberty of non-citizens for reasons related to their [immigration] status.’44 The 
detention of asylum seekers who enter without authorisation is a common policy response to irregular 
migration, practiced in numerous jurisdictions throughout the world.45 In most countries where asylum 
seekers are detained, the period of detention is restricted to the ‘pre-admission’ phase. This is where 
an asylum seeker’s identity is established and security checks are carried out. My first case study 
focuses on the more punitive policy of longer-term mandatory detention of asylum seekers beyond the 
‘pre-admission’ phase.  
In both the United States and Australia, mandatory detention provisions were first introduced as 
measures targeting specific cohorts of asylum seekers arriving by boat without authorisation. These 
targeted provisions were later expanded to apply more generally to unauthorised entrants. The United 
States first introduced mandatory detention in 1981 in response to the arrival of boats carrying Haitian 
asylum seekers. The policy provided for the detention without parole of all Haitians arriving by boat 
without documentation. Mandatory detention was expanded and formalised in 1982: regulations were 
introduced providing for mandatory detention with a presumption against parole for all undocumented 
immigrants who arrived in the United States.46 Detention and parole provisions relating to 
unauthorised arrivals were made more restrictive with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (‘IIRIRA’).47   
                                                   
44  For a detailed discussion of this definition see Michael Flynn, ‘Who Must be Detained? Proportionality as 
a Tool for Critiquing Immigration Detention Policy’ (2012) 31 Refugee Survey Quarterly 40, 42-7. 
45  Guy Goodwin-Gill, 'Article 31 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees: Non-
Penalisation, Detention, and Protection' in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and Frances Nicholson (eds), 
Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR's Global Consultations on International Protection 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003) 185, 187. 
46  47 Fed Reg 30044-46 (9 July 1982), codified at 8 CFR § 212.5 (1982). 
47  Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009-546. 
 11 
 
The introduction of mandatory detention followed a similar pattern in Australia. Provisions initially 
introduced as temporary and ‘exceptional’ measures to deal with a particular cohort of boat arrivals, 
developed into more broadly formalised mandatory detention provisions. The policy was first 
introduced in 1989, when the Hawke Labor government began detaining ‘unauthorised’ boat arrivals 
under existing legislative provisions. ‘Turn-around’ laws were invoked under which persons arriving by 
boat suspected of not holding an entry permit, could be detained until returned from whence they 
came.48 In 1992, concerns about the legality of these provisions for long-term detention led to targeted 
provisions authorising the mandatory detention of unauthorised boat arrivals.49 Reforms in 1994 
expanded mandatory detention further, providing simply that all ‘unlawful non-citizens’ must be 
detained until either granted a visa or removed from Australia.50 
The second and third case studies examine the use of maritime interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing as a means of controlling irregular boat arrivals. Maritime interdiction refers to ‘action 
taken by states to prevent sea-borne migrants from reaching their intended destination.’51 The United 
States began interdicting Haitian asylum seeker boats in 1981. Since then interdiction has been used 
to target boats carrying Cuban migrants in the Straits of Florida and those seeking to travel through 
the Mona Passage from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico. The US Coast Guard has also 
interdicted vessels travelling from China to Guam, as well as Ecuadorian vessels in the Pacific. At 
times, the interdiction program has been accompanied by a policy of extraterritorial processing of 
asylum claims. Extraterritorial processing schemes involve ‘the interception and transfer of asylum 
seekers to a third country where the intercepting state retains exclusive or principal control over 
refugee status determinations.’52 Since 1991, some interdicted asylum seekers have been transferred 
to facilities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, for processing of their claims or to be given safe haven. The 
United States has also entered into agreements with other nations for the establishment of short-lived 
processing facilities and safe haven camps in various locations in the Caribbean. 
Australia introduced a similar policy of maritime interdiction and extraterritorial processing as part of 
the ‘Pacific Solution’ in 2001. The scheme involved a maritime interdiction program dubbed ‘Operation 
Relex’ that saw sea-borne asylum seekers intercepted on the high seas by Australian naval vessels 
and escorted back to Indonesian waters where possible. Those that could not be returned, as well as 
those who evaded interdiction to land at certain prescribed ‘excised’ offshore territories, were liable for 
transfer to extraterritorial processing facilities in Papua New Guinea (‘PNG’) and Nauru.53 The policy 
                                                   
48  See s 88 of the Migration Act, inserted by Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989 (Cth). Note that 
these provisions existed as s 36 prior to this amendment. For a detailed history of the use of immigration 
detention in Australia during this period see Mary Crock, ‘A Legal Perspective on the Evolution of 
Mandatory Detention’ in Mary Crock (ed), Protection or Punishment: The Detention of Asylum Seekers 
in Australia (Federation Press, 1993) 25. 
49  Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth) inserting the new pt 2 div 4B into the Migration Act. 
50  Migration Act, ss 54W, 54ZD, inserted by the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth). 
51  Bernard Ryan, ‘Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guarantees?’ in Bernard Ryan 
and Valsamis Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges 3, 22. 
52  Francis, above n 18, 273. 
53  The scheme is described in detail in Chapter Five, Part 5.2.2. 
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objective was identical to the US initiative, namely to deter irregular migrants arriving by boat and to 
bypass migration legislation and judicial oversight of migration control.  
In 2008, Australia abandoned its policy of transferring sea-borne asylum seekers to PNG and Nauru. 
Instead, unauthorised maritime arrivals were processed on the Australian territory of Christmas Island, 
which was ‘excised’ from the application of regular Australian immigration laws. In effect, the 
Australian government attempted to create its own version of Guantanamo Bay on the island—a 
territory over which it exercised full control, but where domestic laws and protections were said not to 
apply.54 Extraterritorial processing was reintroduced in 2012. This was followed shortly by a 
resumption of interdiction and return of sea-borne asylum seekers to their country of departure. 
These case studies have been selected because they represent rare examples of transferred 
immigration policies that have been challenged in the highest courts of review in both donor and 
recipient nations. There are many other instances of transfers of immigration law and policy, some of 
which are examined briefly in Chapter Three and Chapter Ten.55 However, none of these examples 
have given rise to a comparable body of case law as exists in the United States and Australia in 
relation to the policies of long-term mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing.  
1.3.2 Jurisdictions: Australia and the United States 
The existence of case law challenging the legality of the policy in both the donor and recipient states 
provides a unique opportunity to explore the factors which influence successful integration or rejection 
of an imported law or policy. While the legal systems of Australia and the United States share many 
commonalities, they also exhibit some significant differences. This study will explore the extent, if any, 
to which these differences may have affected judicial responses to the case study policies. 
Australia and the United States are both democratic, federal, settler states with bicameral legislatures 
that evolved from British colonial rule. They are frequently grouped together by immigration scholars 
as classic countries of immigration. They have a common history of population growth through large-
scale immigration and part of their national identity stems from being an immigrant nation.56 Both 
nations relied heavily on British common law when designing their legal systems. Moreover, 
Australians drew on the American Constitution of 1787 when devising their own constitution in 1900. 
The courts in both nations use similar common law logics today. They have federal systems in which 
immigration policy is dictated at the level of national (rather than state) government. In the past, the 
immigration policies of both countries have been used to extend protection to displaced people in 
                                                   
54  Note that such a characterisation of the processing regime on Christmas Island was roundly rejected in 
Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319; For 
an analysis of this case, see Chapter Eight, 8.2.1. 
55  See Chapter Three, 3.1.2 and Chapter Ten, 10.1 
56  Gary Freeman, ‘Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States’ (1995) 19 International 
Migration Review 881, 882; Gary Freeman and James Jupp, ‘Comparing Immigration Policy in Australia 
and the United States’, in Gary Freeman and James Jupp (eds), Nations of Immigrants: Australia, the 
United States and International Migration (Oxford University Press, 1992) 1, 1. 
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need. The United States and Australia have common histories of generous refugee resettlement, 
particularly in the post-World War II and post-Vietnam eras. 
Despite these similar roots, the two countries have adopted different legal, institutional and political 
structures that may affect judicial determinations on the legality of immigration control measures. A 
major distinction between the jurisdictions is the existence of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights 
in the United States,57 and the absence of any equivalent, constitutional or otherwise, in Australia. 
Another major variation between the jurisdictions is the degree of separation between the executive 
and the legislature. In the United States, the two are strictly separated. This can be viewed as a 
deliberate rejection of the untrammeled power of the British King, reflecting the Madisonian concept of 
checks and balances.58 In contrast, Australia has a dominant executive resulting from the fusion of the 
executive and legislative powers that typifies the Westminster system of government. There is also a 
marked difference in the reception of international law into the national legal systems of the two 
countries. Australia adopts a dualist approach under which international law and national law are 
viewed as distinct legal orders. Accordingly, treaties, such as the Refugee Convention and Protocol, 
have no force in domestic law unless implemented through legislation.59 In contrast, the United States 
uses a mixed dualist/monist system under which some international treaties can be deemed 
automatically to have force in domestic law, without the need for enabling legislation.60  
Other differences between the United States and Australia are noteworthy. While both countries have 
land masses of approximately equal size, the fact that Australia is an island nation makes it 
significantly more geographically isolated. Accordingly, it is able to exercise far greater control over its 
territorial borders than the United States, which has thousands of kilometres of shared land borders, 
with Mexico to the south and Canada to the north. These geographies have resulted in a significant 
divergence in the scale of undocumented migrants seeking entry and/or living in each country. Recent 
estimates suggest that there are approximately 11.7 million undocumented migrants living in the 
United States,61 compared with 62,100 in Australia.62  
1.4 Definitions 
                                                   
57  United States Constitution amendments I-X. 
58  Beryl Radin and Joan Price Boase, ‘Federalism, Political Structure, and Public Policy in the United 
States and Canada’ (2000) 2 Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 65, 66. 
59  Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 177 CLR 292, 305; Senate Legal and Constitutional Reference Committee, 
Trick or Treaty? Commonwealth Power to Make and Implement Treaties (1995) 86. 
60  See Fullerton, above n 25, 205, n 18 (noting that ‘[a]lthough there are mixed monist and dualist 
elements in the US legal framework, US law strongly favours domestic legislation to implement 
international obligations). 
61  Jeffrey Passel, D’Vera Cohn and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, ’Population Decline of Unauthorized 
Immigrants Stalls, May Have Reversed’, PewResearch Hispanic Trends Project (23 September 2013) 
<http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-immigrants-stalls-may-
have-reversed/> (providing an estimate of the population of undocumented migrants living in the US in 
2012). 
62  Sarah Whyte, ‘More Than 62,000 People Living Illegally in Australia’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 
26 December 2014 <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/more-than-62000-people-
living-illegally-in-australia-20141226-12dxod.html> (providing an estimate of the number of people living 
unlawfully in Australia in 2014). 
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In this thesis the terms, ‘unauthorised arrival’, ‘undocumented arrival’ and ‘irregular arrival’ are used 
interchangeably to denote migrants who have entered or who seek to enter a country without the 
required legal authority. I refer to irregular entrants who travel by boat as ‘sea-borne asylum seekers’, 
‘maritime asylum seekers’, or ‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’. I avoid using the term ‘illegal migrant’. 
While it may be appropriate to label an action as illegal, the term is both inaccurate and dehumanising 
when used to brand a person. The terms ‘alien’ and ‘non-citizen’ are used interchangeably. While 
acknowledging the negative connotations attached to the former, the term is difficult to avoid given 
that it appears in both the US Immigration and Nationality Act,63 and the Australian Constitution.64 The 
phrases ‘extraterritorial processing’ and ‘offshore processing’ are also used interchangeably to refer to 
the transfer of asylum seekers to a third country or external territory where the transferring state 
maintains full or partial responsibility for processing of asylum claims.  
It is also important to articulate the nuances in the terms ‘policy’ and ‘law’. As Richard Rose explains, 
‘policy’ 
can refer to any topic that is a concern of government, such as foreign policy or economic policy; this 
usage leaves vague what, if anything, government is doing to deal with that concern. Policy can also 
refer to the end intentions of politicians. An election campaign pledge to introduce a full-employment 
policy does not specify the means by which this goal is to be achieved. Third, policy can refer to the 
policy programmes that government uses to realise the policy intention that politicians declare.65 
When the term ‘policy’ is used in this thesis, it is generally used in the third sense identified by Rose, 
namely a specific policy program. These programs are prescriptions that direct the major resources of 
government—such as laws, money, personnel and organisations—towards an identifiable end.66 Law 
is one of the strongest means that can be used to implement policy. It creates a set of binding rules 
that can be implemented by government institutions, including the courts. It includes legislation, 
regulations and legally binding directives. Binding judicial decisions are also law, in that they provide 
normative guidance on how policy and legislation must be interpreted and applied. However, case law 
is qualitatively different from primary enactments, regulations and directives as it emanates from the 
judiciary, and not the political branches. As such, judicial decisions can modify law in a way that 
diverges from the intent or will of the country’s elected elites. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the phrase ‘legal and policy transfer’ is used in a broad sense. It 
describe the processes by which knowledge of law, policies, administrative arrangements, institutions 
and ideas in one political system is used in another political system to develop its policies, 
administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas. This interpretation is based on David Dolowitz 
and David Marsh’s definition of policy transfer,67 but expanded to include the transfer of law as well as 
                                                   
63  See, for example, INA § 101(a)(3), defining ‘alien’ as ‘any person not a citizen or national of the United 
States’. 
64  Australian Constitution s 51(xix). 
65  Richard Rose, Learning from Comparative Public Policy: A Practical Guide (Routledge, 2005) 15-16. 
66  Ibid 16. 
67  David Dolowitz, and David Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer 
Literature' (1996) 44 Political Studies 343, 344. 
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policy. In this context ‘law’ refers primarily to legal rules created by the political branches, and not 
judicial decisions. Of course, it is well documented that judges do draw on foreign law in the judicial 
decision making process.68 The focus of this thesis is on the cross-jurisdictional transfers of law and 
policy carried out by the political arms of government.  
I have chosen to use the term ‘transfer’ when discussing the cross-jurisdictional movement of law and 
policy. While the phrase ‘legal transplant’ is used widely in the legal literature, ‘transfer’ has a clearer 
plain-language meaning and aligns with the language used in the policy transfer and diffusion 
literature. The phrase ‘migration policy maker’ refers to ‘lawyers, legislators, executive branch officials, 
academics, and others who contribute to discourse on immigration-related matters and thereby shape 
public opinion, policy, and law.69 ‘Political branches' is used to refer collectively to the executive and 
legislative arms of government. In the context of my case law analysis, the term ‘rights-protecting’ 
refers to a judicial approach or outcome that upholds the statutory, constitutional or common law 
rights of a non-citizen litigant. I use the term ‘rights-precluding’ to describe an outcome or approach 
which upholds the legality of government action, at the cost of the rights of the non-citizen.70  
Australia’s immigration program is administered by the Department of Immigration and Border 
Protection, which is overseen by a Minister who is a member of Federal Parliament. The agency has 
carried many names over the years, with the title of the Minister also changing accordingly. For the 
sake of consistency, I use the terms ‘Department of Immigration’ to refer to the agency, and ‘Minister 
for Immigration’ to refer to the Minister throughout my period of analysis.71 Between 1933 and 2003, 
the US immigration program was administered by the United States Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (‘INS’) which was an agency of the Department of Justice. In 2003, INS was abolished, and 
its functions transferred to the newly created Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’). The three 
main entities within DHS which deal with immigration issues are the US Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (‘USCIS’), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (‘ICE’), and US Customs and Border 
Protection (‘CBP’). 
1.5 Chapter Plan 
Chapter Two examines the various academic approaches to the inter-jurisdictional transfer of law and 
policy. I compare the approaches adopted in the legal, public policy and international relations 
scholarship. The primary purpose of the analysis is to identify ways in which the legal scholarship can 
be enriched by the approaches taken in the other disciplines examined. The approaches taken in 
each discipline are analysed, identifying relative strengths and weaknesses. Thereafter, I focus on the 
methodological question of how to identify whether a transfer has taken place. I propose a new 
                                                   
68  See, for example, Christopher McCrudden, ‘Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 499. 
69  Hiroshi Motomura, 'Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism' (1999) 70 
Colorado Law Review 1361, 1363. 
70  This terminology is adapted from Rayner Thwaites, The Liberty of Non-Citizens: Indefinite Detention in 
Commonwealth Countries (Hart, 2014) 15. 
71  Where the Department or Minister appears in a citation (whether that be as a party to a case, or as the 
author of secondary materials), I use the abbreviations set out in the table on page xi-xii.  
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framework for this task which draws on the policy transfer literature and its focus on the process and 
agents of transfer. I conclude with an evaluation of the different approaches to measuring success, 
with a primary focus on the legal dimension of success. 
Chapter Three draws on the policy transfer, diffusion and legal transfer scholarship to develop a 
typology of the mechanisms and forces driving the movement of immigration law and policy across 
jurisdictions. In this regard, I identify five overlapping mechanisms: efficiency, prestige, coercion, 
cooperation and competition. This is done with a view to contextualise the case study transfers 
examined in the subsequent chapters within transfers of immigration law and policy generally. I then 
examine the main international forums which facilitate the contemporary transfer of migration law and 
policy. 
Chapter Four applies the framework for identifying contemporary legal transfers developed in Chapter 
Two. I argue that the existence of similar policies relating to long-term mandatory immigration 
detention of certain irregular arrivals in the United States and Australia is the result of a process of 
legal and policy borrowing (at least in part). I identify the common policy problem that exists in both 
the United States and Australia which this policy seeks to address: the desire on the part of the 
political branches to maximise control over the flow and processing of asylum seekers and irregular 
migrants. There follows a detailed comparative analysis of the history and development of the policy 
of long-term mandatory immigration detention in both jurisdictions, with three discreet periods of 
transfer identified. The chapter concludes with an analysis of the evidence for each period of transfer, 
drawing on interviews I conducted with key policy makers, as well as documentary evidence on the 
public record. A similar process of analysis is undertaken in Chapter Five to argue that Australian 
policy makers drew heavily on US interdiction and extraterritorial practices in the Caribbean when 
devising and implementing interdiction and extraterritorial processing regimes introduced as part of 
the Pacific Solution in 2001.  
In Chapter Six, I compare and contrast the way the judiciary in the United States and Australia has 
dealt with challenges to the policy of long-term mandatory immigration detention. The analysis begins 
with an exploration of the relevant constitutional, common law and statutory legal principles that bear 
on adjudicating the rights of non-citizens in each jurisdiction. I turn then to the case law, examining 
two aspects of long-term mandatory detention. On the mandatory nature of detention, I compare the 
US Supreme Court case of Demore v Kim72 with the Australian High Court decision in Chu Kheng Lim 
v MILGEA.73 In both cases, the respective court adopted a balancing test which weighed the interest 
of the detainee with the legitimate government interest served by the policy. Both reached a ‘rights-
precluding’ outcome, upholding the relevant mandatory detention legislative provisions. In relation to 
challenges to immigration detention of a potentially indefinite nature, I compare the US Supreme 
Court decisions in Zadvydas v Davis74 and Clark v Martinez75 with the Australian High Court decision 
                                                   
72  538 US 510 (2003). 
73  (1992) 176 CLR 1. 
74  533 US 678 (2001). 
75  543 US 371 (2005). 
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in Al-Kateb v Godwin (‘Al-Kateb’).76 In these cases, the US Supreme Court and Australian High Court 
adopted different approaches to construing similar statutory provision, which on face value appeared 
to authorise indefinite post-removal detention. In Zadvydas v Davis and Clark v Martinez the US 
Supreme Court implied a 90-day limit for detention in the subject statutory provisions, reasoning that 
indefinite detention may raise serious constitutional problems. In Al-Kateb, Australia’s High Court 
construed the relevant enactment to authorise potentially indefinite detention. It concluded that such 
detention did not raise any constitutional issues. I argue that in each of the cases examined, the 
outcome adopted was far from obvious: the different legal rules were ambiguous enough to support 
either a ‘rights-protecting’ or ‘rights-precluding’ approach. As such, I argue that the legal structures in 
each jurisdiction were not determinative of the divergent judicial outcomes.  
In Chapter Seven, I undertake a similar analysis of the US and Australian case law on maritime 
interdiction. I compare the approaches taken by the US Supreme Court Sale v Haitian Centers 
Council,77 with the decision of the Australian Federal Court in Ruddock v Vadarlis,78 and of the 
Australian High Court in CPCF v MIBP.79 Despite the different legal frameworks in question, in each of 
the cases the courts opted for a ‘rights-precluding’ approach. Each affirmed the executive’s broad 
power to carry out interdiction activities.  
In Chapter Eight, I compare the judicial response to extraterritorial processing measures in the United 
States and Australia. The cases on this issue are not as directly comparable as the detention and 
interdiction cases, dealing with very different issues in each jurisdiction. I begin by examining a 
number of US Federal Circuit court decisions rejecting constitutional and statutory claims by asylum 
seekers held at the migrant processing facility in Guantanamo Bay. These cases are contrasted with 
the more recent US Supreme Court jurisprudence relating to the rights of ‘enemy combatants’ held at 
the same location. In a series of cases, the US Supreme Court upheld certain statutory and 
constitutional claims brought on behalf of these people.80 I argue that these cases are difficult to 
reconcile with the earlier case law relating to the rights of asylum seekers held at Guantanamo Bay. I 
suggest that the change in approach highlights the contingency of the asylum seeker cases.  
In the Australian context, two lines of cases dealing with the rights of persons subject to extraterritorial 
processing are considered. I examine the decision in Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (‘Offshore 
Processing Case’).81 There, the Australian High Court thwarted an attempt by the Australian 
government to create its own version of a Guantanamo-like exceptional zone on the Australian 
territory of Christmas Island. Second, I compare the cases challenging the government’s statutory 
power to transfer offshore entry persons to third countries. I compare a series of unsuccessful Federal 
                                                   
76  (2004) 219 CLR 562. 
77  509 US 155 (1993). 
78  (2001) 110 FCR 491. 
79  [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015). 
80  Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466 (2004); Boumediene v Bush, 533 US 723 (2008). 
81  (2010) 243 CLR 319. 
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Court cases challenging transfers to Nauru under the Pacific Solution,82 with the successful High 
Court challenge in Plaintiff M70/2011 v MIAC (‘Malaysian Solution Case’).83 This struck down an 
attempt by the government to transfer asylum seekers to Malaysia. As in the detention cases, I argue 
that the relevant legal principles were ambiguous enough to allow for either a ‘rights-protecting’, or a 
‘rights-precluding’ approach in each case.  
Chapter Nine explores the ramifications of the contingent nature of the jurisprudence concerning the 
case study polices examined in Chapter Six, Seven and Eight. Given that there was sufficient 
ambiguity in the relevant legal principles in each case to support either a ‘rights-precluding’ or ‘rights-
protecting’ approach, I argue that the different legal structures in Australia and the United States may 
not have determined the outcome of the cases examined. I argue that when faced with alternate 
reasonable interpretations of a legal principle, extra-legal factors may have influenced judges’ choices 
of which interpretation to adopt. I consider the possible impact of two such factors on judicial 
determinations on the rights of non-citizens: national security concerns and public sentiment towards 
immigrants and asylum seekers. 
Chapter Ten concludes the thesis by documenting the spread of the case study policies to other 
jurisdictions. Here I examine the adoption of mandatory detention policies in Canada and New 
Zealand; the use of interdiction in Europe and Asia; and European Union proposals to adopt an 
extraterritorial processing regime. I conclude by highlighting deficiencies in the way transfers of 
restrictive immigration measures have been carried out and make a series of recommendations to 
address these concerns.  
  
                                                   
82  The litigation spanned more than eight years and was comprised of the following cases: WAJC v MIMIA 
[2002] FCA 1631 (claim for interlocutory relief); P1/2003 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1029 (claim for further 
interlocutory relief); P1/2003 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1370 (application for an extension of motion in which 
to file and serve a notice of appeal); Plaintiff P1/2003 v Ruddock (2007) 157 FCR 518 (application by 
plaintiff to amend statement of claims); Sadiqi v Commonwealth [2008] FCA 1262 (relating to discovery); 
Sadiqi v Commonwealth (No 2) (2009) 181 FCR 1 (determination of preliminary legal questions); Sadiqi 
v Commonwealth (No 3) [2010] FCA 596 (determination of substantive claim). 
83  (2011) 244 CLR 144. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
THE STUDY OF TRANSFERS – CONTRASTING 
APPROACHES AND LESSONS TO BE LEARNED 
The fate of comparative law will be determined by its ability to function as a connecting field 
between law and other social sciences. 
Ugo Mattei1 
Over the last four decades, significant scholarship has been devoted to how and why law and policy 
spread from one governmental unit to another. The literature spans numerous disciplines and has 
generated many theories. In this chapter, I present a comparative overview of three approaches: legal 
work on ‘legal transfers’; international relations scholarship on ‘diffusion’; and public policy writings on 
‘policy transfer’. The primary purpose of my analysis is to identify ways in which scholars working in 
each of these disciplines can learn from one another. The work builds on a small (but growing) body 
of legal literature that draws on developments in other disciplines to update the approach to studying 
legal transfers.2  
Part 2.1 provides an overview of the legal transfer, diffusion and policy transfer literature. I examine 
recent developments, compare and contrast methodological approaches and explore the key 
theoretical debates in each field. In the remainder of the chapter, I focus on two specific 
methodological issues. In Part 2.2, I examine the question of how to establish whether a transfer has 
taken place. I propose a new framework for carrying out that task which takes inspiration from the 
policy transfer literature which focuses on the process and agents of transfer. This will be applied to 
my case study transfers in Chapter Four and Five. In Part 2.3, the meaning of ‘success’ is examined 
in the context of legal and policy transfer. I argue that there has been insufficient interest in what I 
                                                   
1  Ugo Mattei, 'An Opportunity Not to be Missed: The Future of Comparative Law in the United States' 
(1998) 46 American Journal of Comparative Law 709, 709. 
2  On the importance of such interdisciplinary endeavours to the future of comparative law, see ibid; Ugo 
Mattei, 'Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics' (1994) 14 
International Review of Law and Economics 3 (drawing on economics); and Otto Kahn-Freund, 
'Comparative Law as an Academic Subject' (1966) 82 Law Quarterly Review 40. Recent notable 
examples of such interdisciplinary endeavours include William Twining, 'Social Science and Diffusion of 
Law' (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society 203 (drawing on sociological literature on diffusion of 
innovations); David Nelken, 'Comparatists and Transferability' in Pierre Legrand and Roderick Munday 
(eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 437 
(drawing on sociology of law); Roger Cotterrell, ‘Is there a Logic of Legal Transplants’ in David Nelken 
and Johannes Feest (eds), Adapting Legal Cultures (Hart, 2001) 71 (drawing on sociology of law); Ralf 
Michaels, ‘Make or Buy – A Public Market for Legal Transplants?’ in Horst Eidenmüller (ed), Regulatory 
Competition in Contract Law and Dispute Resolution (Beck, 2013) 27 (drawing on economics); Assaf 
Likhovski, 'Argonauts of the Eastern Mediterranean: Legal Transplants and Signaling' (2009) 10 
Theoretical Inquiries in Law 619 (drawing on anthropological literature on signalling theory). 
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label legal success. This is the ability of an imported law to survive judicial challenges in domestic 
courts.  
2.1 Approaches to Studying Legal and Policy Transfer  
2.1.1 Legal Scholarship on ‘Legal Transfer’ 
Recent years have seen a wealth of legal scholarship produced on the topic of legal transfers. The 
sheer volume of work has led some to ask whether study of the phenomenon has reached ‘saturation 
point’.3 My view is that recent scholarly inquiries have increased the potential for innovative research. 
First, there is growing recognition of diversity in the transfer phenomenon. The focus of early literature 
was on formal one-way legal transfers, carried out by government officials and evidenced by the 
explicit copying of entire legal systems (or large parts thereof). More recent studies have questioned 
assumptions about the direction, content and agents of the transfer process. Second, scholarship is 
finally moving on from the somewhat stagnant theoretical debate around the proper construction of 
the relationship between law and society, and the ramifications of this question, to the viability (or 
even possibility) of legal transfers.4 This theoretical debate was rooted in colonial and post-colonial 
politics and the context of attempts to transfer entire statutes or legal systems. The recognition of 
more nuanced forms of transfers adapted to meet local conditions both during and after the transfer 
process has reduced the relevance of this debate.  
Legal scholars examining the transfer of law across jurisdictions have given the process a number of 
different labels. Alan Watson coined the term ‘legal transplant’ to describe ‘the moving of a rule… from 
one country to another, or from one people to another’.5 Other terms and metaphors used by legal 
scholars to refer to this phenomenon include ‘diffusion’,6 ‘reception’,7 ‘circulation’,8 ‘transposition’,9 
‘borrowing’,10 ‘migration’,11 ‘transmigration’,12 ‘translation’,13 and ‘transfer’.14 It is beyond the scope of 
                                                   
3  Margit Cohn, 'Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and Proportionality 
Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom' (2010) 58 American Journal of Comparative Law 
583, 584. 
4  See below nn 83-97 and accompanying text. 
5  Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Scottish Academic Press, 1974) 21. 
6  William Twining, 'Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective' (2004) 49 Journal of Legal Pluralism 1; 
Twining, 'Social Science and Diffusion of Law', above n 2. 
7  Wolfgang Wiegand, 'The Reception of American Law in Europe' (1991) 39 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 229. The 1970 International Academy of Comparative Law Congress dedicated a 
section to ‘The global reception of foreign law’: Michele Graziadei, 'Comparative Law as the Study of 
Transplants and Receptions' in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 441, 442. 
8  Edward Wise, 'The Transplant of Legal Patterns' (1990) 38 American Journal of Comparative Law 1. 
9  Esin Örücü, ‘Law as Transposition’ (2000) 51 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 205. 
10  Barry Friedman and Cheryl Saunders, ‘Symposium: Constitutional Borrowing’ (2003) 1 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 177. 
11  Sujit Choudhry (ed) The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
12  Nicholas Foster, 'Transmigration and Transferability of Commercial Law in a Globalised World' in 
Andrew Harding and Esin Örücü (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Academic, 2002) 
55. 
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this study to engage with the subtle differences in the meanings of these various terms and with the 
ongoing debate as to which metaphor/term best captures the characteristics of the transfer process. I 
adopt the term ‘transfer’ to describe the phenomenon as it is comparatively neutral and aligns with the 
language used in policy transfer and diffusion scholarship. 
The early or ‘traditional’ literature on legal transfers was concerned predominantly with the transfer of 
entire legal systems in colonial and post-colonial environments. Labelling it the ‘naïve’ model of 
receptions, William Twining describes this early approach as concerned with a paradigm case 
involving: 
[A] bipolar relationship between two countries involving a direct one-way transfer of legal rules or 
institutions through the agency of governments involving formal enactment or adoption at a particular 
moment of time (a reception date) without major change… [I]t is commonly assumed that the standard 
case involves transfer from an advanced (parent) civil or common law system to a less developed one.15 
Typical case studies included the imposition of legal systems by colonists in settled states and the 
more voluntary modernisation efforts of developing nations. Starting in the late 1980s, the focus 
shifted to the legal reforms of former socialist countries. Much of the work of this period was of a 
theoretical nature and ‘unconnected to actual projects of legal change.’16 
The ‘contemporary’ legal transfer literature has moved beyond many of the assumptions identified by 
Twining as underpinning the ‘naïve’ model of legal transfers.17 I briefly explore the key areas in which 
this has happened below. My analysis here is not an attempt at developing a new explanatory theory 
or typology. Numerous such efforts have already been made.18 Rather, I seek to highlight new 
developments in the field and the way in which understanding of legal transfers has evolved. 
Perhaps the single most significant development is recognition that the vast majority of contemporary 
legal transfers concern discrete legal rules (or fragments of such rules) rather than entire legal codes 
or systems. The early literature focused on relatively large-scale transfers, such as the reception of 
Roman Law in medieval Europe, the spread of the common law, or the importation of civil codes. 
More recent literature recognises that in the era of globalisation, legal reforms at the individual state 
level usually involve the transfer of fragments of rules.19 Margit Cohn observes that 
                                                                                                                                                              
13  Maximo Langer, 'From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining 
and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure' (2004) 45 Harvard International Law Journal 1. 
14  Graziadei, above n 7. 
15  William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Scholarship (Wolf Legal Publishers, 2011) 51-2. 
16  Graziadei, above n 7. 
17  The term ‘contemporary legal transfer’ is adapted from Holger Spamann, 'Contemporary Legal 
Transplants: Legal Families and the Diffusion of (Corporate) Law' (2009) 6 Brigham Young University 
Law Review 1813. 
18  See Cohn, above n 3; Twining, 'Social Science and Diffusion of Law', above n 2; Jonathan Miller, 'A 
Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Argentine Examples to Explain the 
Transplant Process' (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative Law 839. 
19  Twining, 'Social Science and Diffusion of Law', above n 2, 234; Li-Wen Lin, 'Legal Transplants through 
Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example' (2009) 57 
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[w]hile classic accounts were concerned with the grafting of complete legal systems under colonially-
motivated transfers of law, the modern transplant is usually more limited, concerned with a specific 
arrangement or a specified area of law.20  
The paradigm example of a traditional legal transfer involved a formal act of adoption, for instance by 
enacting a statute or constitution. Contemporary scholarship is beginning to recognise that formal 
legal rules are not the only subject matter that can be transferred. Transfers can occur at the level of 
policy, programs, executive or administrative orders, or judicial decisions. As Mathias Siems notes, 
[i]n the past, there have often been cases where legal transplants purely meant copying or translating a 
particular foreign legal text. Today, however, the main aim tends to be to transfer a particular policy—be 
it driven by the transplant or the origin country.21 
There is growing recognition that transferred rules are rarely verbatim copies of the original 
transposed rules. Contemporary legal transfer literature recognises that laws may be transferred in 
varying degrees of abstraction. For example, a general idea may be borrowed and implemented using 
a completely different mechanism.22 By the same token, laws that serve similar purposes and aims 
may be couched in different terms. Change and adaptation of an imported rule can also add an 
additional layer of abstraction. Law makers in the receiving country may deliberately tweak the 
imported legal rule to meet local needs and conditions. Changes may also be made inadvertently 
during the transfer process. For example, law makers may misunderstand the content or operation of 
the original rule, or meaning may be lost through cross-cultural communication or translation. Maximo 
Langer proposes a typology of the types of change that can occur in the transfer process. Criticising 
the transplant metaphor for failing to capture differences between the source law and its implanted 
form in the receiving state, Langer proposes the adoption of the ‘legal translation’ metaphor instead. 
His typology is adapted from the language translation literature, identifying three main approaches to 
translation.23 First, ‘Strict Literalism’ refers to a word-by-word matching between the original and 
translated texts. Second, ‘Faithful but Autonomous Restatement’ refers to situations where the 
translator still tries to be faithful to the original but composes, at the same time, a text that is equally 
powerful in the target language. Third, ‘Substantial Recreation, Variations etc’ occurs when the idea of 
fidelity to the original is weakened or completely disappears, and the focus is on creating a text that is 
powerful or appealing in the target language. Once the law is transferred, it continues to undergo 
change as it interacts with local social and legal structures. As Twining has observed, how and to 
what extent any particular ‘import retains its identity or is accepted, ignored, used, assimilated, 
                                                                                                                                                              
American Journal of Comparative Law 711, 712. See also, Takao Tanase, ‘Global Markets and the 
Evolution of Law in China and Japan’ (2006) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 873, 876. 
20  Cohn, above n 3, 596-7. 
21  Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 220.  
22  Jörg Fedtke, ‘Legal Transplants’ in Jan Smits (ed), Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative Law (Elgar, 
2006) 434, 436. 
23  Langer, above n 13, 33. 
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adapted, rooted, resisted, rejected, interpreted, enforced selectively, and so on depends largely on 
local conditions.24  
The contemporary legal transfer scholarship has also moved beyond earlier conception of transfers as 
standalone or once-only phenomena. It is now recognised that legal transfers are often multi-event 
interactions with the original and transplanted rules continuing to interact after the initial transfers 
have taken place. Margit Cohn identifies several models of long-term interaction:  
1. the importing system maintains its connection with the exporting system and continues to 
follow post-transfer changes;  
2. gradual divergence where the importer severs its connection with the exporter and 
independently develops the adopted rule; or  
3. a mix of both approaches where the importing system follows certain developments in the 
source jurisdiction, but also independently develops the adopted rule.25  
In a similar vein, writers who draw on autopoietic theory, with its notion of law as a largely ‘closed and 
self-referential’ system, propose distinguishing between ad hoc contacts, systematic linkages and co-
evolution.26 In a multi-event context, old assumptions about the mono-directional flow of legal 
transfers no longer always hold true. The direction of the transfer often shifts, with the original 
exporting country drawing lessons and implementing developments from the original importing 
country.27 
So it is that the old view of legal transfers as involving only two jurisdictions (usually a single exporting 
country imposing legal rules on a single importer) has given way to recognition that transfers can 
often be the product of interactions between several players.28 In an era of globalisation, importers 
may choose fragments of rules from various legal systems and integrate them into a single law.29 Esin 
Örücü’s culinary metaphors of a mixing bowl, salad bowl, salad plate, and purée are devised to 
capture the various forms of eclectic multi-source transfers.30 
Contemporary transfer literature also challenges assumptions about the direction of transfers. The 
traditional legal transfer scholarship was almost exclusively concerned with transfers from an imperial 
or other powerful centre to a colonial, dependent, or less developed periphery. It has become 
apparent that law makers in powerful, developed nations also import laws from a variety of sources—
including other developed states, less developed states, and supra-national law. 
The traditional approach viewed legal transfers as occurring exclusively between national municipal 
legal systems. More recent scholarship recognises that transfers are occurring across levels of legal 
                                                   
24  Twining, 'Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective', above n 6, 24. 
25  Cohn, above n 3, 601-2. 
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28  Cohn, above n 3, 585. 
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ordering. As Twining observes, ‘diffusion may take place between many kinds of legal orders at and 
across different geographical levels, not just horizontally between municipal legal systems.’31 The 
most common (and studied) variety of cross-level legal transfer is the adoption of international or 
supra-national legal norms into domestic law. Examples include European harmonisation efforts,32 
and the domestic implementation of the Refugee Convention and Protocol.33 
Finally, it is now acknowledged that government officials are not the only agents involved in the 
transfer process. Transfers can be carried out or facilitated by international institutions, such as those 
that promote legal change on a global scale, international companies, global law firms, and other 
private actors.34 As I explore in the following section, many of the developments in legal transfer 
scholarship are reflected in the policy diffusion and policy transfer literature. 
2.1.2 International Relations Literature on ‘Policy Diffusion’ and ‘Convergence’ 
International relations research on diffusion focuses on how innovations, policies and programs 
spread from one government entity to another. Diffusion is generally conceptualised as an attribute of 
interdependence. As Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett observe, ‘[i]nternational policy diffusion occurs 
when government policy decisions in a given country are systematically conditioned by prior policy 
choices made in other countries.’35 Diffusion scholarship has its roots in comparative policy analysis in 
the United States,36 which focused on the spread of policy innovations within and between particular 
federal states and cities.37 Scholars were examining the diffusion of innovations across US states as 
early as 1940.38 However, it was Jack Walker’s seminal 1969 study on the innovativeness of US 
states across 88 programs which established the study of policy diffusion as a standalone discipline.39  
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(1969) 63 American Political Science Review 880; Virginia Gray, ‘Innovation in the States: A Diffusion 
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Building on these early US studies, the international relations literature on diffusion has been 
described as the study of ‘chronological and geographic patterns of the adoption of a policy innovation 
across government units’.40 A central objective of the research is explaining why some states either 
adopt or adapt policies and practices more readily than others. Examples of relevant factors identified 
include geographic proximity;41 the role of policy networks;42 and political, economic and social 
characteristics.43 Convergence is a closely related phenomenon to diffusion.44 This has been defined 
as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike [and] to develop similarities in structures, processes 
and performances.’45 At a general level, convergence is often explained as a product of the social and 
economic forces associated with industrialisation.46 More recently, globalisation has been cited as a 
factor, defined as ‘the cluster of technological, economic, and political innovations that reduce the 
barriers to economic, political, and cultural exchange’.47 A global civil society, intergovernmental 
organisations, epistemic communities and capital markets have all been identified as aspects of 
globalisation that have contributed to convergence.48  
Sharing some of the characteristics of diffusion scholarship, the convergence literature is distinctive in 
that it is concerned not only with the spread of innovation but also with the increasing similarity 
between different political systems in terms of policy goals, instruments, styles and outcomes.49 
Whereas diffusion refers to a process, convergence characterises the outcome of that process. The 
general argument is that as societies adopt a progressively more industrial infrastructure (or become 
part of an increasingly globalised world), ‘certain determinate processes are set in motion which tend 
over time to shape social structures, political processes and public policies in the same mould.’50 
                                                   
40  Karen Mossberger and Harold Wolman, 'Policy Transfer as a Form of Prospective Policy Evaluation: 
Challenges and Recommendations' (2003) 63 Public Administration Review 428, 429. 
41  Frances Stokes Berry and William D Berry, 'State Lottery Adoptions as Policy Innovations: An Event 
History Analysis' (1990) 84 American Political Science Review 395, 396. 
42  Everett M Rogers and F Floyd Shoemaker, Communication of Innovations: A Cross-Cultural Approach 
(Free Press, 1971); Robert L Savage, ‘Diffusion Research Traditions and the Spread of Policy 
Innovations in a Federal System’ (1985) 15 Publius 1; Everett M Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations (Free 
Press, 5th ed, 2003) 
43  Walker, above n 37 (identifying the following internal characteristics as facilitating innovation: per capita 
income; interparty competition; legislative professionalism; and percentage of urban population); Rogers 
and Shoemaker, above n 42 (emphasising the role of higher education levels, higher literacy rates, and 
greater upward mobility). 
44  See, for example Daniel Bell, The Coming of Post-Industrial Society (Basic Books, 1973); David Collier, 
‘Prerequisites Versus Diffusion: Testing Alternative Explanations of Social Security Adoption’ (1975) 69 
American Political Science Review 1299; Clark Kerr, The Future of Industrial Societies: Convergence or 
Continuing Diversity? (Harvard University Press, 1983); Alex Inkeles, One World Emerging? 
Convergence and Divergence in Industrial Societies (Westview Press, 1998); Katharina Holzinger and 
Christoph Knill, 'Causes and Conditions of Cross-National Policy Convergence' (2005) 12 Journal of 
European Public Policy 775. 
45  Kerr, above n 44, 3. 
46  Colin J Bennett, 'What is Policy Convergence and What Causes it?' (1991) 21 British Journal of Political 
Science 215, 215. For further examples, see Inkeles, above n 44; Kerr, above n 44. 
47  Daniel W Drezner, 'Globalization, Harmonization, and Competition: The Different Pathways to Policy 
Convergence' (2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy 841, 841. 
48  Ibid 841-2. 
49  Bennett, above n 46, 218. 
50  Ibid 216. 
 26 
 
2.1.3 Public Policy Scholarship on ‘Lesson Drawing’ and ‘Policy Transfer’ 
The public policy literature on ‘lesson-drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ also has its roots in the work 
examining the spread of innovations across US states.51 Lesson-drawing refers to the process by 
which actors in one time or place learn lessons from another time or place, which are then 
incorporated into their own policies and practices. This literature was born out of the perception that 
scholars were ignoring the processes associated with diffusion activities and the content of the 
transferred/diffused policy.52 Lesson-drawing theorists focus on the genesis of policy ideas; the 
factors that motivate actors within a political system to adopt a policy operating elsewhere; and the 
role of actors and evidence in the process more broadly.53 The lessons learned may be either positive 
or negative and, as such, may or may not lead to the transfer of policies or practices. Richard Rose 
defines a lesson as an ‘action-oriented conclusion about a programme or programmes in operation 
elsewhere’.54 He examines key features that encourage or inhibit the process of lesson-drawing, 
discusses some of the practical steps required for successful lesson-drawing and identifies five 
alternative methods of lesson-drawing: copying, emulation, hybridisation, synthesis, and inspiration.55  
Policy transfer literature draws heavily on the lesson-drawing approach, examining the ‘process by 
which knowledge of policies, administrative arrangements, institutions and ideas in one political 
system (past or present) is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, 
institutions and ideas in another political system.’56 The main divergence is based around criticism of 
the ‘implicit assumption’ present in the lesson-drawing literature that the process is both rational and 
voluntary.57 While maintaining a preoccupation with the process by which policy travels, the policy 
transfer approach acknowledges that diffusion will not always be the result of deliberate and rational 
policy choices. As such, policy transfer scholars recognise that transfers encompass both ‘voluntary’ 
and ‘coercive’ forms of practice. The latter can occur when ‘one government or supra-national 
institution [is] pushing, or even forcing another’ to adopt policy innovations.58  
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2.1.4 ‘Policy Transfer’, ‘Diffusion’ and ‘Legal Transfer’ Compared 
The terms ‘policy diffusion’, ‘convergence’, ‘lesson-drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’ are sometimes used 
interchangeably.59 However, as I have shown, these approaches differ in their analytical focus. The 
policy transfer approach grew out of the diffusion approach. While both examine the same 
phenomenon, namely the transfer of policy innovations across jurisdictions, they adopt different 
methodologies. The diffusion literature focuses primarily on policy outcomes, while generally 
neglecting the processes by which diffusion/transfer occurs. The focus is on whether a policy was 
transferred/diffused and what structural elements facilitated or inhibited such diffusion. In contrast, the 
literature on policy transfer tends to be more process-oriented, focusing on how, when, and why 
adopters use diffused information, rather than on networks or patterns of diffusion.60 
The approaches also vary in their approach to sample size and type of data analysed. The 
diffusion/convergence literature uses quantitative techniques to analyse a large number of case 
studies to produce generalisations about the reasons for, and the results of, the process. This can be 
contrasted with the policy transfer literature, which employs small-sample qualitative case studies that 
focus on a detailed analysis of the transfer of a policy between two, or several, countries. 
Both approaches have benefits and drawbacks. The large-sample, highly quantitative studies 
employed by diffusion scholars allow for generalisations about the causes and consequences of the 
diffusion process. The downside of the large sample size is that the data is prone to oversimplification. 
For example, diffusion is generally presented as a dichotomous (‘adopt’/‘not adopt’) variable. The 
policy transfer approach recognises that there can be many degrees of transfer, with complete 
transfer being very rare. The small-sample qualitative studies, employed in the lesson-drawing and 
policy transfer approaches, allow for a far more nuanced examination of reasons for and outcomes of 
the process. However, findings made utilising such an approach are less generalisable. Finally, the 
diffusion and convergence literature take for granted the fact that the diffusion process is inevitable 
and beneficial.61 In contrast, the lesson-drawing and policy transfer literature recognise the possibility 
that transfers can result in policy failures and provide frameworks to test prerequisites for good policy 
making and policy success. 
The traditional legal transfer literature dealt with quite distinct phenomena when compared to the 
policy transfer and diffusion literature. However, the expansion of the subject matter examined in 
contemporary transfer literature has resulted in a situation where it now looks at essentially the same 
subject matter as policy transfer and diffusion scholarship. In particular, the acknowledgement that the 
content of transfers are not just formal law, but a variety of ideas, policies, programs, approaches or 
innovations has brought the legal transfer approach in line with the policy transfer and diffusion 
approaches. Contemporary scholars examining legal transfers are asking the same questions that are 
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being examined by diffusion and policy transfer scholars: how do you demonstrate that a transfer has 
taken place; what are the mechanisms driving transfers; and what are the factors that lead to the 
success or failure of transferred law or policy? 
What follows is an in-depth interdisciplinary examination of these questions. In Part 2.2 of this 
chapter, I explore methodological issues relating to demonstrating that a transfer has taken place. In 
Part 2.3, I examine approaches to defining and measuring success in the context of legal transfers. In 
Chapter Three, I examine the mechanisms driving the transfer process in the context of immigration 
control measures. In each instance, I explore how legal transfer, policy transfer and diffusion scholars 
have approached the issue, and the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. As we will see, the 
process-tracing approach used by policy transfer scholars is very useful when trying to identify 
whether a transfer has taken place. In relation to measuring success, both the policy transfer and 
diffusion literature appear to neglect the legal dimension of success. In relation to formulating an 
explanation of the mechanisms driving the transfer process, legal and policy transfer scholarship has 
much to learn from the diffusion literatures’ focus on the interdependence of policy decisions. 
2.2 A New Framework for Identifying Transfers of Law and Policy 
The recent changes in the focus of the legal transfer literature examined in Part 2.1.1 have made it 
better equipped to capture the complexity and richness of the transfer phenomenon than the earlier 
scholarship. However, the acknowledgement of this complexity has given rise to a new challenge that 
the legal scholarship is yet to grapple with. Transfers that fit the old paradigm ‘naïve’ model of legal 
transfer, described by Twining above,62 are easy to identify. However, as the scholarship has moved 
away from the assumptions which underpinned that model, identifying legal transfers has become 
more difficult. A framework for identifying legal transfers was not necessary in the context of verbatim 
transfers of entire legal systems (or large parts thereof). The existence of the transfer in such a 
context was self-evident. As Holger Spamann has observed ‘[one] cannot but see diffusion in identical 
statutes.’63 However, the identification of more subtle forms of transfers gives rise to evidentiary 
issues that cannot be overcome by a simple comparison of formal legal instruments and institutions.  
Each of the seven other areas, in which the understanding of legal transfers has expanded, contribute 
to making the identification task more difficult:64 
 Transfers that occur at the level of policy, programs, or administrative or executive rules can 
be harder to evidence than those that involve formal legal rules. 
 Change and adaptation both during and after the transfer process make transfers harder to 
identify. 
 Multi-event and multi-directional transfers are harder to identify and track than single-event 
and mono-directional transfers. 
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 Multi-source transfers are harder to identify than single-source transfers. 
 The reversal of traditional conceptions about the direction of transplants has made them 
harder to identify. 
 Cross-level transfers are harder to identify than horizontal transfers. 
 The involvement of non-state actors in the transfer process adds a new layer of complexity 
when trying to identify transplants. 
The problem of determining whether a transfer has taken place has been identified in contemporary 
legal transfer literature. For example, Holger Spamann highlights the difficulties in identifying what he 
refers to as ‘substantive diffusion’.65 
Substantive diffusion is invisible: a country can slavishly follow a foreign model without copying a foreign 
statute or ever explicitly acknowledging, or even being conscious of, a foreign influence. Inversely, a 
country can develop a policy, totally autonomously, and yet utilise foreign statutory language for 
technical simplicity or as a decoy.66 
Jörg Fedtke observes that:  
[l]egal transplants are more often than not difficult to identify. There is, of course, no obligation for 
legislators or judges who use foreign law to disclose intellectual ownership of a legal idea, and the origin 
of a rule (indeed the fact that it was borrowed at all) will usually remain more or less obscure. In many 
cases, borrowing will not result in the copying of a specific text but rather in the transplantation of an 
idea; in others the translation of a foreign provision or subsequent modifications to the text will make it 
difficult to identify the original. More importantly, ‘undercover’ transplants avoid criticism in the borrowing 
system based on prejudice against what is often perceived as an imposition of foreign views.67 
Similarly, Michele Graziadei states that ‘[q]uite often… it is not easy to determine who produced the 
initial innovation that becomes the model.’68 Identifying transfers will become more difficult over time, 
as the policy, law or institution adapts to its new context. In this regard, Patrick Glenn observed that 
‘[l]aw drawn from another tradition will originally be identifiable as to its source but the layering of 
domestic sources over foreign ones will eventually camouflage many distant origins.’69 
While the problem of determining whether a transfer has taken place has been identified, to date, no 
framework has been proposed to tackle the issue. In this section, I draw on the policy transfer 
literature to propose a framework for measuring the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of contemporary 
transfers. The identification of specific instances of transfers is not seen as an end in and of itself. 
Rather such identification is an essential prerequisite for making observations about the processes 
and pathways of exchange, thereby gaining a deeper understanding of why transfers are occurring 
and identifying the factors that lead to their success or failure. 
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From the outset, the policy transfer and legal transfer literature covered many of the same themes. 
The recent broadening of the contemporary legal transfer approach has brought the subject matter of 
both disciplines even closer together. In particular, the acknowledgement in legal scholarship that the 
subject matter of transfers are not limited to formal law, but a variety of ideas, policies, programs or 
approaches, means that both disciplines are substantially examining the same phenomena. The 
policy transfer literature has dealt with this broader spectrum of transfers for longer than legal transfer 
literature. The difficulty in establishing whether or not a transfer has taken place was identified in the 
early literature, and frameworks have been developed to address the issue.  
Dolowitz and Marsh identify five sources through which the existence of policy transfer may be 
detected: the media, reports, conferences, visits and governmental statements.70 However, these are 
presented more as sources of learning, rather than a framework for demonstrating that policy transfer 
has occurred. Evans and Davies propose a sequence of five steps to guide attempts at identifying the 
existence, nature and scope of a given instance of transfer:  
1. Identify the subject of analysis (eg a claim that policy transfer is occurring or has occurred in 
the past);  
2. Identify the agent(s) of the transfer—who wants it, what do they want from it, how are they 
going about effecting it, to whose benefit, and why?  
3. Is there evidence of non-transfer? 
4. What is the evidence offered to support the claim? How good is it?  
5. What conclusion can be drawn from the above about the nature and extent of the transfer 
which has taken place?71 
While this proposal is a useful guide for structuring inquiries into whether a transfer has occurred, 
Evans and Davies provide little in the way of specific guidance on how to carry out each step and 
leave certain questions unanswered. For example, where should we look for evidence of transfer/non-
transfer? How do we assess how good the evidence supporting the claim that a transfer has occurred 
is? 
Colin Bennett proposes what is perhaps the most robust framework for determining whether a policy 
transfer has occurred. Drawing on both policy transfer and diffusion literature, he argues that policy 
transfer can be substantiated if: 
1. It can be demonstrated that idiosyncratic domestic factors are not independently responsible 
for policy adoption; 
2. It can be demonstrated that the adoption is not the result of the effects of similar modernising 
forces having the same, but separate effects in different states; 
3. It can be demonstrated that policy makers are aware of the policy adoptions elsewhere; 
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4. It can be demonstrated that this overseas evidence was utilised within domestic policy 
debates.72 
The first two steps are important as they involve ruling out the possibility that the similar policies in two 
jurisdictions are the result of independent forces operating within those jurisdictions. However, in my 
view, Bennett places the bar far too high. In any instance of transfer, it will be practically impossible to 
conclusively rule out the influence of independent domestic forces. In fact, in most instances, 
transfers result from the fact that states are facing similar domestic policy problems.  
In Figure 1, I set out a framework for identifying legal transfers which draws on elements of the policy 
transfer frameworks discussed above, as well as comparative law methods. My framework combines 
the process-oriented analysis undertaken by policy transfer scholars with detailed comparative 
analysis of legal materials. The aim of the framework is to identify the existence of a given transfer 
and hence facilitate an understanding of how and why the transfer occurred. This will then allow an 
assessment of whether the transfer has had its intended effect.  
Figure 1: A Framework for Studying Contemporary Legal Transfers 
1. Identify a common policy problem (or motive); 
2. Undertake a detailed comparative analysis of the suspected transferred law or policy in 
both the sending and receiving country; 
3. Search for physical evidence that a transfer has occurred (evidence of opportunity, and 
the direct transfer of information); 
4. If necessary, identify and carry out interviews with key agents involved in the transfer 
process. 
 
1 Identifying a Common Policy Problem 
The first step involves identifying the motive for law makers in the receiving country to engage in legal 
transfer. The key factor to look for here is the existence of a similar policy problem in the suspected 
source and importing country. The political climate in which the suspected imported law was 
introduced in the receiving country may also be a relevant factor. The temptation to engage in legal 
borrowing may be more prevalent at times of crisis when a policy solution needs to be developed 
quickly.73 The default reaction is usually to look for domestic solutions proposed in law reform 
commission reports or similar inquiries. Where no such domestic guidance exists, policy makers will 
often turn to foreign models.  
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2 Comparative Analysis of Legal and Policy Response 
This step involves a detailed comparative analysis of the suspected source and imported laws or 
policies. Key documents examined at this stage include legislation, regulations, policy documents and 
governmental statements. This requires two distinct levels of analysis. The first is a doctrinal 
comparison of the sources outlined above to ascertain the degree of similarity in drafting and design. 
The existence of laws that are drafted in similar terms and language raise a presumption that a 
transfer has taken place. The more alike the laws and policies are in the suspected source and 
receiving country, the more likely that a transfer has taken place. The second is a functional analysis, 
where the focus is on examining whether, in practice, the suspected source and imported laws serve 
the same function in both legal systems. The existence of functionally equivalent laws also raises a 
presumption that a transfer has taken place. However, the existence of doctrinal or functional 
similarities are not conclusive evidence of transfer. As recognised in the frameworks for identifying the 
existence of policy transfer put forward by Bennett,74 as well as Evans and Davies,75 two jurisdictions 
may come up with similar innovations independently as a response to similar domestic pressures. 
Just as individuals collectively open their umbrellas simultaneously during a rainstorm, governments 
may decide to adopt the same policy in response to similar policy problems.76 At the same time, 
changes to the transferred law or policy, both during and after the transfer process, may make 
transfers difficult to recognise by means of doctrinal or functional analysis. 
3 Analysis of Physical Evidence  
The third stage involves examining sources in the receiving state for evidence that a transfer has 
taken place. The focus here is to find evidence that rebuts the alternate explanation that the 
doctrinally or functionally similar laws were the result of independent development. Two types of 
evidence are relevant in this context. The first relates to whether law makers from the suspected 
source and importing country had an opportunity to transfer information relating to the suspected 
imported law. Relevant evidence includes the existence of forums, meetings or avenues of 
communication which could be used to share information relating to the suspected imported rule. The 
second is direct evidence demonstrating that the source law was consulted, or formed the basis of the 
suspected imported law. Examples include government statements acknowledging the role the source 
law played in the development of the imported rule; government press releases or reports 
acknowledging discussions between the source and receiving country relating the policy area to which 
the suspected transfer relates; or references to the source law in the parliamentary debates, 
parliamentary hearings, explanatory memorandum, or policy material relating to the suspected 
imported law. Key sources to search in relation to the opportunity and direct evidence of transfers 
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include government press releases, media reports, conference proceedings, parliamentary speeches, 
explanatory memorandum and other parliamentary and departmental reports.77  
 4 Identifying and Interviewing Key Agents Involved in the Transfer Process 
The absence of physical evidence does not always mean that a transfer has not taken place. 
Interactions between policy makers often occur behind closed doors and are not always publicly 
acknowledged. Further, in this digital age, law makers can instantly access a wealth of material about 
the detail and operation of foreign law and practice. Lessons drawn from such materials may not be 
documented. This stage of analysis goes beyond publicly available sources and involves identifying 
and interviewing key agents involved in the transfer process. This step takes the policy transfer focus 
on agents and processes of transfer to its logical conclusion. Transfers cannot occur without agents. 
Identifying and interviewing these agents provides the richest source of evidence about the existence 
and degree of the transfer which has occurred.78 Of course much will depend on the nature of the 
study being undertaken. Identifying and interviewing the agents of transfer may not be practical where 
studies involve a transfer across many different jurisdictions. However, for a detailed case study of 
specific transfers across a limited number of jurisdictions, identifying and carrying out such interviews 
is more feasible. The rich data collected in the process can make it a worthwhile endeavour. 
2.3 Measuring Success 
A substantial body of literature exists on the factors that contribute to either the success or failure of 
transfers. The trouble is that no consensus has emerged on the indicators of success and failure, 
either within or across legal and policy transfer literature. David Nelken writes that ‘[s]tudents of legal 
transfers do often talk confidently about what makes for success or failure. The trouble is that what 
they are looking for can be quite different.’79 Indeed, the concepts of success and failure are 
incontrovertibly subjective. Writing from a public policy perspective, Ingram and Mann note, ‘success 
and failure are slippery concepts, often highly subjective and reflective of an individual’s perception of 
need, and perhaps even psychological disposition toward life.’80 Before engaging in any assessment 
of the success or failure of a policy, it is clearly imperative to articulate what type of success we are 
talking about. 
Roger Cotterrell distinguishes three competing dimensions of success in the legal transfer literature.81 
Each reflects a different approach to the way law is conceptualised. For those who view law as 
‘culture’, a transfer will be successful when it proves consistent with the legal culture of the receiving 
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country. For scholars who view law as positive rules, the simple promulgation of a borrowed law can 
be viewed as a success, regardless of how it operates in practice. Those who view law as an 
instrument will only regard a transfer as successful when the law has its intended effect.82 
The legal transfer literature on success has been dominated disproportionately by a long-standing 
debate between proponents of ‘law as culture’ versus advocates of ‘law as positive rules’. At issue is 
the viability (and even possibility) of legal transfers. At one extreme, Pierre Legrand argues that law is 
a culturally determined construct that can never be transplanted fully into another culture.83 For 
Legrand, successful legal transfers are impossible as rules are too laden with historical, 
epistemological and cultural baggage to be transferred between jurisdictions.84 In essence, the 
argument here is that law is much more than its enacted rules. Legrand distinguishes between a 
propositional statement and its invested meaning. While the words that make up the propositional 
statement can be transported from one culture to another, the invested meaning cannot, as it is 
culturally specific. The imported form of the words is ascribed a different, local meaning when 
transported, transforming it to a different rule. In a similar vein, Siedman and Siedman85 take the view 
that law is a culturally determined artefact that cannot be transferred, and have gone as far as 
formulating the ‘law of the non-transferability of law’.86 
At the other extreme, scholars like Alan Watson advocate the ease and feasibility of legal transfers 
from one jurisdiction to another.87 Watson argues that legal transfers are socially easy and common in 
practice, being the most important source of change in the Western legal tradition. Watson’s assertion 
that laws move easily, and are accepted in other legal systems without great difficulty, rests on a view 
of law as a set of positive rules that operate quite separate from other social systems. As such, he 
argues that ‘successful borrowing could be achieved even when nothing [is] known of the political, 
social or economic context of the foreign law’.88  
Occupying the middle ground, Otto Kahn-Freund argues that degrees of transferability are possible, 
but success depends on a range of variables such as geographical, economic, social and above all, 
                                                   
82  See, also, David Nelken, ‘Law as Communication: Setting the Field’ in David Nelken (ed), Law As 
Communication (Dartmouth Publishing, 1996) 3-25 (distinguishing between viewing ‘law as an 
instrument’ and ‘law as a narrative’). 
83  Pierre Legrand ‘The Impossibility of “Legal Transplants”’ (1997) 4 Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 111. 
84  Ibid. 
85  Ann Seidman and Robert Seidman, State and Law in the Development Process: Problem Solving and 
Institutional Change in the Third World (MacMillan, 1994); Ann Seidman and Robert Seidman, ‘Drafting 
Legislation for Development: Lessons from a Chinese Project’ (1996) 44 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 1. 
86  Seidman and Seidman, State and Law in the Development Process, above n 85, 44-6. 
87  Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law, above n 5; Alan Watson, ‘Legal 
Transplants and Law Reform’ (1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 79; Alan Watson ‘Comparative Law and 
Legal Change’ (1978) 37 Cambridge Law Journal 313; Alan Watson, Legal Transplants: An Approach to 
Comparative Law (University of Georgia Press, 1993, 2nd ed). 
88  Watson, ‘Legal Transplants and Law Reform’, above n 87, 79. 
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political factors.89 John Gillespie summarises Kahn-Freund’s theory on legal transfers into three main 
hypotheses: 
One, all laws have to some extent de-coupled from their socio-political moorings, making legal 
transplants across socio-political boundaries a theoretical possibility. Two, since laws de-couple to 
varying degrees, some are more likely to survive the journey than others. Three, socio-political 
institutional factors determine the degree of coupling between law and society, they are: the ideological 
role of law, the distribution of state power, and pressure from non-state interest groups.90 
Kahn-Freund’s general point is that legal phenomena are varied and exist along a continuum of 
transferability.91 Technical areas of law, such as contract and commercial law, can be viewed as a 
neutral set of positive rules that easily lend themselves to transfers. Other areas of law, such as rules 
designed to allocate power, rule-making and decision making, remain deeply embedded in social 
institutions and are unlikely to easily transfer. 
Building on the work of Kahn-Freund, Gunther Teubner supposes that the ease or difficulty of legal 
transfer depends on the degree of connection between law and various social contexts.92 Naming his 
theory the ‘Legal Irritants’ thesis, Teubner argues that transfers are relatively easy in areas of law that 
have only loose contact with social processes, but there is greater resistance to change where laws 
are tightly coupled with other social discourses. However, even where there is loose coupling and 
transfers are apparently easier, the process is not mechanical: ‘legal transfer is not smooth and 
simple, but has to be assimilated to the deep structure of the new law, to the social world 
constructions that are unique to the different legal culture.’93 Where there is tight coupling, Teubner 
supposes that not only does the imported rule change, but the foreign rule may cause ‘irritations’ 
which change the social discourses of the new setting.94  
The debate between proponents of ‘law as culture’ and ‘law as positive rules’ is centred on the 
semantics of what we understand as ‘success’, rather than on any profound disagreement about the 
underlying processes which are occurring. If, like Legrand, we take the strong ‘law as culture’ 
approach, and limit our view of success to situations where the imported laws reproduce identical 
meanings and effects to what they produced in the source jurisdiction, then the prospects of success 
do indeed look grim. If we take the weak ‘law as culture’ approach, and define transfers as a success 
where the imported laws reproduce similar meanings and effects to what they produced in their 
source jurisdictions, then the predictions of Kahn-Freund and Teubner— that transfers of certain 
types of law are more probable to succeed than others—likely ring true. If we take the ‘law as positive 
                                                   
89  Otto Kahn-Freund, ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 Modern Law Review 1.  
90  John Gillespie ‘Globalisation and Legal Transplantation: Lessons from the Past’ (2001) 6 Deakin Law 
Review 286, 289. 
91  For a discussion of Kahn-Freund’s metaphor, see Twining, 'Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective’, 
above n 6, 29. 
92  Teubner, above n 32.  
93  Ibid 19. 
94  Ibid 21-4. 
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rules’ approach, and define success as mere introduction of promulgation of a transferred law, then 
successful transfers seem easy. 
The recent scholarship dealing with success in the context of legal transfers appears to take a more 
pragmatic approach. Scholars now recognise that legal transfers are occurring in almost every area of 
law. They acknowledge that the close connection between law and society means transferred laws 
will never operate in exactly the same way in source and receiving systems.95 The recognition of a 
broader spectrum of more nuanced transfers has made the old ‘law as positive rules’ versus ‘law as 
culture’ debate less relevant. Contemporary scholars recognise that law makers generally do not want 
imported law to operate in exactly the same way as it did in the source country. Rather they are 
interested in more nuanced transfers, where foreign rules are adapted to meet local needs and 
conditions. This reflects the instrumental view of law, where transfers are judged by whether or not 
they had their intended effects;96 or as Michal Gal describes it, ‘the ability of the transplanted law to 
achieve its goals in the transplanting country’.97  
Public policy scholars have developed a robust approach to examining instrumental success of 
policies from which legal transfer scholarship may glean some lessons. Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters 
propose a framework which distinguishes between two primary types of instrumental success: 
programmatic and political. The programmatic mode of assessment focuses ‘on the effectiveness, 
efficiency and resilience of the specific policies being evaluated.’98 The political dimension of 
assessment ‘refers to the way policies and policy-makers become evaluated in the political arena.’99 
They go on to explain that:  
Indicators of political failure or success are political upheaval (press coverage, parliamentary 
investigations, political fatalities, litigation) or lack of it, and changes in generic patters of political 
legitimacy (public satisfaction with policy or confidence in authorities and public institutions).100 
Marsh and McConnell propose a third dimension to policy success: process.101 They define process 
as the ‘stages of policy making in which issues emerge and are framed, options are explored, 
interests are consulted and decisions made.’102 Relevant factors for determining process success 
include: whether policy was produced through constitutional and quasi-constitutional procedures; 
whether a strong alliance supportive of the policy was achieved; and most importantly, where a core 
                                                   
95  See, for example, Siems, above n 21, 195-200. 
96  See above nn 81-2 and accompanying text. 
97  Michal Gal, 'The "Cut and Paste" of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Conditions for a Successful 
Transplant' (2008) 9 European Journal of Law Reform 467, 472. 
98  Mark Bovens, Paul ‘t Hart and B Guy Peters, ‘Analysing Governance Success and Failure in Six 
European States’ in Mark Bovens, Paul ‘t Hart and B. Guy Peters (eds), Success and Failure in Public 
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100  Ibid 21. 
101  Ibid 20. 
102  David Marsh and Allan McConnell, 'Towards a Framework for Establishing Policy Success' (2010) 88 
Public Administration 564, 572; See also Allan McConnell, Understanding Policy Success: Rethinking 
Public Policy (Palgrave MacMillan, 2010) 40. 
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proposal is successfully implemented as law.103 In the context of the legal transfer scholarship, David 
Nelken also suggests that when dealing with success, different stages of the transfer process warrant 
separate examination. 
The question of success can arise in more than one stage of the transfer of legal rules and institutions. 
We may be concerned with how a legal adaptation emerges—the choice of law—or with the way it 
exerts its influence—the results of a given transfer.104 
Beyond identifying which dimension of success we wish to measure, there are a number of further 
impediments to measuring success identified in both the legal transfer and public policy literature that 
warrant further exploration. One of the primary hurdles to developing criteria for measuring success is 
that success inevitably lies in the eye of the beholder. In other words, when we talk about success, it 
is important to define success for whom. As Marsh and McConnell observe, ‘[t]he nature of politics, 
especially in liberal democracies, means that “success” will always be contested to some degree.’105 
As a result, we should expect a divergence of views between various stakeholders as to whether or 
not any aspect of a particular policy is successful. Bovens et al note that even in relatively 
uncontroversial instances, 
policy evaluations are entwined with processes of accountability and lesson drawing that may have 
winners and losers. However, technocratic and seemingly innocuous, every policy programme has 
multiple stakeholders who have an interest in the outcome of an evaluation: decision makers, executive 
agencies, clients, pressure groups.106 
David Nelken makes a similar point in the context of legal transfers: 
In all but the most technical of legal transfers there are likely to be conflicting interests at stake, involving 
different governments or different economic interests, or amongst members of governmental and non-
governmental organisations, parliamentarians, judges, lawyers, other professionals—as well as the 
various parties likely to be most affected by the law.107 
Such considerations are very important in the context of transfers of restrictive immigration measures. 
For example, harsh measures that result in the reduction of irregular boat arrivals could be viewed as 
a success by governments, while at the same time widely condemned by human rights groups, 
academics and other observers. As such, it is essential to be clear about which perspective is being 
assessed.  
There are also difficulties around measuring whether a law or policy has succeeded in fulfilling its 
objectives. The first challenge is to establish the objective of the law or policy. This can be a difficult 
task given that laws and policies often have multiple objectives. Some can be unstated: for example, 
                                                   
103  Marsh and McConnell, above n 102, 572. 
104  Nelken, ‘Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation’, above n 79, 39. 
105  Marsh and McConnell, above n 102, 575 
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securing votes, boosting leadership or appeasing stakeholders. Even where a law’s objectives are 
clear, there is the problem of attempting to identify the causal effect, compared to other independent 
variables. In order to say that successful outcomes are the product of a particular policy initiative or 
law, it must be possible to ascertain that the law or policy actually produced the outcomes in question. 
Marsh and McConnell frame this challenge as the  
need to isolate and ascertain the effect of the policy on the outcome, controlling for other potential 
causal factors such as media coverage, the broader economic climate, external shocks, interest group 
activity, the role of private sector pressure (particularly if public/private partnerships are involved), the 
actions of other jurisdictions, whether national or international, and even other linked policy sectors.108  
The situation is made more difficult by the fact that often the relevant outcome data may not be 
available. This may be the result of the fact that the data does not exist or is difficult to quantify, or 
due to the refusal of official sources to release relevant data. 
One final issue to note is that there can be varying degrees of success. While it is attractive to 
conceptualise outcomes in binary terms as either a success or failure, in reality such black and white 
outcomes are extremely rare. Where a policy has multiple objectives, it may be successful in meeting 
one objective, but fail to meet others. Even in more straightforward scenarios, where a policy has a 
single objective with clearly measureable outcomes, problems may still persist. Take the example of a 
policy which has the goal of reducing infant mortality rates from 15 per cent to five per cent but only 
manages to reduce mortality to 10 per cent. While not successful in meeting its target, it cannot be 
said that the policy was a complete failure. Problems also arise when outcomes are compared across 
the various dimensions of policy success.109 Process, programmatic and political success do not 
always go hand-in-hand. It is possible for a policy to be successful on one of these levels, but to fail 
on another.110  
In this study, I propose an additional dimension to measuring the success of transfers, which has 
been largely absent from both the legal and policy transfer literature. The primary focus is on what I 
label as legal success. I define legal success as occurring when an imported law or policy survives 
judicial challenges in domestic courts. Legal failure occurs when there is a judicial finding that an 
imported law or policy is unlawful; or where the judiciary adopts an interpretation of the imported 
provisions which frustrates the original intention of the drafters of the law or policy.  
This measure of success captures elements of both the ‘law as an instrument’ and ‘law as culture’ 
approaches identified by Roger Cotterrell.111 From a ‘law as an instrument’ perspective, laws will only 
be a success if they achieve the purpose for which they were introduced. A finding by a court that a 
law or policy is unlawful will preclude the law or policy from having such an effect. From a ‘law as 
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culture’ perspective, the judiciary’s response to an imported law sheds light on the degree to which 
the imported law is successfully integrated into the legal culture of the receiving country. A finding by 
a court that an imported law or policy is unlawful represents perhaps the most clear and explicit 
indication of cultural incompatibility. 
This approach to measuring success is attractive as it avoids some of the methodological problems 
identified in the previous section. In relation to the success for whom question, the focus is clearly on 
the perspective of the government officials who introduced the law or policy under challenge. This 
measure also has the advantage of being comparatively easy to quantify. Rather than the complex, 
and often unavailable, quantitative data required to measure programmatic and political success, 
legal success can generally be easily gleaned from publicly available judicial decisions. 
The legal dimension has hitherto been neglected in the public policy literature on success. As noted, 
evaluation of success in public policy scholarship has focused on three main dimensions of success: 
programmatic, political and process. None of these dimensions pay sufficient regard to whether a law 
or policy is fully integrated into the legal system of the receiving state. While Bovens et al do include 
‘litigation’ as one of the indicators to consider when assessing political success,112 I argue that the 
ability of an imported law or policy to withstand judicial scrutiny in domestic courts warrants its own 
level of analysis. This is because, as discussed, the evidence used to assess legal success is very 
different to evidence examined in the context of assessing programmatic, political and process 
success. Rather than quantitative data on policy outcomes or political polling, or qualitative data 
relating to process, assessing legal success requires detailed examination of case law.  
This is not to deny that legal success has bearing on the three dimensions of success identified in the 
public policy literature. Legal failure in the form of a law or policy being struck down by the courts will 
obviously impact on whether a policy can meet its programmatic goals. Legal failure may also stir 
public sentiment towards a government that influences the political success of the policy. The quality 
of the process adopted in developing and implementing the law or policy will have a bearing on the 
likelihood on legal success or failure.  
This measure of legal success will not be relevant to all instances of legal and policy transfer. Most 
transfers are relatively uncontroversial and do not result in legal challenges in the receiving state’s 
courts. However, where such challenges occur, the judiciary’s response provides a rich source for 
measuring success or failure. This legal dimension of success is particularly relevant to the transfer of 
restrictive immigration measures. These laws push the boundaries of domestic and international legal 
protections, and as such, have been challenged in the highest courts of both the United States and 
Australia.  
2.4 Conclusion 
                                                   
112  Bovens, ‘t Hart and Peters, above n 98, 21. 
 40 
 
In this chapter, I compared three approaches to studying the inter-jurisdictional transfer of law and 
policy: legal scholarship on ‘legal transfers’; international relations writing on ‘diffusion’ and 
‘convergence’; and public policy work on ‘lesson-drawing’ and ‘policy transfer’. The primary purpose 
was to identify ways in which the legal transfer literature can learn from the approaches taken in other 
disciplines. In particular, I focused on the methodological questions of how to establish whether a 
transfer has taken place; and how to define and measure success in the context of legal and policy 
transfer. In Chapter Three, I build on my interdisciplinary comparison to compile a typology of the 
various mechanisms driving the transfer of immigration policies across jurisdictions; and explore the 
key forums facilitating the transfer process. The framework for identifying legal transfers and 
measuring success developed in this chapter will be utilised in Chapter Four and Five to study the 
transfer between the United States and Australia of the case study policies of mandatory detention, 
interdiction and extraterritorial processing. In later chapters, the concept of legal success elucidated 
here will guide my analysis of the case law on these policies in each jurisdiction. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
MECHANISMS DRIVING THE TRANSFER PROCESS 
AND THE FORUMS FACILITATING THE PRACTICE 
In this chapter, I address two questions about how legal and policy transfers are being used by 
migration policy makers as a tool for developing immigration control measures. These relate to the 
forces or motivations underlying the transfers, and the forums in which ideas are exchanged. In Part 
3.1, I look at what might be motivating the actors involved in the transfer process. Drawing on the 
policy transfer, diffusion and legal transfer scholarship, I develop a typology of the mechanisms 
driving the transfer of immigration law and policy across jurisdictions. I identify five overlapping 
mechanisms: efficiency, prestige, coercion, cooperation and competition. This is done with a view of 
contextualising the case study transfers examined in the subsequent chapters into the broader 
context of transfer of immigration law and policy generally. In Part 3.2, I identify the forums that could 
be facilitating the transfer of immigration control measures.  
3.1 What Drives Transfers of Immigration Law and Policy? 
In this section, I identify the varying (and sometimes conflicting) motivations of the actors involved in 
the transfer of immigration law and policy across jurisdictions. I do this with reference to the legal 
transfer, policy transfer and diffusion literature, as well as a number of brief case studies. The aim is 
to contextualise the transfer of mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing 
policies between Australia and the United States within the broader spectrum of transfers occurring in 
the immigration policy area. The analysis begins with a survey of the mechanisms identified in the 
legal transfer, policy transfer and diffusion literature as driving the transfer of law and policy generally. 
There is substantial overlap in the motivations identified in each body of literature. I aggregate these 
into three broad categories: efficiency, prestige and coercion. I then explore additional forces that can 
drive transfers in contexts where there is interdependence between the policy decisions of 
governments.  
Immigration policy is an area in which governments are particularly concerned about what other 
jurisdictions are doing. This is because changes in the immigration policy of one country have 
implications for the immigration policy of other nations. Drawing on the diffusion literature and related 
scholarship on regulatory theory, I argue that transfers of immigration policy can be driven by 
cooperative and competitive interdependence. Cooperative interdependence arises where 
governments benefit from having compatible policies. Governments recognise that effective control of 
immigration flows requires cooperation with other states. To this end, transfers are occurring as states 
harmonise their laws as a means of cooperatively dealing with common problems. Competitive 
interdependence occurs where governments are competing to achieve common outcomes and where 
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changes in the law and policy of one jurisdiction create flow-on effects for other jurisdictions. States 
are engaging in transfers of immigration law and policy as they compete with each other to obtain 
what may loosely be called beneficial immigration outcomes. States are engaging in transfers as they 
compete to attract the best and brightest migrants, as a means of boosting economic efficiency and 
growth. In this regard, I briefly examine the transfer of points systems as a mechanism for selecting 
economic migrants. At the same time, states are engaging in transfers as they compete to deter 
‘undesirable’ irregular migration. I argue that the case study transfers between the United States and 
Australia of laws relating to mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing examined 
in the forthcoming chapters can be viewed as being driven by such consideration. Throughout the 
analysis, I take note of the different sources of legal transfers in the immigration policy field. Transfers 
can be sourced in the domestic law of another state, international law or regional instruments. I also 
explore the interplay between the forces driving a transfer and the source of transfer. In this regard, I 
argue that cooperative transfers generally involve vertical movement of laws from international or 
regional sources into domestic legislation. In contrast, competitive transfers are generally horizontal, 
being both sourced from and imported into domestic legislation.  
3.1.1 General Forces Driving Transfers: Efficiency, Prestige and Coercion 
A student of the transfer phenomenon has numerous typologies to draw on in regard to the forces and 
mechanisms driving the transfer of law and policy across jurisdictions. Legal transfer,1 policy transfer2 
and diffusion3 scholars have all dealt with this question. Here, I aggregate the mechanisms discussed 
in the various sub-disciplines into three broad categories: efficiency, prestige and coercion.  
                                                   
1  See Alan Watson, 'Aspects of Reception of Law' (1996) 44 American Journal of Comparative Law 335 
(distinguishing between transfers motivated by ‘Extreme Practical Utility’, ‘Chance’ and ‘the Need for 
Authority’); Jonathan Miller, 'A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process' (2003) 51 American Journal of Comparative 
Law 839 (distinguishing between the ‘Cost-Saving Transplant’; ‘the Externally-Dictated Transplant’; the 
‘Entrepreneurial Transplant; and the Legitimacy-Generating Transplant’); Michele Graziadei, 
'Comparative Law as the Study of Transplants and Receptions' in Mathias Reimann and Reinhard 
Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 441, 
456-61(distinguishing between transplants motivated by ‘Imposition’, ‘Prestige’ and ‘Economic 
Performance’); Rodolfo Sacco, 'Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law (Installment 
II of II)' (1991) 39 American Journal of Comparative Law 343 (distinguishing between ‘Imposition’ and 
‘Prestige’); Margit Cohn, 'Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and 
Proportionality Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom' (2010) 58 American Journal of 
Comparative Law 583, 591-2 (distinguishing between ‘Imposition’; ‘Transnational Commitment’; 
‘External Pressure’; ‘Prestige Generated’; ‘Voluntary Adoption’; and ‘Negative Fertilisation’). 
2  David Dolowitz and David Marsh, 'Who Learns What from Whom: A Review of the Policy Transfer 
Literature' (1996) 44 Political studies 343, 346-9 (distinguishing between ‘Voluntary Transfer’; ‘Direct 
Coercive Transfer’; and ‘Indirect Coercive Transfer’); David Dolowitz and David Marsh, 'Learning From 
Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in Contemporary Policy-Making' (2000) 13 Governance 5, 13-17 
(distinguishing between ‘Lesson-drawing (perfect rationality)’; ‘Lesson-drawing (bounded rationality)’; 
‘Voluntary but driven by perceived necessity’; ‘Obligated transfer’; ‘Conditionality’; and ‘Coercive 
Transfer’). 
3  Dietmar Braun and Fabrizio Gilardi, 'Taking “Galton's Problem” Seriously: Towards a Theory of Policy 
Diffusion' (2006) 18 Journal of Theoretical Politics 298, 304-13 (distinguishing between ‘Learning’; 
‘Competitive and Cooperative Interdependence’; ‘Coercion’; ‘Common Norms’; ‘Taken-for-Grantedness’; 
and ‘Symbolic Imitation’); Jason Sharman, 'Power and Discourse in Policy Diffusion: Anti-Money 
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(a) Efficiency 
The transfer of law and policy across jurisdictions can be driven by a quest for efficiency. Transfers 
can operate as a means of speeding up the policy development process by acting as a shortcut to 
problem solving. Transfers can provide a way to deal with problems more quickly and at a lower cost 
than those associated with devising innovative indigenous responses. Jonathan Miller cites the 
example of ‘a drafter who when confronted with a new problem pulls a solution from elsewhere off the 
shelf of the library to save having to think up an original solution’.4 The temptation to engage in such 
transfer may be higher at times of crisis, where policy makers are required to respond to a policy 
problem quickly.5 Just as importantly, transfers can be a tool for achieving efficient policy outcomes. 
Lawmakers may look abroad and rationally compare the laws of other countries to choose ‘the best 
one’.6 Transfers can be a tool for developing better policies than would be possible if relying solely on 
domestic innovation. They can be a tool for achieving ‘optimum policy solutions’7 or efficient legal 
institutions.8 
It is important to note however, that transfers motivated by efficiency will not always have their desired 
outcomes. Both the quality of information relied on in the transfer process, and differences in 
institutional and legal structures can result in the ‘failure’ of imported law or policy. At one extreme 
there can be a complete rejection of the imported rule, institution or program by the receiving legal 
system—for example through legal challenge in the courts (legal failure).9 Or, there may be a simple 
failure to achieve the desired outcomes for which the law or policy was introduced (programmatic 
failure).10 In relation to the quality of the information relied upon, diffusion and policy transfer scholars 
distinguish between learning that is fully rational and learning that is bounded.11 Fully rational learning 
occurs where actors ‘choose policies after updating their beliefs about the policy effect by looking at 
the experience of others, which is then used to update prior beliefs and eventually orientate action’.12 
Bounded learning occurs where actors try to gather relevant information from observation of the 
behaviour of others, but due to a lack of information or the use of ‘cognitive shortcuts’ they do not 
reach a strictly rational outcome.13 Dolowitz and Marsh argue that perfect rationality is very rare and 
that most learning occurs in the confines of ‘bounded rationality’: 
                                                                                                                                                              
Laundering in Developing States' (2008) 52 International Studies Quarterly 635, 636 (distinguishing 
between ‘learning or lesson-drawing’; ‘coercion’; ‘mimicry or emulation’; and ‘competition effects’). 
4  Miller, above n 1, 845. 
5  Diane Stone, 'Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines' (1999) 19 
Politics 51, 53. 
6  Mathias Siems, Comparative Law (Cambridge, 2014) 192. 
7  Colin J Bennett, 'Understanding Ripple Effects: The Cross–National Adoption of Policy Instruments for 
Bureaucratic Accountability' (1997) 10 Governance 213, 226. 
8  Ugo Mattei, 'Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Economics' (1994) 14 
International Review of Law and Economics 3. 
9  See Chapter Two, n 110-12 and accompanying text. 
10  See Chapter Two, n 98 and accompanying text. 
11  Dolowitz and Marsh, 'Learning from Abroad’, above n 2, 14; Braun and Gilardi, above n 3, 306. 
12  Braun and Gilardi, above n 3, 306. 
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As such transfer may be based upon inaccurate assessment of the ‘real’ situation; in particular, it may 
be based upon incomplete or mistaken information about the nature of the policy and how it operates in 
the transferring political system or about the difference between the relevant economic, social and 
political consequences in the transferring and the borrowing systems.14 
The impact of differences in culture on the efficiency or success of transfers has been the subject of 
much debate in the legal transplant literature. These arguments were examined in Chapter Two, Part 
2.3. 
(b) Prestige 
Transfers are not always based on rational (or even semi-rational) calculations as to which foreign 
model may best address a domestic policy problem. In many cases, ‘adoption of the proposal merely 
depends on the prestige of the proposed model or of its proponents.’15 Jonathan Miller refers to such 
transfers as ‘Legitimacy-Generating Transplants’.16 Alan Watson argues that legal transplants can 
provide much-needed ‘authority’ for new legal rules.17 In this regard, Watson argues that it may often 
be difficult for legislators to get new ideas accepted by others, and the prestige of the foreign model 
can assist in garnering such acceptance. Rodolfo Sacco argues that prestige may be attached to a 
single institution or an entire legal system.18 Like those driven by efficiency, transfers driven by 
prestige considerations are largely voluntary. However, rather than being driven by rational 
considerations, prestige is used as a cognitive shortcut in selecting desirable foreign models. Instead 
of a rational assessment of the impact of the foreign model, the esteem in which the model, its 
proponents, or the source jurisdiction is held, is used as the basis for selecting the model as the 
subject of transfer. In the diffusion literature this form of transfer is described as ‘emulation’, which is 
defined ‘as the process whereby policies diffuse because of their normative and socially constructed 
properties instead of their objective characteristics.’19 
(c) Coercion or Imposition 
Transfers can involve varying degrees of coercion. In the legal literature, such transfers have been 
described as ‘externally-dictated transplants’20 or ‘legal imperialism’.21 In their most extreme form, 
transfers can be forced upon a society as the result of military conquest or expansion. In this regard, 
Michele Graziadei gives the examples of imposition of western models through the growth of colonial 
empires in Africa, the Americas, Asia and Oceania; the extension of German law to Austria in 1938; 
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the Sovietisation of the law in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II; and the spread of 
Islamic law through the conquests of Islamic rulers in the Middle Ages.22 Coercion can also occur 
through economic pressures, with a ‘foreign individual, entity or government [indicating] the adoption 
of a foreign legal model as a condition for doing business or for allowing the dominated country a 
measure of political autonomy.’23 In this broader sense, coercion is at play whenever the acceptance 
of a transfer is ‘motivated by a desire to please foreign states, individuals or entities—whether in 
acquiescence of their demands, or to take advantage of opportunities and enticements that they 
offer.’24 Both policy transfer and legal transplant scholars have observed that the distinction between 
imposed and voluntary transfers is not binary, but that transfers can be viewed as being spread 
across a spectrum, with completely voluntary transfers at one end, and completely coercive transfers 
at the other.25 
3.1.2 Forces Distinct to Interdependent Policy Fields: Cooperation and Competition 
The global nature of migration flows means that immigration policies are inherently interconnected. 
Changes in the domestic immigration policy of one country can have direct flow on effects for 
migratory flows in other countries. Rogers Brubaker observes that ‘a person cannot be expelled from 
one territory without being expelled into another, cannot be denied entry into one territory without 
having to remain in another’.26 In a similar vein, Lavenex and Uçarer argue that a more permissive 
policy in one state may lead to a reduction of immigration flows in neighbouring states, while a more 
restrictive policy may increase the number of migrants seeking entry in other states.27 This 
interconnected nature of immigration policy has fuelled somewhat contradictory forces motivating 
transfers in the immigration policy sphere. On the one hand, states are engaging in cooperative 
transfers pursuant to which immigration policies are coordinated or harmonised across countries in a 
bid to secure common goals. At the same time, however, the interconnected nature of migration flows 
also means that states are increasingly competing with each other in a bid to obtain desired outcomes 
in their immigration programs. States are competing to attract a particular international cohort of highly 
skilled workers and wealthy investors. Conversely, they are competing to deter ‘undesirable’ irregular 
migration. In both contexts, states keep a close eye on policies introduced in competitor jurisdictions, 
adapting and importing policies viewed as effective.  
This interdependence and the resulting transfers resemble the competitive and cooperative 
interdependence observed by diffusion scholars in economic regulation. Cooperative regulatory 
interdependence arises where governments benefit from having compatible policies.28 In economic 
                                                   
22  Graziadei, above n 1, 456-7. 
23  Miller, above n 1, 847. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Dolowitz and Marsh, 'Learning from Abroad’, above n 2, 13-17; Cohn, above n 1, 591. 
26  Rogers Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany (Harvard University Press, 1992) 
26. 
27  Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer, 'The External Dimension of Europeanization: The Case of 
Immigration Policies' (2004) 39 Cooperation and Conflict 417, 425. 
28  David Lazer, 'Regulatory Interdependence and International Governance' (2001) 8 Journal of European 
Public Policy 474, 476. 
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regulation, cooperation delivers increased market access and economies of scale in relation to 
production costs.29 Analogous benefits arise in the context of controlling asylum flows and irregular 
migration generally. Possible gains from harmonisation or cooperation include ‘reducing costs and 
uncertainty, minimising the deflection of asylum applicants from one destination to another, preserving 
international security, and the honouring of international obligations such as the 1951 Refugee 
Convention.’30 
Competitive interdependence occurs as governments implement measures to attract economic 
activity to their jurisdiction.31 In this context, ‘policy choices create externalities for those in the same 
competition space’.32 In the same way that the decision of one government to reduce corporate taxes 
to attract investment may place pressure on other governments to do the same, the introduction of 
certain immigration policies by one government can create externalities for other governments. For 
example, the introduction of concessions for highly skilled migrants will place pressure on competitor 
jurisdictions to follow suit, or experience a reduction in the size and quality of their skilled migration 
program. At the same time, the adoption of harsh deterrent measures targeting asylum seeker flows 
will create pressure on comparator jurisdictions to follow suit, or face a possible increase in the 
number of asylum seekers attempting to enter their territory. In the context of economic regulation 
policy, Simmons and Elkins argue that competitive interdependence means that ‘[g]overnments’ 
liberalisation policies will be influenced by the policies of their most important foreign economic 
competitors.’33 I argue that similar interdependence of migration flows leads to a prediction that 
governments’ immigration policies will be influenced by the policies of their most important 
competitors for migration flows. 
(a) Cooperation: International Refugee Law as a Case Study 
One consequence of the interconnectedness of immigration policy is that goverments are increasingly 
aware of the fact that effective management of migration flows often requires the coordination of 
policy responses across two or more states.34 Attempts to coordinate or harmonise inherently involve 
legal transfers. Immigration policies sourced in international law, regional instruments, informal 
bilateral or regional discussions, or the domestic law of one state, are imported into the domestic legal 
system of other states.  
                                                   
29  Ibid. 
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The 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Protocol are the main instruments underpinning the 
international refugee protection regime.35 Their development and subsequent implementation into the 
domestic law of state parties is one of the largest scale examples of a cooperative transfer of 
immigration law and policy. The Refugee Convention was drafted to deal with problems caused by the 
mass displacement of persons in Europe at the end of World War II.36 European nations faced the 
problem of how best to deal with large numbers of persons who were outside their countries of origin 
and for whom repatriation was not a reasonable solution. The Refugee Convention represented a 
global coordinated response to this problem. The Eurocentric goal of the Refugee Convention is 
evidenced by the fact that mandatory international protection afforded by the Convention only 
extended to refugees whose flight was prompted by a pre-1951 event within Europe.37 These 
temporal and geographical limitations were removed by the 1967 Protocol. 
The preamble of the Refugee Convention acknowledges that cooperation is essential to dealing with 
refugee flows:  
the grant of asylum may place an unduly heavy burden on certain countries, and that a satisfactory 
solution of a problem of which the United Nations has recognised the international scope and nature 
cannot therefore be achieved without international cooperation.  
The need for a coordinated response to refugee crises is underscored by the recommendation of a 
background study undertaken by the UN Department of Social Affairs in 1949 on the desirability of a 
new convention on refugees and stateless persons. The report notes that ‘[n]o Government will be 
willing to take the first step in this direction for fear of being the only one to improve the status of 
stateless persons, thus causing an influx of them into its territory.’38 
Two levels of legal transfer can be identified in relation to the Refugee Convention. First, the 
Convention itself drew heavily on previous treaties on refugees and statelessness as well as on 
definitions adopted by UN bodies. This represented a horizontal transfer, with international law being 
both the ‘source’ and ‘destination’ of the legal transfer. The subsequent incorporation of the 
Convention into the domestic law of state parties represented a ‘vertical’ legal transfer, with the legal 
rules developed in international law imported into domestic legal systems.  
                                                   
35  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugee Convention’); Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
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The drafters’ reliance on previous conventions and UN practice is apparent in the definition of 
‘refugee’. Article 1A(1) directly incorporates the refugee definitions used in earlier international 
instruments by stating that anyone considered a refugee under these earlier instruments is to be 
considered a refugee for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.39 Article 1A(2) then created a new 
general category of refugees, defined as any person who  
as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to a well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such a fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the 
country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such a fear, is 
unwilling to return to it.40 
In fact this (ostensibly new) definition drew heavily on the refugee definitions of earlier instruments. 
The use of the term ‘persecution’, as well as the requirement that the refugee be outside his or her 
country of nationality or former habitual residence, and be unable or unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of the government of his country of nationality or former nationality are all directly sourced 
from the definition of a refugee contained in the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee 
Organization (‘IRO’).41 That is not to say the convention contained nothing new. Previous definitions 
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regimes which assisted them against the United Nations, whether enjoying international status as 
refugees or not; (b) Spanish Republicans and other victims of the Falangist regime in Spain, whether 
enjoying international status as refugee or not; (c) person who were considered refugees before the 
outbreak of the second world war, for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political opinion. 2. Subject 
to the provisions of sections C and D and of Part II of this Annex regarding the exclusion of certain 
categories of persons, including war criminals, quislings and traitors, from the benefits of the 
Organization, the term “refugee” also applies to a person, other than a displaced person as defined in 
section B of this Annex, who is outside of his country of nationality or former habitual residence, and 
who, as a result of events subsequent to the outbreak of the second world war, is unable or unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of the Government of his country of nationality or former nationality. 3. 
Subject to the provisions of Section D and of Part II of this Annex, the term “refugee” also applies to 
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persons, were victims of Nazi persecution and were detained in, or were obliged to flee from, and were 
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had generally only applied to limited categories of persons of particular ethnicity or national origin. The 
adoption of a general definition of refugee (albeit with a temporal and geographical limitation) 
represented an important innovation and an important step towards a non-discriminatory definition 
that came into effect with the 1967 Protocol. 
The concept of non-refoulement, considered the cornerstone of the Convention, was also sourced 
from earlier international instruments. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention stipulates:  
1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country. 
These provisions appear to be based on Article 3 of the League of Nations’ 1933 Convention relating 
to the International Status of Refugees, which states: 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes not to remove or keep from its territory by application of 
police measures, such as expulsions or non-admittance at the frontier (refoulement), refugees who have 
been authorised to reside there regularly, unless the said measures are dictated by reasons of national 
security or public order.42 
The incorporation of the Refugee Convention into the domestic law of state parties represents 
perhaps the most large scale example of the transfer of immigration law or policy. 148 states have 
ratified the Refugee Convention and/or the Protocol.43 Like with any other international treaty, the 
means of implementing these obligations into domestic law depends on the structure of each national 
legal system. Traditionally, scholars have identified two broad approaches to the reception of 
international law into domestic national legal systems, characterising countries as either monist or 
dualist. In monist jurisdictions, international and national law are viewed as being part of a single legal 
order. As such, international law is directly applicable in the domestic legal sphere. Treaties are 
immediately effective in domestic law without the need for any domestic implementing legislation. 
States such as France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, many Latin American countries and 
Francophone African countries adopt a monist approach. In dualist jurisdictions, international and 
national law are viewed as distinct legal orders. Accordingly, treaties do not have force in domestic 
law unless executed or implemented by the legislature. This is the approach followed in most 
Commonwealth and Scandinavian jurisdictions. For example, in Australia the Refugee Convention 
                                                                                                                                                              
subsequently returned to, one of those countries as a result of enemy action, or of war circumstances, 
and have not yet been firmly resettled therein.’ 
42  Convention relating to the International Status of Refugees, signed 28 October 1933, 159 LNTS 199 
(entered into force 13 June 1935). 
43  As of 7 October 2015, 145 countries have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, while 146 have ratified 
the 1967 Protocol. Madagascar, Saint Kitts and Nevis have only ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention, 
while Cape Verde, United States, and Venezuelan have only ratified the 1967 Protocol. 
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and Protocol are implemented in domestic law through the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). As discussed in 
Chapter One, the United States adopts a mixed monist/dualist approach where some ratified treaties 
automatically have force domestically, while others do not.44 
Differences in the way the Refugee Convention and Protocol have been implemented and interpreted 
in domestic law provide an instructive example of the inevitability of change and adaptation in the 
transfer process. Partial implementation, restrictive interpretations and the adoption of different 
procedures have resulted in great variation in the way the protection afforded in the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol have been enforced in different jurisdictions. These differences, both 
between and within national legal systems, have been the subject of much academic criticism.45  
(b) Competitive Transfers: The Race for Talent 
The transfer of immigration law and policy is also being driven by competition as nations compete for 
beneficial migration outcomes. In the context of the global race for talent, nations are emulating each 
other’s policies as they compete to attract the best and brightest migrants. In recent decades, 
governments around the world have come to realise the benefits of attracting highly skilled migrants. 
There is an increasing recognition that such migrants contribute to economic growth, prevent labour-
market shortages and counteract aging demographics.46 There is also a realisation on the part of 
policy makers that they are competing with other nations to attract migrants from a finite international 
pool of highly skilled workers. Ayelet Shacher has noted that in this competitive environment, policy 
emulation is to be expected.47 This is because of an assumption on the part of immigration policy 
makers that unless they match the conditions of admission and settlement offered by other 
comparable nations, they will lose out in the global race for talent. Governments engage in transfers 
as they attempt to copy the success of other nations. In contrast to the cooperative transfers 
                                                   
44  Chapter One, n 60 and accompanying text; See also, Chapter Seven, n 109 and accompanying text. 
45  For a detailed critical study of variations in the way the Refugee Convention as implemented by the 
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub L No 96-212, 94 Stat 102 has been interpreted within the United States, see 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew Schoenholtz and Philip Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication and Proposals for Reform (NYU Press, 2009). For a similar study in context of Canada, see 
Innessa Colaiacovo, 'Not Just the Facts: Adjudicator Bias and Decisions of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada (2006-2011)' (2013) 1 Journal on Migration and Human Security 122. For an 
assessment of the ways in which the Refugee Act of 1980 diverges from international law and 
international practice, see Deborah Anker and Michael Posner, ‘The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative 
History of the Refugee Act of 1980’ 19 San Diego Law Review 9, 64-89. For a discussion of how the 
Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub L No 104-208, 110 Stat 3009 departs 
from the requirements of the Refugee Convention see Joan Fitzpatrick, ‘The International Dimensions of 
US Refugee Law’ 15 Berkeley Journal of International Law 1, 3; Jaya Ramji, 'Legislating Away 
International Law: The Refugee Provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act' (2001) 37 Stanford Journal of International Law 117. 
46  On the benefits of highly skilled migration, see George Borjas, Heaven’s Door: Immigration Policy and 
the American Economy (Princeton University Press, 1999) 190-1. 
47  Ayelet Shachar, 'The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes' 
(2006) 81 New York University Law Review 148. 
 51 
 
discussed earlier, transfer occurs in this context as the result of ‘non-cooperative action taken by 
fiercely competitive jurisdictions.’48 
The spread in the use of points systems in selecting economic migrants exemplifies this type of 
competitive transfer. Points systems are tools used by governments to identify the most desirable 
migrants from the broader pool of applicants. Under the system, governments articulate individual 
characteristics that they value most, giving each a weighted numerical value. The more important a 
factor, the higher the score assigned to that attribute. Applicants must accumulate a minimum number 
of points to be considered for entry. Early points systems focused on the human capital attributes of 
applicants that were believed to contribute to economic success and social integration. More recent 
incarnations of the points system have also incorporated demand-based factors, awarding bonus 
points for job-offers and for occupations subject to labour shortages. 
In the context of the global race for talent, points-based selection criteria are advantageous on a 
number of fronts. The system’s transparency is attractive for prospective migrants as it allows them to 
accurately assess their own chances of being accepted.49 There are obvious benefits for applicants in 
any system in which outcomes can be predicted. The system also allows for greater mobility for the 
migrant than market-based selection systems that rely solely on employer nomination.50 Some points 
systems provide a direct path to permanent residence. This provides greater certainty for applicants 
as compared to demand-driven systems, under which the path to permanent residence is linked to 
maintaining employment with the nominating employer. From the perspective of governments, points 
systems are attractive as they provide objective criteria against which governments can identify the 
best and the brightest. 
These benefits have driven the transfer of points-based tests across numerous jurisdictions. The 
original idea is said to have been devised by a Canadian overseas immigration official in the mid-
1960s.51 Canada introduced its first points system in 1967. Australia followed suit in 1979 with the 
introduction of the Numerical Multifactor Assessment System. New Zealand introduced its own 
version of the points system in 1992. More recently, the use of the system has spread to traditionally 
non-settler countries, with the governments of the United Kingdom, Czech Republic, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Austria, Singapore and Hong Kong all operating various incarnations of the points system 
to select highly skilled migrants.52 The United States and Germany have considered legislative 
proposals to introduce points systems, but to date none have been implemented into law.53 
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The transfer of points systems across these jurisdictions did not involve a simple mono-directional 
transfer, with each country adopting the Canadian model. The flexibility of the points system allowed 
each country to fine tune the system, developing their own criteria and application procedures. 
Innovations perceived as being successful were then borrowed by other countries. The resulting 
pattern of transfers is multi-event and multi-directional, with governments switching between the roles 
of borrowers and innovators. This pattern of transfer is demonstrated by the recent spread of the 
expression of interest (‘EOI’) model for selecting applicants. New Zealand, which had modelled its 
original points system on those used in Canada and Australia, pioneered the new system in 2003.54 
The innovation was then adapted by Australia, which introduced a modified EOI system in July 
2012.55 Canada, the original source of the points system, implemented the EOI system in 2015.56 The 
Canadian EOI system is based on the New Zealand model, but also incorporates some of the 
innovations developed by Australian policy makers. 
Under the EOI system, prospective immigrants can no longer apply directly for points-tested visa 
categories. Instead, they fill out an online form indicating their ‘interest’ in going to a host country as a 
permanent resident. The EOI’s are then assigned scores according to a points system, ranked and 
entered into a pool. Only candidates that best match a country’s national and regional skills needs are 
then invited to submit an immigration application. In effect, the EOI form submitted by a prospective 
immigrant is not an application itself but only a first stage in the assessment of a potential candidate. 
Not all candidates who file an expression of interest are invited to apply for a permanent resident visa. 
The EOI system is designed to address perceived design flaws in points systems. Major backlogs in 
the processing of applications have been a problem in many countries. Points systems have become 
victims of their own success, attracting more applications than government officials can process (or 
accommodate) in a timely manner. By significantly reducing the number of applications that need to 
be processed, the applications of those invited to apply can be processed much faster. It has also 
been alleged that points systems are unresponsive to labour market demands. The lack of a direct 
role for employers, combined with the long delays in processing, have been viewed as leading to a 
mismatch between the skills of entrants and labour market needs. The EOI system remedies this by 
creating a greater role for employers (and as already discussed, by reducing processing times). In its 
original incarnation in New Zealand, this was achieved by giving preference to applicants with job 
offers in the country when deciding who to invite to make a formal application. Australia adopted a 
different approach, creating an online database of all EOI applications. The Australian government 
invites those with the highest scores to apply independently. Then, employers and State and Territory 
governments are given access to the remaining EOI applicants who did not receive an invitation from 
the federal government. They can choose to sponsor applicants who best meet their needs, using the 
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 53 
 
employer or regional sponsorship visa streams. The new Canadian model adopts a very similar 
mechanism, with the creation of a ‘Job Bank’ which connects candidates with employers in Canada.57 
 (c) Competitive Transfer: The Race to Deter 
At the same time as countries are competing to attract the best and brightest, they also appear to be 
competing to deter unwanted irregular migrants. Irregular migration flows are becoming increasingly 
globalised, with migrants more willing to travel beyond their region in search of a better life. The 
success of carrier sanctions has limited the access of irregular migrants to air travel. The globalisation 
of flows is instead being driven by increasingly sophisticated and expansive people smuggling 
networks, as well as an increasing willingness on the part of irregular migrants to undertake longer 
and more perilous journeys. A Tamil asylum seeker wishing to flee Sri Lanka can choose between a 
boat journey to Australia or to Canada. A Hazara asylum seeker fleeing Afghanistan can opt between 
smuggling routes to the United States, Australia or Europe. With globalised irregular migrant flows, it 
is assumed that irregular migrants consider immigration and settlement outcomes when choosing 
destination countries. This has fostered a view in certain nations that unless they match or outdo 
deterrence measures in other comparable jurisdictions, they will be viewed as a ‘soft touch’ and 
experience an increase in irregular arrivals.  
To illustrate this point it may be useful to refer again to an example relating to the interdependence of 
economic regulatory policies: 
The key assumption in the competitive mode of regulatory interdependence is that states care about the 
competitiveness of their industry and their ability to attract investment on the one hand, and on the 
other, value reducing the ‘bad’ at which potential regulations are aimed. It is often asserted that this 
competitive dynamic will result in a ‘race to the bottom’ where states set suboptimal levels of social 
regulation to attract capital.58 
In the case of deterrent measures, we have the inverse scenario. Here, states weigh their 
competitiveness in deterring unwanted immigration against the value of abiding by their obligations 
under the Refugee Convention. The result is a ‘race to the bottom’ where states introduce 
increasingly punitive deterrent measures at the cost of protection outcomes for asylum seekers.59 
This competition to appear tough on irregular arrivals is pitched as much to a domestic audience as it 
is to potential irregular migrants. The arrival (or threat of arrival) of irregular migrants—and in 
particular unauthorised maritime arrivals in the Australian case—can be damaging to the re-election 
prospects of governments. As such, the introduction of many so-called ‘deterrent’ measures have as 
much to do with reassuring the public that the government is doing something, than actually reducing 
the number of arrivals. When one introduces a new deterrent measure, pressure mounts for other 
governments to do the same or risk being viewed as soft by their constituents.  
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The case study transfers of law and policy between the United States and Australia relating to 
mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing exemplify this type of competitive 
transfer of deterrent measures. The motivations driving these transfers and the dynamics of the 
transfer process are examined in Chapter Four and Five. These transfers, as opposed to the other 
examples discussed in this chapter, are chosen for special study because of the rich body of case law 
in both Australia and the United States challenging these policies. This case law allows for an 
assessment of the impact of differing legal structures on the successful reception of imported law and 
policy. Such an assessment would be more difficult with the examples of transfers examined in this 
chapter, which are not as legally controversial. 
3.1.3 Conclusions on the Forces Driving the Transfer of Immigration Law and Policy 
I identify five mechanisms driving the transfer of immigration law and policy across jurisdictions: 
efficiency, prestige, coercion, cooperation and competition. It is important to note that these forces are 
not mutually exclusive and often operate simultaneously in driving transfers. Efficiency often operates 
in parallel with both competition and cooperation, with the goal of these types of transfers being the 
obtainment of optimum policy outcomes. Competition and coercion also overlap, with the policy 
decisions of one government acting as external constraints on the policy decisions of other 
governments. As explored in the following chapters, the case study transfers between the United 
States and Australia in relation to policies of mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing appear motivated primarily by efficiency considerations and competitive pressure to 
implement harsh border control measures.  
3.2 Channels of Communication 
The transfer of immigration law and policy is facilitated by an ever increasing number of organisations 
and forums, both formal and informal, in which state representatives meet to discuss, share and 
coordinate immigration policy and law. These forums create policy networks that facilitate and 
accelerate the transfer process.60 These networks can be divided into five main categories: 1) 
networks operating within international organisations; 2) stand-alone international networks; 3) 
regional networks operating within non-migration-specific organisations; 4) regional consultative 
processes; and 5) ad hoc bilateral and multilateral networks.  
3.2.1 Networks Operating within International Organisations 
Given the inherently global nature of migration, it is surprising that no single multilateral structure has 
been established to regulate this area of law and policy within the United Nations.61 A number of UN 
bodies do deal with specific aspects of migration and facilitate regular intergovernmental meetings on 
                                                   
60  On the role of networks in facilitating transfers, see Diane Stone, 'Transfer Agents and Global Networks 
in the “Transnationalization” of Policy' (2004) 11 Journal of European Public Policy 545. 
61  Alexander Betts, Global Migration Governance (Oxford University Press, 2011) 1, 11. See also Jagdish 
Bhagwati, ‘Borders Beyond Control’ (2003) 82 Foreign Affairs 98; and Khalid Koser, ‘International 
Migration and Global Governance’ (2010) 16 Global Governance 301. 
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migration issues. Annual meetings are conducted by the Executive Committee (‘ExComm’) of the UN 
agency responsible for refugees and displaced persons—the Office of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees (‘UNHCR’).62 These provide an opportunity for state parties to discuss recent developments 
and issues relating to the interpretation and implementation of the Refugee Convention. The ExComm 
develops policies of sorts, in the form of ‘Conclusions’.63 In addition, UNHCR convenes ad hoc forums 
such as the Global Consultations on International Protection held in 2001 and 2002.64 The 
International Labour Organization also convenes regular meetings of state parties to discuss issues 
relating to labour migration. The drawn-out attempts to develop a binding UN treaty protecting migrant 
workers, however, illustrate the reluctance of states to cede any sovereignty in their migration control. 
The 1990 Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their 
Families took ten years for states to negotiate.65 Another 13 years were needed to secure the 
necessary ratifications for the Convention to enter into force. By early 2015 no major destination 
country for migrants was yet a party. Other UN bodies such as the UN Office of Human Rights, UN 
Population Fund; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UN Development Programme; 
and the World Health Organization engage increasingly with policy issues related to migration, but 
have yet to host regular forums on the topic. 
Although the UN does not have a general institution devoted to migration, it has held a number of ad 
hoc forums which facilitate interstate dialogue on migration governance. The first UN High-Level 
Dialogue (‘HLD’) on International Migration and Development held in 2006 represented an opportunity 
for inter-state dialogue on migration at a ministerial level. Delegates from over 130 countries attended 
to deliver statements in plenary sessions and participate in roundtable discussions. This process 
produced a consensus that such high-level dialogue should continue both inside and outside the UN 
system.66 Follow-up events include the Informal Thematic Debate on International Migration and 
Development convened by the General Assembly in 2011 and a second HLD held in October 2013. 
The theme of the 2013 HLD was to identify ‘concrete measures to strengthen coherence and 
cooperation at all levels, with a view to enhancing the benefits of international migration for migrants 
and countries alike and its important links to development, while reducing its negative impacts.’67 
The International Organization of Migration (‘IOM’) is the closest example of a multilateral governance 
body for migration. Operating outsides the UN system, it has no clear mandate provided by the 
international community, in the way most UN agencies operate under statutes that provide agencies 
                                                   
62  UNHCR was established by the UN General Assembly as a subsidiary organ under Article 22 of the 
United Nations Charter. See Guy Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in International Law 
(Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2008) 428. 
63  See Goodwin-Gill and McAdam, above n 62, 215-17, 429-30 ff. 
64  See Judith Kumin, ‘Revitalizing International Protection: The UNHCR’s Global Consultations’ (2001) 19 
Refuge 5. 
65  Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families, opened 
for signature 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3 (entered into force 1 Juley 2003) 
66  Philip Martin, Susan Martin and Sarah Cross, 'High-level Dialogue on Migration and Development' 
(2007) 45 International Migration 7, 7. 
67  International Migration and Development, GA Res 67/219, UN GAOR, 2nd Comm, 67th sess, Agenda 
Item 22(b), Supp No 49, UN Doc A/RES/67/219 (21 December 2012) para 3(a). 
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with normative authority. The IOM focuses primarily on the management of irregular migration, but 
operates first and foremost as a service provider to individual states that pay for its services. Since 
2001, the IOM has facilitated informal and non-binding consultative processes through its 
International Dialogue on Migration. The annual sessions bring together migration policy makers from 
states around the world and are generally structured around a specific theme. For example, the 2014 
Council session was devoted to the theme ‘Human Mobility and Development: Emerging Trends and 
New Opportunities for Partnerships’.68 In addition, IOM holds two intersessional workshops a year, 
which ‘present an opportunity for governmental migration policy makers and practitioners from around 
the world to have focused technical and policy exchanges on migration issues in a non-binding 
context.’69  
Other notable forums on migration related issues hosted by international organisations include the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s High Level Policy Forum on Migration, 
and the Word Trade Organization (‘WTO’) meetings on the operation of Mode 4 of the General 
Agreement in Trade in Services (which deals with the entry and stay of natural persons of a WTO 
member in the territory of another for the purpose of providing service). 
3.2.2 Stand-Alone International Networks 
A number of regular and semi-regular international forums have been convened on migration outside 
the framework of existing international organisations. With the primary goal of facilitating cooperation 
on migration management at a global level, these forums also facilitate transfer of policy ideas across 
jurisdictions. The Berne Initiative developed outside traditional institutional structures as ‘a states-
owned consultative process with the goal of obtaining better management of migration at the regional 
and global level through cooperation between states’.70 Through a series of regional and international 
consultations which took place between 2001 and 2004, the Berne Initiative developed an 
International Agenda for Migration Management (‘IAMM’), a non-binding policy framework aimed at 
facilitating cooperation and building capacity. The IAMM consists of two main components. First is the 
set of Common Understandings outlining fundamental shared assumptions and principles underlying 
migration management. Second, and more importantly in terms of their role in facilitating legal and 
policy transfer, are the ‘Effective Practices for a Planned, Balanced and Comprehensive Approach to 
Management of Migration’. These establish a non-binding best practice policy framework that 
countries can use to develop domestic migration policies and to foster greater international and 
regional cooperation.71 
                                                   
68  International Organization for Migration, International Dialogue on Migration <https://www.iom.int/idm>. 
69  Michele Klein Solomon, ‘International Migration Management through Inter-State Consultation 
Mechanisms', report prepared for UN Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and 
Development, International Organization for Migration, July 2005, UN/POP/MIG/2005/13, 5. 
70  Swiss Federal Office for Migration, International Agenda for Migration Management: Common 
Understandings and Effective Practices for a Planned, Balanced and Comprehensive Approach to the 
Management of Migration (2004) 6. 
71  Ibid. 
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Developing out of the UN’s HLD discussed above, the Global Forum on Migration and Development 
(‘GFMD’) operates as the most visible and high profile international forum for inter-state dialogue on 
migration. An informal, non-binding, voluntary, government-led process, the forum was first convened 
in 2007 and thereafter has occurred annually. With more than 160 states now participating, the forum 
focuses on the link between migration and development. It aims to ‘make new policy ideas more 
widely known, add value to existing regional consultations, and encourage an integrated approach to 
migration development at both the national and international levels’.72 Although operating outside the 
UN system, the GFMD is linked to the UN through the role of the UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary General on Migration and Development, who holds responsibility for promoting the forum.73  
3.2.3 Regional Networks Operating within Non-Migration-Specific Organisations 
Migration law and policy has been placed on the agenda of various regional economic, political and 
security institutions and organisations which address migration issues as one of a broad range of 
topics. Examples include, but are not limited to, the European Union, the Association of South East 
Asian Nations, the African Union, the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR), the South African 
Development Community, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation Forum and the G-20 summits.74 These many and varied institutions and 
processes have provided both regular and ad hoc opportunities for states to discuss migration 
policy— and to exchange ideas.  
3.2.4 Regional Consultative Processes 
Recent years have seen the proliferation of Regional Consultative Processes (‘RCPs’). These are 
regular, informal, closed-door meetings in which states with similar backgrounds and interests meet to 
discuss policy for the purpose of exchanging ideas, fostering cooperation, and developing ‘best 
practice’ models. The term ‘region’ is used loosely here. For example, Australian migration officials 
meet regularly with their counterparts at the Five Country Conferences. This forum includes the 
geographically remote, but culturally and experientially close countries of Canada, the United States, 
the United Kingdom and New Zealand. RCPs vary greatly in composition, history, purpose and 
organisational frameworks. However, they share the principal goal of facilitating regular meetings for 
the specific purpose of discussing migration issues and generating informal, non-binding agreements. 
In this respect they differ from other regional bodies where migration might be but one of many 
themes for discussion. By design, they are processes that foster the transfer of migration policy and 
practice. Their role as facilitators of policy learning and transfer is well documented,75 and is evident 
                                                   
72  United Nations News Centre, Annan Proposes Global Forum Examining Link between Migration and 
Development (6 June 2006) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=18765>. 
73  Betts, above n 61, 12. 
74  Randall Hansen, 'An Assessment of Principal Regional Consultative Processes on Migration' (Report No 
38, IOM Migration Research Series, 2010) 13; Solomon, above n 69, 1. 
75  Randall Hansen, ‘Interstate Cooperation: Europe and Central Asia’ in Gervais Appave and Frank Laczko 
(eds), Interstate Cooperation and Migration (International Organization for Migration, 2005) 17; Colleen 
Thouez and Frederique Channac, 'Shaping International Migration Policy: The Role of Regional 
Consultative Processes' (2006) 29 West European Politics 370; Bimal Ghosh, ‘New International 
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by one of the often cited goals of these institutions: ‘to build capacity to manage migration.’76 Capacity 
building involves the transfer of knowledge, skills and best practice policies. It occurs at a general 
level through the sharing, collecting and dissemination of migration information and lessons learned in 
migration management, and through specific capacity building workshops.77 
RCPs have now been established in most regions of the world. Examples include: between Europe, 
North America and Australia through the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum; in Northern and 
Central America through the Puebla Process; in Asia through the Manila Process; within Europe with 
the Budapest Process and the Mediterranean ‘5 + 5 Dialogue’; and in Africa with the ‘International 
Dialogue on Migration in West Africa’ and the ‘International Dialogue on Migration in Southern 
Africa’.78 Their success at the cost of formal binding international regimes has been explained in terms 
of the reluctance of states to lose any sovereignty over their migration policies.79 In this regard, states 
find the informal, non-binding nature of RCPs preferable as they require no loss of sovereignty or up-
front commitments and allow for easy exit.80 
3.2.5 Ad hoc Bilateral and Multilateral Networks 
Government representatives also meet in ad hoc bilateral and multilateral meetings to discuss the 
relative success and failure of migration policies. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many of the 
examples of legal and policy transfer in the migration field were preceded by informal bilateral 
meetings between officials from the source and borrower jurisdiction.81 The transfer of knowledge is 
also facilitated through exchange programs and fact-finding visits. Another prominent channel for 
communication are migration policy attaches (or Immigration Consuls) based in embassies abroad. 
These officials provide a permanent channel through which policy makers from each country can 
request information regarding the operation or implementation of migration control policies. 
3.3  Conclusion 
                                                                                                                                                              
Regime for Orderly Movements of People: What Would it Look Like?’ in Bimal Ghosh (ed), Managing 
Migration: Time for a New International Regime? (Oxford University Press, 2000) 220. Also see, Jobst 
Koehler, ‘What Government Networks do in the Field of Migration: An Analysis of Selected Regional 
Consultative Processes’ in Randall Hansen, Jobst Koehler and Jeannette Money (eds), Migration, 
Nation States, and International Cooperation (Routledge, 2011) 101, 102.  
76  International Organization for Migration, Global Meeting of Chairs and Secretariats of Regional 
Consultative Processes on Migration (RCPs) - Bangkok, 4-5 June 2009: Summary Report (International 
Organization for Migration, 2009) 3-4. 
77  Ibid 4. 
78  Betts, above n 61; Hansen, 'An Assessment of Principal Regional Consultative Processes on Migration', 
above n 74; Anne-Grethe Nielsen, 'Cooperation Mechanisms' in Ryszard Cholewinski, Richard 
Perruchoud and Euan MacDonald (eds), International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key 
Challenges (TMC Asser Press, 2007) 405.  
79  Thouez and Channac, above n 75, 377. 
80  Randall Hansen, ‘Making Cooperation Work: Interests, Incentives, and Action’ in Randall Hansen, Jobst 
Koehler and Jeannette Money (eds), Migration, Nation States, and International Cooperation 
(Routledge, 2011) 14, 21. 
81  See, for example, the transfer of mandatory detention policies from Australia to Canada discussed in 
Chapter Ten, Part 10.1.3. 
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This chapter set out the broad context in which transfers are occurring in the immigration policy 
sphere. This background is critical to situating the case study transfers of law and policy between the 
United States and Australia relating to mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing, examined in the chapters that follow. In terms of the mechanisms driving the transfer of 
immigration law and policy, I identify five overlapping mechanisms: efficiency, prestige, coercion, 
cooperation and competition. Of these forces, efficiency and competition are the most relevant to the 
case study transfers between the United States and Australia relating to mandatory detention, 
interdiction and extraterritorial processing. In terms of the forums facilitating the transfer of 
immigration law and policy, I identify five main categories: 1) networks operating within international 
organisations; 2) stand-alone international networks; 3) regional networks operating within non-
migration-specific organisations; 4) regional consultative processes; and 5) ad hoc bilateral and 
multilateral networks. This categorisation will be used as a reference point in my discussion of the 
evidence demonstrating the existence of case study transfers examined in Chapter Four and Chapter 
Five. In those chapters, I identify the specific forums in each identified category that were most 
influential in facilitating the case study transfers.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE MANDATORY DETENTION OF ASYLUM 
SEEKERS AND OTHER UNAUTHORISED ARRIVALS  
In this chapter, I set out the evidence that long-term mandatory detention measures targeting 
unauthorised arrivals in the United States and Australia evolved, at least in part, through a mutual 
process of legal and policy transfer. This is done in reference to the framework for identifying transfers 
developed in Chapter Two.1 In Part 4.1, I begin by identifying the common policy problem (or motive) 
behind the suspected transfers. Part 4.2 then examines the history of the use of long-term mandatory 
detention in each country to demonstrate parallels in the implementation and development of the 
policy in each jurisdiction. The existence of similar policy problems and resulting similar laws are not 
enough to establish that a transfer has taken place. The convergence of policies between countries 
can arise as the result of similar, but independent responses of political actors to similar policy 
problems. The third step, set out in Part 4.3, dispels this alternate hypotheses. I examine the forums 
and avenues of dialogue between the United States and Australia that provided an opportunity for 
transfers to take place. I also explore the direct evidence that supports the conclusion that law makers 
from the United States and Australia had intimate knowledge of policy developments in each other’s 
respective jurisdictions throughout the periods in which the purported transfers were occurring. The 
analysis here is informed by interviews conducted with key policy makers involved in the development 
of the policies in each jurisdiction.  
4.1 The Common Policy Problem: A Quest for Control 
The implementation of restrictive immigration measures in the United States and Australia are part of 
a wider effort on the part of the political branches in both countries to maximise control over the flow 
and processing of asylum seekers and irregular migrants. More specifically, they are tools for 
overcoming impediments to this control: court rulings generated in the judicial review of government 
action and international legal obligations towards asylum seekers arising out of the Refugee 
Convention and Protocol.2 
The United States and Australia are both countries that are generally relaxed about large-scale 
immigration. As settler states, a majority of their populations are migrants or descendants of 
migrants.3 Australia and the United States are unusual among developed nations in that they continue 
                                                   
1  See Chapter Two, Part 2.2. 
2  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugee Convention’); Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, 
opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) (‘Protocol’).  
3  UN data from 2013 indicated that proportion of foreign born persons was 24.7% in Australia and 12.1% 
in the United States: United Nations Population Division, Trends in International Migrant Stock: The 
2013 Revision, UN Doc POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013 (September 2013) Table 3. In terms of the 
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to augment their population bases through the conduct of a selective migration program. In both 
countries, however, elected officials view the ability of the government to exercise effective control 
over the admission of aliens as essential to the continued acceptance of migrants. Historically, the 
right to control territorial borders has been the preserve of sovereign states and indeed has been 
regarded as the ‘last major redoubt of unfettered national sovereignty’.4 This prerogative power to 
exclude non-citizens from entry was affirmed by the Privy Council in 1881 in Musgrove v Chun 
Teeong Toy.5 In the 1889 US Supreme Court case of Chae Chan Ping, Field J reasoned that the 
power to exclude aliens ‘is an incident of every independent nation… If it could not exclude aliens it 
would be to that extent subject to the control of another power.’6 The principle was reiterated three 
years later in Nishimura Ekiu v United States, where the Court stated: 
It is an accepted maxim of international law that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in 
sovereignty, and essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, 
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe.7 
A similar view still permeates the contemporary discourse on immigration control in both the United 
States and Australia. The commitment to the sovereign right to exclude underpinned Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard’s statement in 2001 that ‘[w]e will decide who comes to this country and the 
circumstances in which they come.’8 
The view of successive governments in both Australia and the United States has been that public 
acceptance of migrants is contingent on a public perception that the government is exercising its 
sovereignty effectively by securing the nation’s borders. Former Australian Minister for Immigration, 
Phillip Ruddock, summed up this view with his argument that ‘to maintain public confidence in 
immigration programs, you need to be able to demonstrate that the people who get here are those 
who come essentially through the front door and not through the window.’9 Former Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard expressed a similar view when he claimed that his tough border control policies 
led to ‘a sharp increase in support in the community for orthodox immigration’.10 Such views are 
                                                                                                                                                              
proportion of persons who are descendants of migrants, all but the indigenous population hail from 
migrant stock. Colonial immigration to the land mass that constitutes the modern day United States 
began in the 1600s. The first cohort of white settlers arrived in Australia in 1788. 
4  David Martin, ‘Effects of International Law on Migration Policy and Practice: The Uses of Hypocrisy’ 
(1989) 23 International Migration Review 547, 547. 
5  Musgrove v Chun Teeong Toy [1891] AC 272. 
6  Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581, 603-4 (1889). 
7  Nishimura Ekiu v United States, 142 US 651, 659 (1892). 
8  John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, speech delivered at the Federal Liberal Party Campaign 
Launch, Sydney (28 October 2001). 
9  ABC Radio National, Australia Talks Back with Sandy McCutcheon, 5 December 2002 (Hon Phillip 
Ruddock); cited in Murray Goot and Ian Watson, ‘Population, Immigration and Asylum Seekers: Patterns 
in Australian Public Opinion’ (Parliamentary Library Pre-Election Policy Unit Report, Parliamentary 
Library, May 2011) 28. 
10  Quoted in George Megalogenis, ‘Trivial Pursuit: Leadership and the End of the Reform Era’ (2010) 40 
Quarterly Essay 1, 22; See also, see John Hirst, ‘Girt by Sea: Correspondence’ (2002) 6 Quarterly 
Essay 89, 91 (stating the view that ‘[a] tough stand on border control increases support for the official 
migration program’). 
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evidenced also in Australian polling data. A 2001 study found a direct correlation between an increase 
in the number of asylum seeker arrivals and a decrease in public support for immigration.11  
A similar assumption is evident in the debate surrounding comprehensive immigration reform in the 
United States. Many Republicans have conditioned their support for a regularisation program for 
undocumented migrants living in the United States on securing the US-Mexico border. This appears 
to reflect US public opinion, with a 2014 poll finding that most Americans would support a path to 
regularisation for undocumented migrants, but only if the border was strengthened to prevent future 
‘illegal’ migration.12  
Different explanations have been advanced to explain this fixation on border control. For some, 
sovereign control of state boundaries is equated with the very idea of nationhood. Such a view is 
apparent in President Ronald Reagan’s reputed statement that ‘a nation that cannot control its 
borders is not a nation.’13 This quest for control over borders has also been justified in terms of 
national security. For example, in Chae Chan Ping, Grey J argued that without the power to exclude 
aliens, the United States would be unable to defend itself against ‘vast hordes of [a foreign] people 
crowding in upon us.’14 Aleinikoff et al put it this way: 
Foreign powers could send agents provocateurs or suicide bombers to disrupt American institutions; 
developing nations could send workers to take advantage of American jobs; other countries could seek 
to solve their problems of overpopulation by exporting people to the United States. Perhaps to lose 
control over one’s borders is to ‘defeat the venture at hand’ by losing our ability to achieve the objects 
for which the Constitution was established: ‘to ensure domestic Tranquillity, provide for the common 
defense, promote the general Welfare.’15 
A related explanation views arguments about sovereignty over borders as stemming from xenophobia 
or racism.16 The majority of irregular arrivals in Australia and the United States come from particular 
ethnic backgrounds. In the United States, most come from Latin American or Caribbean nations. In 
Australia, the mix has changed over the years, but the vast majority have come from East Asia, the 
                                                   
11  Goot and Watson, above n 9, 29. 
12  Rasmussen Reports, 7% Say Feds Very Likely to Close Border If Immigration Plan Becomes Law (4 
February 2014)  
<http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/current_events/immigration/january_2014/7_
say_feds_very_likely_to_close_border_if_immigration_plan_becomes_law>.  
13  President Ronald Reagan is often credited for having said words to this effect sometime in the 1980s. 
See Robert Owens, The Constitution Failed: Dispatches from the History of the Future (Xulu Press, 
2010) 159; Cf, Patrick J Buchanan, A Republic, Not an Empire: Reclaiming America’s Destiny (Regnery 
Publishing, 1999) 373 (quoting the Reagan as having said ‘a country that cannot control its borders isn’t 
really a country anymore’).  
14  Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581, 606 (1889). 
15  Alexander Aleinikoff et al, Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy (Thompson Reuters, 7th ed, 
2012) 193. 
16  See, for example, Stuart Rintoul, ‘Emerging from the Shadows to Face New “Crisis of Whiteness’”, The 
Australian, 6 May 2002, 8 (questioning ‘was it border protection or … a deeper racism that underpinned 
the [recent] closing of Australia’s doors?’). 
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Middle East, South Asia and Africa.17 These arrivals have been viewed by some elements of the 
public as a threat to the US and Australian white Anglo-Saxon identities.18 As Myron Weiner notes: 
In many countries, citizens have become fearful that they are now being invaded not by armies and 
tanks but by migrants who speak other languages, worship other gods, belong to other cultures, and 
who, they fear, will take their jobs, occupy their land, live off the welfare system, and threaten their way 
of live, their environment and even their polity.19  
4.1.1  Impediments to Control 
Putting aside the factors driving public desire for effective control measures, the policy imperative 
from the perspective of politicians remains the same—to control the flow of unauthorised arrivals, or 
risk electoral backlash.20 In both the United States and Australia, the political branches have come up 
against two primary constraints. First, are the obligations created by the Refugee Convention and 
Protocol, and other human rights instruments. Second, is each country’s judiciary, which at times has 
been viewed as overly sympathetic to irregular migrants and asylum seekers. 
The non-refoulement obligations in the Refugee Convention and Protocol, and other human rights 
instruments, operate to qualify the otherwise absolute nature of the sovereign power to control 
immigration. Article 33 of the Refugee Convention requires that state parties refrain from returning a 
refugee to a country where she or he may face persecution for a Convention reason.21 Similar non-
refoulement provisions in other human rights instruments act as additional constraints on the ability to 
exclude and/or return non-citizens.22 Mary Crock, writing in relation to Australia, frames the policy 
predicament faced by the government in the following way: 
                                                   
17  On the ethnic composition of the most recent wave of maritime asylum seekers in Australia see Sara 
Davies, ‘FactCheck: Are Asylum Seekers Really Economic Migrants? The Conversation (2 July 2013) 
<http://theconversation.com/factcheck-are-asylum-seekers-really-economic-migrants-15601>. Note that 
the make-up of persons who arrive legally, then over-stay their visas is very different. The highest 
number of visa overstayers in 2013 came from China (7690), Malaysia (6420), the US (5220) and the 
UK (3780): DIBP, Australia’s Migration Trends 2012-13 (2014) 78. 
18  Michael Welch, Detained: Immigration laws and the Expanding INS Jail Complex (Temple University 
Press, 2002) 13 (citing concerns of certain nativists that US immigration policy is diluting the whiteness 
of American society and culture). For an Australian perspective, see Danielle Every and Martha 
Augoustinos, ‘Constructions of Racism in the Australian Parliamentary Debates on Asylum Seekers’ 
(2007) 18 Discourse and Society 411. 
19  Myron Weiner, The Global Migration Crisis: Challenge to States and to Human Rights (Harper Collins, 
1995) 2. 
20  The validity of this assumption is explored in Chapter Ten, Part 10.2.4. 
21  The Refugee Convention and Protocol combine to define a refugee as any person who ‘owing to a well-
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’. See the Refugee Convention, art 
1A(2); and the Protocol, art 1(A)(2).  
22  See, for example, Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) 
art 3 (express prohibition against the expulsion, return or extradition of a person to a place where he or 
she would be in danger of being subjected to torture); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 
6 and 7 (implied prohibition against the expulsion or return of a person to a territory where they face a 
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For a Parliament used to controlling every aspect of the migration programme, refugee claimants offer a 
special challenge. Asylum seekers represent a direct threat to the orderly conduct of a migration 
programme because they come uninvited and yet mandate consideration because of the obligations 
created by Australia's ratification of the 1951 Convention.23 
While irregular migrants can be expelled or returned upon detection, the obligations contained in the 
Refugee Convention and Protocol mean that asylum seekers cannot be removed until their refugee 
claim has been considered. In both Australia and the United States, it is no coincidence that public 
paranoia about loss of border control has been highest at times when these countries have 
experienced high flows of asylum seekers. Peter Schuck provides the following account of the political 
fall out in the United States resulting from the arrival of boats carrying more than 150,000 Cuban and 
Haitian asylum seekers in 1980-124: 
The phenomenon of first-asylum claiming dramatized a new, politically explosive fact: the United States 
was increasingly vulnerable to uncontrollable external forces. Many Americans feared in this 
vulnerability a diminution—or at least a redefinition—of the nation’s sovereignty. The United States, it 
seemed no longer controlled its own destiny; its fate was now inexorably linked to the rest of the world.25 
Public unease with unauthorised asylum seeker arrivals, in particular those making the journey by 
sea, has created a pattern of harsh policies. Australia and the United States have both introduced 
punitive measures in direct response to specific cohorts of asylum seeker boat arrivals. 
Increasingly, the political branches in both Australia and the United States have come to view the 
judiciary as undermining effective migration control. The independence and power of the judiciary in 
the two countries is cemented in the principles of the rule of law and judicial review. As constitutional 
democracies, the courts in Australia and the United States can declare statutes passed by federal and 
state legislatures unconstitutional.26 Further, in both countries, the courts are empowered to review 
administrative action by the executive branch of government. In carrying out this function, US and 
Australian courts do not remake decisions on their merits. Rather they check for administrative error, 
such as whether the administrative decision maker has interpreted the relevant legal provisions in the 
correct way. If there has been an error, the court can quash the decision and refer the matter to the 
original decision maker for reconsideration according to the proper principles. 
                                                                                                                                                              
real risk of irreparable harm, such as a threat to the right to life or torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment); Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 
November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) arts 6 and 37 (implied prohibition 
against the expulsion or return of a child where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a 
real risk of irreparable harm). 
23  Mary Crock, 'Apart from Us or Part of Us? Immigrants’ Rights, Public Opinion and the Rule of Law' 
(1998) 10 International Journal of Refugee Law 49, 67. 
24  See below nn 65-8 and accompanying text for further discussion of this incident.  
25  Peter Schuck, Citizens, Strangers and In-Betweens (Westview Press, 1998) 102. 
26  This principle was first established in the US context in Marbury v Madison, 5 US 137 (1803). The 
Australian High Court often refers to Marbury when discussing the basis of Australian judicial review. 
For example, in 1951 Justice Fullager stated that ‘in [Australia’s] system the principle of Malbury v 
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In the United States, somewhat conflicting trends can be identified in the judiciary’s approach to 
reviewing immigration related matters.27 By consistently maintaining that Congress has ‘plenary 
power’ over immigration,28 the courts have generally showed deference to Congress when assessing 
the constitutional validity of immigration laws. The result is that unauthorised arrivals have generally 
been excluded from claiming constitutional protections in the immigration context. On the other hand, 
when reviewing the application of immigration statutes, courts have tended to interpret the laws in a 
manner that favours aliens.29  
Developed by the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth century, the plenary power doctrine affirms 
‘Congress’s absolute substantive power to deny aliens entry to the United States or to expel them 
from its territories, unconstrained by any judicially enforceable constitutional limits.’30 Relying on this 
doctrine, US courts have declined to review federal immigration law for compliance with substantive 
constitutional restraints. The result has been a line of cases in which the judiciary has upheld 
immigration provisions that explicitly discriminate against entrants based on factors which have 
included race, gender and legitimacy.31 While the principle has been qualified in more recent years,32 
it remains rare for the courts to uphold constitutional challenges to decisions concerning the 
admission or expulsion of aliens. 
The approach of the judiciary is starkly different when interpreting the application of immigration laws 
(as opposed to their validity). Here, the courts have frequently adopted a more critical approach in the 
interpretation and application of statutes and often do so for ‘policy reasons’.33 This ‘alien friendly’ 
approach to interpreting immigration law has fostered a view in government that judicial review 
constrains efficient immigration enforcement. This tension between the judiciary and the political 
branches can be traced as far back as to the approach of the courts in interpreting the Chinese 
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Exclusion Acts of the late 19th Century.34 While the US Supreme Court relied on the plenary power 
doctrine to uphold the validity of what can only be described as racist laws,35 in many cases federal 
courts rejected the executive’s interpretations of various provisions of the Exclusion Acts, overruling 
the admission officers.36 Each time the litigation strategy of a Chinese applicant succeeded, Congress 
amended the Exclusion Acts to plug the holes.37 This pattern of ’tit for tat’ law making, has persisted in 
the United States to this day.38 
A similar pattern is evident in the judicial review of immigration laws in Australia. Given that the 
Australian Constitution provides little in the way of individual rights protection, immigration legislation 
is rarely struck down on constitutional grounds.39 Yet, attempts by the political branches to curtail 
judicial review of immigration decisions appear to be based on a view that the judiciary is overly 
sympathetic to immigration applicants when reviewing immigration decisions. Attempts to limit judicial 
review and curial responses have seen ‘a battle royal’ develop over the role the courts should play in 
the review of migration decisions.40 Unlike in the United States, this friction is relatively new in 
Australia. Historically, migrants in Australia fared badly because of limitations of the prerogative 
writs41—and the deference shown by the courts to Ministers of the Crown.42 The situation changed 
with the creation of the Federal Court of Australia43 and the passage of the Administrative Decision 
(Judicial Review) Act in 1977.44 The new legislation cut through the technicalities of the writ system 
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Review of Administrative Action (Thompson Reuters, 4th ed, 2009), 29-31, 40-4. 
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and provided a neat list of the circumstances in which either decisions45 or conduct engaged in for the 
purpose of making a decision46 could be rendered unlawful. The newly appointed Federal Court 
judges made rulings that had far reaching effects on administrative decision making, preventing 
deportations and in one case ordering officials to return an individual who it was claimed had been 
removed from the country illegally.47 Parliament reacted by passing a series of bills aimed at limiting 
or completely ousting judicial review. The High Court has responded by striking out or reading down 
these provisions.48 Crock and Berg argue that successive governments ‘have come to see the courts 
as political subversives which preference the human rights of individuals over the policy objectives of 
those elected to govern.’49 This has been most apparent in the curial review of asylum determinations, 
where there has been a perception that some judges are searching for loopholes to deliberately 
‘undermine the government’s refugee policies.’50 The politicians’ desire to ‘regain’ control over 
immigration was summed up by then Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock: 
It is the government, not some sectional interests, or loud intolerant individual voices, or ill-defined 
international interests, or, might I say, the courts that determines who shall and shall not enter this 
country, and on what terms… [T]he courts have reinterpreted and rewritten Australian law—ignoring the 
sovereignty of Parliament and will of the Australian peoples.51 
4.2 The Policy Response: Mandatory Detention 
The policies of long-term mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing of asylum 
seekers were introduced in the United States and Australia as a direct response to the policy dilemma 
outlined above. These policies represent attempts by the political branches to exert maximum control 
over the movement of asylum seekers and side-step or mitigate the impediments imposed by the 
Refugee Convention and by judicial oversight. Policies of interdiction and extraterritorial processing, 
examined in Chapter Five, express the most extreme manifestation of this quest for control. These 
measures physically block irregular migrants (including asylum seekers) from accessing state 
territory. They also purport to deny access to domestic protections such as judicial review. The 
practice of mandatory detention seeks to maximise control over irregular migrants who manage to 
enter the state’s territory. While this policy does not necessarily subvert non-refoulement obligations, it 
does seek to exert maximum control over asylum seekers while their status is being determined.  
In both the United States and Australia, detention measures have been accompanied by efforts to 
create zones of exception. Detained persons have been designated, either by geographic location of 
detention or by mode of entry, to have fewer substantive and procedural rights than immigrants who 
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enter the country with authorisation. Making detention mandatory for certain classes of asylum 
seekers has the effect of restricting judicial review of the decision to detain. Under a discretionary 
system, a decision maker must undertake an assessment as to whether detention is authorised or 
appropriate in a given circumstance. This decision may be subject to judicial review. In a mandatory 
system, courts can only examine whether a person falls under a category of persons declared subject 
to mandatory detention. In addition to exerting direct physical control over irregular migrants, 
detention and other restrictive policies also purport to have a strong indirect effect. All are designed to 
act as deterrents to future irregular arrivals. Equally important is the message that these policies 
convey to the public. They are all highly visible measures that reassure the public that the government 
is in control of the state’s borders.  
In the common law tradition inherited by both the United States and Australia, the deprivation of a 
person’s liberty for punitive purposes can generally occur only by judicial order. The detention of 
aliens has developed as an uneasy exception to this rule. Governments frame their actions as part of 
an inherent sovereign power to exclude persons with no right to enter or remain in a country. It is 
argued that the incarceration of irregular arrivals is not punishment, but a measure justified to 
preserve the integrity of the border and identity of the nation state. 
The administrative detention of immigrants falls into three main categories. First is the incarceration of 
persons seeking admission pending a determination of their claim to enter. Such detention can be 
initiated after a person presents at the border or upon detection after unauthorised entry into the 
territory. The second group of detainees are persons who have been granted admission, but who face 
removal because of an event or action occurring after entry. This might be due to the violation of an 
explicit condition on which they were granted entry (temporal or other). It may be the result of criminal 
or morally questionable conduct. The third category of detention occurs after a final determination that 
a person is removable. Detention characterised as falling under the first (determining admissibility) 
and second (pending determination as to deportability) transitions to this third category once a final 
negative decision relating to admissibility/deportability is made. The discussion in this chapter is 
primarily concerned with the first category: detention pending determination of eligibility, although 
incidental reference will also be made to individuals who have had their claim to enter rejected and 
who have transitioned into the third category.52 
4.2.1 United States 
United States law has included provisions for the detention of aliens seeking entry since 1891. The 
Immigration Act of 1891 empowered officers to ‘inspect all such aliens’ or ‘to order a temporary 
removal of such aliens for examination at a designated time and place, and then and there detain 
them until a thorough inspection is made’.53 These provisions lead to the creation of the ‘entry fiction’, 
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stating that transfer of an alien from a vessel to shore for examination ‘shall not be considered a 
landing during the pendency of such examination.’54 Daniel Wilsher comments: 
This was a critical legal (and constitutional) innovation because it meant that those incarcerated must be 
treated as if they were not there. This was both an attempt to treat the place of detention as if it were 
simply an extension of being held onboard ship, but also something more serious. The concept of being 
physically detained within the territorial land-mass of the United States but not being considered legally 
present was radical. It suggested a type of limbo—with the detention centre constituting perhaps an 
extra-legal space—putting immigrants beyond the reach of constitutional norms, pending a final 
executive decision to land or deport them.55 
In the face of apparent corruption and a softness on the part of federal immigrant inspectors, which 
was seen to be resulting in the entry of unlawful persons who should have been excluded, the 
government introduced a stricter detention regime in the Immigration Act of 1893. These provisions 
confirmed that ‘it shall be the duty of every inspector of arriving alien immigrants to detain for special 
inquiry… every person who may not appear to him to be clearly and beyond doubt entitled to 
admission’.56 Wilsher explains the importance of the change: 
It represents the first time that any legislature had dictated that detention must be used as a mode of 
procedure in administering the immigration laws. This purported to remove even the discretion to 
determine the necessity and suitability of detention.57  
The 1891 and 1893 Acts made two key innovations that have featured strongly in the immigration 
detention policy of the United States and Australia right through to the present day. The first is the 
entry fiction. Through the creation of exceptional zones, or designation based on mode of arrival, 
certain classes of entrants are denied access to normal domestic legal safeguards. The second are 
attempts to remove independent assessment as to the suitability of detention in a given case by 
prescribing ‘mandatory’ or ‘automatic’ detention of certain classes of persons. The latter measure 
serves the same purpose today as in 1893. It precludes the judicial review of assessments that would 
occur under an individualised assessment model. The only avenue to challenge such detention is by 
challenging the substantive decision that a person is not authorised to enter. 
Between 1891 and 1954, the United States maintained a policy of detaining would-be immigrants 
upon arrival. The two largest detention facilities were on Ellis Island in New York Harbor and Angel 
Island in San Francisco Bay. Most immigrants were detained only briefly for medical checks before 
being either released into the United States or sent back to their country of origin.58 Others, suspected 
of being subversives or criminals, or believed likely to become public charges, were detained for 
longer periods if deportation was impractical.59 The United States abandoned presumptive detention 
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in 1954.60 This move coincided with the introduction of a universal visa system that required all non-
citizens to hold a visa in order to be admitted.61 Visas were issued by US consuls stationed abroad 
who would screen prospective immigrants.62  
After 1954 the vast majority of unauthorised arrivals were released on parole. Only those deemed 
likely to flee or those whose freedom of movement could endanger national security or public safety, 
were detained beyond the initial inspection phase.63 The liberal release policy was explained by the 
Supreme Court in Leng May Ma v Barber: 
The parole of aliens seeking admission is simply a device through which needless confinement is 
avoided while administrative proceedings are conducted… Physical detention of aliens is now the 
exception, not the rule, and is generally employed only as to security risks and those likely to abscond… 
Certainly this policy reflects the humane qualities of an enlightened civilisation.64 
The arrival of a large number of Haitian and Cuban unauthorised boat arrivals led to a reconsideration 
of the detention policy in 1980-81. An announcement by then-Cuban President Fidel Castro that those 
who wished to leave Cuba were free to do so, led to more than 125,000 Cubans making their way to 
the United States. Cuban asylum seekers had traditionally been treated more favourably than arrivals 
from other countries, enjoying a special path to permanent residence through the Cuban Adjustment 
Act.65 Given the unprecedented number of arrivals and reports that some of those making the journey 
had been deliberately released from Cuban jails and mental institutions, the United States 
government began screening all arrivals before releasing them into the community. These detentions 
were carried out under the existing detention framework, with persons held pending a decision as to 
whether they posed a threat to the community. While the majority were quickly released, a small 
minority, deemed inadmissible, were held in long-term detention.66 
While the Cubans were dealt with using the existing detention provisions, the arrival of a 
comparatively smaller cohort of Haitian asylum seekers triggered a change in detention policy and 
reversion to a more restrictive parole policy. Haitian asylum seekers fleeing the repressive regime of 
Jean-Claude ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier began arriving in southern Florida in the 1960s and their numbers 
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slowly increased throughout the 1970s.67 The number of arrivals peaked in 1980, with 15,093 Haitians 
interdicted at sea en route to the United States in that year.68 In May 1981, the administration of 
President Reagan implemented an informal rule that provided for the mandatory detention of all 
Haitians arriving by boat without documentation. The new policy was based on recommendations 
made by the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy.69 The Commission 
recommended ‘that an interagency body be established to develop procedures, including plans for 
opening and managing federal processing centres, for handling possible asylum emergencies.’70 The 
need for processing centres was justified on the following grounds:  
 Ineligible asylum applicants would not be released into communities where they might later evade 
US efforts to deport them or create costs for local governments; 
 A deterrent would be provided for those who might see an asylum claim as a means of 
circumventing US immigration law. Applicants would not be able to join their families or obtain work 
while at the processing centre.71 
The new detention policy was struck down by the courts on a technical point. The government 
authorities had not followed the required administrative rule making procedures when introducing the 
rule.72 In response, a fresh regulation was introduced (this time following the correct procedures) that 
expanded mandatory detention to apply to all aliens arriving without proper documentation.73 Section 
235(b)(2)(A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (‘INA’) (which has been in force since 1952) states 
that an applicant for admission who ‘is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted shall be 
detained.’74 Section 212(d)(5) granted the Attorney General discretion to parole rather than detain any 
applicant for admission ‘for emergent reasons or reasons deemed strictly in the public interest.’75 The 
1982 changes amended the regulations implementing this section to provide that ‘[a]ny alien who 
appears to the inspecting officer to be inadmissible, and who arrives without documents or who 
arrives with documentation which appears to be false, altered, or otherwise invalid… shall be 
detained.’76 The regulations made it clear that while parole was still available for ‘emergent reasons’ 
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or on ‘public interest’ grounds, such conditional release was restricted to limited enumerated 
circumstance. ‘Emergent reasons’ were defined to exist when the immigrant had a serious medical 
condition and continued detention would not be appropriate.77 Parole was only considered to be 
‘strictly in the public interest’ if a person posed ‘neither a security risk nor a risk of absconding’, and 
was pregnant, a juvenile, an infant, a beneficiary of an immigrant visa petition filed by a close relative, 
or a witness to a judicial, administrative or legislative proceeding.78  
The detention provisions were justified with reference to their deterrent effect. Incarceration was no 
longer framed only in terms of facilitating exclusion or deportation, but was instead used to send a 
signal to other aliens attempting to make the journey to the United States. The reasons explaining the 
adoption of the new rule published by the Immigration and Nationality Service (‘INS’) in 1982 stated 
that ‘[t]he Administration has determined that a large number of Haitian nationals and others are likely 
to attempt to enter the United States illegally unless there is in place a detention and parole 
regulation.’79 Despite the apparent restrictiveness of the regulations dealing with parole, there were 
significant fluctuations in the way release decisions were made.80 This was in part the result of a 
shortage of detention facilities. There was simply not enough space to hold all persons that were 
liable to incarceration under the new regulations.81  
In the early 1990’s, a number of initiatives were introduced to ease pressure on detention space and 
to encourage more uniform application of parole regulation. The INS implemented a new priority 
system in February 1991. The detention of criminal aliens was assigned the highest priority, followed 
by unauthorised arrivals.82 In April 1992, the Asylum Pre-Screening Officer Program (‘APSO’) was 
rolled out to screen credible asylum seekers for parole from detention.83 Factors considered included 
whether the applicant’s asylum claim was credible and her identity established, whether they had 
community ties, and whether any statutory bar would preclude ultimate grant of asylum.84 These 
policies failed in their goal of bringing more consistency to parole determinations. A 1996 internal 
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evaluation of the APSO program found that it operated ‘inefficient[ly], inconsistent[ly] from district to 
district’ and ‘unevenly around the country.’85  
Mandatory immigration detention laws targeting irregular arrivals were expanded in the second half of 
the 1990s.86 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (‘IIRIRA’) 
broadened the classes of arriving aliens subject to mandatory detention and reduced access to 
parole.87 It introduced new expedited removal procedures which remain in force today. These allow 
aliens who arrive in the United States without valid documentation or with false documentation to be 
ordered removed without further hearings, reviews or appeals.88 Judicial review of expedited removal 
decisions is expressly barred.89 Aliens who indicate an intention to apply for asylum are referred to an 
asylum officer for a ‘credible fear’ interview.90 Only if the asylum officer agrees the claim is credible, 
can the person pursue their application for asylum through regular removal procedures.  
All persons subject to expedited removal procedures are to be mandatorily detained.91 Those awaiting 
their ‘credible fear’ determination and those found not to hold such a fear have no access to parole.92 
Asylum seekers who establish a ‘credible fear’ of persecution are no longer subject to expedited 
removal proceedings, but rather regular removal proceedings.93 As such, they may be eligible for 
parole under the normal parole criteria.94 INS policy issued shortly after the new laws were introduced 
stated that asylum seekers who established a ‘credible fear’ of persecution should normally be 
released.95 However, given the continued wide discretion given to individual INS district directors, this 
policy was not uniformly enforced across the nation, with many reports of asylum seekers being 
detained for prolonged periods.96 Under the original regulations, expedited removal only applied to 
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INS policy to favour release of aliens who have been found to have a ‘credible fear’ of persecution). 
96  See statement of Wendy Young, Director of Government Relations and US Programs, Women’s 
Commission for Refugee Women and Children, in Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on 
 74 
 
arriving aliens at ports of entry.97 In November 2002, it was expanded to aliens arriving by sea who 
are not admitted or paroled.98 In August 2004, it was further expanded to apply to certain unadmitted 
aliens found within 100 air miles of the US southwest land border.99 
A number of policy initiatives removed access to parole for asylum seekers who had met the ‘credible 
fear’ threshold. The impact on those asylum seekers targeted by these policies was mandatory 
detention without parole for the entire duration of the status determination procedures. In 2001, the 
INS Deputy Commissioner implemented a new parole policy targeting Haitian boat arrivals. The policy 
stated that no Haitian should be paroled from detention except in the most demanding circumstances, 
and even then, only with approval from Washington.100 The Justice Department confirmed that the 
change of detention was needed to ‘prevent against a potential mass migration to the United 
States’.101 This policy of detaining Haitian asylum seekers for the entire duration of their status 
determinations was reinforced by then-Attorney General Ashcroft in April 2003. In the decision issued 
in Matter of D-J-, the Attorney General determined that release on bond pending the determination of 
the asylum claim of a Haitian man, or ‘similarly situated undocumented seagoing migrants’ was 
unwarranted due to ‘adverse consequences for national security and sound immigration policy’ that 
would result from such a release.102 The express purpose of such detention was the deterrence of 
future arrivals: 
the release of [the] respondent and hundreds of others from the October 29 migrant group would 
strongly undercut any resultant deterrent effect arising from the [expedited removal] policy. The 
persistent history of mass migration from Haiti, in the face of concerted statutory and regulatory 
measures to curtail it, confirms that even sporadic successful entries fuel further attempts.103 
A similar policy directive was introduced as part of ‘Operation Liberty Shield’ in March 2003, targeting 
asylum seekers from 33 Arab Muslim countries.104 The directive stipulated that asylum seekers from 
the listed countries were to be mandatorily detained, without parole, for the entire duration of their 
status determination. It was introduced as part of a series of post-9/11 security measures and 
                                                                                                                                                              
the Judiciary, 'An Overview of Asylum Policy' (US Senate, 107th Congress, 2001) 36. In her testimony 
before the committee, Ms Young explains that there were 33 different detention policies across the 
United States, with some INS districts being more generous than others: at 65. 
97  Department of Justice, ‘Inspection of Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens 
Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures; Final Rule’, 62 Fed Reg 10,312 (6 March 1997). 
98  Department of Justice, ‘Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under 
§235(b)(1)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act’, 67 Fed Reg 68,924 (13 November 2002). 
99  Department of Homeland Security, ‘Designated Aliens for Expedited Removal’, 69 Fed Reg 48,877 (11 
August 2004). 
100  Subcommittee on Immigration of the Committee on the Judiciary, 'The Detention and Treatment of 
Haitian Asylum Seekers' (United States Senate, 107th Congress, 2002) 1. 
101  Ibid 2, 30. 
102  In re D-J-, 23 I & N Dec 572, 579 (Att’y Gen 2003). For an analysis of this decision see Judy Amorosa, 
'Dissecting In Re D-J-: The Attorney General, Unchecked Power, and the New National Security Threat 
Posed by Haitian Asylum Seekers' (2005) 38 Cornell International Law Journal 263. 
103  In re D-J-, 23 I & N Dec 572, 580 (Att’y Gen 2003). 
104  Elizabeth Shaffer-Wishner, Implications of Post-9/11 Immigration Policy for Muslim Americans: National 
Security and Human Rights Considerations (Master of Public Policy Thesis, University of Minnesota, 
2011), Appendix C. 
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targeted countries where al Qaeda or related terrorist groups were thought to operate. In the face of 
widespread public criticism, the policy was abandoned after only one month.105  
Beginning in 2005, there was a significant increase in the number of families subject to detention. A 
1996 settlement agreement arising out of a class action challenge to the detention of minors 
stipulated that children in immigration proceedings be placed in the ‘least restrictive setting’.106 This 
had resulted in a general policy favouring release for all minors, whether unaccompanied or 
otherwise. This changed in 2005, with the George W Bush administration claiming that the 1996 
settlement only applied to unaccompanied minors. As a result, there was a marked increase in the 
number of children and their mothers detained for the entire duration of their status determination 
procedures. Most were held at the new T Don Hutto Family Detention Centre in Texas. It was not long 
before reports of serious mistreatment emerged in relation to this facility. These included claims that 
described ‘young children forced to wear prison jumpsuits, to live in dormitory housing, to use toilets 
exposed to public view and to sleep with the lights on… while being denied access to appropriate 
schooling.’107  
In response to reports of endemic problems in the detention system, including repeated incidents of 
human rights violations and denial of basic medical care, the administration of President Obama 
embarked on a program of detention reform.108 A series of changes were announced in 2009 with the 
purpose of addressing human rights concerns regarding detainees in the immigration detention 
system.109 Notable initiatives included the reduction of the use of penal facilities for immigration 
detention purposes; the creation of the independent office of detention oversight to inspect facilities 
and review complaints; and the expansion of community-based alternatives to detention. While most 
reforms focused on the conditions of detention, changes were also made to parole policies. As of 
January 2010, agents were directed to individually assess the suitability of all detained asylum 
seekers for release. All those found to hold a credible fear of persecution were to be released, 
provided they could verify their identity, and did not pose a security or flight risk.110 This led to a 
                                                   
105  See Human Rights First, Operation Liberty Shield Quietly Terminated (15 May 2003) 
<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2003/05/15/asylum-news-15>. 
106  Stipulated Settlement Agreement, Flores v Reno, Case No CV85-4544-RJK (CD Cal, 1996). 
107  Wil S Hylton, ‘The Shame of America’s Family Detention Camps’, New York Times Magazine (online), 4 
February 2015 <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/08/magazine/the-shame-of-americas-family-detention-
camps.html?_r=0>. 
108  For analysis of these reforms see Anil Kalhan, 'Rethinking Immigration Detention' (2010) 110 Columbia 
Law Review 42; Geoffrey Heeren, 'Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention' (2010) 
45 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 601, 626-9; Sarah Gryll, 'Immigration Detention 
Reform: No Band-Aid Desired' (2011) 60 Emory Law Journal 1211.  
109  See US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Fact Sheet: 2009 Immigration Detention Reforms (6 
August 2009) <http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/reform-2009reform.htm>; US Department of 
Homeland Security, ICE Detention Reform: Principles and Next Steps (6 October 2009) 
<www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/press_ice_detention_reform_fact_sheet.pdf>. See also, Dora Schriro, 
'Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations' (US Department of Homeland Security: 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, October 2009). 
110  US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ‘Parole of Arriving Aliens Found to Have a Credible Fear of 
Persecution or Torture’ (Directive No 11002.1, 8 December 2009).  
 76 
 
significant increase in the number of asylum seekers released on parole.111 The policy of detaining 
women and children was also scaled-back and the controversial T Don Hutto Family Detention Centre 
was closed down. 
This liberalisation of the parole policy was short-lived. In 2014, there was a significant increase in the 
number of asylum seekers travelling irregularly to the United States from Honduras, Guatemala, and 
El Salvador. This surge included a significant number of mothers and their minor children. A reported 
61,000 family units, as well as 51,000 unaccompanied minors crossed into the United States in 
2014.112 In response, starting in June 2014, the Department of Homeland Security (‘DHS’)113 appears 
to have abandoned the policy of generally releasing asylum seekers who have established a ‘credible 
fear’. Instead, it adopted a policy of limiting access to parole, particularly for Central American 
mothers and children, with the aim of deterring potential future migrants.114 This has been justified in 
reference to Attorney General Ashcroft’s determination in Matter of D-J-.115 In February 2015, the US 
District Court for the District of Columbia ordered a preliminary injunction to halt the continued 
application of the no parole policy, noting the fact that it raised serious constitutional due process 
issues.116 Initial reports indicate that the government has been complying with the order, with a 
marked increase in the number Central American families being released on bond.117 
4.2.2 Australia 
Australian law has provided for the detention of unauthorised non-citizens since shortly after 
federation. Originally, this was in the form of a criminal sanction. Section 7 of the Immigration 
Restriction Act 1901 (Cth) provided for the summary conviction and imprisonment for up to six months 
of anyone deemed to be a ‘prohibited immigrant’.118 The first administrative immigration detention 
provisions were introduced in 1925. A new s 8C was inserted into the Immigration Restriction Act 
1901 (Cth) authorising the incarceration of any person ordered by the Minister to be removed, 
‘pending deportation and until he is placed on board a vessel for deportation from Australia.’119 The 
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) created a new class of persons who could be subject to administrative 
detention: those arriving in Australia without authorisation. Section 36 introduced the ‘entry fiction’ 
similar to that operated in the United States, deeming persons arriving in Australia without 
                                                   
111  Lutheran Immigration Service, A Way Forward for US Immigration Detention (2012) 20. 
112  Hylton, above n 107. 
113  Note the restructuring which disbanded the INS and created the DHS: see Chapter One, Part 1.4.  
114  A recent district court decision found DHS and ICE have been taking deterrence of mass migration into 
account in making custody determinations, and that such considerations have played a significant role in 
the large number of Central American families detained since June 2014: RIL-R v Jeh Charles Johnson 
(DC, Civ No 15-11-JEB, 20 February 2015).  
115  In re D-J-, 23 I & L Dec 572 (Att’y Gen 2003); see above n 102 and accompanying text. 
116  RIL-R v Jeh Charles Johnson (DC, Civ No 15-11-JEB, 20 February 2015).  
117  ‘Lawyers: Detained Immigrant Families in Texas Offered Bonds’, Fox News Latino (online), 1 March 
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118  The term ‘Prohibited Migrant’ was defined at s 3 of the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth). Similar 
offence provision remained in force until 1994. See Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 27 (later renumbered to s 
77), repealed by s 17 of the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth). 
119  Inserted by the Immigration Act 1925 (Cth), s 8. 
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authorisation as not having ‘entered’ Australia. Such persons could be detained pending their removal 
on the vessel on which they arrived.120 While detention provisions existed in the law, they were used 
sparingly until relatively recently.  
The catalyst for change was the arrival of sea-borne asylum seekers. The first asylum seeker vessel 
to arrive in Australia landed at Darwin Harbour in April 1976, carrying five Vietnamese men.121 Over 
the next five years, a little over 2,000 Vietnamese nationals fled the war in their homeland, making the 
journey to Australia by boat.122 Although the Migration Act contained provisions that would have 
authorised detention and refusal of entry,123 these measures were not invoked at first. As the arrivals 
continued, however, the initial good will faded and both sides of Australian politics began considering 
harsher measures. It is at this point that we see the first discussions of establishing ‘processing 
camps’ in Australia. A proposal for such a camp was raised in 1979 in the Cabinet discussions of the 
ruling Australian Liberal Party, as a possible solution should the unauthorised arrival of boats 
continue.124 The proposal called for the construction of a holding centre for persons arriving 
unauthorised in Australia.125 Foreshadowing the future development of remote processing centres, it 
stipulated that  
[a]n essential feature of any such centre would be its capacity for secure containment. This would 
necessitate the choice of remote location with some form of natural protection eg. a remote island or 
inland centre.126 
The Labor Party, adopted a similar proposal as their policy platform at their 1979 national conference, 
which called for the establishment of camps where ‘uninvited refugees’ would be held until another 
resettlement country could accept them.127 However, it would be more than a decade until a policy of 
systematic mandatory detention of unauthorised asylum seekers was introduced. 
                                                   
120  Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Migration Act’), s 36(1). 
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Starting in 1989, successive waves of boats carrying Cambodian nationals, then Sino-Vietnamese 
and Chinese nationals began arriving in Australia in search of asylum.128 Despite their modest 
numbers, these arrivals provoked a strong reaction from the government and community. Prime 
Minister Bob Hawke’s Labor government began detaining all unauthorised boat arrivals. Existing ‘turn-
around’ laws were invoked under which persons arriving by boat who were suspected of not holding 
an entry permit could be detained until returned from whence they came.129 The decision not to 
release the Cambodians enjoyed bipartisan support, but ultimately the policy did not sit easily with the 
Migration Act as it stood at that time. To begin with, the ‘turn-around’ provisions were supposed to 
operate within a timeframe of 72 hours. A legal challenge brought on behalf of 15 of the detained 
Cambodians who had been held for more than two years prompted amendments to the legislation. 
These were pushed through Parliament by the Keating Labor government in less than 48 hours in 
1992. The amendments reinforced and formalised the policy of mandatory detention, albeit with a 
nominal limit of 273 days on the period for which a person could be incarcerated.130  
The Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth), which came into force on 1 September 1994, replaced these 
provisions with a scheme that provided simply that all ‘unlawful non-citizens’ must be detained until 
either granted a visa or removed from Australia.131 This change broadened mandatory detention 
provisions, initially introduced as a temporary and ‘exceptional’ measure to deal with a particular 
cohort of boat arrivals, to apply to all persons who either arrived without a visa or who were in 
Australia on expired or cancelled visa. Significantly, the 273 day time limit which had applied under 
the earlier law was omitted.  
Unlike the US system, no provisions were made in the Australian laws for release on parole. Instead, 
a system of bridging visas was introduced which would allow the release of certain ‘unlawful non-
citizens’ pending the determination of their claim for a substantive visa. Reflecting the ‘entry fiction’ in 
the United States, which distinguishes between admitted and non-admitted aliens, eligibility for a 
bridging visa was made dependent upon ‘immigration clearance’.132 Only persons who had been 
cleared through immigration control and admitted into Australia were eligible for bridging visas.133 
Unauthorised arrivals, who by definition were not and could not be immigration cleared, could only be 
released if they belonged to certain ‘prescribed classes’ defined at the Minister for Immigration’s 
discretion. Hence asylum seekers who arrived irregularly were routinely detained for the entire 
duration of their status determination procedures. While there have been a number of minor recent 
reforms, the overall architecture of mandatory detention remains in force in 2015. 
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Under pressure of mounting criticism surrounding the wrongful detention of lawful residents and 
Australian citizens,134 and concerns about the cost of detention on the mental health of children and 
detainees, the Liberal/National Coalition government announced a series of immigration detention 
reforms in June 2005.135 These included a new community detention program for women and 
children;136 the introduction of visas that provided an alternative to indefinite detention for persons 
who could not be removed from the country;137 and giving the Commonwealth Ombudsman oversight 
of persons held in long-term immigration detention.138 These reforms were extended by the Labor 
government when it took office in 2007.  The new Immigration Minister Chris Evans announced a 
commitment to using detention as a last resort and for the shortest period of time; and avoiding 
indefinite detention and the detention of children.139 In October 2010, the government announced the 
expansion of the community detention program for women and children. This program was further 
extended to apply to all vulnerable individuals in November 2011. In the same month, the Labor 
government announced that eligibility criteria for bridging visas were to be significantly expanded. 
Asylum seekers entering Australia irregularly became eligible for release, provided they had 
undergone health, security and identity checks.140 Reflecting the practice of parole in the United 
States, reporting conditions could be imposed on those released. It is important to note, however, that 
a detainee’s access to both bridging visas and community detention are reliant on discretionary 
powers of the Minister. The Minister does not have a duty to consider exercising these powers, even if 
requested by a person in immigration detention. 
At the time of writing, mandatory detention of asylum seekers and the detention of children remains a 
reality.141 A number of recent restrictive policy changes have had ramifications on the country’s 
immigration detention program. In November 2012, the Labor government introduced a new ‘no 
advantage’ principle, which stipulated that sea-borne asylum seekers should not receive an 
‘advantage’ over refugees from overseas who are waiting to be resettled.142 The result was the 
suspension of processing of asylum claims and a resulting major increase in the time spent by 
persons in immigration detention. With the reintroduction of offshore processing, asylum seekers who 
arrive by boat are now generally transferred to detention facilities in Nauru and Papua New Guinea 
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(‘PNG’).143 The onshore detention program continues to apply to asylum seekers who arrive in 
Australia by plane, and to sea-borne asylum seekers who arrived in Australia before 19 July 2013.  
4.2.3 US and Australian Practices Compared 
There are clear parallels in the development of policies relating to the detention of unauthorised 
arrivals (asylum seeker or otherwise) in the United States and Australia. While the use of detention 
was more prevalent in the United States than in Australia during the late 19th and early 20th century, 
detention was seldom used in either country from the 1950s to the early 1980s. In both countries, the 
shift towards a more restrictive detention policy was triggered by the arrival of maritime asylum 
seekers. In the United States, the arrival of large numbers of Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s set in motion a series of policy changes. These culminated in the 1982 
policy of mandatory detention for all unauthorised arrivals, with limited humanitarian grounds for 
parole. Over the same period, Australia had its first experience of unauthorised boat arrivals with the 
arrival of boats carrying Vietnamese asylum seekers. The option of mandatory long-term detention 
was considered by both sides of politics at this time. However, it was not implemented until 1989, 
when asylum seeker boats began arriving from Cambodia. Just as in the United States, the change of 
policy was initially made informally, utilising existing discretionary powers to target a specific cohort of 
boat arrivals. And just as in the United States, a court challenge resulted in the formalisation of the 
rule and the extension of its applicability to all unauthorised arrivals (and later to all unlawful non-
citizens).  
Since then, the United States and Australia have operated similar detention regimes. Both have a 
system of mandatory detention for persons that arrive without authorisation, pending determination of 
their claims to a substantive visa. Both have provided grounds of release pending determination for 
certain classes of persons. In the United States, this is achieved primarily through parole or release 
on bond, although recent years have also seen the implementation of community-based models of 
detention. In Australia, release is achieved through temporary bridging visas and community detention 
arrangements. The policies relating to the use of these mechanisms for the release of asylum seekers 
pending determination of their case has also developed along similar lines. Three phases can be 
identified. The first was characterised by a shift towards more restrictive practices which involved 
limiting the classes of persons eligible for release pending final adjudication of their claims. In the 
second phase, this approach was reversed and the grounds for release on parole and bridging visas 
were expanded. The current phase is defined by a move back towards more restrictive measures. 
Between 1989 and 2011, asylum seekers who arrived in Australia without authorisation were 
generally not eligible for bridging visas and hence mandatorily detained for the entire duration of their 
status determination. In the United States, between 1982 and 1996, parole provisions allowed for the 
release of certain asylum seekers at any stage of the determination of their claim. A trend towards an 
Australian approach of limiting release from detention pending final adjudication began with changes 
implemented by the IIRIRA in 1996. The new expedited removal process removed access to parole 
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for asylum seekers awaiting ‘credible fear’ determinations. Then certain asylum seekers were barred 
from accessing parole for the entire duration of their status determination procedures. Such a policy 
was implemented in 2001 with respect to Haitian asylum seekers arriving by boat. In March 2003, a 
similar albeit short-lived directive was issued in relation to asylum seekers from certain Arab Muslim 
countries.  
Clear parallels can also be seen in recent reforms to the detention policy in both Australia and the 
United States. The excesses of the mandatory detention policy gave rise to a similar backlash in both 
countries. Reports about systematic failings in the detention system and the serious mental health 
consequences on long-term detainees led to the introduction of a series of reforms. This process 
started in 2005 in Australia and 2009 in the United States. Similar provisions were introduced in both 
countries to provide more independent oversight over detention operations; the rules governing the 
release of certain asylum seekers pending a determination of their claims were relaxed; and 
community-based alternatives to detention (‘ATD’) were expanded. 
The similarities in the ATD models introduced in both jurisdictions are particularly striking. In Australia, 
the first move towards alternative forms of detention occurred in August 2001 with the introduction of 
the Residential Housing Project.144 Legislative changes in 2005 introduced a more formalised ATD 
program for women and children under which the Minister could authorise the transfer of such asylum 
seekers to community-based accommodation.145 Section 197AB of the Migration Act, gave the 
Minister a discretionary power to make ‘Residence Determinations’ to define what constituted a place 
of detention. Unlike the earlier Residential Housing Project, detainees held in community detention 
were not under guard and were free to move around the community, provided they spent their nights 
at the designated address. A crucial element of the Australian ATD program has been the use of 
NGOs to provide case management and support services. The use of community detention has been 
progressively expanded over the years and is now used for not only women and children, but also any 
other vulnerable individuals.  
In the United States, ATD community-based case management pilot programs were first run in the 
late 1990s.146 Such programs were not rolled out on a large scale until 2004, with the establishment of 
the Electronic Device Program and the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (‘ISAP’). However, 
these programs differed from the earlier pilot programs as they did not include individual case 
management or risk assessments as to the need for supervision.147 Instead, these programs relied on 
intrusive reporting and electronic tagging to ensure compliance.148 As part of the overhaul to the 
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detention system initiated in 2009, the ATD program was expanded with the introduction of the 
Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II (ISAP II). ICE included the presence of a ‘needs-based 
case management component’ as a requirement for a company to obtain the ISAP II contract.149 As 
such, under the current system, participants in the ATD program are provided with case management 
services such as assistance in understanding the legal process, acquiring travel documents and 
reminders to attend immigration proceedings.150 
Australia and the United States have also both moved towards a risk-based model of determining the 
need and type of detention. In July 2008 Chris Evans, Minister for Immigration, announced a new 
‘modern risk management approach’ where the ‘key determinant of the need to detain a person in an 
immigration detention centre will be risk to the community’.151 The need for risk analysis in decision 
making about the appropriateness of immigration detention was first flagged in the United States in 
2009.152 ICE then worked with a number of NGOs to develop a ‘risk assessment tool’, which was 
rolled out nationally between July 2012 and January 2013.153 While details of the precise factors 
considered are not publicly available, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service explains that the 
risk assessment tool  
contains objective criteria to guide decision-making regarding whether or not an alien should be 
detained or released; the alien’s custody classification level, if detained; and the alien’s level of 
community supervision (to include an ICE ADT program), if released. It includes mathematically 
weighted factors that should signal the likelihood of threat to the community based on past behaviour as 
well as of absconding for each and every individual ICE apprehends.154 
There are also some interesting parallels in the public discourse on the detention of children and 
families. In Australia, NGOs like ChilOut and GetUp! have run long-standing campaigns to have all 
children released from immigration detention facilities. These campaigns played a significant role in 
pressuring successive governments to introduce reforms in this area. Efforts in this regard were 
assisted by a recent Australian Human Rights Commission report critical of continued detention of 
children.155 The campaign to release children and families from detention has been largely successful. 
As of April 2015, there were only 69 children held in immigration detention in Australia, with an 
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155  Australian Human Rights Commission, The Forgotten Children: National Inquiry into Children in 
Immigration Detention (2014). 
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additional 95 detained in extraterritorial processing facilities in Nauru.156 In the United States, NGO 
lobbying played a crucial role in scaling back the detention of families in the late 2000s, which 
culminated with the closure of the T Don Hutto Family Detention Facility in 2009. With the introduction 
of the no parole policy for asylum seeker families from Central America in 2014, the NGO community 
again mobilised. Their efforts resulted in some important victories, including the closure of the 
controversial family detention centre in Artesia. 
In response to a surge in irregular migration, recent years have seen a reversion to more stringent 
detention provisions. In the United States, this has taken the form of a policy restricting access to 
parole for asylum seeker women and children from Central American countries. As a result of 
Australia’s reintroduction of extraterritorial processing, sea-born asylum seekers are now transferred 
to detention facilities in Nauru or Manus Island in PNG.157 
4.3 Confirming the Transfer Hypothesis 
The implementation of immigration detention policies has followed similar patterns in Australia and the 
United States. While these similarities raise a presumption that legal and policy transfers have been 
taking place, they do not rule out the alternate explanation that the parallels are due to independent 
responses to similar policy problems in both countries. In this section, I set out the evidence against 
this alternate hypothesis by arguing that policy makers in Australia and the United states had both the 
opportunity to share information relating to policy developments in each other’s jurisdictions and 
directly drew on this information in developing domestic law. My analysis is undertaken with reference 
to both documentary evidence on the public record, and interviews I carried out with policy makers in 
Australia and the United States.158 
Before examining the evidence of the knowledge possessed by decision makers involved in the case 
study transfers, it is important to be clear about the content, direction and timing of the purported legal 
and policy transfers. The analysis above indicates three distinct phases of possible transfer. Phase 
one involved Australian law makers drawing on US practice when implementing and formalising the 
Australian system of mandatory detention between 1989 and 1994. In phase two, which occurred 
between 1996 and 2005, the direction of the transfers appears to have shifted, with US policy makers 
drawing lessons from Australia’s stringent parole policies. Phase three, which occurred from 2005 to 
2014, involved a two-way transfer process with policy makers from both jurisdictions drawing lessons 
                                                   
156  DIBP, Immigration Detention and Community Statistics Summary (30 April 2015) 
<https://www.immi.gov.au/About/Documents/detention/immigration-detention-statistics-apr2015.pdf>. All 
those detained in Australia were being held in alternative places of detention, rather than closed 
detention facilities. This victory, however, came at a significant cost. The recent release of a significant 
number of children from detention facilities at Christmas Island was the result of a deal between the 
government and cross-bench senator Ricky Muir. The price for the release of the children was Senator 
Muir’s crucial support in passing the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving 
the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth), which implemented a raft of restrictive reforms to 
Australia’s asylum seeker policy. Some of the changes implemented by this Act are explored in Chapter 
Five, nn 111-16 and accompanying text. 
157  Australia’s offshore processing policy is examined in detail in Chapter Five, Part 5.2.2. 
158  For details about my interview methodology, see Appendix A. 
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from each other regarding attempts at reforming and mitigating some of the excesses of detention 
practices. 
4.3.1 Opportunity: Channels of Communication 
US and Australian immigration policy makers regularly meet in numerous formal and informal forums. 
The existence of these opportunities for exchange provides strong circumstantial evidence to support 
my transfer hypothesis. In Chapter Three, I provided analysis of the proliferation of such forums, 
dividing them into five main categories.159 Here, I focus on the forums identified by my interview 
subjects as being the most important in terms of facilitating the transfer of immigration detention 
policies between the United States and Australia.  
US and Australian policy makers regularly meet and discuss policy developments in 
intergovernmental meetings facilitated by formal international institutions. As explored in Chapter 
Three, these forums include the yearly UNHCR Executive Committee meetings and the yearly IOM 
International Dialogue on Migration. US and Australian policy makers also gather at ad hoc meetings 
facilitated by international forums. Prominent examples include the UNHCR Global Consultations on 
International Protection held in 2001 and 2002;160 the first UN High-Level Dialogue on International 
Migration and Development (‘HLD’) held in 2006; the Informal Thematic Debate on International 
Migration and Development convened by the General Assembly in 2011; and the second HLD held in 
October 2013. 
Feedback from my interview subjects suggested that informal bilateral talks that take place alongside 
these formal meetings were important forums for the transfer of policy ideas between US and 
Australian policy makers.161 As one former senior Australian bureaucrat put it, the most significant 
form of dialogue were the ‘conversations on the margins in Geneva with the American delegation… 
We took the opportunities when we were all together at those sorts of meetings to have our own 
bilaterals [sic] around particular issues.’162 Another official reported that  
the Australians, the Americans and the Canadians would always caucus before a major Geneva 
meeting and would always discuss what came out of it. There were semi-formalised groups who would 
meet in Geneva around UNHCR and the Australians, the Canadians and Americans were always at the 
forefront of that.163 
Regional Consultative Processes (‘RCPs’)164 were identified by a number of my interview subjects as 
the key forums for the diffusion of migration policy ideas.165 They reported that the two most important 
RCPs for the transfer of migration policy ideas between the United States and Australia are the Five 
                                                   
159  See Chapter Three, Part 3.2. 
160  See Judith Kumin, ‘Revitalizing International Protection: The UNHCR’s Global Consultations’ (2001) 19 
Refuge 5. 
161  AUB01, AUB19, AUB41. 
162  AUB41. 
163  AUB19. 
164  See Chapter Three, Part 3.2.4. 
165  AUB01, AUB77, AUB19. 
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Country Conference and the Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees 
(‘IGC’).166 The Five Country Conference evolved from the ‘Group of Four’ conferences held between 
Australia, the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada since the 1980s. With the addition of 
New Zealand in 2009, the conference was renamed the Five Country Conference. The forum is billed 
‘as a way for senior officials to exchange ideas in an off-the-record manner, and for member countries 
to share information relating to the immigration challenges they were each confronting.’167 Interview 
respondents cited the small number of countries involved; the similar legal systems of participant 
countries; the similar immigration issues faced by the countries; and the informal nature of the 
discussions as contributing to making the dialogue one of the most important forums for frank 
discussion and diffusion of policy ideas.168 
The IGC was founded within the UNHCR in 1985 to examine asylum issues in Europe.169 It became 
an independent state-run consultative process in 1991 and its membership has gradually expanded to 
include 13 European States, as well as the United States, Australia, Canada and New Zealand.170 
The stated purpose of the consultations include ‘discussion and information exchange on migration 
policies and their implementation.’171 While made up of a somewhat larger cohort of participant 
countries than the Five Country Conference, the confidential and informal nature of discussions 
facilitates a full and frank exchange of policy ideas. As one senior Australian bureaucrat I interviewed 
put it 
[The IGC] was a place where there was opportunity to meet senior officials face to face at a multilateral 
basis and scan world developments in all fields of migration. In those circumstances, if you feel you 
have some burning problem and need some inspiration and someone seems to have a good model, 
then you talk to them about it. [You can ask them] will any of this work for us? Or will it not work for 
us?172 
Australian and US immigration policy makers also exchange ideas through bilateral channels. Five of 
the Australian policy makers interviewed (two former Ministers and three bureaucrats) indicated they 
had travelled to the United States on fact-finding missions.173 One Australian politician indicated they 
had undertaken a period of ‘study leave’ in the United States where they had met with both senior 
bureaucrats and politicians to learn about US immigration policy.174 All interview subjects who went on 
such trips also noted that they used the opportunity to furnish US officials with information about 
Australian policy developments.  
                                                   
166  AUB77, AUB01. 
167  Five Country Conference, About the Five Country Conference  
https://members.fivecountryconference.org/>.  
168  AUB01, AUB77, AUB19. 
169  Charles Harns, ‘Regional Inter-State Consultation Mechanisms on Migration: Approaches, Recent 
Activities and Implications for Global Governance of Migration’ (IOM Migration Research Series Report 
No 45, 2013) 65. 
170  Ibid. 
171  Ibid. 
172  AUB77. 
173  AUB01 AUP11, AUB19, AUP35. AUB77, AUB15. 
174  AUP11. 
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Another prominent channel for communication cited by interview subjects involves the immigration 
representatives (or Immigration Consulers) based at the Australian Embassy in Washington and the 
US Embassy in Canberra.175 These officials provide a permanent channel through which policy 
makers from each country can request information regarding the operation or implementation of 
migration control policies. As one former senior Australian bureaucrat put it, immigration 
representatives ‘are your person on the ground. They are the one who can move around an agency 
and deal with people on a day-to-day basis… Your interest in policy development elsewhere is 
continuing and is not limited to say one meeting a year.’176  
4.3.2 Direct Evidence Supporting the Transfer Hypothesis 
(a) Detention Phase 1: United States → Australia (1989–1994) 
In relation to the introduction and formalisation of the policy of mandatory detention in Australia, there 
is evidence on the public record indicating that Australian policy makers were well acquainted with the 
use of the policy in the United States. This fact is evident when one reads the Joint Standing 
Committee on Migration’s 1994 report ‘Asylum, Border Control and Detention, which immediately 
preceded the legislative moves to formalise mandatory detention.177 In that report the committee 
considers examples of detention practices in comparable countries, including the United States, 
noting that ‘the issues and problems which Australia is addressing are as relevant to and of crisis 
proportions amongst developed and developing countries in Europe, North America and Asia.’178 
During the inquiry, the Committee received evidence from US refugee expert, Arthur Helton, in 
relation to the parole program used in the United States.179 
The fact that Australian policy makers were aware of US practice was also evident in interviews 
undertaken by the author. Six key policy makers intimately involved in developing and implementing 
the policy of mandatory detention in Australia during this period were interviewed.180 All agreed that 
they and others involved in the development of the policy had detailed knowledge of US detention 
practices. When pressed, all denied that the US policy had been used as a model, claiming instead 
that the policy was a unique response to Australia’s domestic problems. Four out of the six cited the 
different approaches to parole in the Australian and US systems as proof of the originality of the 
Australian policy.181 However, their acknowledgement that they were aware of and had considered the 
policies in the United States, demonstrates that some degree of transfer had in fact taken place. One 
                                                   
175  AUB01. 
176  AUB01. 
177  Joint Standing Committee on Migration, First Report of the Inquiry into Immigration Detention: Asylum, 
Border Control and Detention (The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1994). 
178  Ibid 49. 
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approach in Australia). 
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interview subject put it in the following way: ‘Direct influence? Did we go looking? I don’t think so. 
Were we influenced? Definitely.’182  
As discussed in Chapter Three, legal and policy transfer rarely involves verbatim copying of laws.183 
Rather, more often foreign practices are drawn upon and adapted to fit local conditions. In this 
instance the basic model of mandatory detention was adopted. However, the parole system utilised in 
the United States was deemed to be undesirable. As one interview subject put it, ‘we had reasonable 
knowledge of parole and it was basically viewed as a broken system. The [US] parole system was 
basically an entry system, and you might as well issue entry permits, rather than use a parole 
system.’184 The comparatively smaller number of unauthorised arrivals in Australia made it possible to 
discard the parole system and simply detain all irregular arrivals for the entire duration of their status 
determination procedures. 
(b) Detention Phase 2: Australia → United States (1996–2005) 
The second phase of transfer involved policy makers in the United States learning from Australian 
immigration detention policies. Documentary evidence demonstrating this transfer is scarce. My 
examination of debates, and congressional and departmental reports produced in the United States 
during this period did not turn up any direct references to Australian detention practices. In relation to 
Australian sources, the Department of Immigration was on the record during this period as stating that 
‘Australia’s border management strategies are increasingly being looked at by other countries as a 
model on which to base the development of their own programs.’185 A number of my Australian 
interview subjects confirmed the United States was one of the countries looking at Australian 
detention practices during this period.186 One senior Australian bureaucrat stated that US officials had 
expressed great interest in the fact that under Australia’s policy of mandatory detention without 
parole, detention was automatic and not pursuant to any reviewable decision.187 The same policy 
maker revealed he had furnished information regarding the operation and implementation of this 
policy to US officials in the context of the Five Country Conference meetings during the 1990s.188 A 
second senior Australian bureaucrat working in the Department from 1993 to 1996 confirmed that he 
was in regularly in contact with US policy makers during this period and had discussed immigration 
detention policy with them: ‘I’m sure it would have been explored. I’m sure they would have known 
about it and I’m sure we would have swapped perspectives on what each of us were doing.’189 
Regrettably, none of the US policy makers identified as being directly involved in the development of 
immigration detention policy during the relevant period agreed to be interviewed. However, a senior 
US bureaucrat who was working for the INS during this period, but not directly involved in immigration 
                                                   
182  AUB15. 
183  See Chapter Two, nn 21-4 and accompanying text. 
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185  DIMIA, 'Australia Not Alone in Detention Stance' (UNHCR Discussion Paper No 2, 2002) 7. 
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detention policy development, confirmed that his department would have been well acquainted with 
Australian policies: 
When you are in a policy job, when you are faced with large policy issues, unless you are totally 
oblivious to the rest of the world, you are going to look at how other countries deal with these similar 
issues. You are going to gather as much information as you can, and you attempt to take, from your 
perspective, the best policies that exist out there.190 
(c) Detention Phase 3: Australia ↔ United States (2005–2014) 
Interview subjects from both Australia and the United States confirmed that Australian and US officials 
exchanged ideas on the issue of detention reform.191 The NGO working group set up by Obama in 
2008 to facilitate detention reform included an Australian representative.192 This representative 
provided information to the Obama administration about Australian detention reform measures.193 The 
Obama administration was purportedly very interested in Australia’s use of alternatives to detention 
and its use of individualised risk assessments, and the representative reported furnishing detailed 
policy advice in relation to the operation of these policies in Australia.194 Additionally, a number of 
NGOs directly lobbied the US government to follow the ‘Australian model’ of case managed 
community detention.195  
4.4  Conclusion 
In this chapter, I identified three phases of transfer of mandatory immigration detention provisions 
between the United States and Australia. In phase one, Australian policy makers appear to have 
drawn on US practice when implementing and formalising the Australian system of mandatory 
detention between 1989 and 1992. In phase two, which occurred between 1996 and 2005, the 
direction of the transfers appears to have shifted, with US policy makers drawing lessons from 
Australia in regard to restricting parole. Phase three, which occurred from 2005 to the present, has 
involved a two-way transfer process in relation to detention reform. In this phase, Australia’s use of 
case managed community-based detention and risk assessment tools for determining the need and 
type of detention appear to have been influential on the adoption of similar policies in the United 
States. 
For all three phases, I have identified the motive for transfer, namely a similar policy imperative to 
deter irregular migration and to maximise executive control over irregular migrants who succeed in 
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reaching the state’s territory. I have also described the similarities in the substantive mandatory 
immigration detention provisions introduced in each phase. With reference to evidence relating to the 
existence of high level policy forums and through interviews with key policy makers in Australia and 
the United States, I have argued that in each phase, policy makers had ample opportunity to share 
and learn from developments in mandatory detention policies in each other’s jurisdictions. In relation 
to direct evidence that legal and policy transfers have occurred, the evidence is strongest in relation to 
phases one and three. The transfer hypothesis in respect to these phases was supported by my 
interview subjects, as well as documentary evidence on the public record. The direct evidence for 
phase two in relation to transfers between Australia and the United States from 1996 and 2005 is 
somewhat weaker, with no documentary evidence directly supporting the claim. While Australian 
interview subjects indicated that US officials would have been well aware of Australia’s policies during 
this period, I was unable confirm this with any of the relevant US policy makers. However, the 
existence of transfers in this phase is supported by circumstantial evidence relating to similarities in 
the policies adopted, and in relation to the motive and opportunity for transfer. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
INTERDICTION AND EXTRATERRITORIAL 
PROCESSING 
In this chapter, I examine the use of maritime interdiction and extraterritorial processing as a means of 
controlling irregular boat arrivals by the United States and Australia. Maritime interdiction refers to 
‘action taken by states to prevent sea-borne migrants from reaching their intended destination’.1 It 
involves the interception and deflection of boats carrying irregular migrants to their point of departure, 
a third country or external territory.2 At times, interdiction programs have been accompanied by the 
use of extraterritorial processing regimes to assess asylum claims. Asylum seekers processed 
extraterritorially generally enjoy fewer procedural and substantive rights than those processed under 
regular ‘mainland’ status determination schemes. Extraterritorial processing has been carried out by 
the US and Australian government in third countries and external territories, as well as on board 
Coast Guard and Navy ships in international waters or the territorial sea of third countries. Processing 
of claims has been conducted by the state carrying out the interdiction policies; or delegated to 
officials from the third country host or the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (‘UNHCR’).  
In what follows, I utilise the framework for identifying legal transfers developed in Chapter Two to 
argue that the use of similar policies authorising the interdiction and extraterritorial processing of 
maritime asylum seekers in the United States and Australia is the result of a process of legal and 
policy transfer. The analysis traces the contours of the processes and motivations underlying the 
transfers identified. In contrast to the two-way transfer relating to the policy of long-term mandatory 
detention explored in Chapter Four, the transfer relating to interdiction and extraterritorial processing 
appears to be mono-directional. I argue that Australian policy makers drew on US interdiction and 
extraterritorial practices in the Caribbean when devising and implementing the interdiction and 
extraterritorial processing regime introduced in 2001 as part of the Pacific Solution.  
In Part 5.1, I identify the common policy problem (or motive) shared by US and Australian policy 
makers. In Part 5.2, I highlight the similarities in the development and implementation of the policies of 
interdiction and extraterritorial processing in the United States and Australia. In Part 5.3, I catalogue 
both the direct and indirect evidence pointing to the fact that Australian policy makers drew on US 
practice of interdiction and extraterritorial processing when devising the Pacific Solution. This will be 
                                                   
1  Bernard Ryan, ‘Extraterritorial Immigration Control: What Role for Legal Guarantees?’ in Bernard Ryan 
and Valsamis Mitsilegas (eds), Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges 3, 22. 
2  In this context, the term ‘external territory‘ is used to describe a territory outside the traditional 
geographic boundaries of country, over which the country’s government exercises control, but is 
designated as an area in which regular domestic laws are said not to apply. 
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done in reference to interviews I carried out with key US and Australian policy makers involved in the 
transfer process.3 
5.1 The Common Policy Problem: A Quest for Control 
The policies of interdiction and extraterritorial processing of maritime asylum seekers are designed to 
address the same fundamental policy problem as long-term mandatory immigration detention. This 
dilemma, explored in detail in Chapter Four,4 is the quest to exert maximum control over unauthorised 
arrivals and to circumvent the impediments to this control caused by the obligations towards asylum 
seekers arising out of the Refugee Convention and Protocol,5 other human rights instruments, and 
judicial review of immigration decisions. 
Interdiction at sea and return of irregular migrants to their point of departure without screening asylum 
claims represents the most extreme manifestation of governmental quests for control. As noted 
earlier, interdiction refers to the practice of intercepting irregular migrants on the high seas and 
physically preventing them from accessing a state’s territory.6 It has been called the ‘ultimate’ barrier 
or deterrent.7 The US Coast Guard notes that ‘[i]nterdicting migrants at sea means they can quickly 
be returned to their countries of origin without the costly process required if they successfully enter the 
United States.’8 By relying on a view that the Refugee Convention has no extraterritorial effect, its 
non-refoulement obligations are said not to apply.9 A similar argument is employed in an attempt to 
avoid judicial enforcement of constitutional and statutory rights that unauthorised arrivals may enjoy if 
they enter the nation’s territory. Practical impediments to returning interdicted migrants, concerns over 
the legality of such an approach under international law, and serious humanitarian concerns mean 
that this approach of interdiction and return without processing has been used rarely in the United 
States and Australia. 
Interdiction coupled with some form of extraterritorial processing strikes a slightly more balanced 
approach between control and the rights of asylum seekers. Rather than being summarily returned, 
                                                   
3  See Appendix A for an outline of my interview methodology. 
4  See Chapter Four, Part 4.1. 
5  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
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7  David Martin, ‘The New Asylum Seekers’ in David Martin (ed), The New Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law 
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8  US Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction (31 October 2014) 
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International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration Control (Cambridge University Press, 
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interdicted persons are subject to procedures to identify those who may have an asylum claim. These 
have taken the form of crude screening measures aboard government vessels on the high seas, as 
well as more formal status determination procedures in external territories or third countries. This 
approach adheres to the letter (if not the spirit) of the non-refoulement obligations by providing 
mechanisms to identify persons who may be refugees and not returning such persons to a place 
where they may face harm on a convention ground. However, in practice, the procedures are often 
inadequate and have resulted in refoulement.10 The extraterritorial nature of these procedures 
purports to place them beyond the reach of domestic statutory and constitutional protections. Control 
over access to the territory of the state is also maintained, with those recognised as refugees not 
automatically granted access to a state’s territory, and instead often held for long periods of time 
awaiting resettlement in a third country.  
5.2 The Policy Response: Interdiction and Extraterritorial 
Processing 
The United States was not the first country to use interdiction as a tool for controlling unauthorised 
maritime arrivals. Britain carried out a maritime interdiction program against unauthorised Jewish 
arrivals seeking to enter Palestine in the late 1930s and again between 1945 and 1948.11 In the 
earlier phase of the program, those interdicted were taken to detention camps within Palestine. 
However, from 1946 Britain began to deport detainees to camps in Cyprus. These camps reached 
capacity in 1947, at which time the British government adopted a policy of refoulement pursuant to 
which interdicted persons were forcefully returned to their point of departure.12 
Maritime interdiction was also carried out by a number of Asian countries in response to the flight by 
boat of Vietnamese asylum seekers escaping the Vietnam War. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand all 
carried out interdiction operations during this period, refusing to allow vessels to land, and pushing 
boats back to international waters.13 These earlier examples of interdiction, however, can be 
distinguished from interdiction practices carried out by Australia and the United States, as they were 
not motivated by a desire to avoid domestic and international legal constraints. The British interdiction 
program in Palestine was carried out before the Refugee Convention came into existence14 and none 
of the states involved in the interdiction of Vietnamese asylum seekers were parties to the 
Convention. 
                                                   
10  See Robert Manne and David Corlett, ‘Sending Them Home: Refugees and the New Politics of 
Indifference’ (2003)13 Quarterly Essay 1; and below nn 28-9 and accompanied text. 
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Naval and Political Reaction to the Illegal Immigration of Jews to Palestine, 1945-1948 (Routledge, 
2005); Ninian Stewart, The Royal Navy and the Palestine Patrol (Routledge, 2002); Steven Wagner, 
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Immigration to Palestine’ (2014) 29 Intelligence and National Security 698. 
12  Wagner, above n 11. 
13  Ryan, above n 1, 23. 
14  The Refugee Convention was opened for signature 28 July 1951 and entered into force 22 April 1954. 
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The response of the United States and Australia to the refugee crisis resulting from the Vietnam War 
stands in contrast to the harsh policies introduced in both countries in later years. At the time, both 
governments expressed concerns about the refoulement resulting from the interdiction and push-back 
operations carried out by Vietnam’s neighbours. These concerns provided the impetus for US and 
Australian involvement in devising multilateral management plans to deal with the situation, which 
came to be known as the Orderly Departure Program (1979-88) and Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(1989-1996).15 Under both these arrangements, the United States, Australia and several other 
Western nations agreed to resettle large numbers of Vietnamese refugees. This was in return for 
Vietnam’s neighbours suspending push-back operations and providing temporary asylum.16 It is 
interesting to note that an alternate policy considered at this time involved purchasing an island in 
Indonesia or the Philippines where Vietnamese refugees could be resettled.17 British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher reportedly asked Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser to help buy such an 
island in 1979.18 This proposal can be distinguished from the extraterritorial processing policies later 
adopted by the United States and Australia in a number of important ways. Thatcher’s proposal was 
not motivated by a desire to circumvent the Refugee Convention. The UK did not have any obligations 
towards the Vietnamese under the Convention. These refugees were in third countries over which the 
UK did not exercise any jurisdiction. Further, the UK was geographically removed from the crisis and 
as such was not experiencing any direct Vietnamese refugee flows. Nor was the proposal motivated 
by a desire to avoid judicial scrutiny of asylum determinations. At the time the proposal was made, all 
Vietnamese asylum seekers were presumed to be refugees.19 As such, no issues arose in regard to 
limiting substantive or procedural rights in respect to asylum determinations. Rather, it appears the 
main motivation behind the proposal was to avoid having to resettle Vietnamese asylum seekers. 
Thatcher was reportedly concerned about the social unrest that large-scale resettlement to the UK 
would cause.20  
Attempts at isolating executive actions from judicial oversight have a long history preceding the 
introduction of extraterritorial processing regimes in the United States and Australia.21 There have 
been attempts by governments to create zones of exception on offshore islands where regular legal 
protections are said not to apply going back as far as the 17th century. When Charles II was restored 
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as King of England in the 1660s, he sought to create a rights-free zone in Jersey and the Isle of Man 
where he could detain dissidents. Judicial oversight of the detention was denied by the issue of a 
decree that the royal writ of habeas corpus should not run in these places.22  
5.2.1 United States: Interdiction and Extraterritorial Processing on Guantanamo Bay 
For the most part, US interdiction and extraterritorial processing policies have targeted maritime 
asylum seekers from Haiti and Cuba. The interdiction of Haitians began in 1981, at around the same 
time as the mandatory detention provisions discussed in Chapter Four were introduced.23 The Coast 
Guard was authorised to intercept and search vessels suspected of transporting undocumented 
Haitians. These early measures included crude extraterritorial processing, with summary screening 
processes carried out aboard US Coast Guard cutters. Officers from the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (‘INS’) assessed interdicted Haitians to determine if any had a credible fear of 
persecution.24 Those found to have such a fear were transferred to the United States to pursue their 
claims, while the others were returned to Haiti. The interdiction program and screening procedures 
aboard US Coast Guard cutters were carried out pursuant to a bilateral treaty between the United 
States and Haiti,25 INS interdiction Guidelines,26 and Executive Order 12,324.27  
Right from the outset, serious concerns were raised about the efficacy of this screening process. A 
study by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (now Human Rights First) found that out of 23,000 
Haitians interdicted by the United States between 1981 and 1990, only six passengers were found to 
have claims strong enough to warrant a full asylum hearing.28 Stephen Legomsky notes that ‘[g]iven 
the high incidence of serious human rights violations in Haiti during that period, there was ample 
reason to worry that the rarity of cases found to justify full hearing said more about the procedural 
adequacy of interviews than about the merits of the claims.’29  
A violent military coup in Haiti in September 1991, which replaced the democratically elected 
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide with a military junta, caused a modification in the interdiction 
program. Reports of wide-spread politically motivated violence and the public condemnation of the 
coup by the US administration made it difficult for the United States to summarily dismiss asylum 
                                                   
22  See Geoffrey Robertson, The Tyrannicide Brief (Vintage, 2006) 349; Geoffrey Robertson, ‘Freedom, 
Soldier’, New Statesman (21 May 2007) 55. 
23  See Chapter Four, nn 69-72 and accompanying text. 
24  For a critique of the ‘credible fear’ test, see Bill Frelick, 'US Refugee Policy in the Caribbean: No Bridge 
Over Troubled Waters' (1996) 20 Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 67, 72-4. 
25  Migrants Interdiction Agreement (23 September 1981) US-Haiti, 33 UST 3559, 3560. 
26  INS Interdiction Guidelines, ‘INS Role in and Guidelines for Interdiction at Sea (6 October 1981, revised 
24 September 1982). 
27  Executive Order No 12,324 (29 September 1981), 46 Fed Reg 48,109 (1 October 1981). 
28  Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Refugee Refoulement: The Forced Return of Haitians under the 
US-Haitian Interdiction Agreement (1990) 4. Cf Ruth Ellen Wasem, 'US Immigration Policy on Haitian 
Migrants' (Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 17 May 2011) 4; Frank Brennan, 
Tampering with Asylum: A Universal Humanitarian Problem (University of Queensland Press, 2003) 77 
(both putting the number of interdicted Haitians recognised as refugees during this period at 11). 
29  Stephen Legomsky, 'The USA and the Caribbean Interdiction Program' (2006) 18 International Journal 
of Refugee Law 677, 679. 
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claims by interdicted Haitians. At the same time, the administration of George H W Bush was reluctant 
to admit the large number of arrivals (more than 38,000 Haitians were interdicted in the eight-month 
period following the coup).30 Screening continued on the high seas, but those found to have a credible 
fear were no longer transferred to the United States to pursue their claims. Instead they were held on 
Coast Guard cutters. The Bush Administration attempted to frame the issue as a regional problem 
and negotiated with other Caribbean nations to take some of the Haitians held on US ships. On the 
whole, these efforts were unsuccessful. Although Belize, Honduras, Venezuela, and Trinidad and 
Tobago agreed to offer temporary shelter to small numbers in UN-administered camps, the combined 
intake of 550 places was not enough to defuse the crisis.31 By November 1991, 2,200 Haitians were 
being held in custody and all available Coast Guard cutters were at capacity.32  
The Bush administration responded by opening a migrant processing facility on the US controlled 
territory of Guantanamo Bay in Cuba.33 Although better known in recent times as an exceptional 
space created to exclude enemy combatants from the protections of the US justice system,34 
Guantanamo was used first as a holding and processing centre to bar interdicted asylum seekers 
from accessing these same legal protections. Between November 1991 and May 1992, all interdicted 
Haitians were taken to Guantanamo for processing. The Bush administration created a special regime 
for processing refugee claims, procedurally inferior to that available to persons seeking asylum within 
mainland America. Guantanamo fell outside of the statutory definition of ‘the United States’ under the 
Immigration and Nationality Act.35 A similar extraterritorial argument was used to frame the 
Guantanamo detainees as having no rights under the US Constitution.36 This left the executive free to 
streamline the screening process, ‘dispensing with such complications as the assistance of lawyers, 
administrative appeals, and judicial review’.37 Those found to have a credible fear of persecution were 
transferred to the United States to pursue an asylum claim.38 Those found not to exhibit such a fear 
were forcibly returned to Haiti. Even these streamlined procedures, however, could not keep up with 
                                                   
30  ‘Islands of Inequality’, Washington Post (4 November 1992) A18, cited in Arthur Helton, 'The United 
States Government Program of Intercepting and Forcibly Returning Haitian Boat People to Haiti: Policy 
Implications and Prospects' (1993) 10 New York Law School Journal of Human Rights 325, 330.  
31  ‘Furor Erupts Over US Policy on Haitian Boat People’ 68 Interpreter Releases 1684 (25 November 
1991) 1685; Vernon Briggs, 'US Asylum Policy and the New World Order' (1993) 1 People and Place 1, 
3. 
32  Briggs, above n 31, 3. 
33  See Chapter Seven, nn 3-7 and accompanying text. For a historical overview of US interests in 
Guantanamo Bay, see Azadeh Dastyari and Libbey Effeney, 'Immigration Detention in Guantanamo 
Bay' (2012) 6 Shima: The International Journal of Research into Island Cultures 49, 51-4. 
34  See Fleur Johns, ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’ (2005) 16 European Journal 
of International Law 613. 
35  8 USC §1101(a)(38) (1994) (defining ‘United States’ as limited to the continental United States, Alaska, 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands); See also, Gerald Neuman, 'Anomalous Zones' 
(1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 1197, 1229. 
36  The Eleventh Circuit accepted this view in dicta in Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 953 F2d 1498, 1513 
n8 (11th Cir, 1992), cert denied, 502 US 1122 (1992). This case is examined in Chapter Eight, Part 
8.1.1(a). 
37  Neuman, above n 35, 1229. 
38  Note that persons who were found to have a credible fear, but were HIV positive, were not transferred to 
the US, but were detained in a special section of the Guantanamo Bay facility. See Chapter Eight, Part 
8.1.1(c). 
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the steady flow of arrivals and the makeshift camp at Guantanamo quickly reached its 12,500 person 
capacity. 
With the facilities at Guantanamo full, President Bush issued the ‘Kennebunkport Order’ on 24 May 
1992,39 revoking the 1981 policy of interdiction with screening. The new policy provided for the 
interdiction and summary repatriation of all Haitians leaving Haiti by boat. The order expressly 
declared that US non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol did not 
extend outside US territory. Despite criticising and promising to repeal the policy during the 1992 
presidential election, President Clinton maintained the policy of interdiction and return without 
screening when he came to office.40 In 1993, in Sale v Haitian Centers Council, the Supreme Court 
tacitly upheld the no-screening policy.41 It affirmed the government’s stance that neither the non-
refoulement obligations in the Refugee Convention and Protocol, nor the US implementing legislation 
prohibited the return of refugees intercepted on the high seas. 
President Clinton suspended the no-screening policy in May 1994, apparently deciding that Haiti was, 
in fact, too dangerous a place to return the asylum seekers.42 Initially, a policy of providing full asylum 
hearings aboard US ships was introduced (in place of credible fear screenings conducted in 1992). 
An agreement was reached with Jamaica that allowed for processing to be carried out on board a US 
ship sitting in Kingston Harbour.43 A separate agreement was reached with the United Kingdom for 
processing to be carried out on the Turks and Caicos Islands.44 The number of Haitians arriving 
quickly outstripped the processing capabilities, and the refugee adjudication procedures were 
suspended a little over a month after they had begun.  
In July 1994 a new policy was implemented pursuant to which interdicted Haitians would be provided 
‘safe haven’ at Guantanamo and other Caribbean Countries. Haitians would not be returned 
automatically to their country, nor would they be offered the option of entering the United States as 
refugees or to pursue asylum claims. Just as President Bush had done three years earlier, Clinton 
sought to supplement capacity on Guantanamo through agreements with countries in the region to 
provide temporary safe haven in refugee camps. An agreement to establish such a camp in Panama 
fell through before it was implemented,45 but Antigua, Grenada, Suriname, St Lucia, and the 
                                                   
39  Executive Order No 12,807 (24 May 1992), 57 Fed Reg 23,133 (1 June 1992). 
40  Three months before the election, Bill Clinton said ‘I am appalled by the decision of the Bush 
administration to pick up fleeing Haitians on the high seas and forcibly return them to Haiti before 
considering their claim to possible political asylum. This process must not stand’: US Newswire, 29 July 
1992, quoted in Brennan, above n 28, 77. 
41  509 US 155 (1993); this case is examined in Chapter Seven, Part 7.1. 
42  Frelick, above n 24, 67. 
43  Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Government of 
Jamaica for the Establishment within the Jamaican Territorial Sea and Internal Waters of a Facility to 
Process Nationals of Haiti seeking Refuge within or Entry to the United States of America, entered into 
force 2 June 1994, KAV 3901, Temp State Dept No 94-153. 
44  Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United Kingdom, the Government of 
the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the Government of the United States to Establish in the Turks and 
Caicos Islands a Processing Facility to Determine the Refugee Status of Boat People from Haiti, entered 
into force 18 June 1994, KAV 3906, Temp State Dept No 94-158. 
45  71 Interpreter Releases 885 (11 July 1994) 885. 
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Dominican Republic offered to host a total of approximately 11,000 Haitians in UNHCR run camps.46 
Following US military intervention in Haiti in September 1994, the number of boat arrivals from that 
country reduced significantly. Reinstituting a policy of presumptive ineligibility, the United States 
repatriated nearly all the remaining Haitian asylum seekers held at Guantanamo in January 1995.47 
In August 1994 the interdiction and extraterritorial processing policy was extended for the first time to 
Cuban arrivals. For three decades, US policy had presumed all persons fleeing Cuba to be refugees 
and those that made it to sea had been rescued and brought to the United States.48 A large spike in 
the number of Cubans making the journey prompted a rethink of this approach.49 On 19 August 1994, 
President Clinton announced that interdicted Cubans would be taken henceforth to the Guantanamo 
Naval Base. Like the Haitians already there, they were to be held in ‘safe haven’. The Cubans were 
not subject to any screening procedures, and were told that their only avenue for entering the United 
States was to return to Cuba to wait in line for processing through the admission programs operating 
there.50 At the same time, the United States entered into an agreement with Cuba under which the 
Cuban government would take measures to prevent irregular boat departures. The United States 
would admit 20,000 Cubans per year through legal and orderly procedures.51  
By September 1994, there were more than 32,000 Cubans held at Guantanamo. An alternate safe 
haven site was set up in the Panama Canal Zone, and 8,000 detainees were transferred there.52 
Once the number of Cuban arrivals began to abate, the policy stance towards those held at 
Guantanamo was softened. At first, children, the sick and the elderly were offered ‘parole’ to allow 
them to enter the United States. Eventually, in May 1995, the Clinton Administration announced that 
most of the remaining Cubans would be brought to the United States. At the same time, a new 
blanket exclusion policy was introduced. All future arrivals were to be interdicted and returned to 
Cuba, except those that could show shipboard adjudicators a ‘genuine need for protection; that could 
not be satisfied by applying for refugee status with the US Interests Section in Havana’.53 Interdiction 
has also been used against migrants from other countries. For example, nationals of the Dominican 
Republic have been regularly intercepted in the Mona Passage en route to Puerto Rico.54 Chinese 
                                                   
46  US Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey (1995) 118. 
47  Frelick, above n 24, 67. 
48  Ibid 68. See also, Chapter Four, nn 65-6 and accompanying text. 
49  This was precipitated by an announcement by the Cuban government on 6 August 1994 that they would 
no longer interfere with efforts of those who desired to emigrate to the United States: Thomas David 
Jones, 'A Human Rights Tragedy: The Cuban and Haitian Refugee Crises Revisited' (1995) 9 
Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 479, 492; The similarities to the Mariel boat lift in 1981, led some 
to label the incident as Mariel II: Carlos Verdecia, ‘Wily Castro Again Sends His Problems North’, 
Christian Science Monitor (12 September 1994) 19. Also see Appendix B, Table 6. 
50  Frelick, above n 24, 68. 
51  Ibid 71. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Ibid 72. 
54  In the period from 1 April 1995 through to 1 October 1997, over 9,500 migrants were interdicted and 
forced to turn back: US Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction: Overview (31 October 2014) 
<http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/amio.asp#Introduction>.  
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nationals have also been interdicted attempting to make the journey by sea to Guam or the US 
mainland.55  
Both the practices of interdiction and extraterritorial processing on Guantanamo continue to this day. 
In the 2014 financial year, there was a total of 3,378 persons interdicted, comprising of 2,059 Cubans, 
949 Haitians, 293 Dominicans and 77 persons with other nationalities.56 The vast majority were 
‘screened-out’ and returned to their point of departure. Up-to-date figures on the number of interdicted 
asylum seekers transferred to the migrant operations centre at Guantanamo are difficult to ascertain. 
The most recent statistics, which are from February 2012, indicate that there was a total of only 33 
migrants (all Cuban) held there at that time.57 The facility remains ready to respond to future mass 
migration flows, with a surge capacity of up to 10,000 persons.58 
Screening procedures are reported to vary depending on the nationality of the arrival. Cubans are 
subject to individual ‘credible fear’ screening aboard coast guard cutters where they are explicitly 
asked whether they have a fear of returning to Cuba.59 All other interdicted migrants, such as 
Haitians, are not questioned about whether they fear being returned, but are required to vocalise a 
‘manifestation of fear’ independently.60 A US Department of State official described this policy as 
‘shout and you get an interview’.61 Regardless of nationality, when a person is found to have a 
credible fear, they are transferred to Guantanamo. The Guantanamo migrant operations centre 
currently operates under the auspices of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. The 
Secretary is empowered with an unreviewable discretion to detain and carry out status determinations 
of asylum seekers on the island.62 Where a person processed at Guantanamo is found to be a 
refugee, they are not admitted to the United States. Instead, they are resettled in a third country 
pursuant to bilateral agreements entered into by the Department of State. From 1996 to 2011, 331 
persons were resettled to 21 countries worldwide.63 Since 2002, Guantanamo has also been used as 
                                                   
55  Ibid.  
56  US Coast Guard, Alien Migration Interdiction: Total Interdictions - Fiscal Year 1982 to Present (1 May 
2015) <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/amio/FlowStats/FY.asp>.  
57  Dastyari and Effeney, above n 33, 58. 
58  Ibid. 
59  Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘YLS Sale Symposium: International Protection Challenges Occasioned by 
Maritime Movement Asylum Seekers’, Opinio Juris (16 March 2014) 
<http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/16/sale-symposium-international-protection-challenges-occasioned-
maritime-movement-asylum-seekers/>.  
60  Ibid. 
61  Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Refugee Policy Adrift: The United States and 
Dominican Republic Deny Haitians Protection (January 2003) 18. 
62  On 15 November 2002, President George W Bush issued Executive Order No 13,276 (15 November 
2002), 67 Fed Reg 69,985 (19 November 2002). The order, as amended by Executive Order No 13,286 
(28 February 2003), 68 Fed Reg 10,619 (5 March 2003), authorises the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to maintain custody and conduct screening of any undocumented non-citizens intercepted in the 
Caribbean region in Guantanamo Bay or any other appropriate location. This in effect provides an 
unreviewable discretion to the Secretary of Homeland security for the detention and status 
determination of asylum seekers and refugees in Guantanamo. 
63  US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, US State Department of Health and 
Human Services, ‘Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal 2012’ (Submission to the Committees on the 
Judiciary of the United States Senate and United States House of Representatives, 2012) 38.  
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a military detention facility to house ‘enemy combatants’ captured in the course of the so-called ‘war 
against terror’. I compare the legal status of enemy combatants and asylum seekers held at 
Guantanamo in Chapter Eight.64  
5.2.2 Australia: The ‘Pacific Solution’ Mark I & II 
Australia’s reaction to its first large-scale experience of asylum seeker boat arrivals was relatively 
restrained. The arrivals from Vietnam, who arrived in Australia from 1976 to 1981, were provided with 
hostel accommodation and generous settlement services. The main policy aimed at reducing boat 
arrivals during this period was the Orderly Departure Program discussed earlier.65 The second wave 
of boat arrivals to reach Australia mostly consisted of Cambodian, Sino-Vietnamese and Chinese 
nationals, who travelled to Australia from 1989 to 1995. As discussed in Chapter Four, the Australian 
government’s response to these arrivals was to introduce a system of mandatory immigration 
detention.66 The introduction of interdiction and extraterritorial processing measures can be seen as a 
response to a new wave of asylum seekers, dominated by persons from Iraq and later Afghanistan, 
who began making their way to Australia by boat from Indonesia in the mid-1990s. The immediate 
trigger for the policy change were events set in motion by the rescue at sea of 433 asylum seekers by 
a Norwegian registered container ship, MV Tampa, in August of 2001.67 A diplomatic row erupted over 
where the rescuees should be delivered. Reflecting the climate of public unease with the increasing 
flow of unauthorised arrivals, Prime Minister John Howard decided to prevent the delivery of the 
rescuees to Australia. When initial negotiations failed to convince the ship’s captain to change course, 
Australian Special Air Service troops were deployed to board the vessel and prevent it from entering 
Australian territorial waters. After a five-day ‘stand-off’, the crisis was resolved when agreements were 
reached with New Zealand and Nauru for rescuees to be transferred to those countries to have their 
protection claims assessed. 
At that time, the Australian government did not have statutory powers that authorised the interdiction 
and transfer of sea-borne asylum seekers to third countries. Two years earlier, the Border Protection 
Legislation Amendment Act 1999 (Cth) inserted provisions into the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) 
(‘Migration Act’) authorising maritime interdiction activities.68 However, these provisions only allowed 
interdicted persons to be detained at sea and brought back to Australia. The provisions did not 
                                                   
64  See Chapter Eight, Part 8.1.3. 
65  See above nn 15-17 and accompanying text. Although proposals for introducing a mandatory detention 
policy were considered during this period, such policy was not introduced until 1989: see Chapter Four, 
nn 121-7 and accompanying text. 
66  See Chapter Four, nn 128-33. 
67  For a detailed analysis of the incident, see Crock and Ghezelbash, above n 15; Mary Crock, 'In the 
Wake of Tampa: Conflicting Visions of International Refugee Law in the Management of Refugee Flows' 
(2003) 12 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 49; Jessica Tauman, 'Rescued at Sea, but Nowhere to Go: 
The Cloudy Legal Waters of the Tampa Crisis' (2002) 11 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 461; Chantal 
Marie‐Jeanne Bostock, 'The International Legal Obligations owed to the Asylum Seekers on the MV 
Tampa' (2002) 14 International Journal of Refugee Law 279; Savitri Taylor, 'The Pacific Solution or a 
Pacific Nightmare?: The Difference Between Burden Shifting and Responsibility Sharing' (2005) 6 
Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal 1. 
68  Migration Act, pt 2 div 12A. 
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authorise transfer to locations outside Australia.69 Given the absence of a statutory authority for the 
actions taken against the passengers of the MV Tampa, the government purported to be acting 
pursuant to the executive’s ‘prerogative power’.70 
In the immediate aftermath of the Tampa incident, the Australian Parliament enacted a series of 
legislative reforms that retrospectively validated the executive’s response71 and introduced new 
provisions to deprive future unauthorised boat arrivals access to regular Australian asylum 
procedures. The scheme, which became known as the ‘Pacific Solution’ and later the ‘Pacific 
Strategy’, involved three initiatives. The first was the ‘excision’ of territories from Australia’s ‘migration 
zone’ with the effect that the migration legislation pertaining to the mainland (including refugee 
determination procedures) no longer applied in these places.72 Initially, only the external territories of 
Christmas Island, Ashmore Reef, Cartier Island and Cocos Islands were ‘excised’. Later, the excision 
zone was extended to include all territories outside of mainland Australia.73 A new category of 
‘offshore entry person’ (‘OEP’) was then created to catch all asylum seekers who landed without a 
valid visa or authority on an excised territory.74 OEPs were barred from making a valid application for 
a Protection visa unless the Minister exercised a personal, non-compellable discretion to allow it.75 
Provisions were also introduced to prohibit OEPs from accessing the Australian courts.76 
The second initiative involved the power to remove OEPs to a designated country for their claims to 
be processed.77 Hasty agreements were reached with Nauru78 and Papua New Guinea (‘PNG’)79 for 
                                                   
69  See former s 245F(9) of the Migration Act, inserted by the Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 
1999 (Cth). 
70  In Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, the Full Federal Court accepted the government’s assertion 
that its actions against the MV Tampa were authorised under the prerogative power as incorporated into 
the Executive power set out in s 61 of the Australian Constitution: see Chapter Seven, Part 7.2.1.  
71  Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth) ss 5 and 6 (providing that any 
action taken between 27 August 2001 and 27 September 2001 by the Commonwealth in relation to the 
MV Tampa and other vessels carrying passengers attempting ‘to enter Australia unlawfully’ and any 
person who was on board such a vessel ‘is taken for all purposes to have been lawful when it 
occurred’). 
72  Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth), amending Migration Act, s 5(1) 
(definition of ‘migration zone’ and ‘excised offshore place’).  
73  Note that the excision regime was overhauled in 2012: see below n 100 and accompanying text. 
74  Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth), amending Migration Act, s 5(1) 
(definition of ‘offshore entry person’).  
75  Migration Act, s 46A.  
76  Migration Act, s 494AA (note that s 494AA(3) provides that the section is not intended to affect the 
original jurisdiction of the High Court). 
77  Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth); 
inserting s 198A of the Migration Act. 
78  A 13 point Statement of Principles and First Administrative Arrangement was signed by Australian and 
Nauruan representatives on 10 September 2001: Select Committee for an Inquiry into a Certain 
Maritime Incident, 'A Certain Maritime Incident' (Commonwealth of Australia, 23 October 2002) 296. A 
new Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 11 December 2001: Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Republic of Nauru and the Commonwealth of Australia for Cooperation in 
the Administration of Asylum Seekers and Related Issues (Answers to Questions on Notice, Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 19 June 2002). 
79  A Memorandum of Understanding was signed with PNG on establishing a processing centre on Manus 
Island on 11 October 2001: John Howard, Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Arrangement with Papua New 
Guinea to Process Unauthorised Arrivals’ (Media Release, 10 October 2001). 
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the establishment of offshore detention facilities in their territory to which OEPs could be transferred. 
Asylum seekers processed on Nauru and Manus Island in PNG did not have access to the refugee 
status determination procedures applied on the Australian mainland. Depending on where they were 
held and when they arrived, their clams were processed by either the UNHCR, or by Australian 
immigration officials applying processes stated to be in accordance with those of the UNHCR. 
Individuals found to be refugees were not entitled to resettlement in Australia. They were required to 
await resettlement in a third country. However, in practice over 40 per cent of asylum seekers 
transferred to the processing centres in Nauru and Manus Island in this first phase of the Pacific 
Solution were eventually resettled in Australia.80 
The third strategy was an interdiction program dubbed Operation Relex, which saw unauthorised 
boats intercepted on the high seas by Australian Navy boats and escorted back to Indonesia. The so-
called ‘push-back’ operations were carried out pursuant to amendments to the Migration Act that 
authorised the transfer of interdicted vessels and their passengers ‘to a place outside Australia’.81 
Operation Relex represented the first official Australian policy authorising direct action against vessels 
carrying asylum seekers aimed at preventing them from reaching Australia. The Australian Navy 
would first attempt to tow or escort unauthorised boats back into Indonesian waters. If these attempts 
failed, the asylum seekers aboard the vessels were transferred to Manus Island or Nauru for 
processing of their claims. 
In August and November 2001, 12 boats carrying asylum seekers were intercepted by Australian 
Navy boats. Four boats, with some 600 asylum seekers on board, were intercepted and successfully 
forced back to Indonesia.82 The other eight were intercepted but could not safely make the journey 
back to Indonesia, either because they had broken down or because they had been sabotaged by 
asylum seekers in an attempt to force the Australians to take them on board.83 From those rescued by 
the MV Tampa, and those on board these eight boats, a total of 1,501 asylum seekers were 
transferred to Manus Island and Nauru for processing.84 
Over the next few years the number of unauthorised boat arrivals dropped off significantly.85 In 2008, 
the newly elected Labor government announced it would bring the Pacific Solution to an end, 
describing it as ‘cynical, costly and ultimately unsuccessful exercise’.86 It did not abandon the policy 
completely, however, maintaining the legislative provisions underpinning the strategy. Australia’s 
offshore territories remained ‘excised’ from the ‘migration zone’. However, after the February 2008 
                                                   
80  Sara Davies and Alex Reilly, ‘FactCheck: Were 70% of People sent to Nauru under the Pacific Solution 
Resettled in Australia?’, The Conversation (13 August 2013) <http://theconversation.com/factcheck-
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81  See Migration Act, s 245F(9) and (9A), amended by the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement 
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83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid 45-6. 
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‘push factors’ in sending countries remains the subject of ongoing debate. 
86  Chris Evans, Minister for Immigration, ‘Last Refugees Leave Nauru’ (Media Release, 8 February 2008). 
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resettlement in Australia of the final group of refugees detained on Nauru, the government adopted a 
policy of not exercising the power to transfer OEPs to third countries. Instead, asylum seekers 
interdicted at sea were to be held on the Australian territory of Christmas Island pending a decision by 
the Minister to exercise the non-delegable, non-compellable discretion to allow an application for a 
Protection visa. As such, OEPs continued to remain barred from mainland status determination 
procedures and subject to a separate, inferior processing on Christmas Island.87  
The scheme was designed to keep status determination procedures beyond the reach of the 
Australian courts, but in a landmark 2010 case the High Court of Australia decided that OEPs were 
entitled to limited access to the courts to have their status determinations reviewed to determine 
whether those decisions were made according to law, including the common law rules of procedural 
fairness.88 The decision resulted in a surge of litigation by OEPs challenging adverse status 
determinations. This coincided with a significant increase in the number of people arriving by boat.89 
Public opinion began to turn against the government, with a view that the perceived ‘softening’ of 
Australia’s border protection policies was to blame.90 In response, the Gillard Labor government 
moved to introduce a number of measures to stem the flow of new arrivals. First, attempts were made 
to seek agreements for the creation of a regional processing centre. East Timor was flagged as a 
possible location, but this plan was abandoned after support within the East Timorese government 
evaporated.91 Second, a bilateral arrangement was negotiated with Malaysia giving rise to what 
became known as the ‘Malaysian Solution’.92 The arrangement provided that 800 asylum seekers who 
arrived in Australia by boat would be transferred to Malaysia for the processing of their claims. In 
return, Australia was to accept 4,000 UNHCR-recognised refugees from Malaysia over four years. 
Shortly after the deal was announced and before any asylum seekers could be transferred, aspects of 
                                                   
87  Where undocumented asylum seekers who entered mainland Australia (and the ‘migration zone’) were 
entitled as of right to apply for a Protection visa under section 36 of the Migration Act, those who arrived 
at an excised offshore place could only apply for a Protection visa if the Minister exercises a non-
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exercise this discretion. Unlike persons who reach mainland Australia, OEPs had no right to merits 
review of an unfavourable status determination decision in the Refugee Review Tribunal. Under the 
‘Pacific Solution’, OEPs were not afforded any opportunity for merits review of unfavourable decisions. 
The Rudd government relaxed policies in this area by introducing a non-statutory independent merits 
review (IMR) carried out by independent contractors. 
88  Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319 
(‘Offshore Processing Case’). See also, Mary Crock and Daniel Ghezelbash, 'Due Process and Rule of 
Law as Human Rights: The Court and the "Offshore" Processing of Asylum Seekers' (2011) 18 
Australian Journal of Administrative Law 101. This case is discussed in Chapter Eight, Part 8.2.1. 
89  See Appendix B, Table 7. 
90  See Mary Crock, 'First Term Blues: Labor, Refugees and Immigration Reform' (2010) 17 Australian 
Journal of Administrative Law 205. 
91  Lindsay Murdoch, ‘East Timor Dumps Bilateral Talks on Refugee Centre’, Sydney Morning Herald 
(online), 29 April 2011 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/east-timor-dumps-bilateral-talks-on-refugee-
centre-20110428-1dynq.html?skin=text-only>. 
92  See Chris Bowen, Minister for Immigration, ‘Joint Statements by the Prime Ministers of Australia and 
Malaysia on a Regional Cooperation Framework’ (Media Release, 7 May 2011); Julia Gillard, Prime 
Minister of Australia and Chris Bowen, Minister for Immigration, ‘Australia and Malaysia Sign Transfer 
Deal’ (Media Release, 25 July 2011). 
 103 
 
the arrangement were struck down in the High Court on the grounds that the protections provided in 
Malaysia were inadequate and did not meet the statutory thresholds required for third country 
transfer.93 Relevant to the Court’s assessment was the fact that Malaysia was not, and still is not, 
party to the Refugee Convention or Protocol. 
Following recommendations from a report by an expert panel set up to examine policy options,94 the 
Australian Labor government reversed its opposition to extraterritorial processing on Nauru and 
Manus Island and moved to reopen the facilities at those locations. The ‘Pacific Solution Mark II’ was 
born. In 2012, legislation was passed to replace the threshold requirements that had been relied on to 
strike down the Malaysian arrangement, in an attempt to ensure future third country transfer and 
processing arrangements would not be invalidated by the courts.95 The government also negotiated 
new memoranda of understanding with Nauru and PNG to reopen their processing camps.96 As of 30 
April 2015, 677 asylum seekers were being held at the processing centre on Nauru.97 On 20 
November 2012, the first group of asylum seekers were transferred to the Manus Island facility in 
PNG,98 and as of 20 April 2015, 971 asylum seekers were being held there.99  
The new extraterritorial processing regime differs from the original ‘Pacific Solution’ in a number of 
ways. First, amendments to the Migration Act expanded the categories of persons liable for transfer to 
third countries to include all unauthorised boat arrivals, not just those who arrived at an excised 
offshore place.100 Consequently, the term OEP was abandoned and replaced with ‘unauthorised 
maritime arrival’ (‘UMA’). Second, whereas under the ‘Pacific Solution’ refugee status determinations 
were carried out by UNHCR or Australian government officials, status determinations under the 
current regime are carried out pursuant to newly enacted domestic refugee legislation in Nauru and 
PNG, by officials from those countries. Third, the updated memorandum of understanding signed with 
PNG, not only allows for the transfer of asylum seekers for processing, but also for the resettlement in 
                                                   
93  Plaintiff M70/2011 v MIAC (2011) 244 CLR 144. This case is discussed in Chapter Eight, Part 8.2.2(b). 
See also, Michelle Foster, 'The Implications of the Failed “Malaysian Solution”: The Australian High 
Court and Refugee Responsibility Sharing at International Law' (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of 
International Law 395; Sasha Lowes, 'The Legality of Extraterritorial Processing of Asylum Claims: The 
Judgement of the High Court of Australia in the 'Malaysian Solution' Case' (2012) 12 Human Rights Law 
Review 168. 
94  Angus Houston, Paris Aristotle and Michael L’Estrange, Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers 
(Australian Government, August 2012).  
95  Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth), amending 
the Migration Act by replacing s 198A with a new s 198AA. The new provisions made it clear that the 
only condition for the exercise of the power to designate a country is that the Minister thinks that it is in 
the national interest to make such a designation. 
96  Julia Gillard, Prime Minister of Australia and Chris Bowen, Minister for Immigration, ‘Australia Signs 
Memorandum of Understanding with Nauru’ (Media Release, 29 August 2012); Julia Gillard, Prime 
Minister of Australia and Chris Bowen, Minister for Immigration, ‘Australia and Papua New Guinea Sign 
Updated Memorandum of Understanding’ (Media Release, 8 September 2012). 
97  DIBP, Immigration Detention and Community Statistics Summary (30 April 2015) 3 
<https://www.immi.gov.au/About/Documents/detention/immigration-detention-statistics-apr2015.pdf>. 
98  Simon Cullen, ‘First Asylum Seekers arrive on Manus Island’ ABC News (online), 21 November 2012 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-11-21/first-asylum-seekers-arrive-on-manus-island/4383876>.  
99  DIBP, above n 97, 3. 
100  Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth).  
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PNG of transferees assessed to be refugees. Nauru has made it clear that it cannot offer permanent 
resettlement. Rather, those recognised as refugees are given five-year visas which allow them to live 
in Nauru temporarily until a third country can be found to resettle them. In September 2014, Australia 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Cambodia that allows for the resettlement of some of 
the recognised refugees from Nauru to Cambodia.101  
Upon being elected in 2013, the government led by Prime Minister Tony Abbott launched Operation 
Sovereign Borders, a military-led initiative to deter and prevent asylum seekers reaching Australia by 
sea. The policy involves both the continuation and expansion of extraterritorial processing on PNG 
and Nauru, as well as the reintroduction of a policy of interdicting and returning sea-borne asylum 
seekers to their point of departure wherever possible. As of January 2015, the Abbott government had 
intercepted and turned back 15 boats carrying a total of 429 asylum seekers.102 The majority of these 
turn-back operations involved the return of asylum seeker boats to Indonesian waters, often without 
the cooperation of the Indonesian government.103 There have also been at least three reports of 
asylum seeker vessels being intercepted en route to Australia from Sri Lanka and their passengers 
being handed over to Sri Lankan authorities on the high seas.104 Whereas the asylum seekers 
returned to Indonesia have not been subject to any screening process, the Sri Lankan asylum 
seekers were subject to summary screenings at sea via teleconference. Reports indicate that asylum 
seekers were asked just four basic questions: their name, their country of origin, where they had 
come from, and why they had left.105  
                                                   
101  Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Kingdom of Cambodia and the 
Government of Australia, relating to the Settlement of Refugees in Cambodia, signed 26 September 
2014. 
102  Shalailah Medhora and Ben Doherty, ‘Australia Confirms 15 Boats Carrying 429 Asylum Seekers Have 
Been Turned Back’ The Guardian (online), 28 January 2015 <http://www.theguardian.com/australia-
news/2015/jan/28/australia-confirms-15-boats-carrying-429-asylum-seekers-have-been-turned-back>. 
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104  41 Sri Lankan asylum seekers were intercepted and handed over to Sri Lankan authorities in June 
2014: Daniel Hurst, ‘Australia Returns Asylum Seekers to Sri Lanka in Sea Transfer’, The Guardian 
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105 Sarah Whyte, ‘Immigration Department Officials Screen Asylum Seekers at Sea “via teleconference”’, 
Sydney Morning Herald (online), 2 July 2014 <www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-
news/immigration-department-officials-screen-asylum-seekers-at-sea-via-teleconference-20140702-
3b837.html>. These procedures are modelled on the ‘enhanced screening’ policy used with respect to 
unauthorised air and sea arrivals from Sri Lanka since 2012. However, up until this incident, there had 
not been any reports of ‘enhance screening’ being carried out at sea. Rather the procedures had been 
used once asylum seekers arrived in, or were transferred to, Australia: see Savitri Taylor, ‘Sri Lankan 
Boat Arrivals: Enhanced Screening, Diminished Protection’, The Conversation (1 November 2013) 
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A High Court challenge to Australia’s interdiction practices prompted the Australian government to 
introduce amendments in 2015 significantly expanding the executive’s powers to interdict, detain and 
transfer asylum seekers at sea. On 29 June 2014, an Indian-flagged vessel carrying 157 Sri Lankan 
asylum seekers was intercepted by an Australian Customs vessel in Australia’s contiguous zone. The 
asylum seekers were transferred to the Customs vessel, where they were detained while diplomatic 
negotiations were made to return them to India. They were detained aboard the Customs vessel until 
27 July 2014 when a decision was made to disembark the passengers to Cocos (Keeling) Island, an 
Australian territory in the Indian Ocean. In CPCF v MIBP, one of the passengers of the intercepted 
vessel, a Tamil asylum seeker, sought to challenge the extent of the government’s powers to intercept 
and detain asylum seekers, and transfer them to third countries.106 The plaintiff’s central claim was 
one of false imprisonment, namely that his detention on the Australian vessel was not authorised by 
law. The Commonwealth’s argument was that their actions were authorised under the Maritime 
Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (‘MPA’) (or alternatively, under the executive power). The MPA had 
consolidated the Commonwealth’s existing maritime enforcement powers, including those previously 
included in the Migration Act,107 into a single framework.108 The key relevant provision, s 72(4), stated 
that where a maritime officer suspects a vessel has been involved in a contravention of Australian 
law, including the Migration Act: 
A maritime officer may detain the person and take the person, or cause the person to be taken: 
a) To a place in the migration zone; or 
b) To a place outside the migration zone, including a place outside Australia.109 
By a narrow 4:3 majority, the High Court found that the detention of the plaintiff was authorised under 
the MPA. The Court’s decision is examined in detail in Chapter Seven.110 The outcome was 
somewhat of a moot point, as before the High Court handed down its decision, the government 
passed the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy 
Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth) (‘Legacy Caseload Act’) which included a raft of changes to the MPA that 
greatly expanded the executive’s powers to interdict, detain and transfer asylum seekers at sea.111 
Most significantly, the amendments stipulate that when carrying out maritime powers, an authorising 
officer is not required to consider Australia’s international obligations, or the international obligations 
or domestic law of another country.112 Additionally, the amendments stipulate that authorisation of 
maritime powers under the Act are not invalid if inconsistent with Australia’s international 
obligations.113 As such, there are no legal safeguards in place to ensure that Australia does not 
breach its non-refoulement obligations by returning a person to a place where they face persecution 
                                                                                                                                                              
<https://theconversation.com/sri-lankan-boat-arrivals-enhanced-screening-diminished-protection-
19601>.  
106  [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015). 
107  See former pt 2 div 12A of the Migration Act. 
108  Explanatory Memorandum, Maritime Powers Bill 2012 (Cth) 1. 
109  These provisions reflect the former s 245F(9)-(9A) of the Migration Act. 
110  See Chapter Seven, Part 7.2.2. 
111  Legacy Caseload Act, sch 1. 
112  MPA, s 22A(1)(a).  
113  MPA, s 22A(1)(c). 
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contrary to the Refugee Convention, or to a situation where they are in danger of death, torture or 
other mistreatment. Other amendments authorise potentially long-term detention at sea,114 restrict the 
application of the rules of natural justice from applying to most maritime powers under the Act,115 and 
restrict the capacity of the courts to review government actions at sea in a number of other ways.116 
5.2.3 US and Australian Practices Compared 
The clear similarities in US and Australian interdiction and extraterritorial processing policies raise a 
strong presumption that Australia drew on US experience when devising its policies. In order to fully 
appreciate the similarities and the possible lessons drawn from US practice, it is important to clearly 
define the various forms the policies of interdiction and extraterritorial processing have taken in the 
United States. First, interdiction was combined with some basic screening procedures carried out at 
sea, where persons ‘screened in’ as having a credible fear of persecution were transferred to the 
United States for the processing of their claims (1981 - November 1991). Second, interdiction was 
combined with the transfer of all interdicted persons to Guantanamo for processing (November 1991 - 
May 1992). Third, interdiction and return to the point of departure was carried out with no screening of 
asylum claims whatsoever (March 1992 - March 1994). Fourth, interdicted persons were transferred 
to a third country for processing (brief policy of carrying out processing in Jamaica and the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, June - July 1994). Fifth, interdiction was combined with the transfer of all persons to 
Guantanamo or a third country (Caribbean nations such as Panama) for safe haven, where they were 
protected from refoulement but not given access to status determination procedures (1994 - 1995). 
Sixth, is the current practice under which interdicted persons undergo basic screening at sea and are 
transferred to Guantanamo for further processing (1995 - present). 
The interdiction and extraterritorial processing measures introduced as part of both the Pacific 
Solution Mark I and II bear the most direct resemblance to the third (interdiction and return with no 
processing) and fourth (interdiction and processing in a third country) forms of the policy utilised by 
the United States. The objective, however, was the same as in all six incarnations of the US 
interdiction and extraterritorial processing programs. This was to control access to the State’s territory 
and carry out asylum determinations in a discretionary manner outside the framework of domestic 
legislation and beyond the reach of judicial oversight. Unlike in the United States, where the 
approaches were used at separate points in time, Australia operated the policies of return without 
screening and extraterritorial processing concurrently. As part of Operation Relex, the Australian Navy 
was instructed to intercept and return boats to Indonesia wherever possible. Recognising, however, 
that returns may not always be possible, the Australian government also set up a system of offshore 
                                                   
114  The Minister is authorised to detain passengers of an interdicted vessel for as long as a decision is 
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discussed above which state that the exercise of certain maritime powers are not invalid due to a failure 
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processing on Nauru and Manus Island in PNG as an alternative. A similar concurrent system of 
interdiction and return to point of departure, and interdiction and transfer to offshore processing 
centres is utilised under the Pacific Solution Mark II. However, it appears that the Abbott government 
has also adopted elements of the sixth approach (interdiction and basic screening at sea), with 
reports that the government is now carrying out screening for refugee claims aboard Navy vessels on 
the high seas in certain circumstances.117 
The extraterritorial processing regimes introduced as part of the Pacific Solution Mark I and II share 
many striking similarities with those utilised by the United States. The US regime involved processing 
asylum claims in third countries (Turks and Caicos Islands and Jamaica) and in the territory of 
Guantanamo. The Australian extraterritorial processing facilities are located in Nauru and Manus 
Island in PNG. Both the US and Australian systems create inferior systems for asylum determination, 
operating outside domestic legal frameworks. Australian law does not extend to asylum seekers on 
Nauru or PNG, as these are sovereign nations with their own laws. US law did not extend to Jamaica 
or Turks and Caicos Islands for the same reason. Guantanamo’s special status puts it beyond the 
reach of domestic migration legislation,118 and until recently, was viewed to be beyond the reach of 
the US Constitution.119 This extraterritoriality has allowed for the adoption of streamlined procedures 
that dispense with essential features of mainland processing such as access to lawyers, 
administrative review,120 and judicial review.121 
The excision of Australia’s offshore islands from Australia’s migration zone may also have been 
inspired by US practice. In some ways, it is a logical extension of the ‘entry fiction’ introduced in the 
United States in 1891.122 This legal fiction allows for certain aliens to be physically present inside the 
territory of the United States, but deemed as not present for purposes of immigration law. Under the 
policy of excision, unauthorised arrivals who reached certain offshore territories were prevented from 
applying for asylum under domestic Australian law. While possibly inspired by certain US practices, 
the policy had the effect of expanding the practice of interdiction and extraterritorial processing 
beyond that which had applied in the United States. Whereas the policy of extraterritorial processing 
had only been applied in the United States to persons who had been intercepted before they reached 
US territory, excision as introduced as part of the Pacific Solution extended the applicability of the 
policy to asylum seekers who made landfall at Australia’s outlying islands. Reforms introduced in 
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2013 as part of the Pacific Solution Mark II extended extraterritorial processing to all unauthorised 
boat arrivals, including those who reached mainland Australia.123  
The excision policy also took on new significance after the 2008 reforms, which moved the location of 
extraterritorial processing from Pacific Islands to the excised territory of Christmas Island. The 
government attempted to rely on the excision laws to create its own Guantanamo on Christmas 
Island, creating a territory over which it exercised sovereign control, but in which domestic laws and 
protections were said not to apply. The judiciary rejected this approach in Plaintiff M61/2010E v 
Commonwealth (‘Offshore Processing Case’).124 This decision, as well as the failure of other attempts 
to create a regional solution to the continuing flow of unauthorised maritime arrivals led to a return to 
third country extraterritorial processing, with the reopening of detention centres in Nauru and Manus 
Island as part of the Pacific Solution Mark II. 
5.3 Confirming the Transfer Hypothesis 
As the previous section indicates, the policy developments relating to interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing have followed similar patterns in the United States and Australia. While these similarities 
raise a strong presumption that legal and policy transfer has occurred, it does not rule out the 
alternate hypothesis that the similarities are due to independent responses to similar policy problems 
in both countries. In this section, I set out evidence that rules out the possibility of independent 
development by demonstrating that policy makers in Australia had direct knowledge of US practice in 
this area and drew upon this information when formulating and implementing the Pacific Solution. The 
section begins by identifying the instances of purported transfer that have taken place. Next, the 
evidence supporting the transfer hypothesis will be examined. This will be done with reference to 
documentary sources and interviews carried with key policy makers from Australia and the United 
States.  
Before examining the evidence of the knowledge possessed by decision makers involved in the case 
study transfers, it is important to be clear about the content, direction and timing of the purported 
instances of transfer. In relation to the practice of interdiction and extraterritorial processing, the 
transfer process appears to have been mono-directional, with Australian policy makers drawing 
lessons from the United States in the immediate lead-up to the introduction of the original Pacific 
Solution in August and September 2001. While there is evidence to suggest ongoing dialogue in 
relation to the operation of offshore detention facilities,125 these do not appear to have materially 
affected the interdiction and extraterritorial processing policies in either country. 
5.3.1 Opportunity: Channels of Communication 
The channels of communication that provided the opportunity for Australian and US policy makers to 
meet and share information on interdiction and extraterritorial processing policies are the same as 
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those examined in Chapter Four in the relation to the transfer of long-term mandatory detention.126 
The key forums discussed there were networks operating within international organisations (as well as 
the informal bilateral discussions that occur on the sidelines of these meetings); Regional Consultative 
Processes such as the Five Country Conferences and the Intergovernmental Consultations on 
Asylum; and bilateral avenues of communication such as ad hoc meetings, staff exchanges, fact-
finding missions and migration policy attachés based in the Australian Embassy in Washington and 
the US Embassy in Canberra.  
5.3.2 Direct Evidence Supporting the Transfer Hypothesis 
There is also direct evidence that Australian policy makers drew on US interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing practices when formulating and implementing the Pacific Solution. The Bill Digest 
accompanying the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 directly refers to 
the US precedent.127 This Act was the first of a series passed in the immediate aftermath of the 
Tampa incident to retrospectively authorise the actions taken against that vessel and establish the 
legislative framework underpinning interdiction and offshore processing. The Bills Digest includes a 
section titled ‘United States Analogy’, which sets out a detailed history of US interdiction and 
extraterritorial processing.128  
The view that Australian officials drew inspiration from US practice was supported by the data 
collected in my interviews. Two US policy makers interviewed stated that they had provided detailed 
advice, relating to US experience with interdiction and extraterritorial processing, to Australian policy 
makers in the immediate lead-up to the introduction of the Pacific Solution.129 The first interview 
subject reported being contacted through the Australian Consular of Immigration based in the 
Australian Embassy in Washington DC. The second interview subject, who had been one of the key 
architects of the US extraterritorial processing policies in the Caribbean in the 1990s, reported he had 
provided detailed policy advice, relating to the US experience with Haitian arrivals, to officials from 
Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Department of Immigration, as well as to the 
Australian Ambassador in Geneva. The policy maker was based in Geneva at the time the Tampa 
crisis unfolded, and was consulted on a daily basis by Australian officials in the immediate aftermath 
of the incident. Both US interview subjects identified specific Australian policy makers with whom they 
spoke. However, I was not able to secure interviews with any of the individuals named. 
Many of the key Australian bureaucrats involved in the formulation and implementation of the Pacific 
Solution declined my request for an interview. This was in stark contrast to the response I received 
from Australian policy makers involved in the development of the policy of mandatory detention. The 
reluctance of policy makers involved in the development of the Pacific Solution may be explained by 
two factors. First, the Pacific Solution is a more recent policy and, as a result, many of the key players 
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are still active in the public service. Some of the key events I examined in relation to mandatory 
detention occurred in the early 1990s. As such, most of the policy makers involved are now retired or 
have moved on to the private sector, and were therefore more willing to talk about their experiences. 
A second and related factor, is that the Pacific Solution was, and remains, a very politically sensitive 
topic. The politically charged nature of the policy is evident in the fact that it was developed within the 
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (‘PMC’), rather than the Department of Immigration. 
The implementation was also overseen by the PMC, which played a key role in coordinating the high-
level, intergovernmental committee that became known as the People Smuggling Taskforce. While no 
bureaucrats directly involved in this taskforce agreed to be interviewed, a senior bureaucrat active in 
the Department of Immigration during this period had the following to say about the degree to which 
he and his colleagues may have drawn on US interdiction and extraterritorial processing policies: 
Clearly we were aware of [the US precedent], and we paid attention to it because it had some similar 
characteristics. It didn’t have identical characteristics, but it did have some similar characteristics, so we 
stayed abreast of developments and if there was anything we didn’t fully understand, we obviously 
spoke to Americans about it, and asked how do you do this, how do you do that? It was more staying 
aware of how another country had approached an issue and how other commentators had characterised 
the US precedent, and what UNHCR’s perspective was on the US model.130 
Interviews with Australian politicians involved in the development of the Pacific Solution elicited a 
similar response. Interview subjects conceded they had knowledge of the US precedent, but denied 
that US policy was used as a model for Australian interdiction and extraterritorial processing 
policies.131 Again, it was emphasised that the policies were a response to unique Australian 
circumstances. Some level of influence was conceded, with one Australia politician stating: ‘It’s 
inspiration, not copying. We looked at all the various policy options, including what was going on 
overseas, and used that to update our own ideas.’132 
Ongoing dialogue in relation to the operation of extraterritorial processing and interdiction was evident 
in the ‘refugee swap’ agreement concluded between the United States and Australia in 2007.133 Under 
a memorandum of understanding entered into on 17 April 2007, the United States was to resettle 200 
refugees from the processing centre in Nauru. In return, Australia was to resettle refugees processed 
in Guantanamo.134 As Azadeh Dastyari has observed, the refugee swap was ‘a reminder of the 
parallels between US and Australian practices towards refugees and asylum seekers’.135 
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5.4 Concluding Remarks on the Transfer of Immigration Control 
Measures between the United States and Australia 
In the preceding two chapters, I have argued that the existence of similar policies relating to long-term 
mandatory detention of unauthorised arrivals, and the interdiction and extraterritorial processing of 
maritime asylum seekers in Australia were likely the result of a process of legal and policy transfer. In 
relation to mandatory detention, three phases of transfer were identified. The first phase involved 
Australian law makers drawing on US practice when implementing and formalising the Australian 
system of mandatory detention between 1989 and 1994. In the second phase, which occurred 
between 1996 and 2005, the direction of the transfer appears to have shifted, with US policy makers 
drawing lessons from Australia’s stringent approach and reducing the grounds for parole. The third 
phase, which occurred from 2005 to the present, has involved a two-way transfer where policy makers 
from both jurisdictions have drawn lessons from each other regarding attempts at reforming and 
mitigating some of the excesses of detention practices. In relation to interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing, the transfer appears to be a one-off occurrence, with Australian policy makers drawing on 
US experience when developing the Pacific Solution in 2001. None of these transfers involved 
verbatim copying of legislative provisions. Rather, in each instance, a policy was adapted at a 
conceptual level, but implemented through original domestic legislation and regulations. In this 
concluding section, I explore one final issue I observed in the course of the interviews I carried out 
with US and Australian policy makers. 
An interesting pattern emerged in my interviews: policy makers in both countries were eager to put on 
the record that their policies were copied by their foreign counterparts, but were reluctant to admit that 
they themselves had drawn lessons from foreign practice. In this regard, the interactions between 
Australian and US policy makers fit Jane McAdam’s description of the broader ‘plagiaristic dialogue’ 
that is occurring in the refugee policy sphere—with states borrowing heavily from each other but 
without any clear acknowledgement.136 There are a number of factors that can explain this behaviour. 
First, a policy maker may genuinely be unaware of the foreign influence. Policy development is a 
fractured process that includes many different agents. This may explain the fact that Australian policy 
makers (both bureaucrats and politicians) involved in the development of the Pacific Solution down-
played the influence of US policy in shaping Australia’s response. The advice of US officials was 
solicited primarily through consular officials posted overseas (who did not respond to my request for 
an interview). It is likely that by the time the information trickled down to the policy makers I 
interviewed, the acknowledgement of the US source was omitted. Second, it may be that some 
interview subjects deliberately or inadvertently misrepresented their own role in the policy 
development process. As discussed in Appendix A, policy makers may slant their accounts for a 
variety of reasons. In this case, policy makers, whether politicians or bureaucrats, may be reluctant to 
admit to engaging in transfers for ‘prestige’ reasons, as it deflates their role in the policy making 
                                                   
136  Jane McAdam, ‘Migrating Laws? The “Plagiaristic Dialogue” between Europe and Australia’ in Hélène 
Lambert, Jane McAdam and Maryellen Fullerton (eds), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 25, 67-8. 
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process and portrays them as ‘followers’. Rather, they may attempt to cast themselves as ‘leaders’ by 
emphasising their role in influencing foreign practices. This tendency is particularly relevant in the 
United States, which has traditionally viewed itself as an ‘innovator’ rather than an ‘emulator’. As 
Maryellen Fullerton has observed:  
To an extent that may be difficult for outsiders to perceive, the United States views itself as the centre of 
the current world order. The United States imagines that it exports human rights norms to the rest of the 
world, not vice versa.137 
This self-perception is buttressed by ‘a reflexive American exceptionalism mindset’ that views the 
United States as somehow qualitatively different from other nations, and a related ‘contemporary 
public antipathy to reliance on foreign law.’138 It is important to bear in mind these tendencies when 
evaluating the reluctance of US immigration policy makers to admit to drawing on foreign practice, as 
well as the relative lack of documentary evidence of such transfers. 
                                                   
137  Maryellen Fullerton, ‘Stealth Emulation: The United States and European Protection Norms’ in Hélène 
Lambert, Jane McAdam and Maryellen Fullerton (eds), The Global Reach of European Refugee Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2013) 201, 201 (emphasis in original). 
138  Ibid, 202-5, 222. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
MANDATORY DETENTION – THE CASE LAW 
Policies of long-term mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing push the 
boundaries of what is acceptable under domestic and international law. These policies have been the 
subject of judicial challenges in the highest courts of the United States and Australia. The examination 
of how the courts have responded to functionally equivalent policies in each jurisdiction provides an 
opportunity to consider the impact of different legal and extra-legal factors on judicial decision making 
and the impact of these factors on the success or failure of transfers of law or policy. The focus of my 
analysis is on what I label as legal success. I define legal success as occurring when an imported law 
or policy survives judicial challenges in domestic courts.1 At the same time, I argue that legal transfers 
fail when there is a judicial finding that an imported law or policy is unlawful, or where the judiciary 
adopts an interpretation of the imported provisions which frustrates the original intention of the 
drafters of the law or policy.  
Over the next three chapters, I argue that different legal frameworks operating in each jurisdiction 
have not been determinative of the way courts in the United States and Australia have responded to 
the case study policies. In each leading case, the judges had a choice between adopting a ‘rights-
protecting’ approach, upholding the statutory, constitutional or common law rights of the non-citizen; 
or a ‘rights-precluding’ approach upholding the legality of government actions.2 I make the case that in 
each instance the law in the United States and Australia contained ample resources to support either 
approach. As such, the choices made by judges reflect differences in judicial mindset, rather than 
variations in the legal frameworks in each jurisdiction.3 The relevant judicial mindset relates to the 
views about the appropriate scope of rights to be afforded to non-citizens who have no right to enter 
or remain in the country; and differences in opinion as to the appropriate role of the judiciary in 
interfering with executive and legislative actions. I argue that such views and opinions, in turn, appear 
to be influenced by extra-legal factors such as national security concerns and public opinion towards 
immigration. Thus, I contend that these extra-legal considerations may be of more significance in 
determining legal success or failure than differences in legal structures. 
In this chapter, I compare the judicial response to immigration detention laws. I examine the judicial 
response to interdiction and extraterritorial processing policies in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight 
respectively. In the course of my analysis, I identify critical junctures in the reasoning of the judges in 
each case, which could have led them down either the ‘rights-precluding’ or ‘rights-protecting’ path. In 
                                                   
1  See Chapter Two, Part 2.3.1. 
2  This terminology is adapted from Rayner Thwaites, The Liberty of Non-Citizens: Indefinite Detention in 
Commonwealth Countries (Hart, 2014) 15. 
3  Rayner Thwaites makes a similar argument in relation to his comparative analysis of the judicial 
response to the legality of the potential indefinite post-deportation order detention in Australia, Canada 
and the United Kingdom: ibid. 
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Chapter Nine, I examine the potential impact of extra-legal factors on judicial decision making when 
faced with these junctures. I argue that there is a correlation between heightened national security 
concerns, negative public sentiment towards immigrants and judicial opinions resulting in a ‘rights-
precluding’ outcome. 
Legal challenges to immigration detention policies in the United States and Australia have focused on 
two primary issues. The first relates to the mandatory nature of detention and whether non-citizens 
can be detained without individualised assessments of the need for incarceration. The second relates 
to the duration of detention and whether legislation can authorise the potentially indefinite detention of 
non-citizens at the discretion of the executive branch of government. The US Supreme Court and the 
Australian High Court have adopted similar forms of proportionality analysis to uphold the legality of 
mandatory immigration detention imposed without individualised findings as to the necessity of 
detention. I question the reasoning relied on to reach this conclusion, arguing that an alternate 
reasonable construction was available in the leading cases in both jurisdictions that could have 
supported a finding that such detention was unlawful. 
In terms of provisions purporting to provide for indefinite, administrative, post-deportation order 
detention, courts in the two countries have diverged in their approach. As will be discussed in detail 
below, the US Supreme Court imposed a presumptive time limit on such detention, while the 
Australian High Court upheld the validity of potentially indefinite detention. It is tempting to attribute 
this divergence to differing legal structures in each jurisdiction—most importantly, the existence of a 
constitutional bill of rights in the United States and the absence of any such protections in Australia. I 
argue that there are reasons to doubt such a conclusion. The plenary power doctrine in the United 
States means that the usual constitutional protections do not always apply in immigration related 
cases. The doctrine has resulted in a fractured application of constitutional protections to non-citizens 
in immigration proceedings. This has given judges a broad discretion as to when they should (and 
should not) intervene. At the same time, Australia has the constitutional requirement of the separation 
of powers between the judiciary and the executive; and the common law presumption in favour of 
personal liberty. These and other tools of statutory interpretation could have provided enough 
justification for judges to adopt an interpretation of the statute that precluded indefinite detention.  
6.1  United States: Legal Frameworks and Early Case Law 
The United States has a federal constitution that limits the power of Congress in two important ways. 
First, the federal government’s power is generally restricted to those grounds expressly enumerated in 
the Constitution. This means the government can exercise ‘only the powers granted to it’ and powers 
‘necessary and proper’ to the execution of those delegated powers.4 Second, the Constitution 
contains explicit limitations that describe specific things that the federal government may not do. The 
most important of these provisions for present purposes are those aimed at protecting individual 
rights. Known collectively as the Bill of Rights, these protections appear as the first ten amendments 
                                                   
4  McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316, 324, 405 (1819). 
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to the US Constitution. The result of these positive and negative constraints is that ‘federal action will 
ordinarily be constitutional only if it is authorised in the Constitution and then only if nothing in the 
Constitution prohibits it.’5  
The US Constitution does not include any language that expressly grants Congress the power to 
control immigration. Immigration law therefore stands as an exception to the general rule that the 
federal government can only legislate with regard to matters expressly enumerated in the 
Constitution. Congress’s power to control immigration is said to derive from powers inherent in 
sovereignty. In Chae Chan Ping v United States (‘Chae Chan Ping’), the Supreme Court held 
unanimously: 
That the government of the United States… can exclude aliens from its territories is a proposition which 
we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of 
every independent nation. It is part of its independence. If it could not exclude aliens, it would to that 
extent be subject to the control of another power.6 
This sovereign power vested in Congress and the executive to control immigration has been 
understood to extend not only to the removal of non-citizens, but also the detention of such persons 
pending their removal. In Wong Wing v United States, Shiras J stated: 
Proceedings to exclude or expel would be in vain if those accused could not be held in custody pending 
the inquiry into their true character and while arrangements were being made for their deportation.7 
In relation to constitutional protections that may have a bearing on immigration detention, the most 
directly relevant is the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. This provides that ‘[n]o person shall… 
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law.’8 This clause creates a 
procedural due process right pursuant to which individuals are to be afforded certain hearing rights 
before they are deprived of life, liberty or property. The clause also provides a substantive due 
process right pursuant to which a law or regulation can be challenged for being inherently unfair or 
arbitrary because it infringes a fundamental right. 
The operation of the Due Process Clause and other constitutional protections in immigration decision 
making is restricted by the plenary power doctrine.9 The contours of the doctrine have evolved over 
the years, but in general it declares that the political branches have a broad and largely exclusive 
authority over immigration. Accordingly, courts have generally declined to review federal immigration 
statutes and decisions made under those statutes for compliance with constitutional restraints. The 
                                                   
5  Stephen Legomsky, Immigration and the Judiciary: Law and Politics in Britain and America (Oxford 
University Press, 1987) 177, citing Monongahela Navigation Co v United States, 148 US 312, 336 
(1893). 
6  130 US 581, 603-4 (1889). 
7  163 US 228, 235 (1896). 
8  United States Constitution, amendment V. 
9  See Chapter Four, nn 27-38 and accompanying text for further discussion of the plenary power doctrine. 
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result is that ‘[i]mmigration law is a constitutional oddity’10 which has developed in isolation from 
mainstream American public law. Over the years, the doctrine has attracted a great deal of criticism, 
and numerous observers have predicted its demise.11 However, for now, the doctrine continues to 
play a significant role in US judicial decision making. 
The plenary power doctrine was developed in a line of Supreme Court decisions dealing with 
challenges to laws designed to exclude and deport Chinese nationals in the latter part of the 19th 
century. In Chae Chan Ping, the US Supreme Court held that the US federal government has the 
power to pass laws regulating migration and that the plenary power doctrine means that these laws 
cannot be challenged on substantive due process grounds.12 Three years later, in Nishimura Eiku v 
United States, the Court made it clear that the plenary power doctrine extended to bar review on 
procedural due process grounds as well.13 However, by explicitly contrasting the position of 
excludable aliens (who had no constitutional rights in the immigration context) to that of resident 
aliens in deportation proceedings, the Court left open the possibility that the latter category may be 
entitled to at least some degree of constitutional protection. This issue was resolved in the case of 
Yamataya v Fisher, which affirmed the distinction between excludable and deportable aliens.14 The 
majority in that case ruled that deportable aliens could challenge their deportation on procedural due 
process grounds. Harlan J states in his majority opinion: 
[I]t is not competent for … any executive officer… arbitrarily to cause an alien, who has entered the 
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its population, although 
alleged to be illegally here, to be taken into custody and deported without giving him all the opportunity 
to be heard upon the question involving his right to be and remain in the United States.15 
The main contours of the plenary power doctrine were set. Subject to minor exceptions discussed 
below, the doctrine remains relatively unchanged to this day. The fault line continues to be based on 
notions of entry and non-entry, with a distinction made between excludable and deportable aliens. 
Deportable aliens are those who have ‘entered’ into the United States by crossing US borders, either 
legally or illegally. Excludable aliens are those seeking entry into the United States, but who are 
stopped at the border awaiting a determination as to their admissibility. Deportable aliens, who are by 
                                                   
10  Stephen Legomsky, 'Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Power' (1984) 
Supreme Court Review 255. 
11  See Ibid; Peter Schuck, 'The Transformation of Immigration Law' (1984) 84 Columbia Law Review 1; 
Charles Weisselberg, 'The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the lives of Ellen Knauff and 
Ignatz Mezei' (1995) 143 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 933; Alexander Aleinikoff, 'Detaining 
Plenary Power: The Meaning and Impact of Zadvydas v Davis' (2002) 16 Georgetown Immigration Law 
Journal 365; Peter Spiro, 'Explaining the End of the Plenary Power' (2002) 16 Georgetown Immigration 
Law Journal 339. 
12  130 US 581 (1889). 
13  142 US 651(1892). 
14  189 US 86 (1903). 
15  Ibid 101. It is important to note, however, that although recognising the competency of the court to hear 
constitutional challenges based on due process in deportation proceedings, no procedural due process 
violation was found to have occurred in this case. This was despite the fact that Ms Yamataya could not 
speak English, had not received notice of the charges against her, and had not been allowed to consult 
with a lawyer: 101-2.  
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definition within the United States, can raise limited procedural due process challenges in deportation 
cases. However, the extent of due process that must be accorded remains unclear. A long line of 
cases recite the procedural due process requirement, but do not apply it for the alien’s benefit.16 
Recent decisions have also signalled a willingness on the part of the Court to entertain substantive 
due process challenges brought by deportable aliens.17 In contrast, excludable aliens do not have any 
procedural or substantive due process rights during their removal process. The one notable caveat to 
this rule relates to returning former long-term residents who may in certain circumstances be entitled 
to limited due process rights.18 
The US Supreme Court has maintained the distinction between aliens who have ‘entered’ the United 
States and those who have not, despite Congress abolishing the division between exclusion and 
deportation proceedings. In 1996, Congress replaced exclusion and deportation proceedings with a 
single removal procedure. Following the 1996 reforms, the concept of ‘admission’ was adopted as the 
fundamental distinction in immigration proceedings.19 Non-citizens placed in removal proceedings 
who have not been admitted, now have to establish an entitlement to admission regardless of whether 
they are picked up at the border or inside US territory. Where a person has been admitted, the onus 
falls on the government to prove deportability. Alexander Aleinikoff explains that ‘[t]he change in law 
ended the anomaly that a non-citizen seeking initial entry on an immigrant visa received fewer 
procedural protections than a non-citizen inside the United States who had entered without 
inspection.’20 However, the Supreme Court has to date declined to shift the application of the plenary 
power doctrine in the direction identified by Congress. As the cases examined below in Part 6.2 
demonstrate, it has chosen instead to affirm the border/interior distinction. 
In Shaughnessy v United States ex rel Mezei (‘Mezei’),21 a majority of the US Supreme Court rejected 
the constitutional claims of an alien who had left the United States and was seeking readmission at 
Ellis Island. In doing so, the Court upheld the constitutional validity of his continued and potentially 
indefinite detention. Ignatz Mezei had been admitted lawfully to the United States where he had 
resided for 25 years. He left the country to visit his dying mother in Romania.22 Upon his return to the 
United States he was refused entry on security grounds. The adverse information the government 
relied on to exclude Mr Mezei was not put to him as it was deemed to be confidential information, the 
disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the public interest.23 As no other country would accept him, 
                                                   
16  See, for example, Carlson v Landon, 342 US 524 (1952). 
17  See analysis of Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 (2001), below Part 6.2.1(a).  
18  Landon v Plasencia, 459 US 21 (1982). 
19  Admission refers to inspection by an officer and authorisation to establish presence in the United States: 
Alexander Aleinikoff et al, Immigration and Citizenship: Process and Policy (West, 7th ed, 2012) 554. 
20  Aleinikoff, 'Detaining Plenary Power’, above n 11, 375. 
21  345 US 206 (1953). 
22  Ibid 208. 
23  The power relied upon was the provision in Passport Act of 1918 that allowed the Attorney General, 
acting for the President, to shut out aliens whose ‘entry would be prejudicial to the interests of the United 
States’ during times of war or national emergencies. These provisions allowed for exclusion without a 
hearing when the exclusion was based on confidential information the disclosure of which would be 
prejudicial to the public interest: see Passport Act of 1918, § 1 ch 81, 40 Stat 559, as amended by the 
Act of June 21, 1941, ch 210, § 1, 55 Stat 252, 22 USC § 223. 
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he faced the prospect of indefinite detention on Ellis Island.24 Mr Mezei petitioned for habeas corpus. 
The lower courts granted that application, finding that continued detention without any realistic 
possibility of removal constituted a denial of due process. The Supreme Court reversed the decision. 
In a 5:4 majority ruling, the Court held that Mr Mezei’s continued and potentially indefinite detention 
was authorised under law and did not raise any constitutional concerns.25 
Clark J’s lead judgement stands as one of the Court’s strongest statements of the application of the 
plenary power doctrine.26 He reasoned that because of Mr Mezei’s status as an excludable alien, no 
statutory or constitutional basis existed for his release. Clark J recognised that ‘aliens who have once 
passed through our gates even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to 
traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.’27 But excludable aliens may not 
assert procedural rights under the Due Process Clause because constitutional protection only extends 
to persons within the United States territory.28 This decision affirmed the distinction created in the 
earlier plenary power doctrine cases between excludable and deportable aliens. Importantly, it also 
upheld the entry fiction under which an alien may physically be present in US territory, but deemed 
not to be present for the purposes of immigration law.29 Mr Mezei had contended that his indefinite 
detention on Ellis Island strengthened his constitutional claim to a hearing to determine whether he 
should be excluded. Clark J rejected this argument, reasoning that his detention was merely incidental 
to his exclusion, deciding that ‘such temporary harborage, an act of legislative grace, bestow[ed] no 
additional rights.’30 While the Supreme Court’s decision gave the green light to the executive to detain 
Mr Mezei on Ellis Island indefinitely—he was eventually released on parole by the Attorney General.31 
6.2  United States: Recent Case Law 
6.2.1 Indefinite Detention 
Recent US Supreme Court decisions on indefinite immigration detention signal a retreat from the 
position taken in Mezei. While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to make an explicit constitutional 
finding which expands due process rights to immigration detainees, it has used the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance to interpret current statutory detention provisions as not generally authorising 
such detention.32 As explored above, aliens who have entered the United States and are 
subsequently placed in deportation proceedings have generally been afforded substantially more 
constitutional rights than excludable aliens seeking entry. However, under the current legislative 
                                                   
24  Mezei, 345 US 206, 208-9 (1953); He had twice been sent to Europe and returned by Britain and 
France. He of his own volition applied to twelve Latin American countries for admission, but had been 
refused. 
25  Ibid 215-16. 
26  See Weisselberg, above n 11, 967. 
27  Mezei, 345 US 206, 212 (1953). 
28  Ibid. 
29  See Chapter Four, nn 53-5 and accompanying text. 
30  Mezei, 345 US 206, 215 (1953). 
31  Charles Weisselberg, ‘The Detention and Treatment of Aliens Three Years After September 11: A New 
World Order?' (2005) 38 University of California Davis Law Review 815, 819, n 17. 
32  See below Part 6.2.1(a) and nn 197-203 and accompanying text. 
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regime, post-deportation detention of both classes of removable aliens is governed by a single 
legislative provision.33 The unintended result of this has been the extension of protections afforded to 
deportable aliens to also apply to excludable aliens.  
In Chapter Four, I examined the expansion of the use of mandatory detention for excludable/non-
admitted aliens. Beginning in the late 1980s, the US government also introduced and progressively 
expanded provisions relating to the mandatory detention of deportable aliens. In 1988, Congress 
passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act, which directed the Attorney General to take into custody any alien 
convicted of an aggravated felony upon completion of his criminal sentence, and not to release the 
aggravated felon from custody.34 The result was that targeted immigrants were to be mandatorily 
detained throughout deportation proceedings and thereafter until removal, potentially for an indefinite 
period. In response to concerns that the mandatory detention provisions violated the Due Process 
Clause, Congress amended the legislation to permit the discretionary release of aliens who had been 
legally admitted into the United States and could show that they did not pose a flight risk or a danger 
to the community.35 This discretionary power to release was again removed in 1996, with the passage 
of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (‘AEDPA’).36  
The current regime governing the post-deportation order detention of aliens was enacted as part of 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (‘IIRIRA’),37 introduced six 
months after the AEDPA. In addition to expanding mandatory detention provisions for excludable 
aliens,38 the IIRIRA also amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (‘INA’) to subject a broader 
category of aliens to mandatory detention during removal proceedings and thereafter until 
deportation.39 The amendments provided for the mandatory detention of aliens removable on terrorist 
grounds, as well as those convicted of crimes of moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, drug related 
offenses, firearm offenses, and the catchall category of ‘miscellaneous crimes’.40  
What is significant for the current analysis is that the reforms created a single provision to deal with 
the post-deportation procedures of both admitted and inadmissible aliens.41 Deportation and exclusion 
proceedings were streamlined into a single removal procedure. The provisions stipulated that when 
an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General has 90 days to remove the alien from the United 
                                                   
33  See below nn 41-4 and accompanying text. 
34  Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub L No 100-690, § 7343(a), 102 Stat 4470 (amending 8 USC 
1252(a)(2)). Aggravated felonies were defined as crimes involving murder, drug trafficking, illicit 
trafficking in firearms or destructive devices, and attempts or conspiracies to commit such crimes in the 
United States. 
35  Note, 'Developments—The Law of Prisons—V. Plight of the Tempest-Tost: Indefinite Detention of 
Deportable Aliens' (2002) 115 Harvard Law Review 1915, 1920; See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub L No 
101-649, § 504(a), 104 Stat 5049; 8 USC 1252(a)(2)(A) and (B) (1988 & Supp II 1990). 
36  Pub L No 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996); 8 USC 1252(a)(2), as amended by AEDPA § 440(c), 110 Stat 
1277. 
37  Pub L No 104-208, 100 Stat 3009-546. 
38  See Chapter Four, nn 87-97 and accompanying text. 
39  See, generally, INA § 236(c).  
40  Ibid. Parole is only available for a very limited subset of detainees: aliens enrolled in witness protection 
programs who can demonstrate that they do not pose a security or flight risk: see INA § 236(c)(2).  
41  INA § 241. 
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States.42 Certain classes of inadmissible and criminal aliens must be detained during this period.43 
The Act specifies that if, for whatever reason, an alien cannot be removed, they ‘may be detained 
beyond the [90-day] period.’44  
(a) Zadvydas: The Indefinite Detention of Admitted Aliens 
In Zadvydas v Davis (‘Zadvydas’) the US Supreme Court addressed the question of whether the 
discretionary power to detain beyond the statutory 90-day period could be used to detain deportable 
former resident aliens indefinitely.45 The case concerned the potential indefinite detention of two 
resident aliens with criminal histories. Kestutis Zadvydas and Kim Ho Ma were issued with removal 
orders that could not be carried out, as no country could be found to accept them. As a result, both 
remained in custody past the expiration of the statutory 90-day period.46 In a 5:4 decision, the 
Supreme Court avoided ruling directly on the issue of whether the detention provisions violated 
procedural or substantive constitutional due process rights. Instead, the majority relied on a textual 
analysis of the INA. It framed the issue as whether INA § 241(a)(6) authorises the Attorney General to 
detain a removable alien ‘indefinitely beyond the removal period or only for a period reasonably 
necessary to secure the alien’s removal.’47 Breyer J, who wrote the majority opinion, adopted the 
latter interpretation, reasoning that the alternative would raise ‘serious constitutional concerns.’48 As 
such, his Honour read an ‘implicit limitation’ into the detention authorisation, ruling that:  
[T]he statute, read in light of the Constitution’s demands, limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention 
to a period reasonably necessary to bring about the alien’s removal from the United States. It does not 
permit indefinite detention.49  
Breyer J concluded that once ‘removal is no longer reasonably foreseeable,’ continued detention is 
not authorised by the statute.50 Six months was the presumptively reasonable period in which to effect 
removal. After this period, if an alien shows that there is good reason to believe that ‘there is no 
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ the onus shifts to the 
government to produce evidence to rebut that presumption. The Court was careful to note, however, 
there may be constitutionally permissive grounds to detain aliens beyond this period, stating that the 
limit may not apply to ‘especially dangerous’ aliens.51 
                                                   
42  INA § 241(a)(1)(A). 
43  INA § 241(a)(2). 
44  INA § 241(a)(6) (emphasis added). 
45  533 US 678 (2001).  
46  At the time of the hearing, Zadvydas had been detained for 7 years and Ho Ma for 2 years: ibid 684-5.  
47  Ibid 682 (emphasis in original). 
48  Ibid 689 (Breyer J, joined by Stevens, O’Conner, Souter and Ginsburg JJ). 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid 699. 
51  Breyer J said that the facts did not require the Court to ‘consider terrorism or other special 
circumstances where special arguments might be made for forms of preventive detention and for 
heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to national security’: ibid 
696. 
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The key determining factor was an analysis of the express terms of the statute. Breyer J found no 
‘clear indication of congressional intent to grant the Attorney General the power to hold indefinitely in 
confinement an alien ordered removed.’52 In the absence of clear congressional intent, the Court was 
able to avoid any constitutional issues that indefinite detention may pose. In concluding that 
incarceration in this context would raise constitutional concerns, Breyer J analysed other laws 
providing for administrative detention. His Honour reasoned that such detention generally had been 
found to be constitutional only where ‘a special justification, such as harm-threatening mental illness, 
outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding physical restraint’.53 Breyer J 
concluded that there was no sufficiently strong justification for indefinite civil detention in this case. His 
Honour expressly rejected the two justifications put forward by the government. The first had been 
that continued detention of deportable aliens was necessary to ensure that aliens do not abscond 
from immigration proceedings.54 The Court found this a weak ground for continued detention when 
the alien’s removal was nothing more than a ‘remote possibility at best.’ 55 Breyer J reasoned that 
where the goal of removal is no longer practically attainable, detention no longer ‘bear[s] [a] 
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual [was] committed.’56 Second, the 
government had argued that continued detention was necessary to protect the community from 
danger.57 Breyer J responded that preventative detention based on threat has only been upheld when 
limited to ‘specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural safeguards.’58 In contrast, 
the detention provisions at issue applied to a broad class of persons, including petty criminals. 
Further, the purely executive review was determined to be an inadequate safeguard.59 
The Court made no explicit finding on the scope of the constitutional due process rights in issue. 
Nevertheless, the majority opinion does signal a commitment to strengthening substantive and 
procedural due process rights for resident aliens. The government had argued that aliens who had 
been properly admitted and who lost their status while still in the United States were legally equivalent 
to those seeking admission at the border. It was claimed that the holding in Mezei that excludable 
aliens were not entitled to any due process rights under the Constitution should also apply to those 
who had entered and subsequently lost their status. The majority squarely rejected this proposition, 
reasoning that 
                                                   
52  Ibid 697. 
53, Ibid 667 citing Kansas v Hendricks, 521 US 346, 356 (1997). 
54  Ibid 690. 
55  Ibid. The Court noted that the INS had made various attempts with respect to both aliens to find a 
country willing to accept them but was unsuccessful: see 684, 686. 
56  Ibid 690 citing Jackson v Indiana, 406 US 715, 738 (1972). 
57  Ibid. 
58  Ibid 691 citing United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 740, 750-2 (1987) (allowing pre-trial detention only 
for the most serious crimes and subject to stringent time limits) and Foucha v Louisiana, 504 US 71, 81-
3 (1992) (striking down insanity-related detention that placed the burden on the detainee to prove non-
dangerousness). 
59  Ibid 691. 
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once an alien enters the country, the legal circumstances change, for the Due Process Clause applies to 
all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, 
temporary or permanent.60  
The Court restricted Mezei to its facts, reasoning that Mr Mezei did not deserve the full extent of Fifth 
Amendment protections because he was at the border seeking admission.61  
The Court avoided procedural due process issues by side-stepping questions as to the 
constitutionality of the procedural scheme used to decide on detention. Rather, the Court relied on 
substantive due process grounds:  
We believe that an alien’s liberty interest is, at the very least, strong enough to raise a serious question 
as to whether, irrespective of the procedures used, the Constitution permits detention that is indefinite 
and potentially permanent.’62  
This represents a shift away from earlier case law which had held that the plenary power doctrine 
precluded substantive due process challenges to immigration laws, even by aliens who had been 
lawfully admitted.63 
(b) Clark v Martinez: Indefinite Detention of Inadmissible Aliens 
After Zadvydas, it was unclear if the Supreme Court would apply similar reasoning to place a limit on 
the duration of the post-removal order detention of inadmissible aliens. As discussed above, the 
majority opinion affirmed the distinction made in Mezei between the constitutional rights of aliens who 
have entered the United States and those who have not. This distinction was maintained in principle, 
to the dismay of immigrant advocates and academic commentators.64 The Federal Courts of Appeals 
took divergent approaches to the question, with some extending the protections laid down in 
Zadvydas to inadmissible aliens, and others declining to do so.65  
In 2005, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in Clark v Martinez.66 The case involved two Cuban 
men who had arrived in the United States as part of the Mariel Boatlift in 1980.67 Both were initially 
                                                   
60  Ibid 693 citing, inter alia, Plyler v Doe, 457 US 202, 210 (1982); Mathews v Diaz, 426 US 67, 77 (1976).  
61  Ibid 693 (noting that his status as an excludable alien ‘made all the difference’). 
62  Ibid 696. 
63  See, for example, Yamataya v Fisher, 189 US 86 (1903). 
64  See Aleinikoff, 'Detaining Plenary Power’, above n 11, 366 (expressing disappointment that Zadvydas 
affirmed the distinction between aliens who have entered officially and those who have entered illegally); 
Linda Bosniak, ‘A Basic Territorial Distinction’ (2002) 16 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 407, 407 
(discussing the Court’s ‘analytical confusion’ and its continuation of distinct categories of aliens, 
declaring that ‘the [Zadvydas] victory came at a real cost’ because ‘the Court all but reaffirmed the long-
deplored decision in Mezei’). 
65  The Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits did not extend Zadvydas’s prohibition on 
indefinite detention to inadmissible aliens: See Sierra v Romaine, 347 F3d 559 (3rd Cir, 2003); Benitez v 
Wallis, 337 F3d 1289 (11th Cir, 2003); Borrero v Aljets, 325 F3d 1003 (8th Cir, 2003); Rios v INS, 324 
F3d 296 (5th Cir, 2003); Hoyte-Mesa v Ashcroft, 272 F3d 989 (7th Cir, 2001). In contrast, the Ninth and 
Sixth Circuits did extend Zadvvdas’s prohibition on indefinite detention to inadmissible aliens: see 
Rosales-Garcia v Holland, 322 F3d 386 (6th Cir, 2003); Xi v INS, 298 F3d 832 (9th Cir, 2002).  
66  543 US 371 (2005). 
67  See Chapter Four, nn 65-6 and accompanying text. 
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paroled into the United States but had their parole revoked after being convicted of criminal offences. 
As parole is not regarded as admission, the men retained their status as aliens seeking entry and as 
such could be removed on the grounds of inadmissibility.68 Both men were placed in removal 
proceedings, found to be inadmissible and issued with removal orders. However, these orders could 
not be effectuated, as Cuba would not accept their return. As such, they remained in detention 
beyond the 90-day removal period with no reasonable prospect of removal.  
Writing for a 7:2 majority, Scalia J found that § 241(a)(6) should be interpreted as being constrained 
by the same time limit that applies to the detention of admitted aliens.69 Inadmissible aliens could be 
detained, ‘only for a period consistent with the purpose of effectuating removal.’70 As in Zadvydas, this 
was held to be a presumptive period of six months, after which a detainee must be released if there is 
‘no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonable future’.71 The majority reached this decision by 
construing the relevant statutory provision, § 241(a)(6), as not distinguishing between admitted and 
inadmissible aliens.72 As such, the Court felt bound to follow the earlier statutory interpretation 
adopted in Zadvydas rather than ‘establish within [their] jurisprudence, beyond the power of Congress 
to remedy, the dangerous principle that judges can give the same statutory text different meanings in 
different cases’.73 The conclusion was reached despite the fact, explicitly noted by the majority, that 
indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens would not raise any of the constitutional concerns arising in 
the context of the indefinite detention of admitted aliens. In this regard, the case affirmed a long line of 
decisions in which US courts had consistently held that Cubans who came to the United States as 
part of the Mariel Boatlift could not claim constitutional due process rights.74 However, relying on the 
approach to statutory construction outlined above, the Court deemed the continued indefinite 
detention of the plaintiffs unlawful, as it was not authorised by the relevant legislative provisions. 
As the ruling was based purely on statutory construction, it does not prevent a legislative amendment 
providing for the indefinite detention of inadmissible aliens. As Scalia J wrote, ‘[t]he Government fears 
that the security of our borders will be compromised if it must release into the country inadmissible 
aliens who cannot be removed. If that is so, Congress can attend to it’.75 The Court noted that 
following Zadvydas, Congress had indeed enacted powers to authorise indefinite detention beyond 
six months where removable aliens presented national security risks or had been involved in terrorist 
                                                   
68  See 8 USC § 1182(d)(5)(A) (Supp IV 1992). 
69  Clark v Martinez, 543 US 371 (2005). Stevens, O’Conner, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer JJ 
joined Scalia J’s opinion, while O’Conner J filed a concurring opinion. Thomas J filed a dissenting 
opinion in which Rehnquist CJ joined. 
70  Ibid 384. 
71  Ibid 378. 
72  Ibid 378. 
73  Ibid 391. 
74  See, for example, Barrera-Echavarria v Rison, 44 F3d 1441 (9th Cir, 1995); Gisbert v US Attorney 
General, 988 F2d 1437 (5th Cir, 1993); and Margaret Taylor, ‘Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of 
Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine’ (1995) 22 Hastings Constitutional 
Law Quarterly 1087, 1142-3. 
75  Clark v Martinez, 543 US 371, 386 (2005). 
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activities.76 Accordingly, they could pass similar amendments relating to the detention of dangerous 
inadmissible aliens. 
6.2.2 Mandatory Detention 
While the US courts have been willing to impose certain limits on the duration of post-deportation 
order detention, attempts to challenge the mandatory nature of detention provisions have been 
unsuccessful. The leading case in this regard is Demore v Kim.77 There, the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of the mandatory detention of criminal aliens while their removal proceedings were 
pending. Hyunk Joon Kim, a South Korean national and US permanent resident, was facing 
deportation proceedings as the result of burglary and theft offences. He was detained under INA § 
236(c) which required that the Attorney General detain, without bail, a subset of deportable criminal 
aliens pending a determination of their removability. Mr Kim had argued that § 236(c) violated his Fifth 
Amendment substantive due process rights because the INS had not made an individualised 
determination that he posed a danger to society or that he was a flight risk.78 Building on the 
Zadvydas decision, Mr Kim’s counsel argued that if aliens who had been issued with a final 
deportation order had a liberty interest in being freed, then aliens who have only been charged as 
deportable have at least as strong an interest. In Zadvydas, the majority adopted the position taken in 
earlier Supreme Court decisions, that detention will violate constitutional substantive due process 
requirements 
unless the detention is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate procedural protections, or in 
certain special and ‘narrow’ non-punitive ‘circumstances,’ where a special justification, such as harm-
threatening mental illness, outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding 
physical restraint.79 
There was a strong argument to be made that the detention in Demore v Kim did not meet this criteria 
and so could be challenged on due process grounds. As Alexis Hedman explains, § 236(c) imposed 
mandatory detention on certain criminal aliens pending their deportation proceedings. All are assumed 
to fall in this category of designated special circumstances, even if they do not. Here, the justification for 
detention, regardless of whether it is particularised to the alien, is found to automatically outweigh the 
individual’s liberty interest. As such, the application of [§ 236(c)] seems far more punitive in nature and, 
subsequently, strays from the ‘narrowness’ prerequisite required by substantive due process 
protections.80 
                                                   
76  See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (‘USA PATRIOT Act’), Pub L No 107-56, § 412(a), 115 Stat 272, 351 
(2001), inserting a new § 236A into the INA. 
77  538 US 510 (2003). 
78  Clark v Martinez, 538 US 510, 514 (2003). 
79  Zadvydas, 690 (Breyer J, joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter and Ginsburg JJ, citing Kansas v 
Hendricks, 521 US 346, 356 (1997); United States v Salerno, 481 US 739, 746 (1987)). 
80  Alexis Hedman, 'In the Name of Fear: The Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens and Demore v. Kim' 
(2005) 48 Howard Law Journal 999, 1009-10 (emphasis in original). 
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This view was adopted by the District Court and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit when 
considering Mr Kim’s challenge. Both found § 236(c) to be unconstitutional when applied to lawful 
permanent residents.81 In other cases brought by permanent residents detained under § 236(c), three 
federal appellate courts reached the same conclusion as the Ninth Circuit.82 The Seventh Circuit was 
the only court to take the ‘rights-precluding’ approach83 ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court. 
In Demore v Kim, the US Supreme Court held that the mandatory detention provisions did not raise 
any constitutional issues. Rehnquist CJ, who delivered a 5:4 majority opinion on this issue, 
distinguished Zadvydas in two key ways.84 First, in Zadvydas, removal was no longer likely and so 
detention did not serve its purported immigration purpose.85 In Demore v Kim the statutory provisions 
at issue governed the detention of deportable criminal aliens pending their removal proceedings. 
Rehnquist CJ reasoned that  
[s]uch detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing deportable criminal aliens from fleeing 
prior to or during their removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered removed, the 
aliens will be successfully removed.86  
Rehnquist CJ relied on the fact that Congress had looked at evidence on absconding rates for those 
granted bail and concluded that they were sufficiently high to justify mandatory detention.87 He also 
cited evidence showing that in most cases removal proceedings were completed relatively quickly.88  
Zadvydas was distinguished further on the basis that the period of detention in that case was 
undefined and potentially permanent.89 In Demore v Kim, the detention was of a much shorter 
duration. While these distinctions between the nature of detention in Zadvydas and Demore v Kim, 
may be valid, they ignore the underlying constitutional requirement affirmed in Zadvydas that 
detention will only be authorised in ‘special’ and ‘narrow’ non-punitive circumstances.90 In the absence 
of an individual assessment as to whether he posed a flight risk or a danger to the community, it is 
difficult to see how Mr Kim’s detention met this constitutional requirement.91  
Demore v Kim dealt with mandatorily detained resident aliens. The constitutionality of similar 
provisions mandating the detention of certain classes of inadmissible aliens has not yet been 
                                                   
81  Kim v Ziglar, 276 F3d 523, 526 (9th Cir, 2002).  
82  Welch v Ashcroft, 293 F3d 213, 228 (4th Cir, 2002); Hoang v Comfort, 282 F3d 1247, 1261 (10th Cir, 
2002); Patel v Zemski, 275 F3d 299, 314-15 (3rd Cir, 2001). 
83  Parra v Perryman, 172 F3d 954, 958 (7th Cir, 1999). 
84  On this point, Rehnquist CJ was joined by Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia and Thomas JJ. 
85  Zadvydas, 533 US 678, 690 (2001). 
86  Demore v Kim, 538 US 510, 528 (2003). 
87  Ibid. The absconding rates in the studies cited by the Court and considered by Congress were around 
20-25 per cent. 
88  Ibid 529. The figures cited indicated that 85 per cent of cases resulted in a final decision within forty-
seven days and the remaining 15 per cent, when appeals were conducted, took four months. 
89  Ibid 528-9. 
90  Zadvydas, 533 US 678, 690 (2001), citing Foucha v Louisiana, 504 US 71, 80 (1992).  
91  This was the view taken by the dissenting Justices: see Demore v Kim, 538 US 510, 548-54 (2003) 
(Souter J, Stevens and Ginsburg JJ concurring) and 576-9 (Breyer J).  
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examined by the US Supreme Court.92 Given that aliens who have entered the United States have 
generally been afforded far broader constitutional rights than those who have not,93 it is very unlikely 
that a challenge brought on behalf of an inadmissible alien who has not entered the United States 
would succeed. However, the situation of aliens who have entered, even without authorisation, may 
be different. In this regard, a recent judicial challenge to the Obama Administration’s ‘no parole’ policy 
for asylum seeker families from Central America, is noteworthy.94 In February 2015, the US District 
Court for the District of Columbia ordered a preliminary injunction to halt the continued application of 
the no parole policy, noting the fact that it raised serious constitutional due process issues.95 
Boasberg J reasoned that the  
[p]laintiffs in this case were apprehended in the territory of the United States. What is more, they may 
have legitimate claims to asylum, such that their presence here may become permanent. It is clear, 
then, that they are entitled to the protection of the Due Process Clause, especially when it comes to 
deprivations of liberty.96 
In terms of the justification for detention, the government stated that continued detention was required 
for the ‘deterrence of future migration’. Boasberg J found that this did not constitute a valid 
government interest that could justify detention of asylum seekers who had demonstrated a credible 
fear of persecution.97 It will be interesting to see how the superior courts address this issue if the 
government decides to pursue an appeal. 
6.3  Australia: Legal Frameworks and Early Case Law 
Australia has shown a long standing interest in learning from the United States. The US Constitution 
was discussed at length during the Australasian Federal Conventions of the 1890s, the forums in 
which Australia’s Constitution was drafted.98 As in the United States, the legislative power of 
Australia’s federal government is restricted to those heads of power mentioned in the Australian 
Constitution. Australia’s Constitution is more explicit than its US counterpart in granting the federal 
government power to legislate with respect to immigration. In this regard, it appears that Australia 
directly drew on US experience. Speaking shortly after the adoption of the Australian Constitution, in 
1901, the Attorney-General Alfred Deakin highlighted the significance of the explicit inclusion of these 
powers in dealing with the ‘race difficulty’: 
                                                   
92  INA §235(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (providing for the mandatory detention of asylum seekers pending their 
credible fear determination). 
93  See Zadvydas, 533 US 678, 693; Sale v Haitian Centers Council, 509 US 155, 175 (1993); Mezei, 345 
US 206, 212 (1953) and above nn 12-20, 26-9, 60-1 and accompanying text. 
94  This policy is discussed in Chapter Four, nn 112-17 and accompanying text. 
95  RIL-R v Jeh Charles Johnson (DC, Civ No 15-11-JEB, 20 February 2015).  
96  Ibid 33. 
97  Ibid. 
98  The Australasian Federal Convention met for three sessions in Adelaide, Sydney and Melbourne in 
1897 and 1898. For a detailed analysis of the influence of the US Constitution on Australian 
constitutional design, see Erling Hunt, American Precedents in Australian Federation (Columbia 
University Press, 1930). 
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Our Constitution marks a distinct advance upon and difference from that of the United States, in that it 
contains within itself the amplest powers to deal with this difficulty in all its aspects. It is not merely a 
question of invasion from the exterior. It may be a question of difficulties within our borders, already 
created, or a question of possible contamination of another kind. I doubt if there can be found in the list 
of powers with which this Parliament, on behalf of the people, is endowed—powers of legislation—a 
cluster more important and more far reaching in their prospect than the provisions contained in sub-
sections [(xxvi) to (xxx)] of section 51, in which the bold outline of the authority of the people of Australia 
for their self-protection is laid down.99 
The two most important powers that have been considered in the context of immigration detention are 
those relating to naturalisation and aliens,100 and immigration and emigration.101 These will be referred 
to as the aliens and immigration powers respectively. As I discuss further below, one of the 
constitutional arguments put forward against both mandatory and potentially indefinite immigration 
detention is that such detention is beyond the scope of these (and any other) heads of power. 
As in the United States, legislation can be struck down as invalid for inconsistency with the 
Constitution. However, the grounds for constitutional challenge are more limited, as Australia does not 
have a bill of rights, constitutional or otherwise. While the Australian Constitution includes limited 
explicit textual provisions for constitutional rights,102 none are relevant to immigration detention. Crock 
and Berg note that ‘the constitution says little about the relationships (rights or duties) between 
Australian citizens and their federal government. Instead, the central concern of this document is to 
set out the relative powers of the machinery of the state.’103 
The structure of the Australian Constitution divides the power of the federal government between the 
Parliament (Chapter I), the Executive (Chapter II) and the Judiciary (Chapter III). The strictest 
separation is that between executive and judicial power. As Chapter III vests the judicial power of the 
Commonwealth exclusively with designated Commonwealth Courts, Parliament has no power to 
make laws which confer judicial power on the executive. This is sometimes referred to as the 
separation of powers doctrine. One of the implications of this doctrine is that the deprivation of liberty 
is a judicial power and accordingly, as a general rule, a person can only be detained by an order of a 
court. However, the administrative detention of non-citizens has emerged as an exception to this rule. 
The central question explored in relation to this issue in the case law is the scope of this exception.  
                                                   
99  Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 September 1901, 4804 (Alfred 
Deakin, Attorney General); the relevant powers referred to here are those authorising the government to 
make laws with respect to (xxvi) the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make 
special laws; (xxvii) immigration and emigration; (xxviii) the influx of criminals; (xxix) external affairs; 
(xxx) the relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific. 
100  Australian Constitution, s 51(xix). 
101  Australian Constitution, s 51(xxvii).  
102  These are the right to vote (s 41); trial by jury (s 80); freedom of religion (s 116); the rights of out-of-state 
residents (s 117), freedom of interstate trade and commerce (s 92) and acquisition of property on just 
terms (s 51(xxxi)). 
103  Mary Crock and Laurie Berg, Immigration, Refugees and Forced Migration: Law, Policy and Practice in 
Australia (Federation Press, 2011) 52. 
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Again, as in the United States, these constitutional restraints on government power manifest 
themselves in both a direct and indirect fashion. Legislation may be struck down directly as 
unconstitutional, either for being beyond the enumerated powers or contrary to other provisions (such 
as the separation of powers doctrine). Constitutional reasoning also has bearing on statutory 
interpretation: so far as it is possible, statutes must be interpreted consistently with the Constitution. 
Common law principles of statutory interpretation have also played an important role in the case law 
challenging immigration detention in Australia. Of most relevance is the ‘principle of legality’, pursuant 
to which ‘statutory provisions are not to be construed as abrogating important common law rights, 
privileges and immunities in the absence of clear words or a necessary implication to that effect.’104 
This common law principle does not amount to a power to strike down legislation, rather it is a tool of 
statutory interpretation requiring that when possible, provisions should be interpreted in a way that 
accommodates common law rights. 
The early case law examining the legality of the administrative detention of non-citizens in Australia 
closely mirrored the early US case law. The aliens and immigration powers were interpreted as 
creating a plenary power to decide which aliens could enter the Australian community. In the 1906 
case of Robtelmes v Brenan, Griffith CJ stated that the aliens power 
must surely, if it includes anything, include power to determine the conditions under which aliens may be 
admitted to the country, the conditions under which they may be permitted to remain in the country, and 
the conditions under which they may be deported from it… [T]he Commonwealth Parliament has under 
the delegation of power authority to make any laws that it may think fit for that purpose; and it is not for 
the judicial branch of the Government to review their actions, or to consider whether the means that they 
have adopted are wise or unwise.105 
In a similar vein, in referring, inter alia, to the aliens power and the immigration power, Barton J 
stated: 
The powers given are plenary within their ambit, it is within these powers to pass legislation, however 
harsh and restrictive it may seem, and as to that it is not the province of a Court of Justice to inquire, 
where the law is clear.106  
It is interesting to note that the judges in Robtelmes explicitly referred to and affirmed the positions 
taken in the Chinese exclusion cases as applying in Australia.107 Griffith CJ held that the doctrines 
stated in those cases ‘may be taken to be the settled law of the British Empire as well as of the United 
                                                   
104  Daniels Corporation International Pty Ltd v Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (2002) 213 
CLR 543, 553 [11] (Gleeson CJ, Gaudron, Gummow and Hayne JJ). The principle was affirmed by the 
majority in Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562, 643 [241] (Hayne J; McHugh and Heydon JJ 
agreeing).  
105  (1906) 4 CLR 395, 404. Note that part of this passage was cited with approval by Hayne J in Al-Kateb 
(2004) 219 CLR 562, 632-3 [203].  
106  Robtelmes v Brenan (1906) 4 CLR 395, 415. 
107  Ibid 401-3, 413 (Griffith CJ and Barton J referring to Fong Yue Ting v United States, 149 US 698 (1893); 
Chae Chan Ping v United States, 130 US 581 (1889); Nishimura Ekiu v United States, 142 US 651 
(1892)). 
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States’.108 The Court’s decision in Robtelmes in many ways represents the high water-mark of judicial 
deference in relation to immigration matters in Australia. This is no surprise, given that two of the 
three justices who sat on the case (Barton J and Griffith CJ) came from the political branches. As 
such they were inclined to take an expansive view of the newly formed federal government’s 
legislative and executive powers.109 
The legality of potentially indefinite immigration detention was considered by the High Court in Koon 
Wing Lau v Calwell in 1949.110 That case concerned the constitutional validity of the War-time 
Refugees Removal Act 1949 (Cth), which authorised the deportation of certain migrants who had 
sought refuge in the country after the Second World War. Sections 6 and 7 allowed the Minister to 
make an order to deport these people and to keep them in custody pending such deportation.111 
These detention provisions were held valid as necessary for the removal of deportees and the 
assessment of applications for an entry permit. As such they could be justified as incidental to the 
executive’s power to exclude, admit and deport aliens. 
One basis for constitutional challenge was that the provisions permitted unlimited imprisonment. The 
Court unanimously construed the legislative provisions as not authorising such an eventuality. Dixon J 
read the provision to mean that ‘a deportee may be held in custody for the purpose of fulfilling the 
obligation to deport him until he is placed on board a vessel’112 and that ‘unless within a reasonable 
time [the person to be deported] is placed on board a vessel he would be entitled to his discharge on 
habeas’.113 Although not making a constitutional finding, the reading down of the detention provisions 
represented a step back from the extreme deference to the political branches shown by the justices in 
Robtelmes. It also stands in contrast to the US Supreme Court decision in Mezei which was handed 
down four years later, as well as more recent High Court jurisprudence on the issue. 
6.4  Australia: Recent Case Law 
6.4.1 Mandatory Detention 
                                                   
108  Ibid 403. 
109  Glenn Nicholls, Deported: A History of Forced Departures from Australia (UNSW Press, 2007) 35-6. 
Barton J had been the first Prime Minister of Australia and had introduced the Pacific Island Labourers 
Act 1901 (Cth) that was being challenged in Robtelmes while in office. Griffith CJ was the former 
Premier of Queensland. 
110  (1949) 80 CLR 533, 555-6. 
111  The relevant section provided that ‘A deportee may– (a) pending his deportation and until he is placed 
on board a vessel for deportation from Australia; (b) on board the vessel until its departure from its last 
port of call in Australia; and (c) at any port in Australia at which the vessel calls after he has been placed 
on board, be kept in such custody as the Minister or an officer directs’: War-time Refugees Removal Act 
1949 (Cth), s 7(1). 
112  Koon Wing Lau v Calwell (1949) 80 CLR 533, 581. 
113  Ibid. 
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Chu Kheng Lim v MILGEA (‘Lim’) concerned the mandatory detention, during the admission process, 
of a group of mostly Cambodian asylum seekers between 1989 and 1994.114 Arriving by boat and 
without authorisation, the detainees were initially held under ‘deemed non-entry’ or ‘turn-around’ 
provisions.115 An appeal against their continued detention was lodged in the Federal Court, on the 
basis that those provisions did not authorise extended detention.116 Two days before the case was 
due to be heard by the Federal Court, the government passed amendments to the Migration Act 1958 
(Cth) (‘Migration Act’) creating new targeted detention provisions.117 The detainees were given the title 
of ‘designated persons’.118 A ‘designated person’ was to be kept in custody until he or she was 
removed from Australia or issued an entry permit,119 although a 273-day time limit was placed on such 
detention.120 Provisions also stipulated that no court may order their release.121  
The main argument advanced by the plaintiffs was that the detention provisions breached the 
separation of powers doctrine by authorising administrative detention of ‘designated persons’ without 
giving the judiciary a role in the process. The High Court unanimously rejected this argument, 
determining that detention of non-citizens for immigration purposes does not necessarily involve an 
exercise of the judicial power. The majority’s reasoning took as its starting point the notion that 
detention of a citizen by the state is penal or punitive in character and as such can only be validly 
carried out by the judicial arm of government.122 It noted, however, that immigration detention was an 
accepted exception to this rule, as it serves a protective rather than punitive function. In what I will 
refer to as the ‘Lim test’, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ stated that provisions authorising the 
detention of unlawful non-citizens pending deportation: 
will be valid laws if the detention which they require and authorise is limited to what is reasonably 
capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or necessary to enable an 
application for an entry permit to be made and considered… [I]f this detention which [the impugned 
laws] require and authorise is not so limited … they will be of a punitive nature and contravene Ch. III’s 
insistence that the judicial power of the Commonwealth be vested exclusively in the courts which it 
designates.123 
The Court made it clear that immigration detention was subject to certain constitutional limits. This 
was formulated in the form of a test of proportionality. Detention would only be valid to the extent that 
                                                   
114  (1992) 176 CLR 1. For a detailed description of the factual background and judicial history of this case, 
see Mary Crock, 'The Evolution of Mandatory Detention' in Mary Crock (ed), Protection or Punishment: 
The Detention of Asylum Seekers in Australia (Federation Press, 1993) 25. 
115  Section 88 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Migration Act’) as it stood at that time provided that a person 
could be held in detention until the vessel on which they arrived left its last Australian port. 
116  The turn-around provisions in question were only supposed to operate within a timeframe of 72 hours. 
117  Migration Amendment Act 1992 (Cth), introducing pt 2 div 4B into the Migration Act; renumbered to div 6 
by Migration Amendment Act 1994 (Cth). 
118  Migration Act, s 54K; renumbered to s 177 by Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth). 
119  Ibid s 54L, renumbered to s 178 by Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth). 
120  Ibid s 54Q, renumbered to s 182 by Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth). 
121  Ibid s 54R, renumbered to s 183 by Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1994 (Cth). 
122  Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 27 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ). 
123  Ibid 33. 
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it was connected to, and reasonably necessary for a legitimate immigration purpose, namely the 
assessment of admission or removal requirements.  
The majority in Lim determined that the mandatory detention provisions at issue were constitutionally 
valid as they met this proportionality requirement. Two statutory restrictions placed on detention were 
central to this finding. First, there were clear restrictions on the duration of detention, which was to be 
limited to 273 days.124 Second, and more importantly, the majority placed great weight on the fact that 
a detainee was to be removed from Australia as soon as practically possible if the person requested 
such removal in writing from the Minister.125 By conferring the power on a detainee to bring their 
detention to an end, detention was construed as ultimately voluntary and hence, non-punitive: ‘It is 
only if an alien who is a designated person elects, by failing to make a request under s 54P(1), to 
remain in the country as an applicant for an entry permit that detention … can continue.'126  
The majority’s reasoning that the detention provisions met the proportionality requirement is 
questionable on two main grounds. First, it is difficult to see how mandatory detention, without any 
individual assessment as to the need for detention in a given case, can be construed as ‘reasonable’ 
or ‘necessary’. Belinda Wells questions how such a conclusion could have been reached when 
no real attempt was made to consider the question of whether a long period of detention of an alien was 
in fact likely to be necessary whilst processing an entry application, or in order to secure eventual 
deportation. There was no mention of other alternative means for securing such ends - such as a 
modified bail system.127 
The reliance of the majority on the ‘voluntary’ nature of the detention to demonstrate the non-punitive 
nature of the detention provisions is also highly questionable as it ignores the reality of the situation 
faced by asylum seekers. Mary Crock argues that the Court’s statement 
that ‘designated persons’ are free to bring their captivity to an end ignores the central characteristic of 
most, if not all, people caught by [the detention provisions] of the Act—namely, that they are applicants 
for refugee status. By definition, genuine refugees cannot go home without placing themselves in some 
form of jeopardy… Given that the plaintiffs have all applied for recognition as refugees, it is perverse to 
say that they are free to bring their custody to an end by requesting repatriation.128 
The majority, Brennan, Dawson, Deane and Gaudron JJ, did find one aspect of the detention 
provisions unconstitutional: the direction that no court could order ‘designated persons’ to be 
released.129 This was held to be a clear breach of the separation of powers doctrine and struck down. 
However, for the purposes of my analysis, Lim can still be identified as a case in which the judges 
                                                   
124  See former s 54Q of the Migration Act (renumbered to s 182: see above n 120). 
125  Migration Act, s 54P(1), repealed and substituted with s 181(1) by the Migration Reform Act 1992 (Cth).  
126  Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 34 (Brennan Deane and Dawson JJ). 
127  Belinda Wells, 'Aliens: The Outsiders in the Constitution' (1996) 19 University of Queensland Law 
Journal 45, 27. 
128  Mary Crock, ‘Climbing Jacob’s Ladder: The High Court and the Administrative Detention of Asylum 
Seekers in Australia’ (1993) 15 Sydney Law Review 338, 347. 
129  Migration Act, s 54R. 
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adopted a ‘rights-precluding’ approach, as the majority upheld the validity of the mandatory detention 
provisions as well as the continued detention of the plaintiffs.  
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6.4.2 Indefinite Detention 
In Al-Kateb v Godwin (‘Al-Kateb’) the High Court was again called upon to determine the limits of 
Parliament’s power to legislate in regard to the administrative detention of non-citizens.130 That case 
concerned the potentially indefinite detention of a stateless Palestinian asylum seeker Ahmad Ali Al-
Kateb.131 Mr Al-Kateb arrived in Australia without a visa in search of asylum and was placed in 
immigration detention. His application for a Protection visa was denied, and after legal appeals failed, 
he asked to be returned to Kuwait (where he was born) or Gaza. Kuwait refused to accept Mr Al-
Kateb as he was not a citizen of that country. Removal to Gaza required cooperation from Israel, 
which was not forthcoming. As such, the government was unable to effect his removal. Mr Al-Kateb 
then sought a declaration in the Federal Court that his continued detention was unlawful. Von Doussa 
J found that removal of Mr Al-Kateb from Australia was not reasonably practicable as there was ‘no 
real likelihood or prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future’, but nevertheless 
dismissed the application.132 Mr Al-Kateb appealed to the Full Court of the Federal Court, but the 
matter was removed to the High Court for determination.133  
The relevant provisions of the Migration Act stated that ‘unlawful non-citizens’ were to be held in 
detention until one of three events occurred: removal from Australia at their own request, deportation, 
or grant of a visa.134 The provisions also stipulated that a person such as Mr Al-Kateb, who had 
requested removal, was to be removed ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’.135 The appeal focused on 
two questions. Did the detention provisions, when properly construed, purport to authorise the 
potential indefinite detention of non-citizens in circumstances where there were no real prospects of 
removal? If so, were the provisions constitutionally valid? 
The Full Federal Court had addressed these same issues 16 months earlier in MIMIA v Al Masri (‘Al 
Masri’).136 In a unanimous decision, the Court found a temporal limitation on detention as a matter of 
statutory construction. It ruled that a detainee must be released when the purpose of removal is 
frustrated.137 The Court’s process of statutory construction was primarily informed by the common law 
principle of legality. However, reference was also made to constitutional considerations. Applying the 
Lim test, the Federal Court reasoned that if a deportee had nowhere to go and there was no ‘real 
likelihood or prospect of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future’,138 continued detention may 
‘not be reasonably capable of being seen as necessary’ for the purpose of removal, and a serious 
                                                   
130  (2004) 219 CLR 562. 
131  Ibid 596 [79] (Gummow J). Despite the fact that Mr Al-Kateb was born in Kuwait, and lived there for 
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135  Migration Act, s 198. 
136  (2003) 126 FCR 54. 
137  Ibid 88 [136] (Black CJ, Sundberg and Weinberg JJ). 
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question of constitutional invalidity would arise.139 Although not directly ruling on the constitutionality 
issue, the process of statutory interpretation was clearly informed by a finding that indefinite detention 
would violate the separation of powers doctrine. This ‘rights-protecting’ interpretation of the relevant 
statutory provisions was supported further by reference to Australia’s obligations under international 
law.140 
The majority of the High Court in Al-Kateb took a different view. On the issue of statutory construction, 
McHugh, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ rejected the approach taken in Al Masri, finding that the 
relevant legislative provisions authorised detention until a detainee was removed, deported or given a 
visa, no matter how long that may take.141 This was so, no matter how ‘tragic’ this outcome may be for 
Mr Al-Kateb.142 As the words of the relevant sections were clear,143 there was no place to consider 
interpretive principles such as the principle of legality, or compatibility with international law.144  
Having determined that the detention provisions purported to authorise the indefinite detention of non-
citizens, even where there was no real prospect of removal, the majority considered the issue of 
whether such provisions were constitutionally valid. The justices considered two related constitutional 
questions which together determined the nature and scope of the implied constitutional immunity from 
administrative detention. The first was whether the scope of the federal legislative power with respect 
to aliens was broad enough to authorise such detention. The second was whether such detention 
breached the separation of powers doctrine. 
In relation to the first question regarding the scope of the aliens power, the majority took an expansive 
approach. For Hayne J, the aliens power not only created an authority to subject unlawful non-citizens 
to administrative detention for the purpose of processing and removal, but also for the purpose of 
‘excluding’ or ‘segregating’ such persons from the Australian community.145 McHugh J took an even 
broader view, stating that ‘any law that has aliens as its subject is a law with respect to aliens’.146 As 
discussed below, this represented a significant shift from the majority position in Lim.147 
The minority held that the relevant legislation was ambiguous in that it did not explicitly address the 
possibility before them: namely, what should happen when removal is not practically possible.148 
Adopting differing approaches, all three minority justices concluded that the provisions, properly 
construed, did not authorise indefinite detention. Gleeson CJ (with Gummow J agreeing) resolved the 
ambiguity in the statute by reference to the principle of legality. This common law principle dictates 
                                                   
139  Ibid 73 [71].  
140  Ibid 88-92 [138]-[155]. 
141  Al-Kateb (2004) 219 CLR 562, 581 [35] (McHugh J), 640 [231] (Hayne J), 661-2 [298] (Callinan J). Note 
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142  Ibid 580-1 [31] (McHugh J). 
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144  See, for example, ibid 661-2 [298] (Callinan J).  
145  Ibid 648 [255] (Hayne J). 
146  Ibid 583 [41] (McHugh J). 
147  See below nn 169-76 and accompanying text. 
148  Al-Kateb (2004) 219 CLR 562, 575 [13]-[14], 577 [20]-[21] (Gleeson CJ). 
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that a court should not impute to the legislature an intention to abrogate or curtail the fundamental 
right to personal liberty, absent words of necessary intendment.149 As the legislature had not 
expressly addressed the issue of indefinite detention in the Act, Gleeson CJ read down the provisions 
as authorising detention for only as long as removal is a practical possibility. 
Gummow and Kirby JJ both agreed that post-deportation order detention would breach the separation 
of powers doctrine if removal was no longer a reasonable possibility. To avoid this constitutional 
issue, the relevant provisions were construed as not providing for such detention. For Kirby J, 
‘indefinite detention at the will of the Executive … is alien to Australia’s constitutional 
arrangements’.150 In a reference to Zadvydas, Kirby J argued that the High Court ‘should be no less 
vigilant in defending those arrangements … than the United States Supreme Court has lately been in 
responding to similar Executive assertions in that country.’151 The Australian Constitution does not 
have an equivalent of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. However, his Honour reasoned that 
the Constitutional principle that only courts can impose punishment (in exercise of the judicial power) 
has similar effect.152 
The High Court has had the opportunity to revisit its decision in Al-Kateb on at least two occasions. In 
each instance, however, a majority of the Court avoided directly addressing the issue. Plaintiff 
M47/2012 v Director-General Security (‘Plaintiff M47’) was a 2012 challenge to the potentially 
indefinite detention of a Sri Lankan asylum seeker.153 An Immigration Department officer had 
accepted the plaintiff’s asylum claim, however the officer refused the plaintiff’s visa application on the 
basis that the applicant did not meet public interest criterion 4002 (‘PIC 4002’). This criterion required 
that the applicant not be assessed as a risk to security under the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation (ASIO) Act 1979 (Cth). The plaintiff could not be returned to Sri Lanka because, 
according to the government’s own determination, he would be subject to persecution there. At the 
same time, the adverse security assessment meant that the plaintiff could not be released into the 
Australian community. The result, therefore, was potentially indefinite detention. The majority justices 
avoided addressing the indefinite detention question. Instead, they found that PIC 4002 was invalid 
because it was inconsistent with the Migration Act. It operated to make the ASIO assessment 
determinative of the applicant’s visa application where the Migration Act vested that task in the 
Minister. The ruling on the regulation meant that the plaintiff’s application had not yet been finally 
determined. The plaintiff’s continued detention was authorised as it was being done for the purpose of 
determining admissibility.154 The majority justices therefore found it unnecessary to consider whether 
to reopen the Al-Kateb decision. 
                                                   
149  Ibid 577 [19] (Gleeson CJ).  
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152  Ibid 617 [153] (citing Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 33). 
153  (2012) 251 CLR 1. 
154  The majority of the High Court struck down PIC 4002 as inconsistent with the Migration Act. As the 
security assessment was found to be invalid, the plaintiff’s Protection visa application became 
incomplete and he was no longer subject to removal and detention pending removal. For a detailed 
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Gummow, Heydon and Bell JJ upheld the validity of PIC 4002 in separate minority judgements. As a 
consequence, each had to directly address the issue of indefinite detention. Gummow and Bell JJ 
argued that the construction of sections 189, 196 and 198 adopted by the majority in Al-Kateb should 
not be regarded as binding precedent. They held that the majority had erred in applying the applicable 
principles of statutory construction in that case.155 Specifically, the majority failed to apply the 
established common law presumption against the abrogation of liberty.156 Gummow and Bell JJ 
affirmed the approach of Gleeson CJ in Al-Kateb, who read down the relevant detention provisions as 
only authorising detention as long as removal remains a practical possibility.157 In contrast, Heydon J 
found that despite the fact that ‘the dissentients’ arguments had obvious force’, the majority’s 
approach in Al-Kateb was to be preferred.158 
The High Court had another opportunity to reconsider Al-Kateb in 2013 in Plaintiff M76/2013 v MIMAC 
(‘Plaintiff M76’).159 That case involved a similar fact scenario to Plaintiff M47. The main difference was 
that the plaintiff had been deemed an ‘offshore entry person’ and was thus being processed under the 
non-statutory Refugee Status Assessment (‘RSA’) process.160 An Immigration Department official 
found that the plaintiff engaged Australia’s protection obligations. However, an adverse security 
assessment led to a determination that the plaintiff would not satisfy PIC 4002. The officer thus 
decided not to refer the plaintiff’s case to the Minister to consider whether to lift the statutory bar 
(placed on all offshore entry persons) on applying for a Protection visa.161 As in Plaintiff M47, the 
plaintiff faced potentially indefinite detention as she could neither be returned home nor released into 
the Australian community. All members of the Court found that there had been an error of law in the 
manner in which the RSA process was carried out. As PIC 4002 had been held to be invalid in 
Plaintiff M47, the decision of the officer to rely on PIC 4002 when deciding not to refer the plaintiff’s 
case to the Minister constituted an error of law. Because the RSA had to be conducted according to 
law,162 the Minister had not yet decided whether to allow the plaintiff to apply for a visa and detention 
continued to be authorised for the purpose of carrying out such assessment. In relation to the 
question of whether Al-Kateb should be reconsidered, French CJ, Crennan, Bell and Gageler JJ 
declined to do so, finding that the facts before them did not strictly require that issue to be 
                                                                                                                                                              
analysis of this case, see Ben Saul, ‘Dark Justice: Australia’s Indefinite Detention of Refugees on 
Security Grounds under International Human Rights Law’ (2012) 13 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 1. 
155  Plaintiff M47 (2012) 251 CLR 1, 60-1 [119]-[120] (Gummow J, stating ‘[t]he justification for not following 
an earlier decision of the court construing a statute, particularly a decision reached by a majority, is that 
the earlier decision appears to have erred in a significant respect in the applicable principles of statutory 
construction); 193 [532] (Bell J, stating that ‘the reasoning of two members of the majority [in Al-Kateb] 
is weakened by the absence of discussion of the principle of legality in the context of a conclusion that 
the scheme abrogates fundamental rights in this degree’). 
156  Ibid. 
157  Ibid 61 [120] (Gummow J); 193 [534] (Bell J). 
158  Ibid 138 [351]. 
159  (2013) 251 CLR 322. 
160  For a discussion of the features of the RSA process, see Chapter Eight, 8.2.1.  
161  See Migration Act, s 46A(2); Chapter Five, n 75 and accompanying text. 
162  Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319 
(‘Offshore Processing Case’). This case is examined in Chapter Eight, Part 8.2.1. 
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considered.163 In doing so, they left open the possibility of reconsidering Al-Kateb if faced with a case 
with more suitable facts. In contrast Hayne, Kiefel and Keane JJ expressly affirmed the majority 
approach in Al-Kateb. Hayne J, the only remaining justice who sat in Al-Kateb affirmed his approach 
in that case.164 Kiefel and Keane JJ undertook extensive analysis of the issue, engaging with and 
dismissing Gleeson CJ’s reliance on the principle of legality in his Honour’s dissenting judgement in 
Al-Kateb.165 It will be interesting to see how the Court will respond to this issue in the future. As of 
April 2015, Bell J is the only current sitting member of the Court who has indicated a willingness to 
overrule Al-Kateb.166 Kiefel, Hayne and Keane JJ have indicated that they will not reopen Al-Kateb. 
French CJ, Gageler J and recent appointee Nettle J are yet to express a view on the issue. With 
Hayne J due to retire in July 2015, there will be a fourth undeclared vote in the mix: that of Hayne J’s 
wife, Justice Michelle Gordon who will replace him on the Court. 
The response of the High Court to any future case in which they are called upon directly to reconsider 
Al-Kateb will be influenced by the opinion of the Court on the continued relevance of the Lim test. In 
Lim, Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ declared ‘a constitutional immunity from being imprisoned by 
Commonwealth authority except pursuant to an order by a court in the exercise of the judicial power 
of the Commonwealth.’167 However, they carved out an exception to this rule for immigration 
detention, provided that detention ‘is limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen as 
necessary for the purposes of deportation or necessary to enable an application for an entry permit to 
be made and considered.’168 
In Al-Kateb, Hayne and McHugh JJ appeared to retreat from the position taken in Lim that detention 
will ordinarily be punitive and therefore an incident of judicial power.169 Even if the separation of 
powers doctrine did supply constitutional immunity from administrative detention, they reasoned that 
their broad reading of the aliens power created a general exception for immigration detention. By 
making such a determination, they arguably expanded the non-punitive purposes identified in Lim that 
would sustain administrative detention of non-citizens. In Lim, the majority held that immigration 
detention of unlawful non-citizens was only constitutionally valid if it was ‘reasonably capable of being 
seen as necessary for the purpose of facilitating admission and removal’.170 Hayne and McHugh JJ 
expand this test to include all detention that has the purpose excluding persons from the Australian 
community.171 Hayne J expressly acknowledged that this was a broader expression of the power of 
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detention articulated in Lim.172 McHugh J made comments to a similar effect in his judgement in Re 
Woolley; Ex parte M276/2003173 handed down a few months after Al-Kateb. There, McHugh J noted 
that the majority in Al-Kateb overturned two principles set out in Lim. They rejected both the claim that 
there is a general constitutional immunity from administrative detention;174 and the use of the Lim test 
for determining whether the purpose of detention is non-punitive.175 However, McHugh J may have 
been premature in declaring the demise of the Lim test in Woolley. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and 
Callinan JJ all endorsed the test in that very same case.176 The continued relevance of the Lim test 
has been demonstrated in subsequent cases. In Plaintiff M76, for example, Crennan, Bell and 
Gageler JJ apply and affirm the test in the course of their majority judgement.177 Moreover, the Lim 
test featured front and centre in the reasoning of the High Court’s recent unanimous decision in 
Plaintiff S4/2014 v MIBP (‘Plaintiff S4’).178 
Plaintiff S4 concerned a challenge to the validity of the Minister’s grant of a restricted temporary visa. 
The plaintiff was a stateless asylum seeker from Myanmar who had arrived in Australia by boat and 
had been designated as an ‘offshore entry person’ (a term later replaced by ‘unauthorised maritime 
arrival’).179 As such, the applicant was subject to the non-statutory RSA asylum processing 
procedures set up to inform the Minister on whether to lift the bar prohibiting the plaintiff from applying 
for a Protection visa.180 After two years in immigration detention, the plaintiff was assessed as 
engaging Australia’s protection obligations under the Refugee Convention.181 However, the Minister 
decided not to grant a Protection visa, and instead issued two temporary permits. The combined 
effect of these permits was that the plaintiff could remain in Australia for three years, but was barred 
from applying for a permanent visa.182 In finding the grant of these visas invalid, the High Court 
focused on the character and purpose of the plaintiff’s detention. 
In a unanimous judgement, the Court expressly affirmed and applied the Lim test, holding that 
detention provisions in the Migration Act are only valid to the extent that they are ‘reasonably capable 
of being seen as necessary’ to achieve three limited purposes. These were 
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the purpose of removal from Australia; the purpose of receiving, investigating and determining an 
application for a visa permitting the alien to enter and remain in Australia; or, in a case such as the 
present, the purpose of determining whether to permit a valid application for a visa.183 
As detention in this case was for the purpose of determining whether to permit a valid Protection visa 
application to made, it was not lawful for the Minister to then grant a different visa which effectively 
prevented the plaintiff from applying for a Protection visa. The Court reasoned that 
[w]hen a person’s detention is prolonged for the purpose of considering the exercise of the power to 
permit the detainee to make a valid application for a visa, [the relevant provision] does not give power to 
the minister to grant a visa which, in effect, forbids the very thing which was the subject of uncompleted 
consideration warranting prolongation of the period of detention.184 
Not only did the Court affirm the continued relevance of the Lim test, but it also went on to spell out 
the implications of this test for the permitted duration of detention: 
The duration of any form of detention, and thus its lawfulness, must be capable of being determined at 
any time and from time to time. Otherwise, the lawfulness of the detention could not be determined and 
enforced by the courts, and, ultimately, by this Court. And because immigration detention is not 
discretionary, but is an incident of the execution of particular powers of the Executive, it must serve the 
purposes of the [Migration] Act and its duration must be fixed by reference to what is both necessary 
and incidental to the execution of those powers and the fulfilment of those purposes. These criteria, 
against which the lawfulness of detention is to be judged, are set at the start of the detention.185 
Although the Court did not cite Gummow J’s dissenting judgement in Al-Kateb, the requirement of a 
temporal limitation to the detention powers in question echoes his Honour’s sentiment on this point. In 
Al-Kateb, Gummow J emphasised the constitutional requirement that administrative detention have a 
duration capable of ascertainment at any time, so as to allow the Court to determine that detention is 
serving a constitutional purpose. His Honour stated: 
The continued viability of the purpose of deportation or expulsion cannot be treated by the legislature as 
a matter purely for the opinion of the executive government. The reason is that it cannot be for the 
executive government to determine the placing from time to time of that boundary line which marks off a 
category of deprivation of liberty from the reach of Ch III. The location of that boundary line itself is a 
question arising under the Constitution or involving its interpretation.186 
Although not directly overturning Al-Kateb, the High Court’s decision in Plaintiff S4 does signal a 
willingness of the current Court to place both purposive and temporal limits on the scope of the 
executive’s detention powers. In terms of purpose, it is important to note that ‘exclusion’ and 
‘segregation’ which Hayne and McHugh JJ viewed as being constitutionally valid purposes for 
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detaining non-citizens in Al-Kateb187 are absent from the list of permitted purposes articulated in 
Plaintiff S4. In terms of the temporal limitation, Plaintiff S4 imposed a requirement that the duration of 
any form of detention must be capable of being determined at any time and from time to time. It will 
be interesting to see how this will be applied to any future assessment of the lawfulness of the 
detention of persons in an analogous position to Mr Al-Kateb.  
6.5  US and Australian Case Law Compared 
6.5.1 Mandatory Detention 
On the issue of mandatory detention, the Australian and US jurisprudence is largely in agreement. 
The US Supreme Court and Australian High Court have both adopted similar proportionality tests 
when assessing the constitutional validity of the relevant detention provisions. Both courts have 
upheld the constitutional validity of mandatory detention, without individualised assessment, of certain 
classes of non-citizens. In Demore v Kim, the Court relied on the argument that mandatory detention 
of an alien, due to criminal conviction, was a constitutionally valid aspect of the deportation process. 
This was because it served the legitimate government purpose of preventing flight of criminal aliens 
while their removal proceedings were underway.188 Although not explicitly referencing the principle, 
the Court essentially applied the balancing test put forward in Mathews v Eldridge, which states that 
due process generally requires that administrative procedures balance the governmental and private 
interests at stake.189 In Demore v Kim, the Court determined that the government purpose of 
preventing flight and the resulting danger to the community by the release of a convicted criminal, 
justified mandatory temporary deprivation of liberty in that case. The US Supreme Court has not 
considered the legality of mandatory detention provisions targeting inadmissible aliens (asylum 
seekers or otherwise). As discussed, any such challenge on behalf of aliens who are deemed as not 
having entered the United States will likely fail as a result of the plenary power doctrine. The situation 
may be different, however, for inadmissible aliens who have entered the United States, even without 
authorisation. A recent decision of the US District Court for the District of Columbia extended 
constitutional due process rights to asylum seekers in this category who had demonstrated a credible 
fear of persecution.190 
In Lim, the Australian High Court used a proportionality test to uphold the legality of the detention of 
the asylum seeker plaintiff. In that case, the mandatory temporary deprivation of liberty faced by the 
plaintiff was determined to be valid as it was reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the 
legitimate purpose of carrying out the assessment of admission or removal. While the substance of 
tests applied in Demore v Kim and Lim are similar, their source is different. In the United States, the 
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balancing act between the interests of the government and the individual’s right to liberty is grounded 
in the Due Process Clause of the US Constitution. As discussed above in Part 6.3, the Australian 
Constitution does not contain an equivalent right. Instead, the test of proportionality expounded in Lim 
is sourced in the Australian Constitution’s Chapter III requirement of the separation of judicial and 
legislative power, and a construction of the scope of the Constitution’s aliens power. 
Despite the similar approaches and conclusion reached in Demore v Kim and Lim, the outcome in 
those cases was far from inevitable. As discussed in Parts 6.2.2 and 6.4.1 above, there are serious 
concerns about the manner in which the proportionality assessment of detention was carried out in 
each case. In both cases, it would have been reasonably open to the Court to construe the mandatory 
detention of a broad class of non-citizens, without any determination as to the need for detention in a 
given case, as not being proportional to a legitimate government purpose. 
6.5.2 Indefinite Detention 
The US Supreme Court and Australian High Court have adopted divergent approaches when 
examining challenges to statutory provisions that appeared to authorise the indefinite post-deportation 
order detention of non-citizens. The decisions in both Zadvydas and Al-Kateb ultimately turned on a 
question of statutory interpretation. As the strong dissenting judgements in those cases indicate, 
reasonable minds may differ on questions of statutory construction.191 In Zadvydas, the US Supreme 
Court adopted a ‘rights-protecting’ approach, interpreting the relevant statutory provisions as including 
an implicit presumptive 90-day limit on post-removal order detention. The majority’s process of 
statutory interpretation relied on the principle of constitutional avoidance and a view that indefinite 
detention would raise serious constitutional issues under the Due Process Clause. In Al-Kateb, the 
Australian High Court adopted a ‘rights-precluding’ approach when interpreting similarly framed 
statutory detention provisions. The provisions were interpreted as authorising potentially indefinite 
detention, and such detention was viewed as not raising any constitutional issues.  
What explains the divergent approaches? It is tempting to attribute them to the different legal 
structures operating in the United States and Australia—in particular, the existence of a constitutional 
right to due process in the United States and the absence of a comparable right in Australia. Such a 
view appears to be supported by statements made by a number of the majority justices in Al-Kateb. 
Callinan J, for example, refers to the decision in Zadvydas but dismisses its applicability in the 
Australian case by reasoning that Australia does not have the constitutional ‘complication’ of the US 
Fifth Amendment.192 McHugh J also distinguished Zadvydas on the basis that it dealt with 
constitutional due process considerations that do not exist in Australia.193 The argument that the 
differing approaches, taken by the US Supreme Court in Zadvydas and the Australian High Court in 
Al-Kateb, were the result of differing legal frameworks is further supported by the commentary made 
in the aftermath of the Al-Kateb decision. A number of academics have argued that the outcome in 
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that case would have been different if Australia had a bill of rights.194 Such a view was also advanced 
by the Australian Democrats, the Greens, and the Federal President of the Labor Party who, in 
response to the Al-Kateb decision, called for the introduction of a bill of rights to override the Migration 
Act.195 
For current purposes, it is not necessary to assess the claims as to whether the outcome in Al-Kateb 
would have been different if Australia had a bill of rights (constitutional or otherwise). Any analysis of 
such a claim would need to consider the nature and exact wording of any such provisions. It is my 
contention that the absence of a bill of rights in Australia did not necessarily preclude the High Court 
from adopting a ‘rights-protecting’ approach. Nor did the existence of the constitutional Due Process 
Clause in the United States necessarily prevent the US Supreme Court from adopting a ‘rights-
precluding’ approach. In both Zadvydas and Al-Kateb, there was sufficient ambiguity in the relevant 
statutory provisions, principles of statutory construction, as well as the relevant constitutional 
considerations, to give the Court in each of those cases enough leeway to adopt either approach. 
Neither the Australian, nor the US detention provisions address directly the issue of whether 
continued detention is authorised once it becomes clear that removal is not practicable. In Australia, s 
196(1) of the Migration Act provides that a person who has qualified for immigration detention must be 
kept there until the person is (a) removed from Australia; or (b) deported; or (c) granted a visa. 
Further, at the relevant time s 198 stipulated that a person who had requested removal was to be 
removed ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’. In the United States, INA § 241(a)(1)(A) stipulates that 
when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General generally has 90 days to remove the alien 
from the United States. However, § 241(a)(6) goes on to stipulate that inadmissible or removable 
aliens who have been determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to 
comply with the order of removal, ‘may be detained beyond the removal period’. A strict literal reading 
would likely conclude, that although neither the Australian nor the US provisions directly address the 
possibility of indefinite detention, such detention is authorised. However, the established principles of 
statutory interpretation in both Australia and the United States dictate that the literal meaning of a 
legislative provision is not always the correct construction. In the United States, the relevant principle 
is the presumption that Congress intends statutes to be read in a way that avoids constitutional 
concerns.196 Given that indefinite detention may violate the Due Process Clause, the majority in 
Zadvydas read an implicit limit into the post-removal order detention provisions at issue. Detention 
was limited to the period that is reasonably necessary to effectuate the alien’s removal from the 
United States. The majority settled on a presumptive time limit of six months, which had no basis in 
                                                   
194  See, for example, Alice Rolls, ‘Avoiding Tragedy: Would the decision of the High Court in Al-Kateb have 
been any different if Australia had a Bill of Rights like Victoria?’ (2007) 18 Public Law Review 119; Hon 
Justice John Basten, ‘Book Review: The Ultimate Rule of Law by David M Beatty’ (2005) 29 Melbourne 
University Law Review 930, 938. 
195  See Thwaites above n 3, 38-9, citing Meaghan Shaw, ‘Ban Indefinite Detention: Lawrence’, The Age, 12 
August 2004, 4; Australian Greens, ‘Bill of Rights: One Way to Defeat Indefinite Detention (Media 
Release, 6 August 2004). 
196  For a critique of this principle, see Aleinikoff, ‘Detaining Plenary Power’, above n 11, 367. 
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the statutory text. This outcome was far from obvious, based on a reading of the statutory provisions 
and relevant constitutional protections.  
The decision of the majority of the US Supreme Court to rely on the principle of constitutional 
avoidance was based on two assumptions that may be open to challenge. The first was that the 
relevant statutory provisions were sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the application of the principle in 
the first place. The four dissenting justices strongly disagreed with such an assertion. Kennedy J, with 
whom Rehnquist, Thomas and Scalia JJ joined,197 argued that the statute is ‘straightforward,’ and not 
susceptible to two meanings.198 The second, questionable, assertion related to whether an 
interpretation of the statute authorising indefinite detention would raise any constitutional concerns. 
The majority was of the opinion that such a construction would breach Zadvydas’s substantive due 
process rights. However, Zadvydas’s entitlement to constitutional due process was by no means 
obvious. As discussed in Part 6.1, the plenary power doctrine means that in many circumstances, 
non-citizens in immigration related proceedings are precluded from constitutional protections. While it 
was generally accepted that aliens who had entered the United States were entitled to limited 
constitutional rights, prior to Zadvydas there was a question as to whether those rights were 
extinguished once an alien was deemed to be removable. US Federal Circuit Courts had split on the 
issue. The US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision adopted a restrictive interpretation that 
precluded Zadvydas from relying on constitutional due process protection. There, the Court reasoned 
that aliens finally ordered removed were in the same position, for constitutional purposes, as aliens 
seeking initial entry. Both had no right to claim that they should be allowed into the United States, and 
therefore, the Fifth Circuit reasoned, no constitutional rights.199 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, ruling that 
serious constitutional concerns would be raised by interpreting the immigration law to permit indefinite 
detention.200 
While the majority of the Supreme Court in Zadvydas adopted the approach taken by the Ninth 
Circuit, at least two of the four dissenting judges favoured the Fifth Circuit approach. Scalia J, with 
whom Thomas J concurred, accepted the government’s arguments that as deportable aliens have no 
right of entry into the United States, they stand on equal footing with inadmissible aliens and as such 
are not protected by the Due Process Clause.201 Academic commentary in the aftermath of the 
Supreme Court decision supports the proposition that the Zadvydas decision had at least in part 
eroded the plenary power doctrine.202 This suggests that if the Court had applied the plenary power 
doctrine in the same manner as it had been applied up until then, the outcome may have been 
different. In particular, the statutory interpretation adopted by the majority was based on an 
                                                   
197  Thomas and Scalia JJ only joined in Part I of Kennedy's dissent. 
198  533 US 678, 706 (2001). 
199  Zadvydas v Underdown, 185 F3d 279, 289 (5th Cir, 1999). 
200  Ma v Reno, 208 F3d 815, 830-1 (9th Cir, 2000). 
201  Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678, 704. 
202  See Aleinikoff, ‘Detaining Plenary Power’, above n 11, 366, 368, 386; Joshua Gardner, 'Halfway There: 
Zadvydas v. Davis Reins in Indefinite Detentions, but Leaves Much Unanswered' (2003) 36 Cornell 
International Law Journal 177, 190, 196; Cf Michele Pistone, 'A Times Sensitive Response to Professor 
Aleinikoff's Detaining Plenary Power' (2002) 16 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 391, 392 (arguing 
‘that ultimately Zadvydas will leave no constitutional legacy’). 
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understanding that an alternate construction authorising indefinite detention may breach constitutional 
substantive due process rights. However, as discussed in Part 6.1, before Zadvydas the Supreme 
Court had generally only extended procedural, rather than substantive, due process rights to 
excludable long-term residents. The contingency of the outcome in Zadvydas is further evidenced by 
subsequent division in the Supreme Court as to the validity of the majority’s reasoning. In Clark v 
Martinez, decided almost four years later, Thomas J maintained that Zadvydas had been wrongly 
decided, stating that the majority ‘was wrong in both its statutory and its constitutional analysis for the 
reasons expressed well by the dissents in that case. I continue to adhere to those views.’203  
It is also important to again stress the fact that Zadvydas concerned the indefinite detention of a US 
resident. In Zadvydas and Clark v Martinez, the Court made it clear that the detention of inadmissible 
aliens seeking entry into the United States would not give rise to any comparable constitutional 
concerns. The presumptive time limit was only applied to the detention of such aliens because they 
were being detained under the same statutory provision that applied to resident aliens. As such, a 
person in the analogous position of Mr Al-Kateb in the United States, that is, an inadmissible alien 
seeking entry, falls outside the protections of the constitution, including the Due Process Clause. 
Similarly, the High Court decision in Al-Kateb could easily have been decided differently.204 The 
decision was by the narrowest of majorities, with a 4:3 split. Only three of the majority judges provided 
substantive reasons, and there were strong minority judgements, including from the Chief Justice. 
Arguably, the adoption of a ‘rights-protecting’ approach when interpreting the relevant detention 
provisions would have been more in line with constitutional precedent and established principles of 
statutory interpretation. The Full Federal Court had adopted such an approach in Al-Masri 16 months 
earlier when examining the same statutory provisions, concluding that they did not authorise indefinite 
detention.205  
As explored above, the Australian High Court had a number of principles of statutory interpretation 
that it could have relied upon to reach a ‘rights-protecting’ outcome. These included the common law 
principle of legality and the rule that legislation should be read so as to avoid constitutional issues. 
The decision of the majority of the High Court not to apply these principles to read down the detention 
provisions at issue relied on two questionable assertions. The first was that the provisions were not 
sufficiently ambiguous for the interpretive principles to apply. The Full Federal Court in Al-Masri took 
the opposite view, finding the text provided enough lee-way to apply both the common law principle of 
legality and the constitutional avoidance doctrine. The dissenting justices in Al-Kateb agreed, with 
Gleeson CJ, Gummow J and Kirby J all finding sufficient ambiguity to apply one or both of the 
principles. This point continues to be hotly contested, with differing viewpoints being expressed on the 
issue by various justices over recent years.206 
                                                   
203  543 US 371, 401 (2005) (references omitted). 
204  This point is forcefully made by Thwaites, above n 3, ch 3 and 4; and Matthew Zagor, 'Uncertainty and 
Exclusion: Detention of Aliens and the High Court' (2006) 34 Federal Law Review 127. 
205  Al Masri (2003) 126 FCR 54; see above nn 136-140 and accompanying text. 
206  See above nn 155-7, 164-6 and accompanying text. 
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In relation to the constitutional avoidance argument, the relevant issue was whether indefinite 
administrative detention by the executive would breach the constitutional separation of powers 
doctrine once the detention is no longer for the objective purpose of facilitating removal. The Full 
Bench of the Federal Court in Al-Masri indicated that such detention may be in breach of the 
separation of powers doctrine. Kirby and Gummow JJ also agreed with such a conclusion in their 
dissenting judgements in Al-Kateb. As discussed, there is a strong argument to be made that the 
dissenting approach was more in line with the High Court’s earlier decision in Lim.207 On this point, 
Matthew Zagor has observed that: 
the [majority] reasoning [in Al-Kateb] is not inconsistent with Lim insofar as it recognises the capacity for 
Ch III to protect against punitive legislation. However, almost everything that follows represents a 
strategic retreat, and the creation of a new, narrower, approach to the operation of Ch III.208 
Similarly, Rayner Thwaites noted:  
Without expressly overruling Lim, the majority undermined the substantive limits on immigration 
detention central to the decision, derived from the separation of powers. They questioned the very 
existence of a constitutional immunity from executive detention and expanded the scope of the 
immigration exception to it. The shift from Lim to Al-Kateb reflects a shift in weight, from the protections 
derived from the separation of powers on the one hand, to the power conferred by the aliens power on 
the other.209 
In Lim, constitutional validity of immigration detention provisions was dependent on whether they were 
reasonably capable of being seen as necessary for the legitimate purpose of carrying out the 
assessment of admission or removal. Post-deportation detention in circumstances where there is no 
reasonable likelihood of removal being carried out in the near future cannot be connected to either of 
those legitimate purposes. Assessment of admission has already been finally determined and 
detention cannot be said to be for the purpose of removal where it is clear removal is not possible. 
The majority justices in Al-Kateb were well aware of this issue. Accordingly, they expanded the Lim 
test by adding an additional legitimate purpose authorising constitutionally valid immigration detention: 
namely, exclusion from the community. This new ‘catch-all’ justification had no precedent in 
constitutional jurisprudence. As such, the ruling represented a significant shift away from Lim and 
other existing case law. The retreat from such a position and the reaffirmation of the Lim test in recent 
jurisprudence,210 as well as the continued disagreement on the Court about whether Al-Kateb should 
be reopened,211 further demonstrates the contingency of the Court’s decision in that case. 
6.6  Conclusion 
                                                   
207  See above nn 169-75 and accompanying text. 
208  Zagor, above n 204, 138. 
209  Thwaites, above n 3, 72. 
210  See Plaintiff S4 (2014) 312 ALR 537, see above nn 179-87 and accompanying text. 
211  See above nn 155-7, 164-6 and accompanying text. 
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My analysis of the recent case law challenging the long-term mandatory detention of non-citizens in 
the United States and Australia suggests that the outcome in these cases was far from obvious. In 
relation to detention of a mandatory nature, courts in both jurisdictions adopted a similar ‘rights-
precluding’ approach. In doing so, they upheld the blanket mandatory detention measures by 
weighing up the interest of detainees in avoiding detention with legitimate government interests. 
However, it is arguable that this proportionality test could have supported the opposite outcome, as 
the government’s legitimate interests could have been achieved with more tailored detention 
measures. In relation to the legality of detention of an indefinite nature, the US Supreme Court and 
the Australian High Court reached divergent outcomes. Like the cases on mandatory detention, I 
contend that these cases were highly contingent and could have easily been decided in a different 
manner. That is not to say that the relevant law in both countries is indeterminate. Rather, in the 
course of their analysis, individual justices came to a number of interpretive junctures where they had 
to choose between alternate reasonable and compelling approaches that could have led to either a 
‘rights-protecting’ or ‘rights-precluding’ approach. These interpretive junctures related to constitutional 
questions as well as general principles of statutory interpretation. In the following two chapters, I 
argue that much of the case law on interdiction and extraterritorial processing in Australia and the 
United States is similarly contingent.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
MARITIME INTERDICTION – THE CASE LAW 
In this chapter, I examine the judicial response to maritime interdiction policies in the United States 
and Australia. Like policies of long-term mandatory detention, maritime interdiction activities targeting 
asylum seekers can be contentious under international, US and Australian law. As such, the legality 
of interdiction operations has been challenged in the highest courts of both jurisdictions. The 
existence of this body of comparative case law provides an opportunity to examine the impact of the 
different legal frameworks operating in the United States and Australia on the judicial response to 
maritime interdiction policies. I argue this case law supports my hypothesis that different legal 
structures have not been determinative on the outcome of judicial challenges to transferred 
immigration control policies in the United States and Australia. Rather, I argue that the relevant legal 
principles were ambiguous enough for the judges in each case to reasonably adopt a ‘rights-
protecting’ or a ‘rights-precluding’ approach. I highlight the junctures in each case which could have 
led judges down either path, as well as other factors that demonstrate this contingency. 
7.1 US Case Law 
The leading Supreme Court case on the legality of the US migrant interdiction program is Sale v 
Haitian Centers Council (‘Sale’).1 The case involved a challenge to President George H W Bush’s 
‘Kennebunkport Order’ of 24 May 1992, which authorised the interdiction and repatriation of all 
Haitians attempting to reach the United States by boat without any screening for asylum claims.2 The 
main issue in Sale was whether these actions violated the non-refoulement obligation in Article 33 of 
the Refugee Convention3 or § 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (‘INA’) that implemented a 
similar obligation into US law.4 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Sale, several circuit courts 
had considered similar issues in the context of the Haitian interdiction program. The District of 
Columbia and Eleventh Circuit found that the US government’s non-refoulement obligations under the 
Refugee Convention and the INA only extended to aliens who were physically present in the United 
                                                   
1  509 US 155 (1993). 
2  See Chapter Five, n 39 and accompanying text. 
3  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugee Convention’); Note that the United States is not party to the 
Convention but in effect assumed the obligations under it when it acceded to Protocol relating to the 
Status of Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 
October 1967) (‘Protocol’). 
4  In 1996, Congress repealed § 243(h) and inserted similar provisions in § 241(b)(3) of the INA: See 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, Pub L No 104-208, 100 Stat 3009-546. 
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States.5 The Second Circuit took the contrary view, interpreting Article 33 and the relevant legislative 
provisions as having extraterritorial effect.6 
In Sale, the US Supreme Court adopted the approach taken by the District of Columbia and Eleventh 
Circuit, finding that the non-refoulement obligations contained in the INA and the Refugee Convention 
did not have extraterritorial effect.7 Stevens J, writing for the majority, first examined the meaning of 
the relevant provisions of the INA. Section 243(h) provided, subject to a number of enumerated 
exceptions, that  
the Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien… to a country if the Attorney General 
determines that such alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.8 
Through an examination of the language and legislative history of this provision, the Court interpreted 
two main restrictions to its operation. First, as the language only referred to the Attorney General, it 
could not be interpreted as placing any limitations on the President’s authority to repatriate aliens 
interdicted in international waters.9 Second, the majority read in a geographical limitation. The 
provision was construed as only applying to activities of the Attorney General authorised by other 
sections of the Act. The Act authorised the Attorney General to conduct deportation or exclusion 
proceedings within the United States. Stevens J reasoned, therefore, that ‘[s]ince there is no provision 
in the statute for the conduct of such proceedings outside the United States … we cannot reasonably 
construe §243(h) to limit the Attorney General’s actions in geographic areas where she has not been 
authorised to conduct such proceedings’.10 His Honour also relied on the presumption that Acts of 
Congress do not ordinarily apply outside US borders to support the interpretation of §243(h) as only 
applying within United States territory.11  
Having rejected the proposition that the INA created any extraterritorial non-refoulement obligations, 
Stevens J turned his attention to the possibility that the Refugee Convention may create such an 
obligation. If that were the case, under the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, the broader 
treaty obligation might provide the controlling rule of law.12 The Court decided, however, that neither a 
textual analysis nor the negotiating history of the treaty supported the position that Article 33 is 
applicable on the high seas or extraterritorially.  
Article 33 of the Refugee Convention states: 
                                                   
5  Haitian Refugee Center v Gracey, 809 F2d 794 (DC Cir, 1987); Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 949 
F2d 1109 (11th Cir, 1991); Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 953 F2d 1498 (11th Cir, 1992).  
6  Haitian Centers Council v McNary, 969 F2d 1350 (2nd Cir, 1992). 
7  509 US 155 (1993) (Stevens, White, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas JJ and CJ Rehnquist; 
Blackmun J dissenting).  
8  INA § 243(h); 8 USC § 1253(h)(1) (1988 ed, Supp IV). See above n 4. 
9  Sale, 509 US 155, 172 (1993). 
10  Ibid 173. 
11  Ibid 173. 
12  Ibid 178.  
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1. No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the 
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 
2. The benefit of the present provision may not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are 
reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, 
having been convicted by a final judgement of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the 
community of that country.13 
Steven J’s first textual argument stemmed from the geographic limitation included in the Article 33(2). 
The effect of that provision is that a refugee cannot claim the benefit of the non-refoulement obligation 
if he poses a threat to the country in which he is located. His Honour reasoned that  
[i]f the first paragraph did not apply to the high seas, no nation could invoke the second paragraph’s 
exception with respect to an alien there: An alien intercepted on the high seas is in no country at all. If 
Article 33.1 applied extraterritorially, therefore, Article 33.2 would create an absurd anomaly: Dangerous 
aliens on the high seas would be entitled to the benefits of 33.1 while those residing in the country that 
sought to expel them would not.14 
Steven J’s second textual argument related to the meanings of the terms ‘expel’ and ‘return’ in Article 
33(1). The Court ruled that these terms paralleled the phrase ‘deport or return’ found in §243(h)(1) of 
the INA. ‘Expel’ was interpreted as having the same meaning as ‘deport’, referring to the deportation 
or expulsion of an alien who is already present in the host country. The term ‘return’ (refouler) was 
interpreted as being limited to the exclusion of aliens who are ‘on the threshold of initial entry’.15 The 
Court reasoned that the inclusion of the term ‘refouler’ following ‘return’ narrows the meaning of the 
term as ‘refouler’ is not a synonym for ‘return’.16 Stevens J referred to two English-French dictionaries 
translating ‘refouler’ as ‘repulse’, ‘drive back’ or ‘expel’. His Honour concluded that these translations 
imply that in the context of Article 33(1) ‘“return” means a defensive act of resistance or exclusion at 
the border rather than an act of transporting someone to a particular destination.’17 The Court also 
found that this interpretation of the terms ‘expel’ and ‘return’ (as applying only to refugees who have 
entered the host country) was also supported by the travaux préparatoires of the Refugee 
Convention. The Court cited statements by the Swiss and Dutch delegates supporting such an 
interpretation.18 Thus, the Supreme Court held that Article 33 does not have extraterritorial effect. 
Blackmun J delivered a powerful dissent, finding that the duty of non-refoulement in both the Refugee 
Convention and the INA applied extraterritorially. In relation to Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, 
Blackmun’s starting point was the principle that a treaty must be construed according to its ‘ordinary 
meaning’.19 The majority’s attempt to give the term ‘return’ a more narrow legal meaning was 
                                                   
13  Refugee Convention, art 33 (emphasis added). 
14  Sale, 509 US 155, 180 (1993). 
15  Ibid 180, quoting Shaughnessy v United States ex rel Mezei, 345 US 206, 212 (1953). 
16  Ibid. 
17  Ibid 182. 
18  Ibid 184-7. 
19  Ibid 191, citing Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 23 
May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 (entered into force 27 January 1980). 
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inconsistent with this accepted canon of statutory interpretation. Blackmun J found that the ordinary 
meaning of ‘return’ is ‘to bring, send, or put (a person or thing) back to or in a former position’, and 
that was exactly what the US government was doing to the Haitians.20 His Honour was critical of the 
majority’s attempt to construe the term refouler in the text of Article 33(2) as somehow limiting the 
meaning of ‘return’ in that provision. Blackmun J, noted that even if the majority’s translation of 
refouler as ‘repulse’, ‘repel’ and ‘drive back’ was accepted, none of these terms necessitated the 
conclusion that the term should be read down to only mean exclusion at the border. A person can be 
repulsed, repelled, or driven back on the high seas. 
Next, Blackmun J dismissed the majority’s argument relating to the inclusion of the geographical 
limitation in Article 33(2). For his Honour, the fact that the drafters of the Convention decided to allow 
nations to deport criminal aliens who have entered their territory hardly suggested an intent to permit 
the apprehension and return of non-criminal aliens who have not entered their territory.21 Blackmun J 
was also very critical of the majority’s reliance on the travaux préparatoires, and in particular the oral 
statements of Swiss and Dutch delegates. Such reference, he argued, should only be made as a last 
resort when there is ambiguity in the language.22 They could not be used to change the plain meaning 
of the text. Moreover, there is no evidence that the statements relied upon reflected the views of other 
delegates as they were not ‘agreed to’ or ‘adopted’ as official amendments to the Convention.23 
In relation to § 243(h) of the INA, Blackmun J reasoned that the provisions are both syntactically and 
grammatically unambiguous in their extraterritorial effect. His Honour argued that such an 
interpretation was supported by a correct reading of the legislative history. Further, he criticised the 
majority’s reliance on the presumption against the extraterritorial applicability of US law. The 
presumption, he argued, only operates where congressional intent is ‘unexpressed’. The language of 
the provisions in this case clearly expressed an extraterritorial effect. Even if the congressional intent 
was unexpressed, the international subject matter of the legislation (immigration, nationalities and 
refugees) created a presumption of extraterritorial applicability. Blackmun J also dismissed the 
argument that as §243(h) only purports to constrain the actions of the Attorney General, the provision 
did not apply to the Haitian interdiction program as it was carried out pursuant to a Presidential Order. 
His Honour concluded that ‘[t]here can be no doubt that the Coast Guard is acting as the Attorney 
General’s agent when it seizes and returns undocumented aliens’.24 
The overwhelming weight of academic opinion backs Blackmun J’s dissent. The majority’s reasoning 
in Sale is subject to almost universal criticism by both US25 and international legal scholars.26 The 
Executive Committee of UNHCR was also quick to condemn the outcome of the case: 
                                                   
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid 193. 
22  Ibid 194-5. 
23  Ibid 197. 
24  Ibid 201. 
25  See, for example, Thomas David Jones, 'Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc' (1994) 88 American 
Journal of International Law 114; Harold Hongju Koh, 'Reflections on Refoulement and Haitian Centers 
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UNHCR considers the Court’s decision a setback to modern international refugee law which has been 
developing for more than forty years, since the end of World War II. It renders the work of the Office of 
the High Commissioner in its global refugee protection role more difficult and sets a very unfortunate 
example.27 
A similar view was affirmed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights when it was called 
upon to determine the legality of the US Haitian interdiction program. The Commission rejected the 
Supreme Court’s approach in Sale, interpreting Article 33 of the Refugee Convention as operating 
extraterritorially in the context of migrant interdiction on the high seas.28 The outcome also directly 
contradicts advice provided to the government by its own Office of Legal Counsel back in 1981 when 
the Haitian interdiction program was established. This advice concluded that even on the high seas, 
Article 33 created an obligation for the United States to ensure that interdicted Haitians ‘who claim 
they will be persecuted… must be given an opportunity to substantiate their claims.’29  
The widespread criticism of the legal reasoning adopted in the case, the fact that the outcome 
contradicted the government’s earlier legal advice, and the plausibility of the construction put forward 
in Blackmun J’s dissent, indicate that the alternate interpretation recognising the extraterritorial effect 
of the non-refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention and INA was at the very least open 
to the judges in Sale. Such a proposition is further supported by the fact that the Circuit Courts were 
divided on the issue. Why then did the majority judges adopt the restrictive approach that in the words 
of one commentator, relied on ‘analysis that [was] flawed in numerous respects’?30 The answer lies in 
the political context surrounding the case, which will be explored further in Chapter Nine. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Council' (1994) 35 Harvard International Law Journal 1; Stephen Legomsky, 'The USA and the 
Caribbean Interdiction Program' (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 677, 687-92. 
26  See, for example, Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the 
Globalisation of Migration Control (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 122; James Hathaway, The 
Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 336-9; Guy Goodwin-
Gill, 'The Haitian Refoulement Case: A Comment' (1994) 6 International Journal of Refugee Law 103, 
103-9. 
27  ‘UN High Commissioner for Refugees Responds to US Supreme Court Decision in Sale v. Haitian 
Centers Council’ (1993) 32 International Legal Materials 1215. For an elaboration of the UNHCR 
position, see ‘Interception of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees: The International Framework and 
Recommendations for a Comprehensive Approach’, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s 
Programme, 18th Meeting, UN Doc EC/50/SC/CRP.17 (9 June 2000) [10]. 
28  Haitian Center for Human Rights v United States, Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Case 
10.675, (13 March 1997) [156]-[157]. For an analysis of this case, see Itamar Mann, 'Dialectic of 
Transnationalism: Unauthorised Migration and Human Rights, 1993-2013' (2013) 54 Harvard 
International Law Journal 315, 356-7. 
29  ‘Proposed Interdiction of Haitian Flag Vessels’ (1981) 5 Opinions of the Office Legal Counsel of the 
United States Department of Justice 242, 248. Note, however, that after contrary views were expressed 
by the legal advisor to the State Department, this Office of Legal Counsel opinion was withdrawn: see 
Lory Rosenberg, 'International Association of Refugee Law Judges Conference: The Courts and 
Interception - The United States' Interdiction Experience and its Impact on Refugees and Asylum 
Seekers' (2003) 17 Georgetown Immigration Law Journal 199, 201. 
30  Jones, above n 25, 122. 
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In the immediate aftermath of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sale, concerns were raised that it 
would provide a green light for other nations to engage in push-back operations. The New York Times 
queried whether 
this ruling by one of the most influential courts in the world set a tempting precedent, particularly for 
developing nations? If the United States, with the imprimatur of its highest court, appears to put the 
protection of its borders above its responsibilities under international law, will others be enticed to follow 
suit?31  
This concern turned out to be well-founded. However, it is interesting to note that the New York Times 
was wrong to single out ‘developing nations’, with the influence of the US interdiction practices having 
the most direct influence on developed liberal democracies such as Australia and nations in Europe.32 
7.2 Australian Case Law 
7.2.1 Ruddock v Vadarlis 
In Chapter Five, I argued that Australia’s interdiction regime introduced after the Tampa incident was 
inspired by the US Caribbean interdiction program. Parallels can also be found in the way the judiciary 
in each country responded to the interdiction policy. In both countries, public interest advocates came 
forward to challenge the policies and practices adopted.33 The US Supreme Court dismissed the 
challenge to the Haitian interdiction program in Sale. In Ruddock v Vadarlis, the Full Bench of the 
Federal Court of Australia did the same with respect to the challenge to the interdiction activities of 
the Australian government.34 While the cases dealt with different fact scenarios and different legal 
questions, the outcome was the same: a ‘rights-precluding’ approach upholding the legality of the 
governments’ interdiction activities. 
The Tampa incident is examined in detail in Chapter Five, Part 5.2.2. For present purposes a 
summary account of the events that led up to the court challenge will suffice. A Norwegian container 
vessel, the MV Tampa, responded to a request by Australian authorities to rescue 433 asylum 
seekers aboard a sinking vessel in the Indian Ocean. When the Tampa attempted to land the rescued 
asylum seekers at Christmas Island, the Australian government ordered the vessel to stay outside 
Australian territorial waters. Concerned about the health and welfare of the rescuees and his crew, 
the ship’s captain defied Australian authorities and headed towards the Australian territory of 
Christmas Island. The Australian government responded by deploying Special Armed Service troops, 
who boarded and took control of the vessel. 
                                                   
31  Deborah Sontag, ‘Reneging on Refuge: The Haitian Precedent’, New York Times (online), 27 June 1993 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1993/06/27/weekinreview/reneging-on-refuge-the-haitian-precedent.html>. 
32  On the use of interdiction and return in Europe, see Chapter Ten, Part 10.1.1. 
33  In the US, the Sale litigation was brought by Haitian Centers Council. The government’s response to the 
MV Tampa incident was challenged by a concerned Melbourne lawyer, Eric Vadarlis, the Victorian 
Council for Civil Liberties, and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission.  
34  (2001) 110 FCR 491. 
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Eric Vadarlis and the Victorian Council for Civil Liberties commenced proceedings in the Federal 
Court against the Minister for Immigration and a number of other Commonwealth officers.35 The first 
hurdle the public advocates had to overcome was the issue of standing. While the lawyers had 
received a letter from the ‘rescuees’, they were unable to obtain direct instructions for the purpose of 
mounting a legal challenge under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Migration Act’).36 Given the lack of 
direct instructions from the rescuees, the public advocates only had standing to seek an order in the 
nature of habeas corpus, requiring the respondents to bring the rescuees to Australia.37 Two 
requirements had to be met for the writ to issue. First, the rescuees had to be ‘detained’ by the 
government. This required a determination that the government was imposing total restraint on the 
movement of the rescuees. Second, it needed to be shown that this detention was not authorised by 
law. The government admitted to acting outside of the statutory regime set up by the Migration Act. 
This was because if this Act was to apply, the rescuees would have to be transferred into immigration 
detention in Australia and afforded an opportunity to claim asylum.38 Instead, the government argued 
that the executive had a ‘prerogative power’ which authorised its actions, outside the statutory 
provisions. The determinative question in this regard was whether such a power existed. 
The trial judge, North J, held that the circumstances amounted to a total restraint on the freedom of 
the rescuees attributable to the government. On the second question, North J concluded that there 
was no non-statutory prerogative power to detain non-citizens for the purpose of expulsion. If there 
ever had been such a power, North J reasoned that it was extinguished by the comprehensive 
provisions contained in the Migration Act dealing with the subject. Detention could only be authorised 
if it was pursuant to the Migration Act, and to the extent that the government purported to be acting 
outside the Act, detention was unlawful. Accordingly, orders were made directing the Commonwealth 
to bring ashore and release the asylum seekers. 
                                                   
35  Victorian Council for Civil Liberties v MIMA (‘VCCL’) (2001) 110 FCR 452. 
36  Vadarlis argued that s 245F(9), which confers on officers the power to board ships, applies to the 
rescuees and requires the government to bring the rescuees to mainland Australia. He contended 
further that the mandatory detention provisions contained in s 189 of the Act applied to the rescuees and 
required the respondents to take the rescuees into detention. The application for mandamus to compel 
the respondents to perform these statutory duties was dismissed on the grounds that Vadarlis did not 
have standing: VCCL (2001) 110 FCR 452, 467-68 [45]-[48] (North J); Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 
FCR 491, 529-530 [151]-[152] (French J). Vadarlis also claimed that the government’s refusal to give 
him access to the rescuees constituted a breach of his implied constitutional right to freedom of 
communication. He unsuccessfully sought an injunction and mandamus to allow him to give legal advice 
to the rescuees: VCCL (2001) 100 FCR 452, 489-90 [162]-[168] (North J). 
37  VCCL (2001) 110 FCR 452, 469 [56] (North J); Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 509 [66] 
(Black CJ); 518 [108] (Beaumont J). The Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), which sets out the 
powers of the Federal Court, does not explicitly mention the writ of habeas corpus. This has led to 
divided opinions as to whether the court has the power to issue such a writ: see David Clark, 
'Jurisdiction and Power: Habeas Corpus and the Federal Court' (2006) 32 Monash University Law 
Review 275 (arguing that the Federal Court judges have been incorrect in their conclusion that they do 
not have the power to issue habeas corpus writs). It is accepted, however, that the Court has the power 
to issue a writ in the nature of habeas corpus, which is essentiallly a mandatory injunction: Ruddock v 
Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 518 [107] (Beaumont J).  
38  See above n 36. 
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In Ruddock v Vadarlis, the Full Federal Court overturned the primary judge’s ruling in a 2:1 majority 
decision.39 Black CJ, in dissent, would have dismissed the appeal on similar grounds relied upon in 
the primary decision. French J, with whom Beaumont J agreed, disagreed with North J’s and Black 
CJ’s analysis of the two key questions. On the first question of whether the rescuees were being 
detained by the government, French J invoked the ‘three walled prison’ concept constructed by the 
High Court in Chu Kheng Lim v MILGEA (‘Lim’).40 His Honour reasoned that the rescuees were not 
being detained as they were free to travel anywhere they wished, except to Australia.41 French J went 
on to conclude that even if the rescuees were being detained, such detention would be authorised 
pursuant to the government’s executive power conferred by s 61 of the Australian Constitution.42 His 
Honour distinguished between the old royal prerogative powers and the constitutional executive 
power, finding that the former had been subsumed by the latter upon the creation of the Australian 
Constitution. The executive power authorises the executive to prevent the entry of non-citizens and to 
do all things necessary to effect such exclusion (including detention). Whereas the old prerogative 
power could be superseded by legislation which operates in the same area, the executive power 
could only be displaced by clear and unambiguous legislative intention.43 This is particularly so in 
cases where the executive power is of great significance to national sovereignty.44 While detailed and 
comprehensive, the provisions of the Migration Act dealing with the entry and removal of non-citizens 
were construed as not demonstrating an intention to override the executive of its non-statutory power 
to prevent the entry of non-citizens into Australian waters.45 Vadarlis sought leave to appeal to the 
High Court. However, the Court declined to entertain the appeal, as by that stage, the rescuees had 
been transferred to Nauru and New Zealand to have their claims for refugee status assessed.46 
Much like the Sale decision in the United States, the majority’s decision in Ruddock v Vadarlis has 
been the subject of intense academic criticism.47 In reaching the conclusion that the rescuees were 
not detained as they were free to go anywhere other than Australia, French J relied on the High 
Court’s decision in Lim. As Mary Crock points out, however, that characterisation of immigration 
                                                   
39  (2001) 110 FCR 491. 
40  Chu Kheng Lim v MILGEA (‘Lim’) (1992) 176 CLR 1; See Chapter Six, Part 6.4.1. 
41  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 548 [214]. 
42  Section 61 of the Australian Constitution provides that ‘the executive power of the Commonwealth is 
vested in the Queen and is exercisable by the Governor-General’. 
43  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540-1 [183]-[185], 545-6 [204] (French J). 
44  Ibid 543 [193], 545 [202] (French J). 
45  Ibid 545 [202] (French J). 
46  Transcript of Proceedings, Vadarlis v MIMA & Ors M93/2001 [2001] HCATrans 625 (27 November 
2001). 
47  See, for example, George Winterton, 'The Relationship Between Commonwealth Legislative and 
Executive Power' (2004) 25 Adelaide Law Review 21; Bradley Selway, 'All at Sea: Constitutional 
Assumptions and “The Executive Power of the Commonwealth”' (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 495; 
Simon Evans, 'The Rule of Law, Constitutionalism and the MV Tampa' (2002) 13 Public Law Review 94; 
Mary Crock, 'Durable Solutions or Politics of Misery: Refugee Protection in Australia after Tampa' in 
Natalie Bolzan, Michael Darcey and Jan Mason (eds), Fenced Out, Fenced In: Border Protection, 
Asylum and Detention in Australia (Common Ground Publishing, 2006) 23; Mary Crock, 'In the Wake of 
Tampa: Conflicting Visions of International Refugee Law in the Management of Refugee Flows' (2003) 
12 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 49; Peter Gerangelos, 'The Executive Power of the Commonwealth 
of Australia: Section 61 of the Commonwealth Constitution, “Nationhood” and the Future of the 
Prerogative' (2012) 12 Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal 97. 
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detention in Lim had been repeatedly and roundly rejected by the UN Human Rights Committee and 
by the European Court of Human Rights.48 This point is also made by Black CJ in his dissenting 
opinion.49  
The majority’s broad construction of the executive power has been the subject of harsh criticism. The 
two main steps in French J’s reasoning have both been attacked. The first line of criticism targets 
French J’s assertion that the boundaries of the Commonwealth executive power should not be 
determined with reference to the content of the prerogative power. This conclusion has been criticised 
on the grounds that it deviates from previous precedent determining the nature and scope of the 
executive power,50 and the context of imperial and colonial history in which the constitutional provision 
was drafted.51 George Winterton argues that French J’s approach involves abandoning the long-
standing principle that the common law should be used to interpret both statutes and constitutions.52 
For Winterton, the prerogative, despite its uncertainty, ‘constitutes a substantial body of principles, 
rules and precedents, established over hundreds of years’.53 Such principles provide clearer guidance 
than vague notions of sovereignty and what is ‘appropriate’ for national governments.  
The second line of criticism targets French J’s conclusion that the executive power to prevent the 
entry of non-citizens had not been abrogated by the passage of the Migration Act.54 Again, this 
conclusion is not derived from any precedent55 and ‘ignores the history of the executive power since 
the 17th century [which] demonstrates progressive constitutionalisation, moderation, and 
republicanisation.’56 This history supports the conclusion that even if the executive power 
encompassed a power to detain non-citizens for the purpose of exclusion at federation, this power 
was abrogated by the legislative action of passing the relevant provisions on interdiction and 
exclusion contained in the Migration Act. Simon Evans argues that this position is correct when one 
considers the legislative intention behind the passage of those provisions, querying whether it is 
realistic to imagine that the Parliament intended to enact in clear and general terms that a person 
attempting to enter Australia unlawfully must be taken into immigration detention by an officer, but to 
                                                   
48  Mary Crock and Laurie Berg, Immigration, Refugees and Forced Migration: Law, Policy and Practice in 
Australia (Federation Press, 2011) 52, 97; referring to A v Australia, Communication No 560/1993: 
Australia, CCPR/C/59/D/560/1993 (30 April 1997) and Amuur v France [1996] III Eur Court HR 826. See 
also Chapter Six, n 128 and accompanying text. 
49  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 510 [73]. 
50  Selway, above n 47, 501, refering to the High Court decision in Re Residential Tenancies Tribunal 
(NSW); Ex parte Defence Housing Authority (1997) 190 CLR 410, 438 as authority for this point. There, 
Dawson, Toohey and Gaudron JJ held that the power conferred by s 61 included ‘the prerogative of the 
Crown because the setting in which the Crown is invested with the executive power is that of the 
common law and the prerogatives of the Crown are those rights, powers, privileges and immunities it 
possesses at common law.’ See also, Winterton, above n 47, 35; Gerangalos, above n 47, 116 (noting 
that Vadarlis ‘constitutes a decisive step beyond what may have been suggested in earlier cases’).  
51  Selway, above n 47, 505. See also, Evans, above n 47, 97.  
52  Winterton, above n 47. 
53  Ibid 35. 
54  See Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 540 [183]. 
55  Winterton, above n 47, 47 (arguing that ‘it may be doubted whether the cases upon which French J 
relied upon [to reach this conclusion] represent current Australian authority.’) 
56  Evans, above n 47, 98. 
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leave open to the officer an alternative non-statutory option with none of the safeguards of immigration 
detention?57 
This criticism, combined with the fact that two out of the four judges who heard the case at trial and 
appeal upheld the habeas challenge (including the most senior judge of the group, Black CJ), at the 
very least, demonstrates the contingency of the Full Federal Court’s decision.  
7.2.2 CPCF v MIBP 
The High Court had an opportunity to examine some of the issues raised in Ruddock v Vadarlis in its 
2015 decision in CPCF v MIBP (‘CPCF’).58 The case concerned a challenge to the detention at sea of 
one of a group of 157 Sri Lankan asylum seekers interdicted en route to Australia. The Indian-flagged 
vessel on which the group was travelling was intercepted on 29 June 2014 by an Australian Customs 
vessel in Australia’s contiguous zone. The asylum seekers were transferred to the Australian vessel 
where they were detained while diplomatic negotiations were undertaken to return them to India. They 
remained aboard the Customs vessel until 27 July 2014 when a decision was made to disembark the 
passengers to Cocos (Keeling) Island, an Australian territory in the Indian Ocean. Subsequently, the 
asylum seekers were moved to the offshore processing facility on Nauru. 
The key legal issue was that of wrongful imprisonment, namely whether the detention of the plaintiff 
for almost one month on the Australian vessel was lawful. The Commonwealth’s argument was that 
their actions were authorised under the Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (‘MPA’). The MPA had 
consolidated the Commonwealth’s various existing maritime enforcement powers, including those 
introduced into the Migration Act in the aftermath of the MV Tampa incident,59 into a single 
framework.60 
The key relevant provision of the MPA, s 72(4), provided that where a maritime officer suspects a 
vessel had been involved in a contravention of an Australian law (including the Migration Act):61  
A maritime officer may detain the person and take the person, or cause the person to be taken: 
(a) To a place in the migration zone; or 
(b) To a place outside the migration zone, including a place outside Australia.62 
In the alternative, the Commonwealth argued that detention was authorised by the non-statutory 
executive power of the Commonwealth derived from s 61 of the Australian Constitution. This drew on 
the Majority’s reasoning in Ruddock v Vadarlis, where French J noted that the Commonwealth 
                                                   
57  Ibid. 
58  [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015). 
59  See former div 12A of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Migration Act’). 
60  Explanatory Memorandum, Maritime Powers Bill 2012 (Cth) 1; See Chapter Five, nn 107-8 and 
accompanying text. 
61  See Maritime Powers Act 2013 (Cth) (‘MPA’) ss 9, 17 and 18. 
62  These provisions reflect the former s 245F(9)-(9A) of the Migration Act. 
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executive power included the power ‘to prevent the entry of non-citizens and to do such things as 
necessary to effect such exclusion.’63 
The plaintiff argued that his detention was not authorised by the MPA as the decision to take him to 
India was invalid. He contended that detention was unlawful because there was no assurance he 
would be allowed to disembark in India. The plaintiff sought to rely on the High Court’s ruling in Lim 
that a Commonwealth statute authorising executive detention must limit the duration of incarceration 
to what is reasonably capable of being seen as necessary to effect an identified statutory purpose 
which is reasonably capable of being achieved.64 The lack of agreement with India for disembarkation 
created uncertainty in the possible duration of detention. It was argued that this took the duration of 
the plaintiff’s detention beyond something reasonably capable of being seen as necessary to effect 
removal. The plaintiff’s second argument relied on the fact that there was no legal guarantee of non-
refoulement by India. Finally, the plaintiff contended that the majority’s ruling on the executive power 
in Ruddock v Vadarlis was incorrect, arguing that even if an executive power to detain on the high 
seas had ever existed, it was extinguished by the MPA.65  
By a narrow 4:3 majority, the High Court found that the detention of the plaintiff was authorised under 
s 72(4) of the MPA. Almost all the judges cited with approval the constitutional principle in Lim. That 
is, statutory detention provisions must be limited to what is reasonably capable of being seen to be 
necessary to effect an identified statutory purpose which is reasonably capable of being achieved.66 
However, they split on how this principle should be applied to the facts before them. The majority 
consisted of four separate judgements delivered by French CJ and Crennan, Kean and Gageler JJ. 
All rejected the plaintiff’s argument that Lim created an implicit requirement in s 72(4) that detention 
be authorised only where the detainee has an existing right to disembark in the destination country. 
French CJ noted that the statute could not be construed as authorising ‘futile or entirely speculative 
taking’. However, it did authorise detention where there is knowledge or reasonable belief that the 
destination country would allow the person to enter its territory.67 The ongoing diplomatic negotiations 
between Australian and Indian officials were sufficient to support this requisite reasonable belief. 
Crennan J found that while removal must be to a reasonable place and within a reasonable time, s 
72(4) did not require certainty of disembarkation at a specific destination.68 Gageler J adopted a 
                                                   
63  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 543 [193]. 
64  Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 33-4 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ); CPCF v MIBP (‘CPCF’) [2015] HCA 1 
(28 January 2015) [196] (Crennan J). 
65  A third argument alleged that the maritime officer responsible for detaining him and taking him towards 
India made the decision to do so at the dictation of the National Security Committee without exercising 
independent discretion as to where he should be taken. This argument was dismissed by all members of 
the Court and is beyond the scope of the present analysis. 
66  See, for example, CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [196], [215]-[216] (Crennan J); [273] (Kiefel 
J); [374] (Gageler J). 
67  Ibid [46]-[50]. 
68  Ibid [205]-[207]. 
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similar approach, finding that the only limitation on the power was that it be exercised reasonably, in 
good faith and in accordance with the objects of the Act.69  
The fourth member of the majority, Keane J, took a slightly different approach, but reached a similar 
conclusion. For Keane J, the decision to take the plaintiff and the other passengers to India was not 
made under the Act. Keane J interpreted s 72(4) as authorising only actions taken by a maritime 
officer. The decision to take the plaintiff to India was made by the Minister in consultation with the 
National Security Committee (‘NSC’), not the maritime officer aboard the Australian customs vessel. 
As s 72(4) was not a source of the decision making power exercised by the executive, it was not a 
source of constraint on the power of the executive.70  
Instead, Keane J found the decision of the Minister and the NCP to take the plaintiff to India was 
authorised under the executive powers conferred by ss 61 and 64 of the Australian Constitution.71 His 
Honour did stipulate, however, that the implementation of that decision was ‘subject to such 
constraints as are expressed by, or necessarily implicit in, s 72(4)’.72 This included requirements that 
the power be exercised with reference to the scope and purpose of the Act, and that ‘taking’ under s 
72(4) be carried out in a reasonable time.73 His Honour concluded that these constraints had not been 
breached in this case. 
The minority held that s 72(4) of the MPA only authorised the removal of a person to a destination, 
when at the time the destination is chosen, the person taken has a right or permission to enter.74 In 
addition to the Lim principle discussed above, Hayne and Bell JJ (in a joint judgement) and Kiefel J 
referred to the High Court’s ruling in Plaintiff S4/2014 v MIBP (‘Plaintiff S4’).75 There, the Court said 
[t]he duration of any form of detention, and thus its lawfulness, must be capable of being determined at 
any time and from time to time. Otherwise, the lawfulness of the detention could not be determined and 
enforced by the courts, and, ultimately by this Court.76 
Hayne and Bell JJ reasoned that the duration of detention was not capable of determination where 
uncertainty surrounds a person’s right to enter a place chosen for the purposes of s 72(4). In such 
circumstances: 
the length of detention would depend upon the particular (unconstrained) decision to choose as the 
destination to which a person subject to s 72 of the [MPA] should be taken a place (or succession of 
places) which that person has no right or permission to enter.77 
                                                   
69  Ibid [360]-[361]. 
70  Ibid [450] (Keane J). 
71  Ibid [423]. 
72  Ibid [450]. 
73  Ibid [450]-[453]. 
74  Ibid [71], [92], [99] and [123], [135] (Hayne and Bell JJ); [318] (Kiefel J). 
75  Ibid [97] (Hayne and Bell JJ); [321] (Kiefel J).   
76  Plaintiff S4 (2014) 312 ALR 537, 543 [29]; See Chapter Six, nn 179-87 and accompanying text. 
77  CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [99]. 
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They go on to reason that a construction of the statute that would authorise detention where there is a 
hope that a person may be allowed to land would raise serious concerns: 
How is a court (and ultimately this Court) to judge whether that hope has been explored with sufficient 
diligence to make the consequential detention not unduly, and thus not unlawfully prolonged? If neither 
a right to land nor an existing permission to do so is required, and hope of landing will do, what level of 
hope must exist?78  
The difficulties in answering these questions make it impossible for a court to determine whether the 
person has been detained longer than reasonably necessary to be taken to his or her destination. 
Kiefel J agreed that the valid exercise of the detention power under s 72(4) required certainty about 
the choice of place to which the plaintiff would be removed. A decision under s 72(4) must be ‘limited 
to one place, which is identified at the time the decision is made as one where it is known that the 
detained person may be disembarked.’79 To hold otherwise would result in a situation where the 
length of a person’s detention is unknown. Such detention would fall foul of the principles from Lim 
and Plaintiff S4 discussed above.  
On the facts before them, most of the justices found it unnecessary to address the question of 
whether the power to detain and transfer a person under s 72(4) was constrained by the non-
refoulement provisions of the Refugee Convention and other human rights treaties. This was because 
there was no evidence before the Court that the plaintiff faced any risk of refoulement if returned to 
India. Nevertheless, the justices provided some hints about how they would approach this question if 
the fact scenario was different. 
French CJ and Keane and Gageler JJ all indicated that there was no basis for adopting a construction 
that limited the power conferred by s 72(4) by reference to Australia’s non-refoulement obligations.80 
Given the dualist nature of Australia’s legal system, international law does not form part of Australian 
law until it has been enacted in legislation. However, it is an accepted principle of statutory 
construction that ‘a statute is to be interpreted and applied, as far as its language permits, so that it is 
in conformity and not in conflict with the established rules of international law.’81 French CJ and Keane 
and Gageler JJ all indicated that this principle does not assist the plaintiff in this case as both the text 
of the relevant provisions, as well as the scope and purpose of the Act are clear and unambiguous.82 
The judgements of Kiefel and Crennan JJ and the joint judgement delivered by Hayne and Bell JJ all 
leave open the possibility that the power under s 72(4) may be limited by Australia’s non-refoulement 
obligations. Interestingly, it was Crennan J, who formed part of the majority in upholding the legality of 
the detention of the plaintiff, who gave the strongest indication that Australia’s non-refoulement 
obligations may limit the power to transfer detainees under s 72(4). Her Honour stated that  
                                                   
78  Ibid [101]. 
79  Ibid [318]. 
80  Ibid [11] (French CJ), [296] (Kiefel J), [384] (Gageler J), [462] (Keane J).  
81  MIEA v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287, cited at ibid [385] (Gageler J).  
82  CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [11] (French CJ), [385]-[387] (Gageler J), [462] (Keane J).  
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[t]he Refugees Convention is part of the context of the Act, considered widely. If the s 72(4)(b) power 
had been invoked to return the plaintiff to Sri Lanka or to take the plaintiff to a place outside the 
migration zone which was not safe questions might have arisen about an interpretation of s 72(4)(b) 
consistent with Australia’s obligation under the Refugees Convention.83  
A number of the justices also noted that statutory protections included in the MPA impose similar 
protections to the non-refoulement obligations of the Refugee Convention and other human rights 
instruments. The power to detain and transfer a person under s 72(4) is limited by s 74 of the MPA, 
which provides that ‘[a] maritime officer must not place … a person in a place, unless the officer is 
satisfied, on reasonable grounds that it is safe for the person to be in that place’. For Hayne and Bell 
JJ, this safeguard provides a similar scope of protection as found in the Refugee Convention: 
The reference in s 74 to a person being ‘safe’ in a place must be read as meaning safe from risk of 
physical harm. A decision-maker who considers whether he or she is satisfied, on reasonable grounds, 
that it is safe for a person to be in a place must ask and answer a different question from that 
inferentially imposed by the Refugees Convention. But there is a very considerable factual overlap 
between the two inquiries. Many who fear persecution for a Convention reason fear for their personal 
safety in their country of nationality.84 
French CJ makes a similar observation, stating  
[t]he content of the term ‘safe for the person to be in that place’ in s 74 may be evaluative and involve a 
risk assessment on the part of those directing or advising the relevant maritime officers. A place which 
presents a substantial risk that the person, if taken there, will be exposed to persecution or torture would 
be unlikely to meet the criterion ‘that it is safe for the person to be in that place’. The constraint imposed 
by s 74 embraces risks of the kind to which the non-refoulement obligations under the Refugees 
Convention and Convention against Torture are directed. The existence of such risks may therefore 
amount to a mandatory relevant consideration in the exercise of the power under s 72(4) because they 
enliven the limit on that power which is imposed by s 74 at the point of discharge in the country to which 
the person is taken. 85 
Kiefel J took a slightly different approach, finding that s 74 only required that a point of disembarkation 
for a person is, ‘in its immediate physical aspects… safe’.86 It does not require that a maritime officer 
be satisfied that place is one in which the person will not face a real risk of harm more generally. 
Meeting such an obligation would involve wider considerations than what is necessary to a decision 
under s 72(4).87 
Only four out of the seven justices in the case addressed the question of whether the executive power 
in s 61 of the Constitution extended to detention and removal of non-citizens seeking to enter 
Australia without authorisation. Having found that the detention of the plaintiff was authorised under 
the MPA, French CJ and Crennan and Gageler JJ indicated that it was not necessary to address this 
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84  Ibid [109].  
85  Ibid [12]. 
86  Ibid [296]. 
87  Ibid. 
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question.88 The fourth member of the majority, Keane J agreed that it was not strictly necessary to 
answer this question.89 However, his Honour went on to do so at length in obiter dictum. Keane J 
endorsed the approach of the majority in Ruddock v Vadarlis.90 He found that the Commonwealth had 
a non-statutory executive power to prevent non-citizens from entering Australia and to detain them for 
that purpose.91 This power had not been abrogated by the MPA or the Migration Act.92 Finally, this 
power to detain and remove was not constrained by Australia’s non-refoulement obligations, nor the 
requirement of certainty of destination.93 
The minority took the contrary approach on the executive power question. Having found that the 
detention of the plaintiff was not authorised under MPA, the three justices rejected the government’s 
contention that the detention was authorised under the non-statutory executive power of the 
Commonwealth. Kiefel J adopted similar reasoning to Black CJ’s dissent in Ruddock v Vadarlis. Her 
Honour found it doubtful that such a power ever existed in Australia,94 but even if it did, it had since 
been displaced by the MPA.95 Hayne and Bell JJ rejected the need to analyse the broad historical 
questions of whether the government has the inherent power to regulate who enters the nation’s 
territory and to repel those who seek to do so without authority. Even if such a power is conceded, 
such considerations ‘do not answer the questions about the scope of the power and the organ or 
organs of government which must exercise it.’96 Instead, their Honours asked more narrowly whether 
the ‘executive power of the Commonwealth of itself provides legal authority for an officer of the 
Commonwealth to detain a person and thus commit a trespass?’97 In answering this question in the 
negative, Hayne and Bell JJ relied on the following passage from the High Court’s decision in Lim:  
Neither public official nor private person can lawfully detain [an alien who is within this country, whether 
lawfully or unlawfully] or deal with his or her property except under and in accordance with some positive 
authority conferred by the law. Since the common law knows neither letter de cachet nor the other 
executive warrant authorising arbitrary arrest or detention, any officer of the Commonwealth Executive 
who purports to authorise or enforce the detention in custody of such an alien without judicial mandate 
will be acting lawfully only to the extent that his or her conduct is justified by valid statutory provisions.98 
Hayne and Bell JJ reasoned that although the comments of the Court in Lim dealt with the exercise of 
power within Australia, there is no reason to doubt that the same rule should apply to actions taken by 
                                                   
88  Ibid [42] (French CJ), [229] (Crennan J) and [392] (Gageler J). 
89  Ibid [476]. 
90  Keane J quotes passages from French J’s in judgement Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 with 
approval at ibid [482] and [489]. 
91  CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [478]-[487]. 
92  Ibid [488]-[492]. 
93  Ibid [493]-[495]. 
94  Ibid [271]. 
95  Ibid [277], [280]. 
96  Ibid [143] (footnotes omitted) (Hayne and Bell JJ). 
97  Ibid [147]. 
98  Lim (1992) 176 CLR 1, 19 (Brennan, Deane and Dawson JJ) (footnotes omitted), cited at ibid [148]. 
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the government extraterritorially: ‘[t]o hold that the Executive can act outside Australia's borders in a 
way that it cannot lawfully act within Australia would stand legal principle on its head.’99 
The contingent nature of the outcome in CPCF is demonstrated by the very tight 4:3 majority by which 
it was decided and the lack of a uniform approach amongst the majority justices. The majority 
consisted of four separate judgements. Keane J adopted a construction of the power conferred by the 
relevant statutory provisions that was significantly different from the other majority judges. French CJ, 
Gageler and Crennan JJ construed s 72(4) as the relevant source of power for both the maritime 
officers involved and the NSC that gave the order for removal. Keane J construed s 72(4) as only 
authorising actions of the maritime officers, finding that the decision of the NSC was made under the 
executive’s non-statutory powers. There was also no clear ratio on the relevance of the non-
refoulement obligations under the Refugee Convention and other Human Rights instruments; nor on 
the scope of the executive’s non-statutory powers. On this last point, it remains unclear how the High 
Court would address the executive power issue if called upon to do so directly. As discussed, Keane J 
was the only justice in CPCF to rule that non-statutory executive power extends to intercepting, 
detaining and removing non-citizens who attempt to enter Australia without authorisation. Although 
not addressing this point in CPCF, this position is likely to be supported by French CJ, as it is in line 
with the approach his Honour took as a Federal Court judge in Ruddock v Vadarlis. Kiefel, Hayne and 
Bell JJ all found that the executive does not possess any non-statutory powers that would authorise 
detention and removal extraterritorially. The outcome of a future High Court challenge on this point 
could thus be determined by Gageler J; Nettle J, who replaced Crennan J on the High Court bench in 
February 2015; and Justice Michelle Gordon who will replace her husband Hayne J in June 2015. 
7.3 Comparison of Australian and US Case Law 
Although the cases considered very different legal issues, there are some similarities in the approach 
of the majority of the Full Federal Court in Ruddock v Vadarlis, the High Court majority in CPCF and 
the majority of the US Supreme Court in Sale. In all three cases, it was held that the executive had 
broad powers to intercept and deflect asylum seekers attempting to enter their respective jurisdictions 
without authorisation. In the US case of Sale, the interdiction program was explicitly authorised in an 
executive order issued by the President.100 The power to make the executive order came from INA § 
212(f). This confers authority on the President to suspend the entry of any class of aliens, or to 
impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions that the President may deem appropriate. In Ruddock v 
Vadarlis, the government’s authority to carry out the interdiction program was less explicit. The 
majority accepted the government’s claims that its activities were authorised under the executive 
power in s 61 of the Australian Constitution. Moreover, in both cases, the executive power was found 
not to be subject to the constraints of domestic statutory law. Both the INA and the Migration Act 
afforded certain protections for asylum seekers. In both cases, it was found that those protections did 
                                                   
99  CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [150]. 
100  Executive Order No 12,807 (24 May 1992), 57 Fed Reg 23,133 (1 June 1992). 
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not apply to the interdicted asylum seekers.101 By the time the High Court was called upon to 
determine the legality of interdiction activities in CPCF, the Australian government had introduced a 
statutory regime for carrying out such activities. By a narrow majority, the High Court found that the 
interdiction and detention at sea carried out in that case were authorised under this statutory 
framework. The MPA contained certain protections for interdicted persons, the most significant being 
that these people could be disembarked only at a ‘safe’ place.102 As discussed in Chapter Five, the 
Abbott government responded to the challenge to its interdiction activities in CPCF with legislation 
strengthening its interdiction powers under the MPA.103 However, the requirement that a person must 
not be taken to a place which is unsafe remains. No such limitations were read into the executive 
powers to interdict, detain and remove as construed by the US Supreme Court in Sale or by the Full 
Bench of the Australian Federal Court in Ruddock v Vadarlis. 
There are also parallels in the way the US Supreme Court and the Australian Federal and High Court 
dealt with the issue of international law. In all three cases, a majority of the justices indicated that 
nothing in international law constrained the actions of the executive. On this point, the approach taken 
in the Australian cases is more understandable. As discussed, Australia adheres to a dualist system 
of international law where international treaties ratified by the executive do not become binding at a 
domestic level unless translated through Parliament or legislation.104 As Parliament had not directly 
enacted the terms of the Refugee Convention,105 the Court was not called upon to determine the 
compatibility of the government’s actions with the Convention. The only scope for considering 
Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention was in the course of applying the accepted 
principle of statutory construction that ‘a statute is to be interpreted and applied, as far as its language 
permits, so that it is in conformity and not in conflict with the established rules of international law’.106 
However, neither the Federal Court in Ruddock v Vadarlis nor the High Court in CPCF addressed this 
point as the facts before them did not give rise to any non-refoulement considerations. In Ruddock v 
Vadarlis, French J found that ‘nothing done by the Executive on the face of it amounts to a breach of 
Australia’s obligations in respect of non-refoulement under the Convention’.107 This was because the 
rescuees were not being returned to their home countries. Rather, the Australian government had 
concluded agreements with New Zealand and Papua New Guinea to transfer the asylum seekers to 
                                                   
101  Note that in Ruddock v Vadarlis, this question was not dealt with directly as there was no standing to 
bring claims under the Migration Act. 
102  MPA, s 74. 
103  See Chapter Five, nn 111-16 and accompanying text. 
104  See above nn 80-2 and accompany text; and Chapter One, n 59 and accompanying text. 
105  At the time Ruddock v Vadarlis and CPCF were decided, the Migration Act incorporated the Convention 
definition of a refugee into s 36 of the Act (stating ‘a person is qualified for a Protection visa if they are 
one to whom Australia owes obligations under the Convention); the Act did not incorporate the 
remainder of the Convention. The reference to the Refugee Convention in s 36 of the Migration Act was 
removed with the passage of the Migration and Maritime Powers Legislation Amendment (Resolving the 
Asylum Legacy Caseload) Act 2014 (Cth), which came into effect on 18 April 2015. 
106  MIEA v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273, 287, cited in CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [385] (Gageler 
J). 
107  Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491, 545 [203]; Beaumont J echoed a similar sentiment, 
referencing the non-refoulement obligation of the Refugee Convention, but noting that international law 
imposes no obligation to settle those who are rescued: 521 [126]. 
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those countries for the processing of their claims. In CPCF, the challenge related to the legality of 
attempts by Australian officials to take the plaintiff to India and there was no evidence before the 
Court indicating risk of harm or secondary refoulement.108 In this regard, the decision in Sale is of 
greater concern. There, the intercepted asylum seekers faced summary return to Haiti without any 
consideration of their protection needs. Further, the Court assumed that the Convention’s non-
refoulement provisions had the force of law in the US domestic legal system.109 Nevertheless, the 
Court concluded that the actions of the executive were not constrained by the Refugee Convention. 
This was thanks to a somewhat questionable interpretation of the non-refoulement provision as 
having no extraterritorial effect. 
The Full Federal Court in Ruddock v Vadarlis and the High Court in CPCF did not have to directly deal 
with the question of whether the Refugee Convention constrained the power of the executive when 
carrying out interdiction activities. Accordingly, they avoided the question of whether the Convention’s 
non-refoulement obligations had extraterritorial effect. French CJ and Keane J did address the issue 
briefly in CPCF. Their Honours noted that there is judicial authority in Australia, the United Kingdom 
and the United States supporting the proposition that the Convention’s non-refoulement obligation 
only extend to refugees within a state’s territory.110 Sale is the US authority cited by both justices and 
as discussed, that case clearly supports such an interpretation. The Australian and UK cases cited for 
the proposition by the two justices are more problematic. Both French CJ and Keane J refer to 
comments by McHugh and Gummow JJ in MIMIA v Khawar (‘Khawar’) as Australian authority 
supporting the lack of extraterritorial applicability of the Refugee Convention’s non-refoulement 
obligations.111 However, this case did not deal with any issues of extraterritoriality.112 The comments 
relied upon were made in the context of a general introduction to the Refugee Convention. In that 
case McHugh and Gummow JJ stated: 
The term ‘asylum’ does not appear in the main body of the text of the Convention; the Convention does 
not impose an obligation upon Contracting States to grant asylum or a right to settle in those States to 
refugees arriving at their borders. Nor does the Convention specify what constitutes entry into the 
territory of a Contracting State so as to then be in a position to have the benefits conferred by the 
Convention. Rather the protection obligations imposed by the Convention upon Contracting States 
concern the status and civil rights to be afforded to refugees who are within Contracting States.113 
                                                   
108  See CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [13] (French CJ), [470] (Keane J). 
109  US courts have distinguished between ‘self-executing’ treaties and ‘non-self-executing treaties’. 
Whereas the former have automatic domestic effect, the latter must be enacted through implementing 
legislation to have effect domestically. While before the decision in Sale there had been some debate as 
to which provisions, if any, of Refugee Convention were self-executing, the Supreme Court appears to 
have assumed that Article 33 did have domestic legal affect: Sale, 509 US 155, 178 (1993). 
110  CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [10] (French CJ) (note that French CJ does go on to note the 
contrary position put forward by UNHCR in their amicus curiae brief); [461] (Keane J).  
111  (2002) 2010 CLR 1, 15 [42]; CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [10] (French CJ), [461] (Keane J). 
112  Rather, the main issue related to the meaning of the term ‘particular social group’ in the Convention 
definition of the term ‘refugee’ and whether it could encompass victims of domestic violence in certain 
cases. 
113  Khawar (2002) 210 CLR 1, 15 [42] (footnotes omitted). 
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Nothing here indicates that the non-refoulement obligations in Refugee Convention do not apply 
extraterritorially. Rather the claim relates to the absence of an obligation to provide asylum. The 
provision of asylum is qualitatively different to non-refoulement protection. The grant of asylum allows 
a person to stay in the receiving country’s territory. Non-refoulement does not necessarily require this. 
All that is required is that the person is not sent back to a place where they will be subject to certain 
prescribed harms. French CJ also cites Gummow J’s comments in MIMA v Haji Ibrahim (‘Ibrahim’) as 
Australian authority for the fact that the Convention’s non-refoulement obligations have no 
extraterritorial effect. His Honour appears to be relying on Gummow J’s statement that ‘the right of 
asylum is a right of States, not of the individual; no individual, including those seeking asylum, may 
assert a right to enter the territory of a State of which that individual is not a national.’114 An 
interpretation of this statement as indicating a lack of extraterritorial applicability of the Refugee 
Convention’s non-refoulement obligations again misconstrues the distinction between non-
refoulement and the act of granting asylum.  
There are also concerns with French CJ and Keane J’s reference to the House of Lords decision in R 
(European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport as UK authority for the non-
extraterritorial applicability of the Convention’s non-refoulement obligations.115 That case challenged 
the practice of stationing UK immigration officials at Prague Airport to ‘pre-clear’ passengers before 
they boarded flights to the United Kingdom. Lord Bingham of Cornhill delivered the lead judgement on 
the issue of whether this practice was in contravention of the Refugee Convention. The key 
determining factor in finding that the policy in question did not violate the Refugee Convention, was 
that the would-be asylum seekers had not left their country of origin or habitual residence. Hence they 
could not meet the Article 1A definition of a refugee.116 This was a very different situation to what 
occurred in Sale, Vadarlis and CPCF where the asylum seekers were intercepted on the high seas or 
in the contiguous zone of the intercepting state. Lord Bingham does, however, cite a number of 
authorities supporting the view that the non-refoulement obligations of the Refugee Convention do not 
apply extraterritorially. Interestingly, Lord Bingham’s analysis on this point makes repeated references 
to the Australian High Court’s decisions in Khawar and Ibrahim.117 Again, as discussed, these cases 
are not sound authority for the non-extraterritorial applicability of Article 33(2). It appears that in 
CPCF, French CJ and Keane J may have relied on Lord Bingham’s reference to Khawar and Ibrahim, 
when citing these cases as authority for the lack of extraterritorial applicability of Article 33. This 
represents an interesting example of the mischief that can be caused by the use of foreign case law, 
and in particular, foreign interpretations of domestic case law. 
Another interesting parallel between the US and Australian case law relates to the way in which each 
jurisdiction deals with the issue of whether the scope of rights afforded to non-citizens changes based 
                                                   
114  Ibrahim (2000) 204 CLR 1, 45 [137] (footnotes omitted). 
115  R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2005] 2 AC 1, cited in CPCF 
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on whether they are inside or outside the state’s territory. US law has long tied constitutional 
protections to the degree of connection a non-citizen has with the United States. As discussed in 
Chapter Six, the plenary power doctrine provides for differentiated treatment of non-citizens seeking 
entry into the United States and non-citizens who have effectuated entry and are subsequently being 
removed.118 While the former has no constitutional rights, the latter may have limited recourse to such 
protections. Given that even non-citizens physically present in the United States seeking entry cannot 
avail themselves to constitutional protections, it is no surprise that interdicted asylum seekers, who 
are outside US territory, are similarly excluded.  
Australian law on this point is not as clear cut. Three justices directly addressed this issue in CPCF in 
the context of whether the constitutional limitations contained in Lim in regard to the detention of non-
citizens inside Australia should also apply to non-citizens detained outside Australia’s territorial 
boundaries. Keane J appears sympathetic to the US approach, explicitly limiting the applicability of 
the constitutional holding in Lim to non-citizens within Australia.119 Hayne and Bell JJ take a different 
approach stating that while there is 
[n]o doubt the passage quoted from [Lim] focused upon the exercise of power within Australia. This case 
concerns actions taken beyond Australia's borders. But why should some different rule apply there, to 
provide an answer to a claim made in an Australian court which must be determined according to 
Australian law?120 
This is an issue that will no doubt further be explored in future cases dealing with the rights of non-
citizens detained by Australian officials extraterritorially. 
7.4  Conclusion 
All three cases examined in this chapter upheld the validity of the government’s interdiction activities. I 
have argued that the Court’s decision in each case was contingent, in the sense that there were 
compelling arguments to support a ‘rights-protecting’ outcome, over the ‘rights-precluding’ outcome 
ultimately adopted. Despite the fact that Sale was decided by an 8:1 majority, there are some serious 
short-comings in the majority’s legal analysis in that case.121 The decision was met with almost 
universal condemnation from academic commentators for misconstruing the extraterritorial effect of 
both the Refugee Convention and INA. The preponderance of academic opinion supported the 
approach taken in Blackmun J’s dissenting opinion, which construed the non-refoulement obligations 
contained in the Convention and INA as having extraterritorial effect. The decision of the Full Federal 
Court in Vadarlis was by a narrower, 2:1 majority. Again, the majority approach was met with 
widespread academic criticism. In particular, the broad interpretation of the scope of the executive 
power in s 61 of the constitution is seen as having no grounding in precedent. This interpretation was 
                                                   
118  Chapter Six, nn 9-20 and accompanying text. 
119  CPCF [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 2015) [483]. 
120  Ibid [149]. 
121  See above nn 19-31 and accompanying text. 
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rejected by three out of four of the High Court justices who considered this issue in CPCF.122 The 
Court’s decision in that case in relation to the scope of the government’s statutory authority to detain 
interdictees on the high seas was also decided on a narrow 4:3 majority. Further, there was little in the 
way of a clear ratio, with the majority justices diverging on a number of key issues. In Chapter Six, I 
argued that a similar degree of contingency is apparent in the US and Australian case law challenging 
long-term mandatory detention laws. I make a similar argument in relation to the case law on 
extraterritorial processing in Chapter Eight. In Chapter Nine, I turn my attention to potential factors 
that may have influenced the judicial decision making process in the face of such contingency. I then 
examine the implications of my findings for predicting the success or failure of transfers of restrictive 
immigration control measures. 
                                                   
122  See above nn 88-99 and accompanying text. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
EXTRATERRITORAL PROCESSING – THE CASE 
LAW 
In this chapter, I examine the judicial response to extraterritorial processing policies in the United 
States and Australia. In Chapter Five, I examined the history of the use of extraterritorial processing in 
Australia and the United States. I argued that the existence of similar policies in those countries was 
the result of a process of legal and policy transfer. Like the policies of mandatory long-term detention 
and interdiction examined in the previous two chapters, extraterritorial processing policies push the 
boundaries of international, US and Australian law. This has given rise to a rich body of jurisprudence 
examining the legality of extraterritorial processing, and the scope of rights which ought to be afforded 
to asylum seekers subjected to the policy. The existence of this comparative case law provides an 
opportunity to again test my hypothesis relating to the impact of differing legal structures on 
immigration control policies transferred between the United States and Australia. I argue that the 
different legal structures in the two countries have not determined the outcome of leading cases 
challenging these policies. 
The case law on extraterritorial processing measures in the United States and Australia is not as 
directly comparable as the case law relating to long-term mandatory immigration detention and 
interdiction. The cases deal with different issues and legal questions in each jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless, just as in the cases examined in Chapter Six and Seven, the justices in each instance 
had a choice between adopting either a ‘rights-protecting’, or a ‘rights-precluding’ approach. Again, 
the relevant legal principles were ambiguous enough to allow for either approach. In this chapter, I 
examine the junctures at which judges were faced with alternate interpretations that could have led to 
different outcomes.  
8.1  US Case Law 
My analysis begins with an examination of a number of US Federal Court decisions rejecting 
constitutional and statutory claims brought by asylum seekers held at the migrant processing facility in 
Guantanamo Bay.1 I contrast these cases with the more recent US Supreme Court jurisprudence 
upholding certain statutory and constitutional claims brought on behalf of enemy combatants detained 
on the territory.2 I argue that these cases are difficult to reconcile with the earlier case law relating to 
the rights of asylum seekers. I suggest that the change in approach highlights the contingency of both 
the migrant and enemy combatant cases.  
                                                   
1  Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 953 F2d 1498 (11th Cir, 1992); Cuban American Bar Association v 
Christopher, 43 F3d 1412 (11th Cir, 1995). 
2  Rasul v Bush, 542 US 466; Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723 (2008). 
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Guantanamo Bay is a territory nominally owned by Cuba, but controlled by the US government.3 The 
United States first occupied Guantanamo in 1898, during the Spanish-American war, for the purpose 
of establishing a naval base. Its control over the territory was formalised by a lease agreement 
entered into with the Cuban government in 1903. This agreement recognised ‘the continuance of the 
ultimate sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba’. However, it went on to stipulate that the ‘United States 
shall exercise complete jurisdiction and control’ over the territory.4 A subsequent treaty in 1934 
renewed the lease agreement ‘[u]ntil the two contracting parties agree to the modification or 
abrogation of the stipulations’.5 The effect was to give the United States a perpetual lease over 
Guantanamo. The arrangement has given rise to jurisdictional ambiguities in the context of rights 
protection, with the territory described as an ‘anomalous legal zone’,6 and a ‘legal black hole’.7 
8.1.1 Asylum Seekers Detained at Guantanamo Bay and Other Facilities   
In a series of cases decided between 1992 and 1995, a number of US Federal District and Circuit 
Courts dealt with the question of whether the Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers held on 
Guantanamo could claim any rights under the US Constitution or statutory law. All the decisions with 
any precedential value squarely rejected such claims. 
(a) Haitian Refugee Center v Baker (‘Baker’)8  
Baker involved a challenge to the interdiction policy that existed prior to George H W Bush’s 
‘Kennebunkport Order’, under which interdicted Haitians had access to asylum procedures at 
Guantanamo.9 The Haitian Refugee Center (‘HRC’) initiated litigation in the Eleventh Circuit against 
US government officials in an attempt to block the practice of returning ‘screened-out’ Haitians without 
                                                   
3  For a detailed history of the US presence in Guantanamo Bay see, Ernesto Hernández-López, 
'Guantanamo as Subordination: Detainees as Resisting Empire' (2010) 104 Proceedings of the Annual 
Meeting (American Society of International Law) 472 (explaining the establishment and development of 
the base as a manifestation of US imperial ambition); Joseph Sweeney, 'Guantanamo and US Law' 
(2007) 30 Fordham International Law Journal 673; Azadeh Dastyari, Out of Sight, Out of Right?: The 
United States’ Migrant Interdiction Program in International Waters and in Guantánamo Bay (PhD 
Thesis, Monash University, 2013); Amy Kaplan, 'Where is Guantanamo?' (2005) 57 American Quarterly 
831. 
4  Agreement between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba for the Lease to the United 
States of Lands in Cuba for Coaling and Naval Stations, TS No 418 (signed and entered into force 23 
February 1903) (emphasis added). 
5  Treaty between the United States of America and Cuba Defining their Relations, signed 29 May 1934, 
TS No 866 (entered into force 9 June 1934).  
6  Gerald Neuman, ‘Anomalous Zones' (1996) 48 Stanford Law Review 1197, 1201 (defining an 
anomalous zone as ‘a geographical area in which certain legal rules, otherwise regarded as embodying 
fundamental policies of the larger legal system, are locally suspended’); Gerald Neuman, ‘Closing the 
Guantanamo Loophole’ (2004) 50 Loyola Law Review 1 (examining how Guantanamo’s designation as 
an anomalous zone influences the detention of enemy combatants). 
7  See Johan Steyn, 'Guantanamo Bay: The Legal Black Hole' (2004) 53 International and Comparative 
Law Quarterly 1; Ernesto Hernández-López, 'Guantánamo as a "Legal Black Hole": A Base for 
Expanding Space, Markets, and Culture' (2011) 45 University of San Francisco Law Review 141. 
8  953 F2d 1498 (11th Cir, 1992). 
9  See Chapter Five, nn 30-8 and accompanying text. 
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sufficient process. ‘Screened-out’ Haitians were those who, upon initial inspection, were found not to 
possess a credible fear of persecution. 
The relevant constitutional claim asserted was a First Amendment right on the part of attorneys 
seeking to provide pro bono representation to ‘screened-out’ Haitian asylum applicants at 
Guantanamo.10 With little analysis, the Court concluded that Guantanamo was ‘outside the United 
States’ and rejected the argument that aliens located there have extraterritorial constitutional rights.11 
The finding that Haitians outside the United States had no cognisable rights under US law meant that 
it would be ‘nonsensical to find that HRC possesses a right to access to the interdicted Haitians for 
the purpose of advising them of their legal rights’.12 The HRC appealed to the Supreme Court but was 
denied certiorari.13 Thomas J, in concurring with the decision to deny certiorari, expressed deep 
concern about the treatment of Haitians returned to Haiti, but reasoned that the matter should be dealt 
with by the political branches.14 
(b) Haitian Centers Council v McNary (‘McNary’)15  
The McNary litigation involved similar issues raised in the Baker litigation, but concerned ‘screened-in’ 
asylum seekers. ‘Screened-in’ Haitians were those found to possess a credible fear of persecution 
and who were, according to policy, to be brought to the United States to apply for asylum. In March 
1992, the INS had decided that they would no longer transfer ‘screened-in’ Haitians to the United 
States for processing.16 Instead, full asylum interviews would be carried out at Guantanamo. When 
the litigation was initiated, some 3,000 ‘screened-in’ Haitians were being held at Guantanamo.17 A 
challenge was brought on behalf of the Haitian asylum seekers and several Haitian service 
organisations. The asylum seeker plaintiffs asserted a due process right to counsel before being 
returned to persecution, while the Haitian service organisations asserted a reciprocal First 
Amendment right of access to Guantanamo for the purpose of providing legal advice to the Haitian 
detainees. The District Court for the Eastern District of New York granted a preliminary injunction 
based on both the First Amendment and due process claims.18 The Second Circuit affirmed the 
preliminary injunction, finding that there were serious questions going to the merits of the claim that 
Haitian refugees held on Guantanamo were protected by the Due Process Clause.19 The Court found 
                                                   
10  953 F2d 1498, 1503 (11th Cir, 1992). The relevant part of the First Amendment states that ‘Congress 
shall make no law… abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people to 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for redress of grievances’: United States 
Constitution, Amend I. 
11  953 F2d 1498, 1513 (11th Cir, 1992).  
12  Ibid.  
13  Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 502 US 1122 (1992). 
14  Ibid 1123. Blackmun J, in dissent, argued that the issues raised in the case were difficult and 
susceptible to competing interpretations, as evidenced by the different approaches adopted by the four 
federal judges who considered the claims: at 1123. 
15  969 F2d 1326 (2nd Cir, 1992). 
16  McNary, 969 F2d 1326, 1332-3 (2nd Cir, 1992). 
17  Harold Hongju Koh, 'Refugees, the Courts, and the New World Order' (1994) Utah Law Review 999, 
1001. 
18  Preliminary Injunction Order, Haitian Centers Council, No 92-1258 (ED NY granted 6 April 1992). 
19  McNary, 969 F2d 1326 (2nd Cir, 1992). 
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that the Guantanamo Naval Base was under the jurisdiction of the United States, making protections 
of the Due Process Clause applicable to aliens held there.20 The litigation was subsumed by the 
subsequent challenge to the change of policy which saw Haitians interdicted at sea and returned to 
Haiti without any screening procedures.21 This was ultimately resolved by the Supreme Court in the 
Sale v Haitian Centers Council (‘Sale’)22 and the Second Circuit’s injunction was vacated.23 
(c) Haitian Centers Council v Sale (‘Haitian HIV case’)24 
Following Bush’s ‘Kennebunkport Order’ in May 1992, directing the return of all Haitians interdicted on 
the high seas without screening, the McNary litigation was broken up. Sale became the venue for the 
Supreme Court’s consideration of whether Haitian interdictees subject to the ‘Kennebunkport Order’ 
were covered by the non-refoulement provisions of the Refugee Convention25 or § 243(h) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (‘INA’).26 The question of the rights of ‘screened in’ asylum seekers 
still held at Guantanamo was returned to the District Court for consideration and permanent relief. By 
this stage, there were still around 300 Haitian men, women and children held at Guantanamo who 
had been ‘screened in’ as having a ‘credible fear’ of return to Haiti. They had been barred from 
entering the United States because they had tested positive to human immunodeficiency virus (‘HIV’). 
The refugees’ claims were reformulated to focus on the illegality of the HIV detention camp, rather 
than on their original right-to-counsel claim. In a scathing opinion, Judge Sterling Johnson Jr issued a 
permanent injunction, ordering the Guantanamo Haitians immediately released and declaring their 
confinement illegal.27 Johnson J reasoned that the US Naval Base at Guantanamo is ‘subject to the 
exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States where the criminal and civil laws of the United 
States apply’.28 The plaintiffs were held to have constitutional due process rights. These included a 
right to counsel during status determination interviews, access to adequate medical care, and a liberty 
interest in not being arbitrarily or indefinitely detained. For Johnson J, to hold otherwise would be 
unacceptable:  
If the Due Process Clause does not apply to the detainees at Guantanamo, Defendants would have 
discretion deliberately to starve or beat them, to deprive them of medical attention, to return them 
without process to their persecutors, or to discriminate among them based on the color of their skin.29 
                                                   
20  Ibid 1347. 
21  McNary, 969 F2d 1350 (2nd Cir, 1992). 
22  509 US 155 (1993). See Chapter Seven, Part 7.1. 
23  Sale v Haitian Centers Council, 509 US 918 (1993). 
24  823 F Supp 1028 (ED NY, 1993) (‘Haitian HIV case’) (vacated per settlement agreement). The story of 
this litigation is recounted in Brandt Goldstein, Storming the Court: How a Band of Yale Law Students 
Sued the President – and Won (Simon & Schuster, 2005); and Victoria Clawson, Elizabeth Detweiler 
and Laura Ho, 'Litigating as Law Students: An Inside Look at Haitian Centers Council' (1994) 103 Yale 
Law Journal 2337. 
25  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) art 33(1). 
26  Sale, 509 US 155 (1993). See Chapter Seven, Part 7.1. 
27  823 F Supp 1028 (ED NY, 1993). 
28  Ibid 1041 (citations omitted). 
29  Ibid 1042. 
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Further, Johnson J rejected the government’s contention that status determination procedures on 
Guantanamo were undertaken pursuant to executive authority and operated outside the INA. As such, 
the plaintiffs were held to possess the same statutory rights as those processed on the US mainland. 
The government decided to settle, rather than appeal the decision.30 The settlement allowed the 
asylum seekers to enter the United States, but resulted in the District Court decision being vacated.31  
(d)  Cuban American Bar Association v Christopher (‘CABA’)32  
The CABA litigation examined the rights of Haitian and Cuban asylum seekers granted ‘safe haven’ 
status on Guantanamo and US military facilities in Panama pursuant to a new policy introduced by 
President Clinton in July 1994.33 The initial class action was brought on behalf of a group of Cuban 
asylum seekers and Cuban refugee service organisations (‘CRSOs’).34 The plaintiffs claimed that the 
US government was violating both the Cuban refugees’ and the CRSOs’ First and Fifth Amendment 
rights. The CRSOs contended that they had a right to associate with refugee clients at Guantanamo 
and that the Cuban refugees had a correlative right to counsel. The District Court was sympathetic to 
these arguments, and issued a temporary restraining order compelling the government to give 
CRSOs access to their refugee clients on Guantanamo and prohibiting further involuntary repatriation 
of refugee plaintiffs to Cuba prior to reasonable access to their lawyers.35 The Court ruled that the 
government’s complete control and jurisdiction over Guantanamo, effectively made it a US territory. 
Hence asylum seekers detained there could avail themselves of US constitutional protections. The US 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sale was distinguished as the Haitian plaintiffs in that case were 
interdicted by US Coast Guard vessels on the high seas and as such were ‘not already within the 
United States territory, [and] not yet admitted’. Subsequent to its original ruling, the District Court 
provisionally allowed the Haitian Refugee Center to intervene in the case. 
The US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court decision. The Court 
reasoned that jurisdiction and control over Guantanamo were not synonymous with the concept of 
state sovereignty. As the United States did not exercise sovereignty over Guantanamo, asylum 
seekers held there had no legally cognisable rights under the INA or the Refugee Convention. This in 
effect affirmed the Court’s earlier approach to this question in Baker. It also ruled that the CRSOs had 
no First Amendment right of association with the asylum seekers. As the Haitian and Cuban migrants 
had no legal rights under domestic or international law, the legal organisations could not have a right 
                                                   
30  The plaintiff’s agreed to have the trial orders vacated in return for the freedom of the Haitians held at 
Guantanamo, a government decision not to appeal, and a compensatory award of fees and costs 
totalling $643,100. See Haitian Centers Council v Meissner, No 92-1258 (SJ) (ED NY, 22 February 
1994); Koh, 'Refugees, the Courts, and the New World Order', above n 17, 1011. 
31  Ibid. 
32  43 F3d 1412 (11th Cir, 1995).  
33  See Chapter Five, nn 45-52 and accompanying text. 
34 The two CRSO’s involved in the litigation were the Cuban American Bar Association and the Cuban 
Legal Alliance and Due Process, Inc. 
35  Cuban American Bar Association v Christopher, No 94-2183 (SD Fla, 24 October 1994); Order Granting 
Plaintiff’s Emergency Motion for TRO (31 October 1994). 
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of association for the purpose of counselling them. The plaintiffs appealed to the US Supreme Court, 
but the Court denied their petition for writ of certiorari.36 
Accordingly, the only decisions of any precedential value resulting from the asylum seeker litigation in 
the 1990s, Baker and CABA, clearly affirm the proposition that non-citizens held at Guantanamo were 
outside the reach of international law, and US statutory and constitutional protections. 
8.1.2 ‘Enemy Combatants’ Detained at Guantanamo Bay 
Beginning in 2002, some 660 persons captured by US and allied forces in the course of military 
operations against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan were transferred to military prisons in 
Guantanamo. In the aftermath of the events which occurred on 11 September 2001, the US Congress 
passed the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (‘AUMF’). This gave the President the power to 
use all appropriate force against those ‘nations, organizations, or persons (who) planned, authorized, 
committed or aided the terrorist attacks… or harbored such organizations and persons.’37 The AUMF 
was used as the legal basis for the military operations of US and allied forces against the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan in October 2001. The AUMF also authorised the President to detain ‘enemy 
combatants’ engaged in hostilities against the United States.38 An ‘enemy combatant’ was defined as: 
an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are 
engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. This includes any person who 
has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces.39 
During the operations in Afghanistan, hundreds of alleged ‘enemy combatants’ were captured by US 
and Coalition forces. US authorities were faced with the question of where to detain these prisoners. 
Sites in several foreign countries, locations within the United States, other locations within external US 
territories, and the US Naval Station at Guantanamo were considered as options.40 Ultimately, 
Guantanamo was selected for the same reasons that had informed the decision to use it as a location 
to hold interdicted asylum seekers: it was under the complete jurisdiction and control of the US 
government, but purportedly beyond the reach of US courts.41 
In selecting Guantanamo, US authorities relied on legal advice that Federal District Courts would 
likely not have jurisdiction to entertain a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of enemy 
                                                   
36  Cuban American Bar Association v Christopher, 516 US 913 (1995). 
37  Joint Resolution to Authorise the use of United States Armed Forces Against those Responsible for the 
Recent Attacks Launched Against the United States, Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001). 
38  A separate military order of November 2001 authorised the use of Military Tribunals: Military Order of 
November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed Reg 57833 (16 November 2001). 
39  Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of the Navy, ‘Order Establishing 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal’ (7 July 2004) 1.  
40  Daniel McCallum, ‘Why GTMO?’ (unpublished seminar paper, National War College, 2003) 4-5 
<http://www.pegc.us/archive/Authorities/McCallum_why_gtmo.pdf>. 
41  McCallum cites seven factors that were considered by US officials when decided where to detain the 
enemy combatants: 1) Impact on US Foreign Relations; 2) Impact on Domestic Security; 3) Facility 
Security; 4) Facility Size; 5) Remoteness of the Locations; 6) Litigation Risks; and 7) Logistics: Ibid. 
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combatants transferred there.42 In the World War II era case of Johnson v Eisentrager,43 the Supreme 
Court held that federal courts did not have authority to entertain an application for habeas corpus 
relief filed by an enemy alien who had been seized and held outside the territory of the United 
States.44 The relevant question, therefore, was whether Guantanamo was sovereign territory of the 
United States. The legal advice provided to US authorities relied on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in 
CABA to predict that the courts would answer this question in the negative.45  
The right of enemy combatants to habeas corpus relief was the subject of a number of US Supreme 
Court rulings. The outcome of these cases contradicted the advice that federal courts would not have 
jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions brought on behalf of Guantanamo detainees. What 
follows is a brief examination of the two leading Supreme Court cases: Rasul v Bush (‘Rasul’) which 
affirmed a statutory right to habeas corpus for Guantanamo detainees;46 and Boumediene v Bush 
(‘Boumediene’) which held that the US Constitution’s Suspension Clause applied to Guantanamo 
detainees.47  
Rasul dealt with the question of whether US courts had jurisdiction to consider statutory challenges to 
the legality of the detention of enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo.48 The majority of the US 
Supreme Court answered this question in the affirmative.49 Federal statutory habeas corpus 
provisions granted Federal District Courts, ‘within their respective jurisdictions,’ the authority to hear 
applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held ‘in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States’.50 The respondents had argued that these 
legislative provisions did not apply in Guantanamo because of the presumption that congressional 
legislation does not have extraterritorial application, unless such intent is clearly manifested.51 The 
majority of the Court rejected this argument, reasoning that:  
[w]hatever traction the presumption against extraterritoriality might have in other contexts, it certainly 
has no application to the operation of the habeas corpus statute with respect to persons detained within 
‘the territorial jurisdiction’ of the United States … The United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and 
control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control permanently 
if it so chooses.52  
                                                   
42  See Deputy Assistant Attorney Generals Patrick Philbin and John Yoo, ‘Memo 3 - Memorandum for 
William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of Defense: Possible Habeas Jurisdiction over 
Aliens Held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba’ (28 December 2001) reproduced in Karen Greenberg and 
Joshua Dratel (eds), The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 
29; McCallum, above n 40, 6.  
43  339 US 763 (1950). 
44  Ibid 768-78. 
45  Philbin and Yoo, above n 42, 4.  
46  542 US 466 (2004). 
47  533 US 723 (2008). 
48  542 US 466 (2004). 
49  The majority opinion was penned by Stevens J, who was joined by O’Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer, JJ, with Scalia and Thomas JJ and Rehnquist CJ in dissent. 
50  28 USC §§ 2241(a), (c)(3). 
51  Rasul, 542 US 466, 480 (2004). 
52  Ibid 480-1 (references omitted). 
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Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul, Congress introduced statutory amendments that 
purported to strip federal courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo 
detainees.53 In Hamdan v Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court, through a process of statutory interpretation, 
found that these jurisdiction-stripping provisions did not apply to pending cases.54 Congress reacted 
by passing the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (‘MCA’), which clarified that Congress in fact 
intended to remove federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions for pending cases.55  
In Boumediene v Bush, the Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of the jurisdiction-stripping 
provisions of the MCA.56 The Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution states that the 
‘Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.’57 The central question was whether this constitutional 
privilege could be claimed by aliens designated by the government as enemy combatants and held at 
Guantanamo. Relying on the premise that the common law writ ran only in territories over which the 
Crown was sovereign, the government contended that the Suspension Clause afforded the petitioners 
no rights. This was because the United States did not claim sovereignty over the place of detention. In 
effect, the government was making the same arguments accepted in the asylum seeker cases: that 
Guantanamo is outside US territory and as such US constitutional protections do not apply there.58 In 
a narrow 5:4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected this contention.59 While conceding that the US 
government did not exercise de jure sovereignty over Guantanamo, the fact that it exercised complete 
jurisdiction and control meant that it had de facto sovereignty over the territory.60 The Court reasoned 
that this de facto sovereignty was sufficient to extend the application of the Constitution’s Suspension 
Clause to the territory. To hold otherwise would mean that the political branches could surrender 
formal sovereignty over any unincorporated territory to a third country, enter into a lease that grants 
total control back to the United States and ‘govern without legal constraint’.61 
  
                                                   
53  Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, enacted pursuant to the Department of Defense, Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic Influenza Act 
of 2006, Pub L 109-148, 119 Stat 2680; and National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 
2006, Pub L 109-163, 119 Stat 3136, inserting 28 USC § 2241(e)(1). 
54  548 US 557 (2006). 
55  Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub L 109-366, 120 Stat 2600, amending 28 USC § 2241(e) (2006).  
56  533 US 723 (2008). 
57  United States Constitution art 1 § 9 cl 2. 
58  Boumediene, 533 US 723, 753 (2008). 
59  Kennedy J wrote the majority opinion, which Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer JJ joined. Justice 
Scalia wrote the primary dissenting opinion dealing with the characterisation of Guantanamo, in which 
Roberts CJ, and Thomas and Alito JJ joined. Roberts CJ also filed a separate dissenting opinion in 
which Scalia, Thomas and Alito JJ joined.  
60  Boumediene, 533 US 723, 755 (2008). 
61  Ibid 765. 
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8.1.3 Comparing the Guantanamo Asylum and Enemy Combatant Cases 
The asylum cases and the enemy combatant cases differ in the way the courts dealt with the status of 
Guantanamo and the implications for the application of constitutional protections. In Baker, without 
any detailed analysis, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Guantanamo was ‘outside the United 
States’ and rejected the argument that aliens there have extraterritorial constitutional rights.62 When it 
returned to the question two years later in CABA, that Court again found that the complete jurisdiction 
and control exercised by the United States over Guantanamo did not make it ‘functionally equivalent’ 
to land within US territorial borders.63 As such, the Court reasoned that Cuban and Haitian migrants 
held at Guantanamo would only have statutory or constitutional rights if the relevant provisions could 
be construed as operating extraterritorially. Finding no provisions with such application, the Court held 
that the migrants could not claim constitutional or other statutory protections to challenge their 
detention.64 The Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in both Baker and CABA implicitly approved the 
Eleventh Circuit’s classification of Guantanamo as beyond the reach of US statutory and 
constitutional protections.65  
In Boumediene, the majority of the Supreme Court agreed with the government’s position (as well as 
the construction of the judges in Baker and CABA) that Cuba, not the United States, had sovereignty, 
in the technical sense of the term, over Guantanamo.66 However, they reached a different conclusion 
as to the implications of this lack of formal sovereignty. The majority adopted a ‘functional approach’ 
to the reach of the US Constitution. It found the fact that the United States exercised ‘complete 
jurisdiction and control’ over Guantanamo was sufficient to extend constitutional protection to certain 
non-citizens detained there. The Court reached this conclusion by distinguishing between de jure 
sovereignty, which was retained by Cuba, and de facto sovereignty, held by the United States. The 
‘absolute’ and ‘indefinite’67 control exercised by the United States over the territory was more 
important in deciding the scope of the constitutional protection than considerations of ‘legal and 
technical’ sovereignty.  
What explains this change in approach? Christina Frohock argues that CABA can be reconciled with 
Boumediene when one considers the different status of the petitioners in each case.68 In CABA, the 
Eleventh Circuit labelled the Cuban petitioners as ‘migrants’ seeking freedom in the United States 
who were ‘temporarily provided safe haven’.69 This can be contrasted with the more recent Supreme 
Court jurisprudence which conferred US statutory and constitutional rights on Guantanamo detainees. 
There, the plaintiffs were labelled ‘enemy combatants’ forcibly ‘detained' in military prisons. Frohock 
                                                   
62  953 F2d 1498, 1507, 1512 (11th Cir, 1992). 
63  43 F3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir, 1995).  
64  Ibid, 1428-9.  
65  Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 502 US 1122 (1992); Cuban American Bar Association v Christopher, 
516 US 913 (1995). 
66  Boumediene, 533 US 723, 754 (2008). 
67  Ibid 768. 
68  Christina Frohock, '"Brisas Del Mar": Judicial and Political Outcomes of the Cuban Rafter Crisis in 
Guantanamo' (2012) 15 Harvard Latino Law Review 39. 
69  43 F3d 1412, 1417 (11th Cir, 1995) (Birch J). 
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draws parallels with the criminal system, where the more serious the misconduct and resulting 
punishment, the more extensive the substantive and procedural safeguards afforded. However, 
Frohock’s analysis does not consider the Eleventh Circuit’s earlier decision of Baker. In Baker, the 
petitioners arguably had just as much at stake as the enemy combatants. Unlike the Cubans who 
were held in temporary safe haven in CABA, the Haitian and Cuban petitioners in Baker had been 
‘screened-out’ as not engaging the United States’ protection obligations pursuant to rudimentary and 
questionable screening processes.70 They faced the prospect of continued detention at Guantanamo, 
or forced repatriation to their home countries and resulting possible persecution. 
Azadeh Dastyari argues that the divergent approaches taken in the migrant and enemy combatant 
cases are better explained by the different constitutional rights being claimed in each case. Dastyari 
criticises Frohock’s analysis as conflating the right to habeas corpus (claimed in Boumediene) with 
rights under the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution (claimed in CABA). She 
writes: 
[Frohock] does not address whether the Court’s differing treatment of detainees in the ‘war on terror’ 
and the refugee population may have been due to the privileged status the Court gave the writ of 
habeas corpus over rights under the First and Fifth Amendments of the United States Constitution. That 
is, Frohock does not offer enough legal evidence to support her contention that the difference between 
the treatment of enemy combatants and the refugee population is due to their status rather than the 
remedies they sought.71 
Without further guidance from the Supreme Court on this issue, it is difficult to determine the influence 
of the status of the plaintiffs or the different constitutional provisions considered, on the differing 
outcomes in the asylum seeker and enemy combatant cases. In Chapter Nine, I explore an alternate 
explanation, examining the extra-legal or political considerations that may have influenced the 
divergent approaches. 
8.2 Australian Case Law 
The Australian High Court has considered challenges to a number of aspects of Australia’s 
extraterritorial processing policies. In Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (‘Offshore Processing 
Case’), the Court considered the scope of rights to be afforded to asylum seekers processed on the 
Australian offshore territory of Christmas Island.72 In a separate line of cases, the Court has 
considered the power of the government to transfer asylum seekers to the third countries. In Plaintiff 
M70/2011 v MIAC (‘Malaysian Solution Case’), the Court struck down a deal to transfer asylum 
seekers to Malaysia on the ground that conditions in that country did not meet the minimum statutory 
                                                   
70  INS officials were carrying out credible fear determinations based on five minute interviews on Coast 
Guard cutters, conducted in public, at a time when Haitians were physically and mentally exhausted and 
in no condition to answer questions: See Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 789 F Supp 1552, 1577 (SD 
Fla, 1991). 
71  Dastyari, above n 3, 291. 
72  (2010) 243 CLR 319. 
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requirements.73 I argue that this case is difficult to reconcile with earlier Federal Court cases that 
upheld third country transfers to Nauru under the same statutory framework. My analysis of the 
Australian case law concludes with an examination of the High Court’s 2014 decision in Plaintiff 
S156/2013 v MIBP (‘Plaintiff S156’)74 which upheld the legality of third country transfers to Papua 
New Guinea (‘PNG’) pursuant to a new legislative regime introduced in response to the Malaysian 
Solution Case. 
8.2.1 Rights of Detainees on Christmas Island 
In Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth; Plaintiff M69 of 2010 v Commonwealth (‘Offshore 
Processing Case’)75 the Australian High Court considered the attempt by the Australian government to 
create its own version of Guantanamo on the Australian territory of Christmas Island—a place where 
status determination procedures could be carried out without interference from Australian courts. As 
discussed in detail in Chapter Five, the Australian government first introduced an extraterritorial 
processing regime in 2001.76 Legislation was passed to declare certain Australian Islands to be 
‘excised offshore places’.77 The islands in question remained Australian territories, but the intent was 
to create spaces where statutory protections and other aspects of Australian law would not apply. A 
new category of ‘offshore entry person’ (‘OEP’) was created to catch all asylum seekers landing on an 
excised territory without a valid visa or other authority.78 OEPs were barred from making a valid 
application for a Protection visa unless the Minister exercised a personal, non-compellable discretion 
to allow them to do so.79 Those designated as OEPs became liable to be transferred to a ‘declared 
country’—initially Nauru or PNG.80  
In 2011, when the Offshore Processing Case was decided, this legislative framework remained 
unchanged. However, upon coming to office in 2007, the Labor government had decided to stop 
exercising the s 198A power to transfer OEPs to third countries. Instead, asylum seekers interdicted 
at sea were held on Christmas Island pending a decision by the Minister to exercise the non-
delegable, non-compellable discretion under s 46A(2) to allow an application for a Protection visa—
and admission to the Australian mainland. 
A non-statutory system was established to process claims for refugee status made by persons taken 
to Christmas Island. New processes were introduced to allow for Refugee Status Assessment (‘RSA’) 
and Independent Merits Review (‘IMR’) of negative rulings. The government purported that these 
procedures operated outside of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) (‘Migration Act’). The RSA process 
                                                   
73  (2011) 244 CLR 144. 
74  (2014) 309 ALR 29. 
75  (2010) 243 CLR 319. 
76  Chapter Five, Part 5.2.2. 
77  Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth), amending Migration Act 1958 
(Cth) (‘Migration Act’), s 5(1) (definition of ‘migration zone’ and ‘excised offshore place’).  
78  Ibid (definition of ‘offshore entry person’). 
79  Ibid, inserting s 46A Migration Act.  
80  Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth); 
inserting s 198A of Migration Act. 
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allowed an OEP, on request, to be assessed to determine whether he or she was a person with 
respect to whom Australia had protection obligations under the Refugee Convention. The RSA was 
carried out by an officer of the Department of Immigration, while IMR was conducted by reviewers 
employed by a private contractor, Wizard People Pty Ltd. Where an asylum seeker was assessed by 
the officer or independent reviewer to be a refugee, a submission was made recommending that the 
Minister consider exercising the power conferred by s 46A(2) of the Act. This section allowed the 
Minister to lift the statutory bar on applying for a Protection visa, or alternatively, to exercise the 
related non-compellable discretion under s 195A to grant a Protection visa to an OEP held in 
detention. In practice, a recommendation by an RSA or IMR officer to ‘lift the s 46A bar’ was always 
followed by a decision by the Minister to exercise the discretion contained in s 46A(2) and grant a 
Protection visa in accordance with s 195A. 
The effect was the creation of a parallel system of refugee status determination for persons 
processed on Christmas Island. The processes were inferior to those that applied to onshore 
determinations in a number of respects.81 Most importantly for current analysis, as the process 
purported to be non-statutory, the protections of the Migration Act, Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) 
and Australian case law interpreting Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention were seen 
as not being binding on either the RSA officer or independent reviewer. The result was that there was 
purportedly no enforceable criteria in place to ensure claims were ‘assessed in accordance with, or 
even taking into account, Australia’s international protection obligations’.82 Also concerning was the 
fact that the regime operated in a completely discretionary manner. Even when an OEP was found to 
engage Australia’s protection obligations through the RSA or IMR process, the applicant’s access to a 
Protection visa was reliant on the exercise of the Minister’s discretionary power.  
The offshore processing regime operating on Christmas Island was challenged by two Tamil asylum 
seekers, given the codenames M61 and M69. The plaintiffs had arrived by boat and claimed refugee 
status on the basis that they feared persecution from the Sri Lankan army and paramilitary groups, 
due to their alleged support for the Tamil Tigers separatist movement. Their protection claims had 
been rejected at both the RSA and IMR stages. Each plaintiff instituted proceedings in the original 
jurisdiction of the High Court, naming the Commonwealth, the Minister and others as defendants. The 
plaintiffs made two main claims. First, they alleged they were not afforded procedural fairness during 
either the original RSA assessment or the subsequent IMR review. Second, each claimed the 
decision makers who undertook the assessment and the relevant review made errors of law by not 
treating themselves as bound by relevant provisions of the Migration Act and case law interpreting 
these provisions.83 
                                                   
81  For a detailed analysis of these shortcomings, see Michelle Foster and Jason Pobjoy, 'A Failed Case of 
Legal Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Australia’s “Excised” Territory” (2011) 23 
International Journal of Refugee Law 583, 591-9.  
82  Ibid 593. 
83  Plaintiff M69 made a further constitutional claim that s 46A of the Migration Act was invalid as the 
provision had the effect of precluding judicial oversight. This argument was rejected by the court. For 
analysis of this issue, see Mary Crock and Daniel Ghezelbash, 'Due Process and Rule of Law as 
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The government sought to rely on the Full Federal Court decision in Vadarlis in arguing that the RSA 
and IMR regimes were undertaken in exercise of a non-statutory executive power under s 61 of the 
Australian Constitution.84 This power, it was submitted, was a prerogative executive power to inquire. 
While capable of informing the government and shaping the course of executive decisions, the 
exercise of the power did not in itself directly determine rights. As the inquiry was said to neither affect 
legal rights nor interests, there was no obligation to afford procedural fairness in conducting the RSA 
and IMR processes. Nor were the decision makers undertaking the inquiry bound by certain 
provisions of the Migration Act and associated case law. 
The High Court unanimously rejected the government’s characterisation of the power exercised by the 
RSA and IMR decision makers. Instead the Court accepted submissions made by the plaintiffs that 
the power being exercised was statutory, being tied to the Minister’s consideration of whether to 
exercise his discretion under s 46A or s 195A(2) of the Migration Act. The Court found that the 
Minister’s practice and the published policies governing the RSA and IMR processes indicated that 
the Minister had made a decision to tie the non-reviewable, non-compellable discretions conferred by 
ss 46A and 195A to the assessment and review outcomes. 
A key factor in the Court’s reasoning was the fact that the Migration Act required the detention of an 
OEP for the duration of RSA and IMR processes.85 The Court expressed a reluctance to accept that a 
statutory power to detain a person could permit the continuation of that detention at the unconstrained 
discretion of the executive.86 Such detention, the Court found, could only be lawful if the relevant 
assessment and review had some sort of statutory footing.  
The Court held that RSA and IMR determinations had to be carried out in accordance with the 
Migration Act. The relevant inquiries were made pursuant to the power to lift the bar under s 46A and 
permit a claimant to make a valid claim for a Protection visa. The Court determined that the 
[e]xercise of that power on the footing that Australia owed protection obligations to the plaintiff would be 
pointless unless the determination was made according to the criteria and principles identified in the 
Migration Act, as construed by the courts of Australia.87 
It followed that the reviewer had made an error of law by treating the Migration Act and decided cases 
as no more than guides to decision making. The decision did not strike down any aspect of the 
scheme for processing OEPs. Rather, the impact of the decision was to overturn one of the 
fundamental assumptions underlying the scheme. Whereas the government believed its assessment 
process was ‘non-statutory’ and thus unreviewable, the Court found that the process was in fact 
statutory and as such decisions could be reviewed by the courts for compliance with relevant statutory 
provisions and on procedural fairness grounds. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Human Rights: The Court and the "Offshore" Processing of Asylum Seekers' (2011) 18 Australian 
Journal of Administrative Law 101, 110-11. 
84  This case is examined in Chapter Seven, Part 7.2.1. 
85  See Migration Act, s 189. 
86  Offshore Processing Case (2010) 243 CLR 319, 348 [63]-[64]. 
87  Ibid 356 [88]. 
 181 
 
The fact that the decision in the Offshore Processing Case was delivered as a single unanimous 
judgment by the High Court may give the impression that the case involved an uncontroversial 
application of the relevant legal rules and precedent, and that the outcome was not contingent in the 
same way as some of the other decisions examined in this study. However, the decision appears to 
diverge from previous High Court jurisprudence in its analysis of two key issues. First, the Court’s 
attitude appears to have shifted in regard to the significance placed on a ‘non-citizen’s liberty interest’ 
when determining the scope of the rights that they should be afforded.88 The decision to link the right 
to procedural fairness with the plaintiff’s continued detention rested on a view that ‘[i]t is not readily to 
be supposed that a statutory power to detain a person permits continuation of that detention at the 
unconstrained discretion of the Executive.’89 However, as Rayner Thwaites has noted, such a view as 
to the undesirability of unconstrained discretionary executive detention generates a dissonances with 
the majority reasoning in Al-Kateb: 
In the Offshore Processing Case, the High Court lambasted the idea that a person can continue in 
detention ‘at the unconstrained discretion of the executive’. There were two components to this 
characterisation of the government’s position by the Court in the Offshore Processing Case: the means 
of obtaining release were completely within the control of the executive; and no predictions could be 
made as to whether, or when, those means would be utilised by the government. These components 
also served to characterise the power of detention pending removal given legal sanction in Al-Kateb. 
There is the distinction that, in Al-Kateb, the ability to effect a detainee’s removal from Australia is not 
‘wholly within the control of the [Australian] executive’. It is dependent on the cooperation of foreign 
governments. But in a situation where the Australian government cannot effect removal, Al-Kateb 
illustrated that the detainee may be entirely dependent on the government to obtain release. Absent 
removal, Al-Kateb means that any remaining prospect of the detainees’ release is ‘wholly within the 
control of the executive’.90 
Second, the reasoning of the Court appears to represent a shift in approach to the relevance of 
international law to the statutory construction of the Migration Act. In the Offshore Processing Case, 
the Court stated:  
read as a whole, the Migration Act contains an elaborated and interconnected set of statutory provisions 
directed to the purpose of responding to the international obligations which Australia has undertaken in 
the Refugees Convention and the Refugees Protocol.91 
This is a clear departure from earlier case law which had drawn a much more limited link between the 
Migration Act and the Refugee Convention. For example, in MIMIA v QAAH, the Court expressed the 
view that the Migration Act should not be construed as an attempt to implement the entirety of the 
Refugee Convention into Australian law.92 The Court noted that only s 36 of the Migration Act related 
                                                   
88  Rayner Thwaites, The Liberty of Non-Citizens: Indefinite Detention in Commonwealth Countries (Hart, 
2014) 119. 
89  Offshore Processing Case (2010) 243 CLR 319, 348 [64]. 
90  Thwaites, above n 88, 107 (footnotes omitted). 
91  (2010) 243 CLR 319, 339 [27]. 
92  (2006) 231 CLR 1. 
 182 
 
to the Refugee Convention, and then only to use its article 1 definition of ‘refugee’.93 As such, the 
Court was able to uphold the lawfulness of the Temporary Protection visa program operating at that 
time, despite concerns about the regime’s compatibility with the Refugee Convention. Gummow ACJ, 
Callinan, Heydon, and Crennan JJ stated that ‘it is the law of Australia which prevails in case of any 
conflict between it and the [Refugee] Convention. It is the law of Australia which must first be 
identified’.94 
8.2.2 Power to Transfer Asylum Seekers to a Third Country 
A separate line of cases in Australia have targeted another aspect of the extraterritorial processing 
regime: the government’s statutory power to transfer asylum seekers to third countries. As discussed 
above, one of the features of the legislative regime implemented in the aftermath of the Tampa 
incident was s 198A of the Migration Act that enabled the transfer of OEPs to a ‘declared’ country. 
Section 198A(3)(a) set out the conditions necessary to designate a ‘declared’ country: 
 The Minister may declare in writing that a specified country: 
(i) provides access, for persons seeking asylum, to effective procedures for assessing their need 
for protection; and  
(ii) provides protection for persons seeking asylum, pending determination of their refugee status; 
and 
(iii) provides protection to persons who are given refugee status, pending their voluntary 
repatriation to their country of origin or resettlement in another country, and  
(iv) meets relevant human rights standards in providing that protection.95  
A declaration made by the Minister under this section triggered a corresponding power of removal 
under s 198A(1) of the Migration Act. That power authorised the Department to remove an OEP to a 
country which is the subject of the declaration. 
The Australian government has sought to rely on s 198A to transfer OEPs to third countries during 
two separate periods. Between 2001 and 2007, OEPs were transferred to Nauru and PNG as part of 
the Pacific Solution. The Labor government abandoned this policy shortly after being elected in 2007, 
utilising the Australian territory of Christmas Island as the primary location for the processing of 
OEPs.96 The government reverted back to a policy platform of transferring OEPs to third countries in 
2011, with the announcement that it planned to send OEPs to Malaysia.97  
                                                   
93  Ibid 14 [34]. 
94  Ibid. It is a well-established principle in Australian law that statute law takes precedent over international 
law. See, for example, Polites v The Commonwealth (1945) 70 CLR 60, 69 (Latham CJ stating that 
‘courts are bound by the statute law of their country, even if the law should violate a rule of international 
law’). 
95  Note that this provision was repealed by the Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing 
and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth), which amending the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) by replacing s 198A 
with a new s 198AA. See below nn 132-7 and accompanying text. 
96  See above nn 80-1 and accompanying text; Chapter Five, nn 86-88 and accompanying text. 
97  See Chapter Five, nn 92-9 and accompanying text.  
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The offshore transfers of OEPs carried out between 2001 and 2007 were made pursuant to 
declarations made by the Minister under s 198A(3)(a) that Nauru and PNG satisfied the relevant 
protections set out in that section. A similar declaration was made pursuant to s 198A(3)(a) in regard 
to Malaysia in 2011. The validity of the 2001 declaration in relation to Nauru was upheld in a line of 
cases initiated in 2002.98 The High Court determined that the declaration in relation to Malaysia was 
invalid in Plaintiff M70/2011 v MIAC (‘Malaysian Solution Case’).99 I argue that the divergent outcomes 
were not due to differing objective assessments of the protections available in Nauru and Malaysia. 
Rather the decisions turned on different approaches to the question of whether courts could review 
the Minister’s decision to designate a country. Following the Malaysian Solution Case, the Rudd 
government replaced s 198A with new legislative provisions that sought to remove the safeguards 
that were relied upon to strike down the declaration in that case. In 2014, the Australian High Court 
upheld the validity of a declaration made in respect of PNG under these new provisions in Plaintiff 
S156/2013 v MIBP (‘Plaintiff S156’).100 
(a) Challenging the Designation of Nauru under s 198A 
The validity of the Minister’s 2001 declaration in respect of Nauru was challenged in a line of cases 
brought on behalf of a young Afghani asylum seeker, Ali Reza Sadiqi. Mr Sadiqi had attempted to 
enter Australia by boat shortly after the new extraterritorial processing regime was introduced in 2001. 
The boat he travelled on had caught fire and sunk subsequent to its interception by Australian 
Customs. Two passengers had died in the incident. Mr Sadiqi was initially transferred to Nauru 
pursuant to s 198A. His legal challenge only came about when he was brought back to Australia in 
2002 to testify at a coronial inquest.  
Mr Sadiqi claimed that the Minister’s decision to remove him to Nauru in 2001 was unlawful and that 
any attempt to transfer him there again would be similarly unlawful. The litigation involved a number of 
complex claims which are beyond the scope of analysis here.101 These included an argument about 
the constitutional validity of s 198A; allegations that the Minister had breached the Immigration 
(Guardianship of Children) (‘IGOC') Act 1946 (Cth); a series of claims about the lawfulness of his 
detention; misfeasance of the Minister’s public office; and claims for compensatory aggravated and 
exemplary damages.102 Here, I focus only on the arguments raised in relation to the validity of the 
Minister’s declaration in regard to Nauru. These arguments turned on the proper construction of the 
criteria for making that declaration set out in s 198A(3)(a). The government had contended that all 
                                                   
98  See below n 101. 
99  (2011) 244 CLR 144. 
100  (2014) 309 ALR 29. 
101  The litigation spanned more than eight years and was comprised of the following cases: WAJC v MIMIA 
[2002] FCA 1631 (claim for interlocutory relief); P1/2003 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1029 (claim for further 
interlocutory relief); P1/2003 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1370 (application for an extension of motion in which 
to file and serve a notice of appeal); Plaintiff P1/2003 v Ruddock (2007) 157 FCR 518 (application by 
plaintiff to amend statement of claims); Sadiqi v Commonwealth [2008] FCA 1262 (relating to discovery); 
Sadiqi v Commonwealth (No 2) (2009) 181 FCR 1 (determination of preliminary legal questions); Sadiqi 
v Commonwealth (No 3) [2010] FCA 596 (determination of substantive claim). 
102  For analysis of the IGOC argument, see Mary Crock and Mary Anne Kenny, 'Rethinking the 
Guardianship of Refugee Children after the Malaysian Solution' (2012) 34 Sydney Law Review 437. 
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that was required for the valid exercise of the power was that the Minister ‘declare in writing’ that a 
specified country meets the four identified criteria.103 On this reading, the objective existence of any 
facts relating to those criteria was not required as a precondition for the exercise of this power.  
Mr Sadiqi’s counsel proposed an alternate interpretation of s 198A(3)(a) as constituting jurisdictional 
facts, such that proof of their existence was essential to the valid exercise of the jurisdiction conferred 
by s 198A upon the Minister. Put simply, a declaration would be invalid if made in respect of a country 
that did not objectively meet the criteria enumerated in s 198A(3)(a).104 Mr Sadiqi’s counsel argued 
that upon such a reading, the declaration in respect to Nauru was invalid, as Nauru was not a party to 
the Refugee Convention and did not meet any of the requirements in s 198A(3)(a).  
All three Federal Court judges who addressed this question at various stages of the litigation, rejected 
the argument that the criteria of s 198A(3)(a) should be construed as constituting jurisdictional facts. 
French J was the first to consider the question in the course of his determination of the plaintiff’s claim 
for an injunction prohibiting the government from removing Mr Sadiqi from Australia while his litigation 
was pending. French J found that there was no seriously arguable case and refused to grant the 
injunction. On the issue of the construction of s 198A(3), his Honour reasoned: 
The form of that subsection does not in its terms condition the power to make a declaration upon 
satisfaction of the standards which are its subject matter. The form of the section suggests a legislative 
intention that the subject matter of the declaration is for ministerial judgment. It does not appear to 
provide a basis upon which a court could determine whether the standards to which it refers are met. 
Their very character is evaluative and polycentric and not readily amenable to judicial review. That is not 
to say that such a declaration might not be valid if a case of bad faith or jurisdictional error could be 
made out. In my opinion however, the argument against the validity of the declaration face a significant 
threshold difficulty. It does not support the view that there is a seriously arguable case… [T]he case 
against validity [of the declaration] is, at this stage, so insubstantial that it would not justify making an 
order to restrain the removal of the plaintiff from Australia.105 
Nicholson J cited French J’s reasoning on this point with approval in his subsequent decision not to 
allow an application by Mr Sadiqi for an extension of time to file and serve a notice of appeal.106 
McKerracher J determined the question in a similar manner, siding squarely with the government: 
the criteria contained in s 198A(3) are not criteria which admit of answers by reference to indisputable 
fact ... Debates even about what evidence may be relevant in order to prove the existence or absence of 
such criteria would be substantial. It is improbable that Parliament would have intended that Australian 
courts should without clear legislative imprimatur make judgments with public effect about whether other 
countries meet relevant human rights standards. The criteria in s 198A(3)(a), in my view, are iconically 
the province of the Executive... The broad ranging and subjective nature of the considerations involved 
                                                   
103  Sadiqi (No 2) (2009) 181 FCR 1, 47 [218]. 
104  Ibid 46 [215]. 
105  P1/2003 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1029, [49]-[50]. 
106  [2003] FCA 1370, [14]. However, note that in Plaintiff P1/2003 v Ruddock (2007) 157 FCR 518, 537 
[70], which considered an application by Mr Sadiqi to amend the statement of claim, Nicholson J states 
that the argument that criteria in s 198A(3) are jurisdictional facts is ‘arguable’.  
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in the criteria and the fact that opinions for and against could be so varied make it clear that the criteria 
do not set out straightforward objective standards.107 
It is important to note this litigation did not make it beyond the Federal Court. Neither the validity of the 
declaration in respect of Nauru, nor any other aspects of the third country processing arrangements 
during the Pacific Solution, were considered by the Australian High Court. 
(b) Challenging the Designation of Malaysia under s 198A 
It was not until 2011 that the High Court was called upon to consider the validity of a ministerial 
declaration made under s 198A. The Malaysian Solution Case108 was a challenge to a declaration 
made under s 198A in respect of Malaysia.109 This declaration had been issued by the Minister shortly 
after the government entered into an ‘arrangement’ with Malaysia that involved sending 800 OEPs to 
that country in exchange for Australia resettling 4,000 refugees from Malaysia (‘Malaysia 
Arrangement’).110  
A challenge was brought on behalf of two asylum seekers from Afghanistan who were part of the first 
cohort of OEPs scheduled to be transferred to Malaysia. The plaintiffs sought an injunction against 
their removal from Australia. Their argument focused on the fact that there were no binding 
international or domestic legal protections for asylum seekers or refugees in Malaysia. The absence 
of such protections, it was argued, meant that the criteria in s 198A(3) were not met. As a result, the 
Minister’s declaration under that section was outside the power conferred on the Minister by the Act, 
and thus invalid.  
The main legal issue considered by the Court, was the same question of statutory construction 
considered in the Sadiqi litigation: what was the relationship between the objective existence of the 
criteria set out in s 198A(3)(a) and the Minister’s power to issue a declaration. The plaintiffs argued 
two alternative constructions of the provisions. First, they made the same argument put forward by Mr 
Sadiqi’s counsel a decade earlier, contending that the criteria in s 198A(3)(a) constituted ‘jurisdictional 
facts’ for the exercise of the power to make the declaration. On this construction, the Court had the 
power to find the declaration invalid if the criteria were not, as a matter of fact, satisfied.111 In the 
alternative, the plaintiffs put forward a new argument that as a minimum, s 198A(3) required the 
Minister to be satisfied of the s 198A(3) criteria, and that whether the Minister had properly reached a 
state of satisfaction was also judicially reviewable by reference to jurisdictional error.112  
                                                   
107  Sadiqi (No 2) (2009) 181 FCR 1, 49 [223]-[225] (McKerracher J) (although note that these comments 
are obiter as his Honour rejected the claim on other grounds: at 46 [214]). 
108  (2011) 244 CLR 144. 
109  Chris Bowen, Minister for Immigration, Instrument of Declaration of Malaysia as a Declared Country 
under Subsection 198A(3) of the Migration Act 1958, F2011L01685, 25 July 2011.  
110  Arrangement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Malaysia on Transfer and 
Resettlement, signed 25 July 2011. For discussion of the details and motivations behind the 
arrangement, see Chapter Five, nn 92-9 and accompanying text. 
111  Malaysian Solution Case (2011) 244 CLR 144, 193 [105]. 
112  Ibid 194 [107]. 
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The government’s submissions were essentially the same as those accepted by the Federal Court in 
the Sadiqi litigation—namely that the objective fulfillment of the criteria in s 198A(3) was not a 
prerequisite for the exercise of the Minister’s power. All that was required, it was contended, was that 
the power be ‘exercised in good faith and within the scope and for the purpose of the statute.’113 The 
government’s submission on this point cited the Sadiqi litigation as authority for their position.114 The 
outcome of the Sadiqi litigation also appears to have played an important role in shaping the legal 
advice given to the government by the Solicitor-General, which stated that the proposed ‘Malaysian 
Solution’ would withstand judicial scrutiny.115 
The majority of the High Court rejected the government’s submissions and in doing so took a different 
approach to that taken by the Federal Court judges who considered the issue in the Sadiqi litigation. 
Five of the seven judges determined that the objective satisfaction of the criteria set out in s 
198A(3)(a) were jurisdictional facts.116 In a joint judgment, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ 
reasoned that to determine otherwise would ‘pay insufficient regard to [s 198A(3)(a)’s] text, context 
and evident purpose’.117 In reaching this conclusion, the joint judgment affirmed the position taken in 
the Offshore Processing Case as to the relevance of the Refugee Convention in establishing the 
context and purpose of the Migration Act.118 The majority reasoned that safeguards included in s 
198A(3)(a) ‘are to be seen as reflecting a legislative intention to adhere to the understanding of 
Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention and Refugees Protocol that informed other 
provisions made by the Act.’119 Kiefel J concurred with the joint judgment’s finding on this point.120 
In a separate judgment, French CJ (who was involved in the Sadiqi litigation in his previous role as 
Federal Court judge) rejected the notion that the objective fulfillment of the criteria in s 198A(3)(a) 
were ‘jurisdictional facts’.121 His Honour, however, accepted the alternate construction put forward by 
the plaintiffs: namely that the Minister must be satisfied of the s 198A(3)(a) criteria, and that whether 
the Minister had properly reached a state of satisfaction was a jurisdictional fact. This conclusion was 
not technically at odds with his decision in the Sadiqi litigation. There he had rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that the objective fulfillment of the criteria in s 198A(3)(a) were jurisdictional facts. However, 
                                                   
113  Ibid 194 [108]. 
114  See MIAC, ‘Submissions of the Defendants’, Submission in the Malaysian Solution Case, 18 August 
2011, [66]–[67]. 
115  See Crock and Kenny, above n 102, 456 (quoting Minister Bowen’s statement made on 8 August 2011 
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116  Malaysian Solution Case (2011) 244 CLR 144, 194 [109] (Gummow Hayne Crennan and Bell JJ); 236 
[255]-[256] (Kiefel J). 
117  Ibid 194 [109]. 
118 See above n 91 and accompanying text. 
119  Malaysian Solution Case (2011) 244 CLR 144, 160 [10], quoting the Offshore Processing Case (2010) 
243 CLR 319, 341 [34]. 
120  Ibid 223 [212]. 
121  Ibid 180-1 [59]. 
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he had left open the possibility that a declaration might be invalid in the case of bad faith or 
jurisdictional error.122  
All six of the concurring judges concluded that, for the criteria in s 198A(3)(a) to be met, the 
protections contained in that section must exist as a matter of law.123 For the majority, the agreed fact 
that no such legal protections existed in Malaysia under domestic or international law meant that the 
relevant jurisdictional facts under s 198A(3)(a) were not met. As such the Minister’s declaration was 
invalid.124 For French CJ, the Minister’s failure to consider whether such legal protections existed 
meant that a jurisdictional error had occurred.125 
Heydon J, in dissent, was the only justice to refer directly to the Sadiqi litigation.126 He cited with 
approval the separate pronouncements by the three Federal Court judges that the subjective nature 
of the criteria set out in s 198A, evidences a legislative intention that the subject matter of the 
declaration is for ministerial satisfaction.127 Heydon J cautioned against adopting a different approach 
to the Federal Court: 
The largest single part of the Federal Court of Australia’s work is migration law. It has incomparably 
greater experience in migration law than this Court. These pronouncements in the Federal Court of 
Australia suggest that questions as to whether the conditions actually exist are not apt for resolution by 
a process of adjudication and are not thrown up by s 198A(3)(a).128 
For Heydon J, all that was required for a valid declaration was that the Minister consider the criteria in 
s 198A(3)(a) and assert that they exist as a matter of fact. His Honour construed the criteria as 
requiring practical protections and not legal obligations.129 The consideration by the Minister of the 
practical protections enshrined in the Malaysia Arrangement and its Operational Guidelines,130 was 
sufficient to form the basis of a valid declaration under s 198A(3).131 
(c) The New Statutory Provisions and the Challenge to the Designation of PNG 
Following the High Court’s decision in the Malaysian Solution Case, the Rudd government introduced 
a new legislative framework for transferring asylum seekers arriving by boat without authorisation to 
third countries.132 Section 198A of the Migration Act was replaced by a new subdivision titled 
                                                   
122  P1/2003 v MIMIA [2003] FCA 1029, [49]. 
123  Malaysian Solution Case (2011) 244 CLR 144, 195 [116] (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell JJ); 182-
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131  Malaysian Solution Case (2011) 244 CLR 144, 208-9 [162]. 
132  See Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth). 
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‘Regional Processing’.133 The statement of intent included in that subdivision made it clear that the 
purpose of the changes was to side-step the High Court’s decision in the Malaysian Solution Case: 
(i) people smuggling, and its undesirable consequences including the resulting loss of life at sea, are 
major regional problems which need to be addressed; 
(ii) offshore entry persons, including offshore entry persons in respect of whom Australia has or may 
have protection obligations under the Refugees Convention as amended by the Refugee Protocol, 
should be able to be taken to any country designated to be a regional processing country; 
(iii) it is a matter for the Minister and Parliament to decide which countries should be designated as 
regional processing countries; and 
(iv) the designation of a country to be a regional processing country need not be determined by 
reference to the international obligations or domestic law of that country.134 
The subdivision included s 198AB that set out a new process by which the Minister can issue a 
legislative instrument designating a country as a ‘regional processing country’. The only express 
condition for the exercise of this power is that ‘the Minister thinks that it is in the national interest’.135 In 
considering the national interest, the Minister is to take into account whether there are assurances in 
place that persons transferred to that country will not be subject to refoulement; and whether the 
country has processes in place to carry out refugee status determinations.136 Such assurances need 
not be legally binding.137 
Plaintiff S156 concerned a challenge to the designation of PNG as a ‘regional processing country’ 
under the new legislative framework outlined above.138 The plaintiff was an Iranian asylum seeker 
who had been transferred to Manus Island in PNG. He sought to challenge the Minister’s designation 
on both constitutional and statutory grounds. The High Court dismissed the challenge in a short 
unanimous judgement. 
The constitutional argument was that the new statutory framework for third country transfer was 
invalid as it was not supported by the aliens power139 or any other of the Commonwealth 
government’s legislative heads of power.140 The plaintiff acknowledged that legislation excluding or 
deporting non-citizens falls under the aliens power.141 However, it was claimed that the regional 
processing regime goes much further than this by imposing subsequent control, including detention, 
over the non-citizen in a regional processing country for purposes unconnected to the determination 
of status or entry under Australian law. 
                                                   
133  Migration Act, div 8, subdiv B, inserted by Migration Legislation Amendment (Regional Processing and 
Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth). 
134  Migration Act, s 198AA. This intent was also confirmed in the Revised Explanatory Memorandum to the 
Migration Amendment (Regional Processing and Other Measures Act 2012 (Cth). 
135  Migration Act, s 198AB(2). 
136  Ibid s 198AB(3)(a). 
137  Ibid s 198AB(4). 
138  (2014) 309 ALR 29. 
139  Australian Constitution, s 51(xix). 
140  In particular, the immigration power (s 51(xxvii)) or the external affairs power (s 51(xxix)). 
141  Plaintiff S156 (2014) 309 ALR 29, 35 [26]. 
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The plaintiff sought to rely on the High Court’s decision in Chu Kheng Lim v MILGEA (‘Lim’) as 
imposing a ‘proportionality’ test when determining whether a law is authorised under the aliens 
power.142 Reference was made to Gaudron J’s comments that laws ‘imposing special obligations or 
special disabilities on aliens… which are unconnected with their entitlement to remain in Australia and 
which are not appropriate and adapted to regulating entry or facilitating departure’ are not supported 
by the aliens power.143 Reference was also made to comments of the majority in Lim about the limits 
placed on executive detention by the exclusive nature of the judicial power in Chapter III of the 
Australian Constitution. Specifically, the plaintiff sought to rely on the majority’s finding that laws 
authorising executive detention would be valid only if incarceration could be seen as ‘reasonably 
capable of being seen as necessary for the purposes of deportation or… an application for an entry 
permit to be made and considered’.144 The High Court rejected the relevance of these proportionality 
considerations by construing the relevant provisions as dealing only with removal, a purpose clearly 
authorised by the aliens power. The legislation made no provisions for control beyond deportation. As 
such, any detention imposed on the non-citizen after removal was not relevant to determining 
constitutional validity of the removal provisions.145  
In the alternative to the constitutional argument, the plaintiff challenged the validity of the Minister’s 
declaration of PNG as a ‘regional processing country’ on the grounds that the Minister had failed to 
take into account a number of relevant considerations. Section 198AB stated that the Minister ‘must’ 
only consider Australia’s national interest when deciding whether to designate a country. However, 
the plaintiff argued that other mandatory considerations could be implied. These included the potential 
breach of Australia’s international law obligations; the potential for arbitrary and indefinite detention; 
and the capacity of PNG to implement its international legal obligations. In support of such a 
construction, the plaintiffs cited the pronouncement in the Offshore Processing Case—affirmed in the 
Malaysian Solution Case—that the Migration Act, read as a whole, contains an ‘elaborated and 
interconnected set of statutory provisions directed to the purpose of responding to the international 
obligations which Australia has undertaken in the Refugees Convention and Refugees Protocol.’146 
The Court rejected this argument out of hand. The justices pointed to the unambiguous language of 
the Act.147 They ruled that in exercising discretion, the Minister is obliged only to consider the matters 
listed in s 198AB(3)(a). In reaching this conclusion, the Court appears to have retreated from the 
statements made in respect to the relevance of the Refugee Convention to construing the Migration 
Act in the Offshore Processing and Malaysian Solution Cases. It acknowledged that ‘[t]here may be 
some doubt’ whether the new legislative framework for third country transfers, which was introduced 
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after those cases, ‘can be said to respond to Australia’s obligations under the Refugees 
Convention.’148 
The case is significant for current purposes because it illustrates that some judicial decisions relating 
to the rights of non-citizens are more predictable than others. The clarity of the legal principles at play 
in Plaintiff S156 made it difficult for the judges in that case to reasonably adopt a ‘rights-protecting’ 
approach. On the constitutional question, the provisions authorising third country transfer clearly fell 
under the aliens power, as they did not authorise anything more than removal of non-citizens who had 
no right to remain in Australia. On the statutory interpretation question, the legislature had used the 
High Court’s reasoning in the Malaysian Solution Case as a blueprint for drafting new legislative 
provisions that placed the offshore processing regime beyond judicial scrutiny. Parliament had gone 
to great lengths to express its intent to limit the considerations that the Minister must take into account 
when designating a country to only those expressly enumerated in s 198AB(3)(a). In the face of such 
clear legislative intent, the presumption that the legislative purpose behind the Migration Act was to 
implement Australia’s obligations under the Refugee Convention was clearly rebutted and could not 
be relied upon to reach a ‘rights-protecting’ interpretation of the relevant legislative provisions. The 
case also demonstrates the precarious status of ‘rights-protecting’ judicial decisions based on 
statutory interpretation, highlighting the fact that the protections afforded by such decisions can be 
overturned by the legislature with clear words of necessary intendment.  
8.3 Comparison of the US and Australian Case Law 
The case law on extraterritorial processing in the United States and Australia has dealt with very 
different legal issues. The litigation in the United States dealt primarily with a constitutional question: 
namely, whether asylum seekers held on the territory of Guantanamo could avail themselves of 
constitutional protections. A series of cases heard in the early 1990s determined this question in the 
negative. In Baker, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit rejected a First Amendment claim to 
legal counsel brought on behalf of Haitians screened-out on Guantanamo and facing repatriation to 
Haiti. In CABA, the same court determined that asylum seekers held in ‘safe haven’ at Guantanamo 
and other extraterritorial facilities were not entitled to First Amendment rights to legal counsel, or Fifth 
Amendment due process rights. In both cases, the decisions were based on a view that Guantanamo 
was ‘outside the United States’ and that aliens did not have extraterritorial constitutional rights. The 
contingency of this outcome is apparent when one considers the litigation concerning enemy 
combatants held at Guantanamo. In Boumediene, the Supreme Court determined that an enemy 
combatant detained at Guantanamo was entitled to the protection of the Constitution’s Habeas 
Suspension Clause. In reaching this conclusion, the Court adopted a different approach to construing 
the status of Guantanamo and the impact of this status on the question of whether constitutional 
rights extended there. Adopting a functional approach to the reach of the US Constitution, the majority 
in that case viewed the fact that the United States had complete jurisdiction and control over 
Guantanamo as sufficient for some constitutional protections to apply there. Boumediene dealt with 
                                                   
148  Ibid 39 [44]. 
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the Habeas Suspension Clause, rather than First and Fifth Amendment rights considered in Baker 
and CABA. Nevertheless, the case appears to signify a shift in approach to construing the reach of 
constitutional protections to non-citizens in Guantanamo. 
In contrast to the constitutional focus of the US litigation, the Australian cases challenging 
extraterritorial processing measures generally turned on narrow questions of statutory interpretation. 
The Offshore Processing Case dealt with the attempt made by the Australian government to create a 
Guantanamo-like zone on Christmas Island, where the domestic legal framework for status 
determination was said not to apply. The legal and factual issues considered in that case were very 
different to those considered in the US context. Christmas Island was clearly Australian sovereign 
territory and the reach of Australian constitutional protections there was never contested. The case 
turned upon the reach of the statutory provisions contained in the Migration Act. The Court rejected 
the government’s attempt to characterise refugee status determinations carried out on Christmas 
Island as a discretionary non-statutory process. Rather, the Court found that the power being 
exercised was a statutory one, and accordingly, the criteria applied in the process should be informed 
by relevant provisions of the Migration Act. The Court also construed the rights at stake in a way that 
gave rise to a duty of procedural fairness. Although the judgment was a unanimous one, it was by no 
means an obvious outcome. The Court’s decision hinged on contestable assumptions relating to the 
relationship between the Migration Act and the Refugee Convention, as well as a view as to the 
undesirability of unconstrained executive discretionary detention that appeared to be at odds with the 
decision in Al-Kateb. 
The second line of Australian cases involved statutory challenges to the Minister’s power to transfer a 
person to an extraterritorial processing location. No analogous issue arose in the US extraterritorial 
processing regime. The US regime only ever applied to asylum seekers interdicted at sea. The usual 
destination for extraterritorial processing has been on board coast guard cutters, or the US controlled 
territory of Guantanamo. Where third country processing has been used, the Presidential executive 
orders authorising such action did not contain safeguards about the conditions which needed to be 
met in the third country to which the asylum seekers were transferred. These safeguards were 
presumably thought to be unnecessary, given the US government’s view that the Refugee Convention 
does not apply to its extraterritorial actions.149 In Australia, certain asylum seekers have been liable to 
third country transfer even after reaching Australian territory. The extraterritorial processing regime 
under the original Pacific Solution applied to asylum seekers who made landfall at certain excised 
offshore places. The offshore processing arrangements introduced in 2012 extended third country 
transfers to apply to all unauthorised boat arrivals, regardless of their point of arrival. The fact that the 
asylum seekers have reached Australian territory means that Australia clearly owes them protection 
obligations under the Refugee Convention. 
The Malaysian Solution and Sadiqi litigation dealt with the proper construction of statutory provisions 
aimed at ensuring that third country transfers did not contravene these obligations. Section s 
                                                   
149  This view was upheld by the US Supreme Court in Sale: See Chapter Seven, Part 7.1. 
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198A(3)(a) of the Migration Act set out the criteria which the Minister had to consider when 
designating a country as a destination for third country transfers. In the Sadiqi litigation challenging 
the declaration made in respect of Nauru, the Federal Court repeatedly adopted a ‘rights-precluding’ 
approach, refusing to treat the existence of the protections set out in s 198A(3)(a) as jurisdiction facts. 
In the Malaysian Solution Case, the High Court took a different approach when considering a 
declaration made in respect of Malaysia. By construing the existence of the criteria set out in s 
198A(3)(a) as jurisdictional facts, the majority found the declaration invalid as the relevant protections 
did not exist in Malaysia as a matter of law. The different approaches evident in the judicial reasoning 
undertaken by the Federal Court judges in the Sadiqi litigation and the justices of the High Court in 
the Malaysian Solution Case, illustrate the contingency of the outcomes in those cases. This 
contingency is further demonstrated by the advice given by the Solicitor-General to the government in 
the lead-up to the case, stating that the Malaysian Solution would survive judicial challenge. In 
response to this decision, Parliament introduced a new legislative regime for declaring a country a 
‘regional processing country’. This new regime was challenged in Plaintiff S156, where the High Court 
adopted a ‘rights-precluding’ approach to construing the relevant legislative provisions, citing the clear 
and unambiguous legislative intent supporting such an outcome. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The analysis in this chapter of the case law dealing with challenges to extraterritorial processing 
policies in Australia and the United States suggests, that in most cases, the relevant legal principles 
were sufficiently ambiguous to allow for judges to reasonably adopt either a ‘rights-protecting’ or 
‘rights-precluding’ approach when determining the scope of rights to be afforded to the non-citizen 
plaintiffs. The one exception may be the High Court of Australia’s decision in Plaintiff S156, where the 
legislature had intervened to ensure a ‘rights-precluding’ outcome. In the other cases examined in this 
chapter, contingency is evidenced by shifts in judicial approach to the same legal issues over time; 
ongoing scholarly disagreement about the validity of the judicial reasoning adopted; and/or narrow 
judicial majorities. Such contingency is apparent in cases dealing with the scope of constitutional as 
well as statutory protections. I have sought to identify the junctures in judicial decision making in each 
case that could have led judges to either a ‘rights-protecting’ or ‘rights-precluding’ outcome. In 
Chapter Nine, I turn my attention to potential factors that may have influenced the judicial decision 
making process in the face of such contingency and the implications for predicting the success or 
failure of transfers of restrictive immigration control measures. 
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CHAPTER NINE: 
DETERMINANTS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 
IN RELATION TO THE RIGHTS OF NON-CITIZENS IN 
THE UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA 
Great cases like hard cases make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by reason 
of their real importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some accident of 
immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feelings and distorts the judgment. 
These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which makes what 
previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of law will 
bend.  
—Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes1 
The case law dealing with challenges to the policies of long-term mandatory detention, interdiction 
and extraterritorial processing in the United States and Australia examined in the preceding three 
chapters dealt with a variety of different statutory and constitutional questions. Despite the different 
legal issues at play, the judges in each case were called upon to deal with the same fundamental 
question: what is the content and scope of the rights which are to be afforded to non-citizen litigants in 
immigration related proceedings? In each case, judges had to decide between a ‘rights-protecting’ or 
‘rights-precluding’ interpretation of the relevant legal principles. I have argued that in the vast majority 
of the cases examined, judges faced junctures in the interpretive process where they were required to 
choose between alternate reasonable readings of the relevant law that could have led them down 
different paths. As such, the decision by judges in those cases to adopt a ‘rights-protecting’ or ‘rights-
precluding’ approach was far from obvious.  
In this chapter, I examine the ramifications of this uncertainty. When faced with interpretive junctures, 
I argue that judges’ decisions to select one path over another may have been influenced by extra-
judicial considerations. In this regard, the subject rulings may indeed be regarded as ‘great cases’ of 
the type identified by Justice Holmes.2 I explore the impact of two extra-judicial factors: national 
security concerns and public opinion. The possible impact of these factors is considered by 
juxtaposing the signature cases examined earlier with key contemporary events and data measuring 
public opinion towards immigration and asylum seekers. I concede that such a correlative approach 
does not provide enough evidence to demonstrate causation. Rather, my analysis in this chapter 
intends to identify possible relationships that can be further explored in future research. 
                                                   
1  Northern Securities Co v United States, 193 US 197, 400-1 (1904) (Holmes J, dissenting). 
2  Ibid. 
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The conclusions drawn in this chapter hold significant ramifications for the study of transfers. If extra-
legal factors are determinative of divergences in judicial approaches to the case study policies, it may 
be that these factors are more important to the legal success or failure of transferred law and policy 
than differences in legal structures between the jurisdictions. 
9.1 The Nature of Judicial Decision Making 
The influence of extra-legal factors on judicial decision making has been the subject of long-standing 
and vigorous academic debate. The central question examined has been the degree to which law 
constrains the results reached by adjudicators in legal disputes. Traditionally, scholars have fallen into 
two broad camps.3 Exponents of Legal Formalism, which was prominent in the late 19th century, view 
judicial decision making as an autonomous and fully rational process in which judges carefully apply 
legal rules to the facts of each case. Such an approach is evident in Ronald Dworkin’s ‘right answer’ 
thesis. He posits that even in hard cases, where competing rights are asserted by the parties and 
judges disagree on the legal outcome, there is a correct answer as to the rights of the parties 
‘discoverable’ through the adjudication process.4 Proponents of Legal Realism, which was developed 
in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s, assert that legal materials such as statutes and case law 
do not always determine the outcome of legal disputes.5 On this view, law is indeterminate, filled with 
gaps and contradictions. As such, judges can rely on extra-legal considerations to reach a conclusion, 
which can then later be rationalised with deliberative reasoning.6 Both the formalist and realist 
perspectives have been criticised as oversimplifying the adjudicative process.7 A number of scholars 
have proposed a middle road that recognises the subjective aspects of the judicial process, while 
acknowledging the fact that by and large, judges follow the law in a predictable way. 
The jurist Julius Stone offers what is perhaps the most eloquent reconciliation of the subjectivity of 
legal realism with the formalist dedication to legal principle. Stone argued that appellate court judges 
generally have ‘leeways of choice’ when making their decisions. This is in spite of the fact that judges 
often state they are bound by a particular precedent. Stone states that it is a 
rather self-evident but also often overlooked truth, that, where the applicable law is seriously in dispute, 
appellate judgement always requires the court to choose between more than one legally and/or logically 
                                                   
3  Note criticism of this dichotomous categorisation: see, for example, Brian Tamanaha, Beyond the 
Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of Politics in Judging (Princeton University Press, 2010); Chris 
Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski and Andrew Wistrich, 'Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases' 
(2007) 93 Cornell Law Review 1. 
4  Ronald Dworkin, 'No Right Answer?' (1978) 53 New York University Law Review 1. 
5  The beginning of the legal realism movement is sometimes traced to the publication of Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (American Bar Association, 1881). However, legal realism did not 
emerge as an intellectual force until the 1920s and 1930s. Key texts associated to the movement during 
this period include Benjamin Cardoza, The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, 1921); 
Karl Llewellyn, ‘A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next Step’ (1930) 30 Columbia Law Review 431; Karl 
Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism: Responding to Dean Pound’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 
1222. 
6  See, for example, Joseph Hutcheson, Jr, ‘The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of the “Hunch” in 
Judicial Decision’ (1929) 14 Cornell Law Quarterly 274, 285.  
7  See, for example, Tamanaha, above n 3; Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, above n 3. 
 195 
 
available alternatives. The law being disputed, the pre-existing law cannot ex hypothesi compel. Equally, 
in such a situation, neither can logic compel: for it is common ground among lawyers that conclusions, 
even if drawn with logical validity from an indubitably applicable legal precept, are not necessarily 
binding legal conclusions. And since in the situation supposed the law is disputed, no legal precept may 
in any case be available as a major premise which can be said to be indubitably applicable.8 
Stone articulates a number of common logical fallacies, which he refers to as ‘categories of illusory 
reference’,9 that judges use to ground their decision making in precedent. Stone describes these as 
‘certain patterned features of legal materials—which means, of course, language patterned features 
of legal materials—which, whenever we find them, signal that leeways exist for choice by courts which 
seek to use them as the basis for decision.’10 These leeways allow for ‘the entry of judicial experience 
of life, and judicially recognised social values, into the common law of successive generations.’11  
Nevertheless, Stone emphasises that this does not mean the law is indeterminate: 
It is necessary… to stress that to assert the availability of judicial choices is not the same as to assert 
judicial arbitrariness in decision, or even judicial ‘legislative power’ in the sense in which we attribute this 
to the legislature. The effect of the exercise of the judicial duty to choose within the leeways left by stare 
decisis is, of course, to produce new law, and control and guide its growth. In this sense it may be called 
‘creative’ or even ‘legislative’. But unlike that of the parliamentary legislator, the judicial choice is usually 
between alternative decisions and modes of reaching them presented to the judge by the authoritative 
materials of the law. These materials do, of course, include areas of settled rules which it would require 
parliamentary action to overcome. But they also present (especially at the appellate level) guide posts to 
alternative solutions which remain legally open, beyond the settled areas.12  
More recently, Brian Tamanaha has described judicial decision making as comprising both 
determined and undetermined aspects. Tamanaha describes his approach, which he labels ‘balanced 
realism,’ as having  
two integrally conjoined aspects—a sceptical aspect and a rule-bound aspect. It refers to an awareness 
of the flaws, limitations, and openness of law, an awareness that judges sometimes make choices, that 
they can manipulate legal rules and precedents, and that they sometimes are influenced by their political 
and moral views and their personal biases (the sceptical aspect). Yet it conditions this sceptical 
awareness with the understanding that legal rules nonetheless work; that judges abide by and apply the 
law; that there are practice-related, social, and institutional factors that constrain judges; and that judges 
render generally predicable decisions consistent with the law (rule-bound aspects). The rule-bound 
aspect of judging can function reliably notwithstanding the challenges presented by the scepticism-
                                                   
8  Julius Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law Growth (Butterworths, 1985) 221. 
9  Julius Stone, The Province and Function of Law: Law as Logic, Justice, and Social Control: A Study in 
Jurisprudence (Associated General Publications, 1946) 149–214; Julius Stone, Legal System and 
Lawyers’ Reasonings (Maitland Publications, 1968) 235–300; Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of 
Common Law Growth, above n 8, 61–80. 
10  Stone, Precedent and Law: Dynamics of Common Law Growth, above n 8, 65. 
11  Stone, Legal System and Lawyers’ Reasonings, above n 9, 276. 
12  Ibid 281. 
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inducing aspects, although this is an achievement that must be earned, is never perfectly achieved, and 
never guaranteed.13 
According to this approach, most judicial decision making involves formalistic application of the 
relevant legal principles to the facts of the case. However, where legal ambiguity arises, extra-legal 
factors can play a role in determining the judicial outcome. The approaches of both Stone and 
Tamanaha recognise the importance of extra-legal factors such as political considerations, without 
discrediting the judicial process as being wholly subjective. 
I argue that the ambiguities of the legal principles in the United States and Australia regulating the 
scope of rights afforded to non-citizens in immigration related proceedings give judges a broad ambit 
for importing subjective values into the judicial process. In the US context, the impact of the plenary 
power doctrine has meant that immigration law has developed outside the confines of mainstream 
constitutional jurisprudence.14 Unbound by regular constitutional precedents and developments, the 
courts have had a wide degree of discretion in interpreting the scope of constitutional protection that 
is to be afforded to non-citizens in the immigration context. This is evidenced through the shifting 
boundaries and selective application of the plenary power doctrine over the years.15 The constitutional 
principles that determine the scope of the rights of non-citizens in immigration proceedings in 
Australia are similarly ill-defined.16 In the 1906 case of Robtelmes v Brenan, Barton J stated:  
[t]he [constitutional] powers given are plenary within their ambit, it is within these powers to pass 
legislation, however harsh and restrictive it may seem, and as to that it is not the province of a Court of 
Justice to inquire, where the law is clear.17 
While Australian jurisprudence did not go on to develop a formal plenary power doctrine equivalent to 
that found in the United States, the aliens power in s 51(xix) of the Constitution has been relied upon 
to create a similar form of immigration exceptionalism. The Australian High Court has affirmed 
repeatedly that this power authorises restrictions on the rights of non-citizens that would be unlawful if 
targeted at citizens.18 The ill-defined scope of this exception has given judges broad discretion in 
determining the nature of the rights to be afforded non-citizens. The boundaries of exactly what is 
authorised has waxed and waned over the years.  
These constitutional considerations can affect statutory interpretation indirectly through the principle 
of constitutional avoidance. This ‘requires a court to adopt a plausible—but not necessarily the most 
                                                   
13  Tamanaha, above n 3; Guthrie, Rachlinski and Wistrich, above n 3, 103 (proposing a middle ground 
between realism and formalism which they label ‘realistic formalism’). 
14  See Chapter Four, nn 27-38 and accompanying text; Chapter Six, nn 9-20 and accompanying text. 
15  Ibid. See also, Chapter Six, nn 201-3 and accompanying text. 
16  See the discussion relating to the scope of the s 51(xix) and (xxvii) of the Australian Constitution in 
Chapter Six, Part 6.3. 
17  (1906) 4 CLR 395, 415. See Chapter Six, nn 105-9 and accompanying text. 
18  See, for example, the comments of Brennan, Deane, Dawson JJ in Chu Kheng Lim v Minister for 
Immigration (1992) 176 CLR 1, 29 (stating that one of the important differences between the rights of 
Australian citizens and aliens is the latter’s vulnerability to exclusion or deportation. The effect of this 
vulnerability is to significantly ‘diminish the protection which Ch III of the Constitution provides, in the 
case of a citizen, against imprisonment otherwise than pursuant to judicial process’). 
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persuasive—interpretation of a statute in order to avoid serious constitutional issues.’19 In Australia, 
the principle of constitutional avoidance is complemented by the principle of legality. This creates a 
rebuttable presumption, for the purposes of statutory interpretation, that parliament does not intend to 
override fundamental rights.20 Even in cases that do not raise constitutional issues (or engage the 
principle of legality), ambiguous statutory language and conflicting principles of statutory interpretation 
can often provide sufficient leeway for compelling and reasonable alternate interpretations of 
legislative provisions. These constitutional and statutory ambiguities were demonstrated by the 
conflicting approaches adopted by the judges in the cases examined in Chapter Six, Seven and Eight.  
Given these ambiguities, immigration law is an area particularly prone to the ‘sceptical aspect’ of 
judicial decision making identified by Tamanaha. Adopting Stone’s formulation, the ambiguities 
identified can be said to provide ample leeway for recourse by judges to the categories of illusory 
reference. In the remainder of this chapter, I examine whether, in the face of this ambiguity, judicial 
decision making in the leading US and Australian cases on mandatory detention, interdiction and 
extraterritorial processing was influenced by extra-legal factors. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that 
we can expect ‘rights-precluding’ decisions at times of heightened national security concerns and 
negative public opinion towards immigration. Table 1 lists the case universe by country and issue 
area. It colour-codes the outcome of interest, the approach that judges took in each case. 
Table 1: US and Australian Case Law on Long-Term Mandatory Detention, Interdiction and 
Extraterritorial Processing 
Red = ‘rights-precluding’ approach; Green = ‘rights-protecting’ approach 
Policy United States Australia 
Mandatory Detention Demore v Kim, 538 US 510 (2003) Chu Kheng Lim v MILGEA (1992) 176 
CLR 1 (‘Lim’) 
Indefinite Detention 
 
Zadvydas v Davis, 533 US 678 (2001)  Al-Kateb v Godwin (2004) 219 CLR 562 
Interdiction 
 
Sale v Haitian Centers Council, 509 US 
155 (1993) 
Ruddock v Vadarlis (2001) 110 FCR 491 
CPCF v MIBP [2015] HCA 1 (28 January 
2015) (‘CPCF’)  
Extraterritorial 
Processing 
Haitian Refugee Center v Baker, 953 F2d 
1498 (11th Cir, 1992) 
Cuban American Bar Association v 
Christopher 43 F3d 1412 (11th Cir, 1995) 
(‘CABA’) 
Boumediene v Bush, 533 US 723 (2008) 
Plaintiff M61/2010E (2010) 243 CLR 319 
(‘Offshore Processing Case’) 
Plaintiff M70/2011 (2011) 244 CLR 144 
(‘Malaysian Solution Case’) 
Plaintiff S156/2013 v MIBP (2014) 309 
ALR 29 
                                                   
19  Brian Slocum, 'Canons, the Plenary Power Doctrine, and Immigration Law' (2007) 34 Florida State 
University Law Review 363, 366. On the importance of this principle in US Supreme Court jurisprudence 
on the rights of non-citizens in the immigration context see: Hiroshi Motomura, 'Immigration Law after a 
Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation' (1990) 100 Yale 
Law Journal 545.  
20  On the relationship between the principle of constitutional avoidance and the principle of legality, see 
Dan Meagher, ‘The Principle of Legality and the Judicial Protection of Rights – Evans v New South 
Wales’ (2009) 37 Federal Law Review 293, 300-7. Chief Justice James Spigelman has characterised 
the principle of legality as ‘quasi-constitutional’ as it ‘reflect[s] fundamental assumptions about the 
relationship between citizen and state’: Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights (University of QLD 
Press, 2008) 65. 
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9.2 National Security and Public Opinion 
In this section, I examine the impact of national security concerns and public opinion towards 
immigration on the judicial decision making process. In Part 9.2.1 and 9.2.2, I explore the possible 
linkages between these factors and judicial decision making generally. In Part 9.3, I examine the 
national security climate in which the US cases were decided. I then explore whether there is a 
correlation between heightened national security concerns and the adoption of a ‘rights-precluding’ 
approach by the judiciary. I also compare the US cases with polling data on public attitudes towards 
immigration. In Part 9.4, I undertake a similar analysis with regard to the Australian case law. 
9.2.1 National Security Concerns 
National security concerns are often cited as having significant impact on judicial decision making. It is 
intuitive to believe that at times of heightened national security concerns, there will be an increase in 
judicial deference to the political branches and a decrease in respect for constitutional and human 
rights.21 Judicial deference to the executive is at its strongest at times of war. As former US Supreme 
Court Chief Justice Rehnquist states: ‘in times of war the laws are silent’.22 Similarly, Mark Tushnet 
argues that law historically remains silent concerning government actions in response to often-
exaggerated national security concerns during wartime, which can often result in substantial 
restrictions of civil liberties.23 These concerns are amplified in the context of judicial decision making 
involving the rights of aliens. When a nation faces a threat from the outside, it is understandable that 
judges are reluctant to frustrate the actions of the political branches by upholding the rights of 
outsiders. On this view, we can expect to see the courts more likely to adopt a ‘rights-precluding’ 
approach when determining the scope of rights to be afforded to non-citizens at times of heightened 
national security concerns, and a ‘rights-protecting’ approach at times of relative peace and security.  
9.2.2 Public Opinion 
A second related factor that may have influenced decision makers in the cases studied is public 
opinion. When faced with plausible alternative interpretations of the law, judges may be influenced by 
the public mood or zeitgeist in making their decisions. In the US context, this view is supported by a 
growing number of empirical studies that have shown that Supreme Court decision making coincides 
with prevailing public sentiment.24 This has been explained through direct and indirect linkages 
                                                   
21  Brian Slocum, 'The War on Terrorism and the Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution in 
Immigration Law' (2007) 84 Denver University Law Review 1017, 1038. 
22  William Rehnquist, All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties in War Time (Alfred A Knopf Inc, 1998) 202. 
23  Mark Tushnet, 'Defending Korematsu?: Reflections on Civil Liberties in Wartime' (2003) Wisconsin Law 
Review 273. 
24  See, for example, Michael Giles, Bethany Blackstone, and Richard Vining Jr, 'The Supreme Court in 
American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages between Public Opinion and Judicial Decision Making' 
(2008) 70 The Journal of Politics 293, 294; Roy Flemming and Dan Wood, ‘The Public and the Supreme 
Court: Individual Justice Responsiveness to American Policy Moods’ (1997) 41 American Journal of 
Political Science 468; Kevin McGuire and James Stimson, 'The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: 
New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences' (2004) 66 The Journal of 
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between public opinion and judicial decision making. The indirect linkage is said to arise out of the 
process of appointing new Supreme Court justices. As Giles, Blackstone and Vining explain, ‘[p]ublic 
opinion influences the selection of presidents, and presidents, in turn, select Supreme Court 
justices’.25 This ‘replacement’ mechanism is said to realign the Supreme Court to shifts in public 
opinion.26  
The correlation between Supreme Court decisions and public opinion has also been explained with 
reference to two possible direct linkages between the decision making of Supreme Court justices and 
public opinion. First, the ‘strategic behaviour’ explanation posits that justices respond strategically to 
public opinion to protect the Supreme Court’s legitimacy.27 As McGuire and Stimson argue, 
a Court that cares about its perceived legitimacy must rationally anticipate whether its preferred 
outcomes will be respected and faithfully followed by relevant publics. Consequently, a Court that strays 
too far from the broad boundaries imposed by public mood risks having its decisions rejected. Naturally, 
in individual cases, the justices can and do buck the trends of public sentiment. In the aggregate, 
however, popular opinion should still shape the broad contours of judicial policymaking.28 
According to this explanation, justices do not change their attitudes or preferences, but rather 
strategically alter their behaviour to avoid negative public reaction and protect the institutional integrity 
of the court. 
The ‘attitudinal change’ explanation posits that justices are influenced by the same forces that act to 
shift the opinion of the general public.29 Writing in 1921, eminent legal scholar and future Supreme 
Court Justice, Benjamin Cardoza recognised the fact that shifts in judicial attitude may reflect the 
influence of wider social forces:  
I do not doubt the grandeur of the conception which lifts [judges] into the realm of pure reason, above 
and beyond the sweep of perturbing and deflecting forces. None the less, if there is anything of reality in 
my analysis of the judicial process, they do not stand aloof on these chill and distant heights; and we 
shall not help the cause of truth by acting and speaking as if they do. The great tides and currents which 
engulf the rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judge by.30 
The theory here is that judges are influenced by the same events and ideas that shape public opinion. 
The direct linkage between public opinion and the behaviour of judges is explained as arising ‘from 
the force of mutually experienced events and ideas in shaping and reshaping preferences of both the 
public and justices.’31  
                                                                                                                                                              
Politics 1018; Thomas Marshall, Public Opinion and the Supreme Court (Unwin Hyman, 1989). Note that 
I am unaware of any research on this topic in the Australian context. 
25  Giles, Blackstone and Vining, above n 24, 302. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid 294-5; 303. 
28  McGuire and Stimson, above n 24, 1019.  
29  Giles, Blackstone and Vining, above n 24, 295, 303. 
30  Cardoza, above n 5, 167-78, quoted in Giles, Blackstone and Vining, above n 24, 295. 
31  Giles, Blackstone and Vining, above n 24, 295.   
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Proponents of this view do not claim that the impact of public opinion is immediate in the sense ‘that 
the decisions of justices on pending cases are influenced by relevant public opinion polls seen in the 
morning paper.’32 Rather, 
[a] more realistic assumption is that public opinion, if it is important, influences the Court as a result of 
gradual almost imperceptible changes in the attitudes and beliefs of individual justices as they adapt, 
consciously or not, to long-term, fundamental trends in the ideological temper of the public.33 
My analysis focuses on exploring the possible relationship between shifts in public opinion and judicial 
decision making. The relevant public opinion I examine includes public attitudes towards immigration 
generally and where relevant, more specific attitudes to particular cohorts of asylum seekers. It is 
important to note that public opinion on these issues is closely related to national security concerns 
discussed earlier. One can expect public support for immigration to be at its lowest at times of 
heightened danger, and support to increase at times of relative peace and security.  
9.3  US Cases 
The cases upholding the legality of interdiction and extraterritorial processing measures in the United 
States were all decided at a time of heightened national security concerns and relatively negative 
public sentiment towards migrants.34 In contrast, the US Supreme Court’s decision in 2008 in 
Boumediene to extend certain constitutional protections to non-citizens held at Guantanamo Bay was 
handed down in a climate of relative peace and security. Moreover, this ruling was delivered at a time 
when US public opinion was turning against the government’s treatment of enemy combatant 
detainees. In relation to long-term mandatory immigration detention, the context of the decision to limit 
the duration of post-deportation order detention in Zadvydas stands in stark contrast to that 
surrounding the decision upholding mandatory detention of criminal aliens in Demore v Kim. 
Zadvydas was decided in the months before the September 11 2001 terrorist attacks, in a context of 
record high public support for immigration. Demore v Kim was handed down in the post-September 11 
context of heightened security concerns and a relatively low support for immigration. 
9.3.1 National Security and the US Cases 
In the early 1990s, the unprecedented number of maritime asylum seekers, combined with the threat 
of foreign terrorism on US soil, may have influenced the courts’ decisions to adopt ‘rights-precluding’ 
approaches in the case study rulings. In a series of cases between 1992 and 1995, US appellate 
courts upheld government interdiction activities (Sale, 1993), and determined that asylum seekers 
processed extraterritorially on Guantanamo could not avail themselves of US constitutional or 
statutory protections (Baker, 1992; CABA, 1995). These cases were decided against the background 
of record numbers of maritime arrivals from Haiti. Boat arrivals, particularly those carrying Haitians, 
                                                   
32  William Mishler and Reginald Sheehan, 'The Supreme Court as a Countermajoritarian Institution? The 
Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions' (1993) 87 American Political Science Review 87, 
88.  
33  Ibid. 
34  See Table 1 for a full listing of these cases. 
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have always caused great anxiety in the United States.35 The significant increase in arrivals during 
this period led to what one commentator labelled a ‘moral panic’.36 The situation may have been 
severe enough to categorise the increase in arrivals as a ‘mass influx situation’. While the term has no 
precise legal definition, the two necessary factors are the size of the influx and the suddenness of 
arrivals.37 In 1992, when Baker was decided, the US Coast Guard interdicted more people in that year 
alone, than the total number of persons interdicted in the 10 years since the migrant interdiction 
program had been introduced.38 Interdictions jumped from 4,990 in 1991 to 40,627 in 1992.39 
Concerns about continued arrivals were further exacerbated by the fact that Guantanamo’s capacity 
of 12,500 was reached in May 1992.40  
By the time the decision in Sale was handed down on 22 June 1993, the number of arrivals had 
begun to ease. Nevertheless, the 10,584 interdictions carried out in the fiscal year ending in July 1993 
remained high by historical standards.41 That year also saw the United States’ first large-scale 
experience of unauthorised boat arrivals from outside its region, with the interdiction of 2,882 Chinese 
nationals.42 These arrivals stoked fears of a possible future mass influx of irregular migrants from 
China. Public fears were amplified by the highly publicised arrival in New York on 6 June 1993, of a 
cargo ship named Golden Venture, carrying 286 undocumented Chinese migrants. The ship ran 
aground on a sandbar a few hundred metres off Rockaway Beach in Queens and 10 of the 
passengers drowned while attempting to swim to shore. The whole tragedy was broadcast live on 
national television.43 The incident occurred a little more than two weeks before the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in Sale. It is possible that this highly publicised incident and resulting fear of 
unauthorised Chinese immigration, as well as continued concerns about Haitian and Cuban boat 
arrivals, may have weighed on the minds of the majority in that case.  
Two terrorist attacks carried out in the United States in 1993 further heightened national security fears 
during this period. On 25 January 1993, a lone gunman opened fire outside the Central Intelligence 
                                                   
35  Some commentators have attributed this to racial discrimination stemming from the fact that Haitian 
asylum seekers are generally black: see, for example, Malissia Lennox, 'Refugees, Racism, and 
Reparations: A Critique of the United States' Haitian Immigration Policy' (1993) 45 Stanford Law Review 
687; James Zink, 'Race and Foreign Policy in Refugee Law: A Historical Perspective of the Haitian 
Refugee Crisis' (1998) 48 DePaul Law Review 559. 
36  Kate Jastram, 'The Kids before Khadr: Haitian Refugee Children on Guantanamo' (2012) 11 Santa Clara 
Journal of International Law 81, 94. 
37  Jean-François Durieux and Jane McAdam, 'Non-Refoulement through Time: The Case for a Derogation 
Clause to the Refugee Convention in Mass Influx Emergencies' (2004) 16 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 4, 17. 
38  The US Coast Guard interdicted 40,627 migrants in 1992. Between 1982 and 1991, the total number of 
interdicted migrants was 31,470: see Appendix B, Table 6, which sets out the number of interdictions by 
the US Coast-Guard per fiscal year from 1982-2014. 
39  See Appendix B, Table 6. 
40  Robert Williams, 'Sale v Haitian Centers Council and its Aftermath: A Problematic Gap in International 
Immigration Law' (1995) 9 Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 55, 67. 
41  Appendix B, Table 6. 
42  Appendix B, Table 6. 
43  Patrick Radden Keefe, ‘A Path Out of Purgatory’, The New Yorker (6 June 2013) 
<http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2013/06/golden-venture-immigration-reform.html>.  
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Agency (‘CIA’) compound in Langley, killing two people and seriously injuring three others.44 One 
month later, terrorists detonated explosives in the World Trade Centre, killing 6 people and injuring 
thousands. Foreigners living in the United States without legal status were implicated in both attacks. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (‘FBI’) established that the Langley attack was carried out by Mir 
Aimal Kansi, a native of Pakistan who had entered the United States on a fraudulent business visa 
and had subsequently applied for asylum.45 His application was still pending at the time of the attack. 
Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, one of four conspirators convicted for the 1993 World Trade Centre attack, 
travelled to the United States without a visa and claimed asylum on arrival. He was released into the 
community as detention centres were full and had failed to turn up to any of his scheduled hearings.46 
The involvement of asylum seekers in these attacks linked the issue of irregular migration flows with 
concerns of national security and terrorism. This sentiment is captured by the following comments 
made by Susan Schreck in 1993: 
The 1990’s, if the first third of the decade is any reliable forecast of things to come, is likely to be 
remembered as the period Americans became vulnerable to terrorist attacks on US soil. Why the 
vulnerability? The answer is simple: America’s borders had become so porous that those who wished to 
send a message, whether political or religious, could easily gain entry to the United States and make 
their presence known with an inhumane act certain to generate worldwide media attention.47  
The ‘rights-precluding’ decision in CABA, handed down in January 1995, was decided in an even 
more acute context of mass arrivals and resulting public fear. There were a total of 64,443 persons 
interdicted at sea en route to the United States in the 1994-1995 fiscal year.48 This remains by far the 
most number of interdictions carried out in a single year. As discussed in Chapter Six, the influx of 
mostly Cuban asylum seekers was triggered by an announcement by Fidel Castro on 8 August 1994 
that he would no longer patrol the coast nor forcibly prevent emigration by boat. Christina Frohock 
describes the fallout of the new policy: 
Within ten days of Castro’s announcement, approximately 8000 Cubans arrived in South Florida. By 
contrast, the US Coast Guard had previously rescued and brought to the United States only 1300 
Cuban rafters during the first six months of 1993 and 4700 during the first six months of 1994. In little 
more than a week in August 1994, the number of Cubans entering the United States from across the 
Florida Straits had nearly doubled from the entire first half of the year.49 
                                                   
44  For more info on this incident, see Susan Schreck, 'Accidental Terrorists: Excludable Aliens Who Slip 
Across US Borders' (1993) 23 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 625. 
45  David Marshall, 'Political Asylum: Time for a Change - The Potential Effectiveness of Reforms to 
Prevent Terrorist Attacks in America' (1995) 99 Dickinson Law Review 1017, 1031. 
46  Ibid 1030. 
47  Schreck, above n 44, 642. 
48  See Appendix B, Table 6. 
49  Christina Frohock, '"Brisas Del Mar": Judicial and Political Outcomes of the Cuban Rafter Crisis in 
Guantanamo' (2012) 15 Harvard Latino Law Review 39, 43 (footnotes omitted) 
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By the end of the year, a total of 38,560 Cuban asylum seekers had been intercepted attempting to 
reach the United States by boat.50 Some feared the influx would lead to a repeat of the 1980 Mariel 
Boat lift, which saw the arrival of more than 130,000 Cubans and Haitians.51  
The ‘rights-protecting’ decision handed down in Boumediene (2008) was formulated in a very different 
political environment. It is true that in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks in 2001, 
the political context in the United States was one of fear and panic.52 However, the impending sense 
of crisis had abated by 2008 when Boumediene was decided. The United States was still technically 
at war in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, the immediate threat to national security had receded and 
for most Americans, the detainees at Guantanamo no longer posed an actual or existential threat. 
Moreover, the treatment of the enemy combatants had received widespread criticism, both within the 
United States and abroad. Domestically, the policy was criticised by the likes of former President 
Jimmy Carter,53 as well as by congressmen54 and academics.55 Internationally, former British Prime 
Minister Tony Blair, former Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan, German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel and a number of other world leaders unequivocally called on the US government to 
close the Guantanamo facility.56 
An important distinction between the asylum seeker and enemy combatant cases was the size of the 
groups affected by the rulings. By the time Boumediene was heard, there were only about 250 enemy 
combatants left at Guantanamo,57 and there were no plans to transfer any new detainees to the 
facility. This meant that the Boumediene decision applied to a clearly defined and numerically limited 
cohort of persons. Relevantly, the majority went to great lengths to emphasise the limited reach of the 
holding: ‘[o]ur decision today holds only that petitioners before us are entitled to seek the writ [of 
Habeas Corpus].’58 The political consideration behind extending rights to this limited cohort was very 
different to the considerations at play in Baker and CABA. Those cases dealt with the rights of tens of 
thousands of Haitians and Cubans held at Guantanamo. Moreover, those decisions would have 
                                                   
50  See Appendix B, Table 6. 
51  See Chapter Four, nn 65-8 and accompanying text. 
52  See below nn 61-3 and accompanying text. 
53  Mark Bixler, ‘Carter Chides US on Rights’, Atlanta Journal-Constitution (online), 12 November 2003 
<http://www.dankalia.com/archive/2003/031112.htm>. 
54  Carol Rosenberg, ’13 House Members Support Detainees’, Miami Herald (online), 7 January 2004 
<http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2004-01-07/news/0401070050_1_prisoner-of-war-guantanamo-
letter>. 
55  See, for example, Diane Marie Amann, 'Guantánamo' (2004) 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 
263; Seth J Hawkins, 'Up Guantanamo Without a Paddle: Waves of Afghan Detainees Drown in 
America's Great Habeas Loophole' (2003) 47 St Louis University Law Journal 1243; Gerald Neuman, 
'Closing the Guantánamo Loophole' (2004) 50 Loyola Law Review 1; Charles Weisselberg, 'The 
Detention and Treatment of Aliens Three Years After September 11: A New World Order?' (2005) 38 
University of California Davis Law Review 815. 
56  Matthew Ivey, ‘A Framework for Closing Guantánamo Bay’ (2009) 32 Boston College International and 
Comparative Law Review 353, 354. 
57  Erin Miller, Julia Pilcer, and Georgina Druce, ‘The Current Detainee Population at Guantánamo: An 
Empirical Study’ (Research Report, Brookings, 16 December 2008) 
<http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2008/12/16-detainees-
wittes/1216_detainees_wittes.pdf>. 
58  Boumediene, 533 US 723, 795 (2008) (Kennedy J) (emphasis added). 
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relevance to an almost unlimited class of future asylum seekers that might attempt the journey by sea 
to the United States. This consideration as to the potential size of the group claiming a particular 
constitutional right is primarily a political question. The Court’s ‘functional’ approach to determining 
whether constitutional provisions have legal effect at Guantanamo adopted in Boumediene appears to 
allow for exactly such considerations.59 The approach dictates a flexible test to determine which 
provisions apply at a location under US control, with provisions having legal effect as long as they are 
not ‘impractical or anomalous’.60 It could be argued that the greater the number of persons claiming a 
constitutional right, the more impractical it becomes to extend them protection. 
The decision in Zadvydas was handed down in a context of relative peace and security, three months 
before the 2001 September 11 attacks. Accordingly, the political climate was appropriate for taking an 
expansive view of the rights of non-citizens. In contrast, the Supreme Court’s decision to adopt a 
‘rights-precluding’ approach in relation to a challenge to the mandatory nature of detention in Demore 
v Kim, was decided in 2003, in the post-September 11 climate of heightened national security 
concerns. As Donald Kerwin notes, after the September 11 attacks ‘immigration and terrorism 
became inextricably linked in the US public debate on security’.61 The possible impact of the 
September 11 attacks on the divergent approaches taken in Zadvydas and Demore v Kim has been 
noted by academic commentators. Yoh Nago observes that: 
Although never mentioned in the Court’s opinion, one reason for the Court’s shift could be a response to 
new national security policies instigated by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States… Notably, Zadvydas, which extended due process protections afforded aliens, was decided in 
June 2001, nearly three months prior to the September 11th attacks. Demore, on the other hand, was 
decided after September 11th and, unlike Zadvydas, restricted the definition of due process applied to 
aliens… 
Thus, even though the September 11th attacks were not mentioned in Demore, and no one has alleged 
that Kim has any ties to terrorism, its post-September 11th timing, combined with the realities of the new 
political climate, suggest that the decision reached by the majority signals judicial mirroring of the post-
September 11th political and legislative climate of willingness to sacrifice personal liberties in exchange 
for a more certain national security.62 
Similarly, Alexis Hedman comments that 
It has been argued that the role of the judiciary has been compromised since the September 11, 2001 
attacks due to the assertions of both the President and Congress of their authority to construct 
                                                   
59  Ibid 756-66. See Chapter Eight, nn 56-61 and accompanying text. See also, Gerald Neuman, 'The 
Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush' (2009) 82 Southern California Law Review 259, 
261 (arguing that the Boumediene holding rejects ‘formalistic reliance’ on factors such as nationality or 
location and presents functionalism as the ‘standard methodology’).  
60  Boumediene, 533 US 723, 759, 770 (2008). 
61  Donald Kerwin, 'The Use and Misuse of “National Security” Rationale in Crafting US Refugee and 
Immigration Policies' (2005) 17 International Journal of Refugee Law 749, 749; see also Weisselberg, 
above n 55. 
62  Yoh Nago, 'Demore v. Kim: Is the Supreme Court Decreasing the Rights of Lawful Permanent 
Residents' (2004) 37 Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review 1715, 1725-7 (footnotes omitted). 
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extraordinary procedures. Consequently it would be irrational to presuppose that the Court’s opinion in 
Demore was not affected by the overwhelming pressure to defer to the government’s interest in 
preventing criminal aliens from fleeing or engaging in more criminal activity, especially against the 
backdrop of the war on terrorism.63 
9.3.2 Public Opinion and the US Cases 
In the same vein, correspondences can be observed between shifts in US public opinion around 
immigration and asylum seekers and the adoption of ‘rights-precluding’ or ‘rights-protecting’ 
approaches in the US case study cases. The decisions in Sale (1993), Baker (1992), CABA (1995), 
and Demore v Kim (2003) all occurred at times of relatively high anti-immigration sentiment. In 
contrast, the decisions in Zadvydas (2001) and Boumediene (2008) were handed down in the context 
of relatively high support for immigration. 
Figure 2 sets out data from polls carried out by Gallup between 1965 and 2014.64 According to this 
data, the United States experienced its highest level of anti-immigration sentiment between the years 
1993 and 1995.65 The large number of irregular arrivals, the poor state of the US economy,66 and the 
perceived nexus between irregular migration flows and terrorism, combined to create wide-spread 
anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the US public during this period. In the Gallup polls taken in July 
1993 and July 1995, 65 per cent of respondents believed that immigration levels should be 
decreased. This can be contrasted with the long-term average of 47 per cent between 1965 and 
2013.67 
  
                                                   
63  Alexis Hedman, 'In the Name of Fear: The Mandatory Detention of Criminal Aliens and Demore v. Kim' 
(2005) 48 Howard Law Journal 999, 1023. 
64  The data relied upon to construct this graph is set out in Appendix B, Table 8. 
65  Note that Gallup does not have polling data available for 1992; See Appendix B, Table 8. 
66  For an examination of the poor state of the US economy during this period, see Paul Krugman, The Age 
of Diminished Expectations (MIT Press, 3rd ed, 1997). 
67  See Figure 2 and Appendix B, Table 8. 
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The ‘rights-protecting’ decision by the US Supreme Court in Boumediene (2008) was handed down in 
the context of relatively high support for immigration. In the Gallup poll of June/July 2008, only 39 per 
cent of respondents indicated that they would like to see immigration decreased. However, it is 
important to note that Boumediene was not an immigration case. The case dealt with a similar 
substantive legal question to that addressed in Baker and CABA, relating to the applicability of US 
Constitutional protections to aliens detained at Guantanamo. However, Mr Boumediene was not a 
would-be immigrant, but an ‘enemy combatants’ captured abroad during the ‘war on terror’ and 
transferred to the US detention facility on Guantanamo against his will. My argument relating to the 
correlation between US public opinion and judicial decision making is better illustrated by more 
tailored polling measuring the shifts in the attitude of the American public to enemy combatants 
detained at the Guantanamo facility. In a Gallup poll taken in January 2002, 72 per cent of Americans 
questioned found the treatment of Taliban soldiers at Guantanamo acceptable.68 As time passed, 
public sentiment appears to have shifted. In a 2005 poll, 36 per cent of respondents believed that the 
prison at Guantanamo should be closed.69 By January 2009, around six months after the decision 
was handed down in Boumediene, the proportion of Americans who wanted Guantanamo closed had 
increased to 51 per cent.70 While the polls are not directly comparable, given the difference in the 
language of the questions asked,71 they do indicate that the ‘rights-protecting’ decision in Boumediene 
appears to be in line with a general decline in support for the continuing operation of the enemy 
combatant detention facilities at Guantanamo.  
In relation to US case law on the limits of immigration detention, there again appears to be a clear 
relationship between public sentiment towards immigration and judicial decision making. In a Gallup 
poll taken in June 2001, just days before the US Supreme Court handed down its decision in 
Zadvydas, only 41 per cent of respondents wanted immigration levels to be decreased.72 As 
demonstrated in Figure 2, the outcome of this poll represented one of the highest levels of pro-
immigration sentiment since data began being collected on the issue in 1965. As such, if there ever 
was a moment in recent US history when the public would have supported a decision affirming the 
rights of non-citizens, June 2001 was it. In contrast, by the time Demore v Kim was decided in April 
2003, support for immigration had dropped markedly. In the closest Gallup poll preceding the 
                                                   
68  Lydia Saad, ‘Few Americans Object to Treatment of Guantanamo Bay Captives’, Gallup News Service 
(7 February 2002) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/5302/Few-Americans-Object-Treatment-Guantanamo-
Bay-Captives.aspx>. 
69  ‘CNN Poll: Americans Split on Closing Guantanamo Bay Prison’, CNN Political Ticker Blog (21 January 
2009) <http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2009/01/21/cnn-poll-americans-split-on-closing-guantanamo-
bay-prison/>. 
70  Ibid. 
71  The 2002 poll asked ‘[b]ased on what you have heard or read, would you consider the way the U.S. is 
treating the Taliban soldiers being held at the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba to be acceptable 
or unacceptable treatment, or don't you know enough to say?’. The 2005 and 2009 polls asked ‘based 
on what you have heard or read, do you think the US should continue to operate the prison, or do you 
think the U.S. should close the prison and transfer the prisoners somewhere else?’. 
72  See Figure 2 and Appendix B, Table 8. 
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decision, taken in September 2002, 54 per cent of respondents wanted immigration levels to be 
decreased.73  
9.4 Australian Cases 
In Australia, the arrival of boats carrying unauthorised migrants has always caused great public 
concern, both hardening public opinion towards such migrants and raising national security fears. This 
public reaction, as well as other factors influencing the national security climate, appear to have 
influenced judicial responses to policies aimed at stemming the flow of unauthorised boat arrivals. The 
‘rights-precluding’ decisions in Lim (1992), Vadarlis (2001), Al-Kateb (2004), Plaintiff S156 (2014) and 
CPCF (2014) were all handed down at times when Australia was under threat from actual or 
perceived national security crises. In contrast, the ‘rights-protecting’ approaches adopted in the 
Offshore Processing (2010) and Malaysian Solution (2011) cases were handed down at times of 
relative amity. There does not appear to be as clear a relationship between judicial decision making 
and public sentiment towards immigration, as is evident in the United States. However, we see a 
clearer correlation when the judicial outcomes are compared to more tailored opinion polls measuring 
public sentiment towards asylum seekers who arrive in Australia by boat. 
9.4.1 National Security and the Australian Cases 
The High Court upheld the legality of mandatory administrative detention of unauthorised arrivals in 
Lim in 1992. This decision was handed down in the context of acute public concern about national 
security and a loss of control over Australia’s borders. While there were no direct links drawn between 
irregular arrivals and terrorism, such as seen in the United States, the arrival of the relatively modest 
number of sea-borne asylum seekers in this period triggered public paranoia about a possible flood of 
asylum seekers descending on Australia’s shores. A total of just over 600 asylum seekers reached 
Australia by boat between 1990 and 1992.74 However, a number of factors combined to fuel fears that 
these arrivals were just the tip of the iceberg and that Australia was on the verge of a mass-influx type 
situation. First, these arrivals represented the first sizeable cohort to have travelled to Australia with 
the aid of people smugglers motivated by profit. In this regard, Australia was in unchartered territory 
and there was no way of ascertaining how many more asylum seekers would seek to do the same. 
Although most of the arrivals between 1990 and 1992 were from Cambodia, there were fears that 
asylum seekers from other Asian nations would follow. For example, in an interview in 1993, Gerry 
Hand, who had recently retired as Minister for Immigration, flagged a possible impending arrival in 
Australia of ‘large mass movements’ of asylum seekers from Hong Kong as a result of the soon 
scheduled handover of that territory back to China.75  
The decision of the Full Federal Court in Vadarlis was handed down in the immediate aftermath of the 
September 11 attacks. Justice North handed down the primary judgement at around 2.15pm 
                                                   
73  See Figure 2 and Appendix B, Table 8. 
74  See Appendix B, Table 7. 
75  ‘An interview with Mr Gerry Hand, Former Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic 
Affairs’ (1993) 1(4) People and Place 1, 7-8. 
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Australian Eastern Standard Time on 11 September 2001,76 just a few hours before terrorists carried 
out the attack on the World Trade Centre in New York. The appeal was heard on 13 September 2001 
and the Full Federal Court handed down its decision on 18 September 2001. None of the judges in 
the appeal court mentioned the September 11 attacks. However, the impact of this event is evident 
the tone of the majority judgements. Beaumont J’s judgement is particularly noteworthy in this regard. 
As Mary Crock has noted, his Honour’s judgement 
is replete with a sense of urgency, if not moral panic. The judge underscores passages and words. His 
conclusion—that an alien has no right to enter Australia—is placed quite literally in bold print. The effect 
is to emphasise and re-emphasise the outside status of the rescuees. The word ‘alien’ appears no less 
than 27 times in the 30 paragraphs of his judgement.77 
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the issue of ‘boat people’ and terrorism became 
inextricably linked in Australia. Peter Mares observes that ‘[a]s soon as the finger of blame for 
September 11 was pointed in the direction of the Middle East and Afghanistan, shrill voices echoed 
down the talkback lines to warn of Australia’s vulnerability to terrorists posing as “boat people”’.78 This 
view was perpetuated by the government of the time. Within 48 hours of the attacks in the United 
States, Defence Minister Peter Reith warned that the unauthorised arrival of boats on Australian 
territory ‘can be a pipeline for terrorists to come in and use your country as a staging post for terrorist 
activities’.79 It is impossible to determine whether the outcome of the case would have been different if 
the September 11 attacks had not been carried out. It would, however, be naïve to think that such a 
monumental game-changing event would have no impact on the decision making of the judges.  
The ‘rights-precluding’ decision in Al-Kateb was also made in a context defined by heightened 
national security concerns. The judgement was handed down on 6 April 2004. Although two and half 
years had passed since September 11, several terrorist acts in the intervening period meant  
fears of an attack by Islamic militants on Australia remained high. In October 2002, Australians were 
targeted in an explosion at a nightclub in Bali, Indonesia, which killed 202 people.80 The attack was 
allegedly carried out by the al-Qaeda affiliated Islamic militant group, Jamaah Islamiyah. The Madrid 
train bombings, carried out by al-Qaeda inspired extremists in March 2004, occurred less than a 
month before the Al-Kateb decision.81 These incidents were a reminder that terrorism continued to 
                                                   
76  Justice AM North and Peace Decle, 'Courts and Immigration Detention: The Australian Experience' 
(2002) 10 Australian Journal of Administrative Law 5, 20. 
77  Mary Crock, 'In the Wake of Tampa: Conflicting Visions of International Refugee Law in the 
Management of Refugee Flows' (2003) 12 Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 49, 68 (emphasis in 
original). 
78  Peter Mares, 'A Pacific Solution: Reflections on the Tampa Affair and September 11' (2001) 11 Eureka 
Street 22, 23. 
79  Quoted in Mares, ibid 23. 
80  88 of these were Australian citizens: ‘Bali Death Toll Set at 202’, BBC News (online), 19 February 2003 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2778923.stm>.  
81  The attack killed at least 192 people and injured more than 1400 and was the deadliest terrorist attack in 
Europe since World War II: Elaine Sciolino, ‘Spain Struggles to Absorb Worst Terrorist Attack in its 
History’, New York Times, (online), 11 March 2004  
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/11/international/europe/11CND-TRAI.html>. 
 210 
 
pose a real threat to western nations. These national security concerns may have been further 
exacerbated by the fact that Mr Al-Kateb was a Palestinian Muslim.  
By contrast, the decisions of the High Court of Australia in the Offshore Processing Case (2010) and 
Malaysian Solution Case (2011) were handed down in a more tranquil national security climate. As 
such the time was ripe for taking an expansive view on the rights which should be afforded to asylum 
seekers subject to extraterritorial processing measures. The threat of an imminent terrorist attack on 
Australian soil had abated and Australia had significantly scaled down its involvement in the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq.82 Although the number of boats significantly increased in 2010, they decreased 
again in 2011. The scale of arrivals during this period was roughly on par with the wave of arrivals 
which occurred between 1999 and 2001. As such, Australia was not in uncharted territory, having 
experienced and dealt with similar sized flow in the past.  
In contrast, by the time the High Court handed down its ‘rights-precluding’ decisions in Plaintiff S156 
(2014) and CPCF (2015), the geopolitical climate had shifted back to one of heightened concerns with 
terrorism and national security. The decision in Plaintiff S156 coincided with the rise of the Islamic 
State in Iraq and Syria (‘ISIS’). The Court handed down its judgement on 18 June 2014. This was a 
little more than one week after ISIS gained international prominence by taking control of Mosul, Iraq’s 
second largest city.83 On 13 June 2014, Australia’s Prime Minister Tony Abbot had flagged the 
possibility of redeploying Australian troops to Iraq to counter the threat of ISIS.84 The rise of ISIS and 
reports that Australians were travelling to fight with the group, led to renewed fears of a terrorist attack 
on Australian soil. On 19 June 2014, the day after the decision in Plaintiff S156 was handed down, 
Sydney’s Daily Telegraph newspaper ran the headline ‘Aussies are waging jihad in Iraq: Fears 
terrorists will bring their twisted belief system home’.85 The following day, the same paper ran the 
headline: ‘Australia goes into terror lockdown: Spy agencies and customs will lock down borders to 
potential jihadists’.86 
                                                   
82  Australia began scaling down troops from Iraq in 2008, with final withdrawal occurring in 2011: Benjamin 
Isakhan, ‘The Politics of Australia’s Withdrawal from Iraq’ (2014) 49 Australian Journal of Political 
Science 647, 648. By 2010, only a modest number of Australian troops remained in Afghanistan, with a 
full withdrawal initiated in November 2012 and December 2013: ABC News (online), ‘Timeline: 
Australian involvement in Afghanistan’ (16 December 2013) <www.abc.net.au/news/2010-10-
19/timeline-australian-involvement-in-afghanistan/2302702>. 
83  Mark Corcoran and Freya Petersen, ‘Islamic State Explained: Jihadist Group Fighting in Iraq, Syria’, 
ABC News (online), 11 August 2014 <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-06-12/explainer-islamic-state-
of-iraq-and-syria-the-levant/5519404>.  
84  Tony Abbot, Prime Minister of Australia, Interview with James Glenday, ABC AM (13 June 2014); 
transcript available at <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-06-13/interview-james-glenday-abc-am>. 
85  Simon Benson, ‘Aussies are Waging Jihad in Iraq: Fears Terrorists will Bring their Twisted Belief System 
Home’, The Daily Telegraph (online), 19 June 2014  
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/aussies-are-waging-jihad-in-iraq-fears-terrorists-will-bring-
their-twisted-belief-system-home/story-fni0cx12-1226959293125>. 
86  Simon Benson, ‘Australia Goes into Terror Lockdown: Spy Agencies and Customs will Lock Down 
Border to Potential Jihadists’, The Daily Telegraph (online), 20 June 2014 
<http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/news/nsw/australia-goes-into-terror-lockdown-spy-agencies-and-
customs-will-lock-down-borders-to-potential-jihadists/story-fni0cx12-1226960618379>.  
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By 28 January 2015, when the High Court handed down its decision in CPCF, a number of violent 
incidents on Australian soil had sent the nation into a national security panic. As a result of 
intelligence indicating that Australians were working with terrorist groups such as ISIS, the Australian 
government raised the National Terrorism Public Alert level from medium to high on 12 September 
2014.87 Less than two weeks later, 18 year old Abdul Numan Haider attacked two police officers with 
a knife outside a Melbourne police station. Haider had migrated to Australia from Afghanistan 10 
years earlier, and had purported links with an Australian-based radical Islamic group.88 This was 
followed by what became known as the Martin Place siege, which occurred on 15-16 December 2014. 
Man Haron Monis, a  refugee from Iran and a self-proclaimed ‘sheik’, took a number of customers and 
staff hostage in a café in the heart of Sydney’s commercial district.89 The siege lasted for more than 
17 hours and was televised live both domestically and internationally. It ended with the death of Monis 
and two hostages. Despite having no official links with any terrorist organisation, Prime Minister Tony 
Abbott was quick to label Monis a terrorist whose actions were ‘inspired by that death cult, now 
rampant in much of Syria and Iraq, which is a travesty of religion and governance and which should 
never be dignified with the term Islamic State.’90 The implication of asylum seekers and migrants as 
the perpetrators of these attacks resulted in national security and asylum seeker issues becoming 
inextricably linked in the Australian psyche. 
9.4.2 Public Opinion and the Australia Cases 
Figure 3 below demonstrates that there is no clear relationship between judicial decision making in 
the Australian case study cases and shifts in general public sentiment towards immigration. For 
example, the ‘rights-precluding’ decisions in Vadarlis (2001), Al-Kateb (2004), Plaintiff S156 (2014) 
and CPCF (2015) were all handed down in the context of relatively high public support for 
immigration. The Australian public has traditionally drawn a sharp distinction between general 
migration and so-called ‘boat people’ who arrive in Australia without authorisation.91 Given that the 
cases studied all dealt with issues concerning the scope of rights afforded to maritime asylum 
seekers, public opinion towards this specific cohort may be more relevant. Unfortunately, there is no 
consistent comparable polling data measuring public attitudes towards maritime asylum seekers 
across the relevant period. Rather, the analysis in this section utilises a number of polls based on 
                                                   
87  Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia, ‘National Terrorism Public Alert Level Raised to High (Media 
Release, 12 September 2014) <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-09-12/national-terrorism-public-
alert-level-raised-high>. 
88  Dan Oakes, ‘Melbourne Shooting: What we Know about Abdul Numan Haider, Shot Dead after Stabbing 
Anti-Terrorism Officers at Endeavour Hills’, ABC News (online), 25 September 2014 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-24/what-we-know-about-abdul-numan-haider/5767044>.  
89  For a detailed timeline and description of the incident see Australian Government Department of the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet and NSW Government Premier and Cabinet, Martin Place Siege: Joint 
Commonwealth – New South Wales Review (Commonwealth of Australia, 2015). 
90  Tony Abbott, Prime Minister of Australia, ‘Condolence Motion on Martin Place Siege’ (Media Release, 9 
February 2015) <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2015-02-09/condolence-motion-martin-place-siege>.  
91  See comments of former Minister for Immigration Phillip Ruddock and former Prime Minister John 
Howard justifying harsh border control measures targeting asylum seekers by claiming they increase 
public support for immigration: see Chapter Four, nn 9-10 and accompanying text. 
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different questions across time. This data is useful for demonstrating shifts in sentiment within the 
periods covered by each poll series.  
Figure 3: Australian Public Opinion on Immigration 
‘What do you think of the number of immigrants accepted into Australia?’ 
 
 
 
Source: Varied Opinion Polls taken from 1990 to 201492 
The High Court’s decision in Lim (1992), upholding the legality of mandatory detention, was handed 
down at a time of near record anti-immigration sentiment. Data on Australian public opinion from 1954 
                                                   
92  There is no consistent polling data in Australia equivalent to the Gallup polls that exists in the US. As 
such, this chart reflects yearly averages from data aggregated from the following sources: Katherine 
Betts, The Great Divide: Immigration Politics in Australia (Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999) 114-15, 350-2; 
Murray Goot and Ian Watson, ‘Population, Immigration and Asylum Seekers: Patterns in Australian 
Public Opinion’ (Parliamentary Library Pre-Election Policy Unit Report, Parliamentary Library, May 2011) 
23-5; Andrew Markus, Mapping Social Cohesion: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys (2014) 
<www.arts.monash.edu.au/mapping-population>; Alex Oliver, The Lowy Institute Poll 2014 (2014) 13 
<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/lowyinstitutepollinteractive/2014-Lowy-Poll-web.pdf>. See Appendix B, 
Table 9 for further information about each of these data-sets.  
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to 2014, reveals that anti-immigration sentiment was at its peak during 1991 and 1992.93 The closest 
poll measuring attitudes towards maritime asylum seekers was taken in September 1993, less than a 
year after the decision in Lim was handed down. This poll illustrates significant anti-asylum seeker 
sentiment, with 44 per cent of respondents expressing the view that maritime asylum seekers should 
be sent back; while 46 per cent were of the view that they should be allowed to stay, but detained 
while their claims were being processed.94 
In Vadarlis, the Australian Full Federal Court adopted a ‘rights-precluding’ approach to determining 
the rights of asylum seekers subject to maritime interdiction. As already discussed, the decision was 
handed down shortly after the September 11 terrorist attack in New York. This was a time of relatively 
high negative sentiment towards asylum seekers arriving by boat. The polling data in Table 2 
demonstrates, that there was a modest hardening of public opinion towards maritime asylum seekers 
after the attack. Before September 11, 50 per cent of respondents believed all boats should be turned 
back. When asked the same question after September 11, 56 per cent wanted all boats turned back.  
Table 2: Whether Australia Should Turn Back All, Some or None of the Asylum Seekers, 2001-
2004 (percentages) 
Date Allow all Allow some Allow none Neither 
August 2004 14 47 35 4 
August–September 2002 10 38 48 4 
October 2001 8 33 56 3 
August–September 2001 9 38 50 3 
 
Sources: Newspoll, 31 August–2 September 2001, 26–28 October 2001, 30 August–1 September 2002, 13–15 
August 2004; cited in Murray Goot and Ian Watson, ‘Population, Immigration and Asylum Seekers: Patterns in 
Australian Public Opinion’ (Parliamentary Library Pre-Election Policy Unit Report, Parliamentary Library, May 
2011) 39 
 
Table 3 sets out the data from another series of polls carried out in Australia after the September 11 
attacks. The results demonstrate an even higher degree of public animosity towards asylum seekers 
arriving by boat during this period. These polls carried out between 2001 and 2014 all asked 
respondents whether they agree or disagree with the policy of turning back boats carrying asylum 
seekers. The three polls taken in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks all report 
relatively high levels of negative sentiment towards asylum seekers who arrive by boat. Between 68 
and 77 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that boats carrying asylum seekers should 
be turned around.  
Table 3: Whether to Turn Back the Boats Carrying Asylum Seekers, 2001-2014 (percentages) 
                                                   
93  See Figure 3 for a visualisation of data from 1990-2014. The data for the period 1954-2014 is set out in 
Appendix B, Table 9.  
94  Irving Saulwick Poll, 28 September 1993, published in The Age (11 October 1993) 1, 4; reproduced in 
Katherine Betts, 'Boat People and Public Opinion in Australia' (2001) 9 People and Place 34, 41. 
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Date Agree Disagree Neither 
February 2014 71 28 1 
August–October 2010 55 26 10 
July 2010 64 26 10 
March 2010 64 26 10 
October–November 2009 66 14 20 
November 2001–April 2002 61 20 20 
October 2001a 73 22 5 
October 2001b 77 18 4 
September 2001 68 20 12 
 
Source: Polling data from 2001-10 is sourced from Murray Goot and Ian Watson, ‘Population, Immigration and 
Asylum Seekers: Patterns in Australian Public Opinion’ (Parliamentary Library Pre-Election Policy Unit Report, 
Parliamentary Library, May 2011) 36 (the exact wording of the questions asked in each poll are set out page 37 
of the report). Polling data for 2014 is sourced from Alex Oliver, The Lowy Institute Poll 2014 (2014) 10 
<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/lowyinstitutepollinteractive/2014-Lowy-Poll-web.pdf> (asking ‘the government 
should tow back boats where it is safe to do so’) 
 
The decision of the Full Bench of the Federal Court in Vadarlis was also in line with polling of public 
sentiment towards the particular cohort of asylum seekers who were the subject of the litigation (see 
Table 4). The Full Bench of the Federal Court handed down its decision on 18 September 2001. 
Polling carried out between 12 and 16 September 2001, after Justice North’s first instance decision, 
but before the Full Federal Court decision was handed down, reported that 76 per cent of 
respondents did not want the asylum seekers aboard the Tampa transferred to the Australian 
mainland. This was despite the fact the question expressly stated that the Federal Court had 
determined that continued detention was unlawful.95 
Table 4: Support for Complying with the Initial Federal Court Ruling on the Tampa, 12-15 
September 2001 
‘In your opinion, should the Tampa boat people be returned to the Australian mainland now, or not?’96 
Yes, should be returned to mainland 19 per cent 
No 76 per cent 
Undecided 5 per cent 
 
Source: Morgan Poll, first published in The Bulletin (25 September 2011); reproduced in Katherine Betts, 'Boat 
People and Public Opinion in Australia' (2001) 9 People and Place 34, 43 
                                                   
95  See below n 96.  
96  The full question was as follows ‘As you probably know, boat people picked up by the Norwegian vessel, 
the Tampa, are now being sent by the Australian Government to Nauru and New Zealand for 
processing. The Federal Court of Australia has ruled that the Government acted unlawfully in detaining 
the refugees on the Tampa, and has ordered the boat people on the Tampa be returned to the 
Australian mainland. In your opinion, should the Tampa boat people be returned to the Australian 
mainland now, or not?’ 
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The ‘rights-precluding’ decision of the High Court of Australia in Al-Kateb was handed down in April 
2004. Unfortunately there is little data on public sentiment towards maritime asylum seekers at that 
time. The only relevant polling data taken around this time demonstrates that public support for 
maritime asylum seekers was at a relative high point. In a poll carried out in August 2004, around six 
months after the decision in Al-Kateb was handed down, only 35 per cent respondents wanted all 
asylum seeker boats turned back (see Table 2). This was down from 56 per cent in October 2001 and 
48 per cent in August/September 2002. As such, it appears the Al-Kateb decision does not fit neatly 
into my hypothesis that we should expect ‘rights-protecting’ decisions at times of relative public 
support for maritime asylum seekers. However, it is important to caution against putting too much 
weight on the findings of a single poll taken six months after the decision was handed down. It is also 
important to note the limitations of relying on relative polling data that only covers such a short period 
of time (2001-2004).  
There is comparably more reliable polling data on public sentiment towards maritime asylum seekers 
from the time of the High Court’s decisions in the Offshore Processing Case (2010), Malaysian 
Solution Case (2011) and Plaintiff S156 (2014). The polling data in Table 3 indicates that the ‘rights-
protecting’ decision in the Offshore Processing Case came at a time when positive public sentiment 
towards maritime asylum seekers was at its highest during the period of the data-set (2001-2014). 
The decision was handed down in November 2010. In a poll taken in August/September 2010, only 
55 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that all asylum seekers should be sent back. In 
contrast, the ‘rights-precluding’ decision in Plaintiff S156 handed down in May 2014, came a time at 
when public support for maritime asylum seekers was at its lowest during the period. The poll taken in 
February 2014 reported that 77 per cent of respondents believed that asylum seekers should be sent 
back. At the time of writing, there was no data on public opinion on this issue for 2015 when the 
‘rights-precluding’ decision in CPCF was decided. The data outlined in Table 3 also lacks a polling 
point for 2011, the year in which the Malaysian Solution Case was decided. However, an Age/Nielson 
poll administered after the hearing of the Malaysian Solution Case (but before the court handed down 
its decision), indicates that the High Court’s ‘right-protecting’ approach in that case was in line with 
public opinion. Only 28 per cent of poll respondents said people arriving by boat should be sent to 
another country for processing, 15 per cent believed they should be sent back to sea, while 53 per 
cent favoured assessing them in Australia.97 
With the possible exception of Al-Kateb, the decision by judges in each of the Australian cases to 
adopt either a ‘rights-protecting’ or a ‘rights-precluding’ approach correlates closely with relevant 
public opinion. The ‘rights-protecting’ decisions in the Offshore Processing Case (2010) and the 
Malaysian Solution Case (2011) both appear to reflect a climate in which support for maritime asylum 
seekers was relatively high. At the same time, the ‘rights-precluding’ decisions in Lim (1992), Vadarlis 
                                                   
97  Opinion poll commissioned by The Age, published in Michelle Grattan and Farah Farouque ‘Voters Say 
“No” to Asylum Deal’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 16 August 2011  
<http://www.smh.com.au/national/voters-say-no-to-asylum-deal-20110815-1iuvj.html>. 
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(2001), Plaintiff S156 (2014) and CPCF (2015) were all handed down at times of relatively low public 
support for maritime asylum seekers. 
9.5 Conclusion: Implications for Predicting Success of Legal 
Transfers 
In Chapter Six, Seven and Eight, I argued that the leading cases challenging the policies of long-term 
mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing in the United States and Australia 
could have been decided differently. In almost all the cases examined, I argued that there were 
reasonable interpretations open to the judges that could have led them down either a ‘rights-
protecting’ or ‘rights-precluding’ path. The decision to adopt one approach over another was 
influenced by judges’ understanding of the legal position of non-citizens and the degree to which such 
persons are entitled to domestic constitutional and statutory protections. The data presented in this 
chapter suggests that the view of judges on this point may be influenced by national security concerns 
and public opinion. 
My findings hold substantial ramifications for the study of legal transfers, and in particular, the factors 
which contribute to their legal success or failure. The implication of the contingency of the decisions 
examined is that differences in legal structures between the United States and Australia were not 
determinative on the legal success or failure of the transferred policies. Rather, it appears that extra-
legal factors played a significant role in determining whether courts adopted an interventionist ‘rights-
protecting’ approach (frustrating the intention of the law makers who initiated the transfers and 
resulting in a legal failure), or a deferential ‘rights-precluding’ approach (implementing the will of law 
makers to restrict the rights of particular cohorts of asylum seekers or non-citizens). The lesson for 
law makers considering engaging in the transfer of immigration restriction measures is that compatible 
legal structures are not enough to ensure legal success. Rather, law makers must undertake a more 
holistic approach and look at the broader political context in the receiving state.  
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CHAPTER TEN:  
COPYCAT LAW MAKING – TOWARDS A RATIONAL 
APPROACH 
Now the Australian government is prepared to turn boats around, we’ve been able to do it 
safely and effectively and I am not surprised that other countries are now doing likewise. 
—Prime Minister Tony Abbott1 
Immigration control is an area that naturally lends itself to inter-jurisdictional policy and legal transfers. 
The global nature of population movements means that immigration policies are inherently 
interconnected. Governments are aware that changes in the immigration settings of one jurisdiction 
can directly affect migratory flows in other places. As Lavenex and Uçarer note, the adoption of a 
more permissive policy in one state can lead to a reduction of immigration in neighbouring states, 
while a more restrictive policy can increase the number of migrants seeking entry to other countries.2 
This interconnectivity has fueled somewhat contradictory motivations for transfers in the immigration 
policy sphere. On the one hand, states are engaging in cooperative behaviour whereby policies are 
harmonised across countries in a bid to secure common goals. At the same time, states are 
increasingly in contest with each other in efforts to achieve desired immigration outcomes. They are 
competing to attract particular international cohorts of highly skilled workers and wealthy investors.3 I 
argue that states also compete to deter ‘undesirable’ irregular migration. In both their quest to attract 
and deter, policy makers keep a close eye on policies introduced in competitor jurisdictions, and adapt 
and import policies viewed as effective.  
Governments are most likely to engage in transfers when they share common policy goals and face 
similar constraints limiting their possible policy responses. Innovations that meet a policy goal while 
circumventing the common constraints spread quickly to other jurisdictions operating within the same 
paradigm. The governments of Australia and the United States share the common objective of 
maximising control over who can enter and remain in their territory. They also face similar 
impediments to achieving this goal. First are the non-refoulement obligations created by the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’)4 and human rights 
                                                   
1  Quoted in Sid Maher and Peter Alford, ‘Stand Firm on Boats, Says Tony Abbott’, The Australian (online), 
18 May 2015 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/stand-firm-on-boats-says-
tony-abbott/story-fn9hm1gu-1227358293135>.  
2  Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer, 'The External Dimension of Europeanization: The Case of 
Immigration Policies' (2004) 39 Cooperation and Conflict 417, 425. 
3  Ayelet Shachar, ‘The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and Competitive Immigration Regimes’ 
(2006) 81 New York University Law Review 148. 
4  Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 UNTS 137 
(entered into force 22 April 1954) (‘Refugee Convention’) art 33(1); Protocol relating to the Status of 
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instruments.5 Second, each country’s judiciary has operated to frustrate government measures. At 
times, judges have been viewed by politicians in both countries as being overly sympathetic to asylum 
seekers and irregular migrants. The policies of mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing spread between the United States and Australia because they were seen as well suited to 
addressing these constraints. The United States and Australia are not the only governments operating 
within this environment. Many nations strive to maximise control over their borders. Their policy 
options are limited by domestic and international legal constraints similar to those facing governments 
in the United States and Australia. It is unsurprising that the case study policies have been considered 
and/or adopted in other jurisdictions. I begin my analysis in this chapter with an examination of a 
number of examples of such transfers. 
Given the prevalence of inter-jurisdictional transfers of restrictive immigration control measures, it is 
important to identify, rationalise and critique the processes underlying the phenomenon. Philosopher 
George Santayana warned that ‘those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.’6 
Selective memory can be even more dangerous than no memory. In the context of policy and legal 
transfers, a robust understanding of the history and consequences of policies being considered for 
emulation is essential to avoid repeating mistakes made in other jurisdictions. I conclude with an 
analysis of the implications of my findings for policy makers considering engaging in the transfer of 
restrictive immigration control measures. While my analysis in this study focused primarily on the legal 
dimension of success, I also make some brief observations in relation to the process, programmatic 
and political dimensions of success. At a deeper level, I argue that a nuanced understanding of how 
states borrow from each other is critical to understanding how international protection norms are 
developed and enforced—herein lies the deepest need to persuade states to think carefully about the 
potential ramifications of their actions.  
10.1  The Adoption of the Case Study Policies in Other 
Jurisdictions 
The transfer of migration control policies between the United States and Australia examined in this 
thesis are not isolated incidents. Policies of mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing have been considered and or implemented in a number of other jurisdictions. The policies 
                                                                                                                                                              
Refugees, opened for signature 31 January 1967, 606 UNTS 267 (entered into force 4 October 1967) 
(‘Protocol’). 
5  See, for example, Convention Against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, opened for signature 10 December 1984, 1465 UNTS 85 (entered into force 26 June 1987) 
art 3 (express prohibition against the expulsion, return or extradition of a person to a place where he or 
she would be in danger of being subjected to torture); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 March 1976) arts 
6 and 7 (implied prohibition against the expulsion or return of a person to a territory where they face a 
real risk of irreparable harm, such as a threat to the right to life or torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment); Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 
November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990) arts 6 and 37 (implied prohibition 
against the expulsion or return of a child where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a 
real risk of irreparable harm). 
6  George Santayana, The Life of Reason: Reason in Common Sense (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1905) vol 
1, 284.  
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have been identified (and justified) as measures used by the US and Australian governments. 
Copycat law making in this field is very much a live issue. In May 2015, it was reported that European 
leaders were considering implementing aspects of Australia’s border control measures in response to 
an increase in sea-borne asylum seekers crossing the Mediterranean. May 2015 also saw the use of 
maritime interdiction and push-back operations by Thai, Indonesian and Malaysian authorities. These 
actions left thousands of Rohingya and Bangladeshi asylum seekers adrift in the Andaman Sea, with 
no countries in the region willing to grant them access to their territory. In this section, I briefly 
examine these and other recent examples of the adoption or consideration of interdiction, 
extraterritorial processing and mandatory detention policies. 
10.1.1 The ‘Australian Solution’ as a Model for Europe?  
Australia’s use of interdiction, boat turn-backs and extraterritorial processing has been touted as a 
possible answer to contemporary irregular migration crises in Europe. Almost 220,000 migrants 
travelled by boat across the Mediterranean from North Africa in 2014.7 A further 40,000 had made the 
journey by May 2015.8 This large number of arrivals was accompanied by an unprecedented number 
of deaths at sea. In one weekend alone in April 2015, more than 1,000 migrants perished in separate 
incidents across the Mediterranean.9 These deaths were the immediate trigger for calls for Europe to 
adopt the ‘Australian Solution’.10 Prime Minister Tony Abbott urged European countries to use his 
government’s tough asylum seeker policies to stop people smuggling.11 This view was echoed by the 
architect of Australia’s border protection policy. Retired Major General Jim Molan called on European 
nations to adopt interdiction, push-back and extraterritorial processing measures to stop migrants 
drowning at sea.12 Across Europe, and particularly in Germany, Austria and the UK, newspapers 
carried stories asking whether Australia’s tough border protection regime could serve as a model for 
Europe.13 The deputy leader of the UK Independence Party, Paul Nuttall, backed the use of gunboats 
to turn back asylum seekers in the Mediterranean. He said, ‘Australia has got this right. 18 months 
ago they created a ring of steel around the country. Since then there have been no boats, no 
drownings and no deaths.’14 Prime Minister Abbott, as well as The Australian newspaper, reported 
that European immigration officials requested a briefing on the workings of Australia’s push-back and 
                                                   
7  Nikolas Feith Tan, ‘Europe Rejects “Australian Solution”’ (2015) 25(9) Eureka Street 
<http://www.eurekastreet.com.au/article.aspx?aeid=43930>. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Sam Greenhill and Daniel Martin, ‘“Send Gunboats to the Mediterranean”: Australian PM Warns Europe 
Crisis will not Stop until it Copies Tough Stance on People-Smugglers’, Daily Mail Australia (online), 21 
April 2015 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3048375/If-want-stop-migrants-crossing-
Mediterranean-don-t-let-asylum-seekers-set-foot-land-Australian-Prime-Minister-urges-EU-adopt-tough-
policies-proved-success.html>. 
10  Tan, above n 7.  
11  Steven Scott, ‘Follow My Lead on Boats: Abbott Tells Europe Turn-Back Model Stops Deaths’, Courier-
Mail (Brisbane), 22 April 2015, 1, 8. 
12  Jim Molan, ‘Europe Could Learn from Australia’s Tough Border Controls’, Financial Times (online), 26 
April 2015 <www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ae480298-eaac-11e4-96ec-00144feab7de.html>. 
13  David Wroe, ‘Refugee Crisis: Europe Looks to Australia for Answers’, Sydney Morning Herald (online), 
24 April 2015 <http://www.smh.com.au/national/refugee-crisis-europe-looks-to-australia-for-answers-
20150424-1ms804.html>. 
14  Oscar Pearson, ‘Europe Needs Gunboats to Stop More Immigrant Tragedies, UKIP’s Deputy Leader 
Warns’, Express (online), 24 April 2015 <http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/572559/Ukip-Paul-
Nuttall-immigration-migrants-ring-of-steel-Australia>.  
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extraterritorial processing policies.15 It appears Australian officials provided such a briefing to senior 
immigration officials from Europe, North America and New Zealand in the context of the 
Intergovernmental Consultations on Migration, Asylum and Refugees (‘IGC’) meeting, which took 
place in Sydney in May 2015.16 The irony of all this, as I discussed at length in Chapter Five, is that 
Australia’s offshore processing and interdiction policies are modelled on US practice. The suite of 
policies labelled the ‘Australian Solution’ could just as accurately be called the ‘American Solution’. 
For now, Europe has made it clear that it will not be implementing the Australian approach in its 
entirety. Natasha Bertaud, a spokesperson for the European Commission, stated ‘the Australian 
model can never be a model for us’.17 However, her comments appear to specifically relate to push-
back operations and the fact that they may contravene non-refoulement obligations under 
international law.18 On the other hand, the option of implementing a European Union (‘EU’) 
extraterritorial processing regime appears to be still on the table. Reports indicate the EU is in 
negotiations with Tunisia and other African countries to host asylum processing centres to which 
asylum seekers interdicted in the Mediterranean could be returned.19 It is important to note that these 
proposals for interdiction and extraterritorial processing in the EU are not completely novel.  
(a) European Maritime Interdiction Activities 
Maritime interdiction operations to combat irregular migration have been carried out in recent years by 
individual European nations, as well as by the EU. The programs were motivated, at least in part, by a 
desire to avoid responsibility for asylum claims that would have been made if the migrants reached 
the territory of the interdicting state. Italy implemented a scheme in 1991 to block boats from Albania 
attempting to cross the Adriatic following the fall of Albania’s communist regime.20 From 1997 
onwards, interdicted migrants were returned to Albania pursuant to a bilateral agreement between 
Albanian and Italian authorities.21 Italian legal scholar Tullio Scovazzi justified the legality of these 
measures with reference to US interdiction practices.22 Italy began interdicting boats coming from 
                                                   
15  Stefanie Balogh, ‘Europe Seeks Asylum Advice from Abbott Government’, The Australian (online), 6 
May 2015 <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/immigration/europe-seeks-asylum-advice-
from-abbott-government/story-fn9hm1gu-1227337899105>. 
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Libya and other North African states in 2006.23 Initially, these were not push-back operations, with 
most of the intercepted migrants taken to Italy. However, from 2009, intercepted migrants were 
returned to Libya pursuant to a bilateral agreement with the Libyan government.24 Spain has also 
carried out maritime interdictions, targeting migrants attempting to reach the Canary Islands from 
North Africa. Like the Italian operations, Spain’s program was carried out pursuant to bilateral 
arrangements with countries of departure. Spain concluded agreements allowing for joint interdiction 
operations and repatriation of interdictees with Mauritania and Senegal in 2006; Cape Verde in 2007; 
and Gambia, Guinea and Guinea Bissau in 2008.25 
At times, Italian and Spanish interdiction activities have been carried out with the support of Frontex, 
the EU’s border security agency.26 Frontex began operations in 2005 with the mission of improving 
‘the integrated management’ of the EU’s external borders. The aim was to ensure ‘a uniform and high 
level of control and surveillance’.27 Spain’s interdiction activities were supported through operations 
Hera I, Hera II and Hera III which took place in 2006 and 2007. These involved joint patrols by up to 
seven member states targeting migration flows from the West African coast to the Canary Islands.28 
Frontex has coordinated similar operations to assist Spain’s interdiction activities in subsequent 
years.29 Italy’s interdiction program was supported by operations codenamed Nautilus carried out 
between 2006 and 2008. Under these arrangements, France, Germany, and Greece provided 
maritime and aerial assistance to the Italian and Maltese interdiction efforts in the Mediterranean.30 
Other operations in which Frontex coordinated assistance for Italy’s interdiction activities in the 
Mediterranean include the initiatives codenamed Hermes, carried out between 2007 and 2013.31 
Push-back operations carried out under the auspices of Frontex are accompanied by asylum 
screening procedures. However, commentators have raised concerns, claiming that the screenings 
‘are far from ideal and in many cases are probably of little practical effectiveness in ensuring 
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protection’.32 The push-back activities carried out by Spain and Italy outside the Frontex framework 
have generally included no procedures at all to screen for asylum claims.33 
(b) Plans for EU Extraterritorial Processing  
Plans for the extraterritorial processing of asylum claims have been proposed by European nations 
since the late 1980s. In 1986, Denmark proposed a draft resolution in the UN General Assembly, 
which called for the establishment of regional asylum processing centres run by the UN.34 The 
proposal sought to end the in-country processing of asylum claims altogether. It was said that ‘asylum 
seekers who arrive irregularly in third countries outside their region should in principle be returned to 
the UN processing centre of their home region to have their case examined.’35 The draft failed to 
garner the necessary support and was abandoned.  
The establishment of extraterritorial processing centres was picked up by the Dutch government in 
1993. Then Dutch State Secretary for Justice, Aad Kosto, proposed a system where ‘all asylum 
seekers would be sent back to reception centres in their own region of origin’ for the processing of 
their claims.36 The proposal was discussed, but ultimately dismissed, in the Intergovernmental 
Consultation on Asylum, Refugees and Migration (‘IGC’) in 1993.37 
The most comprehensive proposal to introduce extraterritorial processing of asylum claims in the 
European context was set out in a 2003 UK Cabinet Office and Home Office policy paper entitled ‘A 
New Vision for Refugees’.38 The document outlined plans to create ‘transit processing camps’ on the 
non-EU side of Europe’s borders. Under the proposal, no asylum claims would be processed within 
EU territory. Any asylum seekers who managed to enter the EU would be transferred to the 
extraterritorial camp for assessment of their protection claims. The camps were to be run by the 
International Organization for Migration and screening procedures were to be approved by the 
UNHCR.39 Countries such as Albania and Croatia were suggested as possible locations for the 
camps.40 While the proposal was backed strongly by the Danish and Dutch governments,41 it was 
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abandoned after it met strong resistance from a number of European governments, including 
Germany, which referred to the proposed centres as ‘concentration camps’.42 However, by 2004, 
Germany had changed tack and with the support of Italy, revived the proposal for extraterritorial 
processing. The Baltic States, Slovakia and Ukraine were suggested as possible locations for the 
camps.43 Again, however, the proposal failed to gain the required level of support. 
These EU proposals for extraterritorial processing clearly drew inspiration from the US and Australian 
precedents.44 This is borne out in IGC policy documents. Gregor Noll explains:  
The Spring 2003 debate reveals that the “Pacific Solution” constituted a source of inspiration for the 
British and Danish governments. On the 23 April meeting of the mini-IGC… the Australian model as well 
as the Haiti and Cuban interdiction programs implemented by the US were discussed.
45
  
On the role of Australia’s policies, Liza Shuster observes that ‘developments in Australia were 
watched very closely… The Pacific Solution was referred to approvingly by both [Prime Minister] Tony 
Blair and [Home Secretary] David Blunkett when they first mooted the idea of external camps.’46 In 
fact, Australia was actively promoting its extraterritorial processing as a best practice model during 
this period. Graham Thom of Amnesty International notes that 
[t]he Australian government appears to have spent a great deal of money from 2000 to 2004, sending 
officials and consultants to international forums, extolling the virtues of their system and defending their 
system against criticisms from organisations like Amnesty International… [T]he UK has quite clearly 
picked up on the Australian initiatives, as seen in some of the options that the UK has flagged.47 
While the EU wide proposal did not go ahead, individual European nations have established ad hoc 
extraterritorial immigration detention camps in transit countries in Africa. One of the most notorious 
examples is the Nouadhibou Detention Centre in Mauritania. Sometimes referred to as ‘El 
Guantanamito’ or ‘little Guantanamo’, the camp was built in 2006 by the Spanish army and funded by 
the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation.48 Until its closure in 2012,49 the camp 
was used to confine third country nationals interdicted on the high seas en route to the Canary 
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Islands. Migrants were interdicted by joint patrols carried out by Spanish Guardia Civil and 
Mauritanian authorities.50 Once taken into custody, the migrants were returned pursuant to an 
agreement between Spain and Mauritania concluded in 2003 (and updated in 2006). Mauritania 
accepted the return of not only its own citizens, but also nationals from third countries who attempted 
to travel to Spain from the Mauritanian coast.51 Unlike the extraterritorial processing facilities used by 
the United States in Guantanamo Bay, and by Australia in the Pacific, no processes were instituted 
for the screening of asylum claims. Rather, the centre was used as a temporary holding site while 
preparations were made to return the interdicted migrants to their home countries. Similar camps 
were set up by Italy in Libya. Reports indicate that at least three such camps were in operation from 
2003-2010.52 
10.1.2 Interdiction and Push-Back Operations in Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia 
In May 2015, the Thai, Malaysian and Indonesian governments carried out maritime interdiction and 
push-back operations in the Andaman Sea. These activities resulted in a temporary humanitarian 
disaster, with approximately 8,000 Rohingya and Bangladeshi asylum seekers stranded at sea on 
decrepit vessels.53 The purported justification for the interdiction activities echoed that used by 
Australian authorities in regard to their push-back operations. The operations were promoted as 
necessary to save lives at sea, working to deter prospective asylum seekers from making the 
dangerous journey. Australia’s Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, publicly supported the actions of 
Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia on these grounds.54 After a two week stand-off, Indonesian and 
Malaysian authorities reached an agreement to allow the asylum seekers to temporarily land on their 
territories.55 The agreement came too late for some—with dozens of deaths reported as a 
consequence of the push-back operations.56 
10.1.3 Mandatory Detention in Canada and New Zealand 
In the last few years, both Canada and New Zealand have introduced mandatory detention laws 
targeting specific cohorts of asylum seekers arriving without authorisation. The Canadian policy 
appears to be modelled on the US and Australian mandatory detention measures. In turn, the 
Canadian policy appears to have been influential in shaping New Zealand’s mandatory detention 
regime. 
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(a) Canada 
Canada appears to have drawn heavily on the experience of the United States and Australia when 
devising its new immigration detention framework.57 As in those countries, the trigger for legislative 
change in Canada was a particular cohort of sea-borne asylum seekers. The Ocean Lady arrived on 
Canada’s shores in October 2009 carrying 76 Tamil passengers. This was followed by the Sun Sea, 
which was intercepted off the west coast of Canada on 13 August 2010 with 490 Tamil passengers on 
board. Plans for a mandatory detention regime were announced shortly after the Sun Sea’s arrival. 
The Bill setting out the new measures was introduced to the Canadian Parliament immediately after a 
visit to Australia by Jason Kenny MP, the then Canadian Minister for Citizenship, Immigration and 
Multiculturalism. Reports indicate the trip was, at least in part, a border control fact-finding mission, 
with the Minister meeting with his Australian counterpart at the time, Chris Bowen, and other senior 
immigration officials.58 
After a two year legislative process, the Protecting Canada’s Immigration Act (or Bill C-31) was 
enacted in June 2012.59 This Act amended the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to give the 
Canadian Minister of Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism authority to label groups of non-
citizens ‘designated foreign nationals’.60 The designation process is triggered when non-citizens enter 
Canada in violation of immigration law, with the assistance of a smuggler motivated by profit, or when 
the Minister believes the non-citizens as a group cannot be examined and dealt with ‘in a timely 
manner’.61 While the provisions are drafted in general terms to apply to groups of smuggled persons, 
it is clear that they target irregular maritime arrivals. 
One ramification of being a ‘designated foreign national’ is detention for a period of up to one year for 
the purpose of determining identity, inadmissibility and illegal activity.62 The original legislative 
proposal provided that detainees would not have their detention reviewed for a minimum of 12 months 
and thereafter every six months. In a concession to refugee advocates and opposition parties, an 
amendment was introduced that provides for the review of mandatory detention within 14 days and 
thereafter every six months.63 Even with this concession, the changes represent a major departure 
from the earlier detention provisions (which continue to apply to persons not designated by the 
Minister). Non-designated asylum seekers can only be detained in clearly defined, exceptional 
circumstances. These include where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person in 
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question is unlikely to appear at their next hearing or interview; is considered a danger to public 
safety; is inadmissible on security grounds or for violating human or international rights; or cannot 
provide adequate identification to satisfy the officer of their identity.64 In contrast to the detention of a 
‘designated foreign national’ which is not reviewed for six months, a decision to detain non-designated 
persons must be reviewed within 48 hours, again after seven days and then every 30 days after 
that.65  
(b)  New Zealand 
New Zealand adopted mandatory detention laws targeting certain unauthorised arrivals in 2013. The 
Immigration Amendment Act 2013 (NZ) introduced provisions for the detention of irregular migrants 
who reach New Zealand as part of a ‘mass arrival group’.66 This is defined as 30 people or more. 
Such arrivals can be subject to detention for an initial period of up to six months.67 The New Zealand 
proposal has drawn heavily from the Australian, and in particular Canadian, systems. However, it 
does contain an important additional safeguard. Most notably, the group warrant for detention can 
only be issued by a District Court judge, who must be satisfied that detention is necessary based on 
certain stipulated grounds.68 This judicial oversight is absent in Australia, the United States and 
Canada. In Australia and the United States detention is automatic for all unauthorised arrivals.69 In 
Canada the decision to designate a group as subject to mandatory detention is made by the Minister 
for Citizenship, Immigration and Multiculturalism. 
While detention laws in the United States, Australia and Canada were all introduced in response to 
specific boat arrivals, New Zealand has never actually had an asylum seeker vessel reach its shores. 
The need for the proposed measures is based on a claim of an ‘ongoing threat’ of mass arrivals. In 
justifying this statement, New Zealand Prime Minister John Key pointed to the arrival of Tamil asylum 
seekers in Canada, stating ‘if they can get to Canada they can get to New Zealand’.70 He also cited a 
number of cases in which asylum seekers arriving in Australia had declared that their intended 
destination was New Zealand as it did not have mandatory detention laws.71 
In this regard, the introduction of New Zealand’s mandatory detention regime is a clear example of a 
transfer motivated by a competition to deter. However, the fact that no asylum seeker boats have ever 
reached New Zealand indicates that this ‘competition’ can be just as much about reassuring a 
domestic audience, as about sending a signal to potential irregular entrants. The logic behind this 
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move is that some New Zealanders may fear that their nation’s relaxed detention policy (particularly 
when compared to Australia or Canada) will make them a target for future boat arrivals. The proposal 
is aimed, at least in part, at addressing this fear so as to gain political mileage for the Conservative 
government. Both the unnecessary nature of the proposed changes and their resemblance to the 
Australian and Canadian precedents have not gone unnoticed by New Zealand’s Labour opposition. 
In 2012, Darien Fenton, then the party’s Spokesperson for Immigration Issues, quipped that ‘the 
Minister of Immigration has been carried away by spending too much time with the big boys in 
Australia and Canada instead of focusing on the real issues in New Zealand.’72 
In addition to these detention laws, New Zealand has also made arrangements for the extraterritorial 
processing of asylum seekers who arrive in New Zealand as part of a ‘mass arrival group’. In 
February 2013, New Zealand negotiated an agreement with Australia pursuant to which New Zealand 
would resettle 150 refugees from Australia’s extraterritorial processing facilities in Nauru and Papua 
New Guinea (‘PNG’). In return, New Zealand was given the option of transferring future mass arrivals 
arriving on its shores to those facilities.73 
10.2 Implications for Policy Makers Considering Engaging in 
Transfers of Restrictive Immigration Measures 
It has been seen that the transfers of restrictive immigration measures between the United States and 
Australia are not isolated incidents. Rather, they represent examples of a phenomenon that is taking 
place across many nations. Future transfers of this nature are inevitable. In this concluding section, I 
examine the lessons that can be gleaned from my analysis of the US and Australian case study 
transfers for policy makers considering engaging in the transfer of restrictive immigration control 
measures. I begin with an examination of the factors which contribute to the legal dimension of 
success which was the focus of my analysis in Chapter Six to Nine. I then make some observations 
about the three additional dimensions of success: process, programmatic and political. 
10.2.1 Legal Success 
Restrictive immigration control measures such as mandatory long-term detention, interdiction and 
extraterritorial processing push the boundaries of what is acceptable under both international and 
domestic law. As a consequence, such transfers may result in a legal failure, where the imported law 
or policy is rejected by the legal system of the receiving state. This may take the form of an adverse 
judicial decision determining that the measures are unlawful. Alternatively, it may be judicial 
interpretation of the provisions that frustrates the policy’s underlying purpose of maximising 
government control over asylum seekers and irregular migrants. So what factors do law makers need 
to take into account to avoid such a failure?  
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My comparative analysis of the case law challenging mandatory and long-term immigration detention, 
interdiction, and extra-territorial processing in the United States and Australia, suggests that 
differences in the legal structures in these jurisdictions were not as determinative to legal success or 
failure as one might think. The case law on immigration detention turned on two key issues. The first 
was whether legislative provisions in each country allow for indefinite detention. The second related to 
the legality of mandatory detention provisions. In relation to interdiction and extraterritorial processing, 
the litigation has focused on both the legality of the practice and the procedural and substantive rights 
that are to be afforded to persons subject to the policies. I argued that in each of the leading US and 
Australian cases, the courts were faced with a choice between a ‘rights-protecting’ or a ‘rights-
precluding’ approach. A ‘rights-protecting’ approach is one where the court upholds the rights of the 
immigrant involved in the litigation, frustrating the purpose of the restrictive immigration control 
measure. In the context of a challenge to a policy imported through a process of legal or policy 
transfer, such an outcome could be viewed as a legal failure. A ‘rights-precluding’ approach is one 
where the court shows deference to the political branches of government by interpreting the relevant 
legal provisions in a way that minimises the scope of rights afforded to the immigrant litigant. In the 
context of a challenge to a policy implemented as the result of a process of policy or legal transfer, 
such an outcome could be categorised as a legal success. 
My analysis revealed that in most instances, the relevant legal rules in the United States and Australia 
were ambiguous enough to justify either a ‘rights-protecting’ or a ‘rights-precluding’ approach. From 
this, we can conclude that at least in the case study transfers examined, the different legal structures 
were not determinative to legal success or legal failure. Rather, my analysis in Chapter Nine suggests 
that extra-legal factors such as the national security climate and relevant public opinion may be more 
important factors in determining legal success or failure. There, I argued that we can expect ‘rights-
precluding’ decisions at times of relatively high anti-immigration sentiment and heightened national 
security concerns. At the same time, we can expect judges to take a more expansive view as to the 
rights of non-citizens at times of high public support for immigration and relative peace and security. 
These findings have significant ramifications for law makers who are considering engaging in legal or 
policy transfer of restrictive immigration measures. Compatibility of legal structures and domestic legal 
protections in the sending and receiving jurisdictions may not be enough to ensure legal success. 
Further, incompatibility of legal structures and domestic legal protections will not necessarily lead to 
legal failure. As was demonstrated in my case law analysis, the existence of a constitutional bill of 
rights in the United States and the absence of any such protections in Australia was not determinative 
in explaining the similarities and differences in the way the courts in each jurisdiction addressed the 
legality of the case study policies. My findings suggest that law makers ought to adopt a more holistic 
approach to comparing the compatibility of the exporting and importing jurisdiction by taking into 
account wider political and social forces.  
My analysis is based on a comparison of cases from only two jurisdictions: the United States and 
Australia. As such, my findings downplaying the importance of different legal structures in determining 
legal success or failure cannot be generalised to apply to transfers occurring in other jurisdictions. 
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Further comparative research is needed. A cursory look at the European jurisprudence challenging 
interdiction practices reveals that it may not conform neatly to my hypothesis. In the 2012 case of Hirsi 
Jamaa v Italy,74 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that the 
European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) applies extraterritorially and provides extensive 
protections for asylum seekers interdicted on the high seas by member nations.75 The Court grounded 
its jurisdiction to review the action on the fact that the Italian authorities exercised continuous and 
exclusive de jure and de facto control over the applicants.76 The findings of the Court in relation to the 
rights of interdicted asylum seekers are summarised by Violeta Moreno-Lax: 
extraterritoriality does not preclude the application of the ECHR in the context of border surveillance and 
migration control operations. The interdiction of migrants on the high seas without consideration of the 
particular case of each individual concerned is prohibited by the Convention. Information on the 
procedure to be followed to oppose removal to a third country as well as access to legal assistance and 
linguistic interpretation must be guaranteed. There must also be an opportunity to suspend the removal 
before it is implemented. In addition, the safety of the receiving State cannot be presumed in absolute 
terms. Public information on the prevailing situation must be taken into account. These conditions must 
be respected regardless of whether asylum has been explicitly requested.77 
This ‘rights-protecting’ approach is a far cry from the approach taken by Australian and US courts in 
cases challenging interdiction practices in those jurisdictions.78 At face value, the difference seems to 
be a direct result of the different legal structures which operate in Europe—namely the binding supra-
national human rights protection instrument in the form of the ECHR. Importantly, this regime was 
held to apply extraterritorially and to non-citizens regardless of their immigration status. This can be 
contrasted to the territorial limitations of statutory and constitutional protections and the broader 
‘exceptional’ treatment of non-citizens in Australia and the United States. 
One final note on legal success is that transfers initially rejected by the Courts can be modified to 
survive subsequent judicial challenges. In this regard, what starts out as a legal failure can turn into a 
legal success with a little tweaking. Itamar Mann notes that ‘[w]hen courts review policy and 
enforcement directed towards unauthorised migrants, they provide guidelines to policymaking and 
enforcement networks on how to push policies beyond the courts’ jurisdiction.’79 The Australian 
government’s reaction to Plaintiff M70/2011 v MIAC (‘Malaysian Solution Case’) is an example of such 
responsive law making.80 The High Court’s decision that Malaysia did not meet the statutory 
safeguards for third country transfers provided the blueprint for the amendments creating the current 
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offshore processing regime.81 These new provisions survived judicial challenge in Plaintiff S156/2013 
v MIBP.82  
However, protection instruments may not always be so easily modified. For example, a decision 
grounded in the US Constitution, or in the ECHR cannot be circumvented via a simple process of 
legislative amendment. States may still be able to get around such decisions by amending the 
operation of the policy itself. We may see this course of action emerge in Europe in response to Hirsi. 
By saying that states cannot turn back asylum seekers with boats under their de jure or de facto 
control, the ECtHR left the door open for interdiction policies conducted with no such control. As such, 
it may be possible to ensure the legal success of interdiction polices within the context of the ECHR if 
European nations outsource these activities to foreign flagged boats.83 
10.2.2 Process Success 
The process dimension of success relates to the legitimacy of the process underlying the policy or 
legal transfer. In relation to the case study transfers between the United States and Australia, my 
research raised concerns about the quality of the information relied upon when deciding to emulate a 
foreign practice and the transparency of the process generally. Policy and legal transfer can only be 
an effective policy making tool when it is informed by reliable and independent information about the 
operation and effect of the policy in the source country. The policy measures examined in this study 
all share the underlying goal of maximising the power of the political branches to deal with irregular 
migrants and reducing the number of irregular migrant flows. In relation to the second objective, it is 
unclear what evidence policy makers are relying on when evaluating the effectiveness of foreign 
models. There exists a relative dearth of hard research on the real effects and effectiveness of 
migration control measures in influencing irregular migrant flows.84  
The discourse on immigration and border control in many countries seems to be characterised by 
assertion and assumption rather than by reasoned and evidence-based exposition. The unreliability of 
the information relied upon is compounded by the closed and exclusionary nature of the forums in 
which governments share information about migration control policies.85 As discussed in Chapter Four 
and Five, the main forums for the sharing of policy ideas between Australia and the United States 
were various regional consultative processes (‘RCPs’) (in particular the Five Country Conferences) 
and informal bilateral discussions. These forums all took place behind closed doors and the 
information shared at such meetings was generally not open to public scrutiny. 
I make two suggestions for improving the quality of the transfer process. First, there needs to be more 
robust research examining the effects of restrictive immigration measures on irregular migration flows. 
Such evidence would provide a stronger basis of empirical evidence for law makers considering 
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engaging in transfers. Compiling such evidence is no easy task given the multitude of factors, other 
than changes in policy, which can influence migratory flows. The study would need to isolate the 
influence of policy changes from push factors, such as changing conditions in the migrant source 
countries, as well as pull factors such as community ties and the availability of people smuggling 
services. Isolating these factors is very difficult when dealing with a small sample group of 
jurisdictions. However, a large-n study comparing changes in immigration policies and changes in flow 
data could control for and isolate the effect of these various factors. 
One of the primary impediments to such a study to date has been the absence of comprehensive, 
cross-national comparable data on immigration policies; and a lack of a systemic method for 
classifying, measuring and comparing migration policies across countries and over time. Researchers 
are currently compiling a data-set with the express aim of filling this gap as part of the International 
Migration Policy and Law Analysis (‘IMPALA’) Database Project.86 Once complete, the database will 
contain a compilation of comparable data on immigration law and policy across 29 countries and over 
50 years. This data-set will facilitate research into the effects of various immigration control measures 
along the lines outlined above. For example, it will be possible to identify all jurisdictions which have 
introduced detention measures targeting irregular arrivals, and to correlate the introduction of the 
measure in each jurisdiction with changes in irregular migratory flows. 
Second, there needs to be more transparency in the transfer process and a greater degree of public 
scrutiny of the policy choices being considered. In particular, academics, immigration practitioners and 
civil society actors should be afforded an opportunity to scrutinise and comment on the evidence 
being relied upon to justify a transfer. The first step to achieving this would be for policy makers to be 
more open about the fact that they are engaging in transfers in the first place. As borne out in my 
interviews examined in Chapter Four and Five, policy makers involved in importing policies are 
generally very reluctant to admit that they have done so.87 Without disclosing that such transfers are 
occurring, independent scrutiny of the process underlying the transfers becomes very difficult. Further, 
the evidence relied upon for transfers should be made public, either by the inclusion of a wider range 
of participants, such as academics and NGO representatives in RCP and bilateral discussions, or 
through the release of policy documents which explicitly set out the evidence relied upon to justify the 
transfer. 
In the absence of such measures, academics, the migration profession and civil society must work 
hard to recognise potential transfers and influence the policy debate. This can only be achieved by 
these parties taking an active role in sharing and discussing policy developments in their respective 
countries. These non-government actors need to share their experience about the practical 
implications and impacts of policy developments with their overseas counterparts. By engaging with 
developments abroad, these actors will not only be in a position to react appropriately to poor transfer 
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proposals, but they can also play an active role in lobbying for and facilitating sound transfers based 
on substantiated evidence. 
10.2.3 Programmatic Success 
Programmatic success has two distinct dimensions. The first is whether a policy has achieved its 
intended outcomes. The second is whether the benefit of these outcomes outweighs any intended 
and unintended negative consequences. Here, I make some brief observations about each of these 
dimensions of programmatic success in the context of the transfer of restrictive immigration 
measures. The question of measuring whether the case study transfers achieved their intended 
outcomes was beyond the scope of this study. Any future studies examining this point would have to 
confront the issues relating to the highly subjective nature of success.88 The typology of motivations 
driving transfers set out in Chapter Three may assist in addressing these concerns.89 Different 
stakeholders are always going to have different views as to what constitutes success or failure, and 
success is always going to be contested to some degree. A useful starting point for a benchmark to 
measure success is whether it met the goals of the actors involved in the transfer process. By 
identifying the motivation of the actors involved in a given transfer, we can then assess whether the 
transfer met its intended goals. Using my typology we can ask, did the efficiency-driven transfer lead 
to an efficient policy outcome? Did the transfer driven by considerations of prestige result in authority 
and legitimacy for the imported law or policy? Did the cooperative transfer succeed in its aim of 
mutually beneficial harmonisation for the state parties involved? Did the competitive transfer lead to 
an advantage for the importing jurisdiction vis-à-vis competitor jurisdictions? Even where it is possible 
to get around the subjectivity issues, there will be significant methodological difficulties in isolating the 
causal effect of a policy, compared to other independent variables. These are the same issues 
discussed above in relation to the process dimension of success. As discussed, these concerns may 
be addressed by a well-designed large-n comparative study. 
Any analysis of programmatic success must also take into account the negative consequences of 
transfers of restrictive immigration measures. In this regard, I am concerned that there has been 
insufficient attention paid to the damage caused by such policies. Australia provides an instructive 
example of the harm that can be caused by so-called ‘deterrent’ measures like mandatory detention, 
interdiction and extraterritorial processing.90 These policies have had a devastating impact on the 
welfare of the vulnerable asylum seekers they target. Numerous studies have demonstrated the 
adverse impact of mandatory detention on physical and mental health.91 These problems are only 
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compounded when detention occurs in remote extraterritorial processing facilities.92 On top of these 
mental health issues, asylum seekers held in offshore processing facilities in Nauru and PNG have to 
contend with a range of tropical diseases and substandard medical assistance,93 as well as hostile 
local populations. In February 2014, tensions between asylum seekers detained on Manus Island and 
locals led to an all-out confrontation in which one Iranian asylum seeker was killed and another 62 
detainees were seriously injured. In October 2014, four unaccompanied minors released from 
detention centres in Nauru to live in the community were hospitalised after being physically assaulted 
by two local men.94 Australia’s maritime interdiction activities have put both asylum seekers and Navy 
personnel at serious risk. Vice Admiral Ray Griggs provided the following warning in regard to his 
experience with interdiction activities to Senate Estimates Hearing in 2011: 
There are risks involved in this whole endeavor. As I said, there were incidents during these activities [in 
2001], as there have been incidents subsequently, which have been risky. There have been fires lit… 
attempts to storm the engine compartment… people jumping in the water and that sort of thing.95 
A number of asylum seeker deaths can be directly linked to Australia’s push-back operations. An 
asylum seeker vessel returned to Indonesia by the Australian Navy in 2001 ran aground a few 
hundred metres from the Indonesian shore and three passengers reportedly drowned while trying to 
reach the shore.96 A further five asylum seekers died in 2009 as a result of an explosion on an asylum 
seeker vessel under the control of the Australian Navy. The fire was reportedly lit deliberately by some 
of the asylum seekers in an apparent bid to prevent their return to Indonesia.97  
These policies have come at a massive financial cost. The detention and processing of irregular 
maritime arrivals cost the Australian government more than AUD$3.1 billion in 2013-14.98 AUD$2.7 
billion has been allocated for the task in the 2014-15 budget.99 To this we must add the extra 
AUD$420 million in foreign aid promised to PNG in return for hosting the extraterritorial processing 
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facility at Manus Island.100 This expenditure comes at a time when Australia is purportedly 
experiencing a budgetary crisis. Any evaluation of programmatic success must take into account 
these hefty outlays and consider whether these funds would be better spent on other government 
programs. 
By pushing the boundaries of what is acceptable under international human rights law and the 
Refugee Convention, Australia’s policies have undermined its international reputation and its moral 
authority to call out human rights abuses carried out by other nations. This was demonstrated recently 
when China deflected Australian criticism relating to crackdowns on dissidents and academics by 
expressing concerns about Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers.101 
Finally, by demonising so-called ‘boat people’, the policies of mandatory detention, interdiction and 
extraterritorial processing have damaged the general health of Australia’s multicultural society. This 
demonisation has created and exacerbated divisions within emergent ethnic communities and 
between migrant and traditional Anglo-Saxon communities. Writing in 2010, when the Australian 
government was considering the reintroduction of interdiction and offshore processing, Mary Crock 
and I cautioned: 
It is more than a passing coincidence that the years of extraordinarily harsh border control policies under 
the Howard government culminated in, first, an unprecedented number of wrongful arrests, detention 
and removals of citizens and lawful permanent residents and, second, in inter-racial rioting that made 
headlines all over the world.102 
Itamar Mann describes the fundamental political challenge facing states in this context:  
either treat people as humans and risk changing who you are (in terms of the composition of your 
population), or give up human rights and risk changing who you are (in terms of your constitutive 
commitments).103  
The damage caused in Australia by the decision to adopt the latter option should be taken as a 
warning for other nations considering going down this path. 
10.2.4 Political Dimension 
It is also important to note that the transfer of restrictive immigration control measures may at times be 
driven by political, rather than programmatic considerations. This is based on a belief that fear 
mongering, particularly on the issue of race, can be a vote winner. Tad Tietze describes the perceived 
causation as follows: ‘[p]oliticians respond to the dark passions of the voters and the electoral 
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calculus makes resisting these difficult if not impossible’.104 While there is little in the way of direct 
evidence for this underlying assumption,105 it appears to be taken as a foregone conclusion by most 
commentators. John Pilger has observed that the barbarity of Australia’s border control policies are 
‘considered a vote-winner’ by both of Australia’s major parties. He argues that ‘a crude, often 
unconscious racism remains an extraordinary current in Australian society and is exploited by [the] 
political elite.’106 The introduction of mandatory detention by Prime Minister Paul Keating has been 
explained by Ben Eltham as a ‘knee-jerk policy prescription designed to appease xenophobic Labor 
voters in marginal seats, dressed up in the language of deterring people smugglers.’107 In a similar 
vein, Prime Minister John Howard’s decision to interdict and deflect the asylum seekers aboard the 
MV Tampa has often been recognised as a decisive factor in his come-from-behind victory in the 
2001 federal election.108 This is not an issue that is unique to Australia. In 2001, the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees warned that 
[a]sylum seekers have become a campaign issue in various recent and upcoming election battles, with 
governments and opposition parties vying to appear toughest on the ‘bogus’ asylum seekers ‘flooding’ 
into their countries. In some nations—Australia, Austria, Denmark, Italy and Britain, for example, 
individual politicians and media appear at times to be deliberately inflating the issue. Statistics are 
frequently manipulated, facts are taken out of context, and the character of the asylum seekers as a 
group is often distorted in order to present them as a terrible threat—a threat their detractors can then 
pledge to crush. Politicians taking this line used to belong to small extremist parties. But nowadays the 
issue is able to steer the agenda of bigger parties … Genuine refugees should not become victims yet 
again. Surely, there are other ways to win elections.109 
Regardless of whether the underlying assumption that harsh deterrent measures win votes holds true, 
transfers in the immigration control policy sphere should never be driven by such considerations. 
Given the substantial social damage caused by these policies, their use as tools for scoring cheap 
political points is beyond reckless.  
10.2.5 Ramifications for the International Refugee Protection Regime  
Finally, the way in which the transfer of restrictive immigration measures has been carried out has the 
potential to undermine the international refugee protection regime. As states compete to deter 
irregular migrants, the result is the dissemination of progressively harsher and more punitive 
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measures. In Chapter Three, I explained this behaviour by drawing an analogy with regulatory theory. 
I argued that the interdependence of governments’ migration policy decisions and the resulting 
transfers resemble the ‘cooperative interdependence’ observed by diffusion scholars in the context of 
economic regulation.110 In the same way that the decision of one government to reduce corporate 
taxes to attract investment may place pressure on other governments to do the same, the introduction 
of certain immigration policies by one government can create externalities for other governments.  
In this policy paradigm, the adoption of harsh deterrent measures targeting asylum seeker flows, 
places pressure on comparator jurisdictions to follow suit or face a possible increase in the number of 
asylum seekers attempting to enter their territory. The assumption is that asylum seekers choose 
countries in which to seek refuge according to ease of access and what might loosely be termed 
immigration and settlement outcomes. This competitive approach creates a vicious cycle which leads 
to a race to the bottom in which governments seek to outdo each other by implementing progressively 
more restrictive policies. In this context, the policy imperative becomes deflecting irregular arrivals to 
alternate destinations and reassuring the public that the government is in control of the nation’s 
borders. States are essentially being called upon to weigh up their competitiveness in deterring 
unwanted immigration against the value of abiding by their obligations under the Refugee Convention. 
As more states opt for deterrence over protection, this places pressure on other states to follow suit. 
This scenario has, and will continue to have, a devastating impact on the institution of asylum and 
international human rights more generally.  
The legality of the case study policies under international law was beyond the scope of this study. 
This question has been explored at length by other scholars who have raised serious concerns about 
the compatibility of aspects of mandatory detention, interdiction and extraterritorial processing with the 
Refugee Convention and international human rights instruments.111 Repeated non-compliance with 
the Refugee Convention or international human rights norms, has the potential to completely unravel 
the international protection regime. Recent years have seen the proliferation of theories which seek to 
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explain why nations conform to international human rights norms.112 Goodman and Jinks aggregate 
these theories into three broad categories: coercion, persuasion and acculturation. Compliance 
through coercion occurs where states and institutions influence the behaviour of other states by 
creating benefits for conformity and/or imposing costs on non-conformity.113 Persuasion theory 
explains the influence of international law on state behaviour as resulting from ‘processes of social 
“learning” and other forms of information conveyance’.114 According to this approach, actors need to 
be consciously convinced of the appropriateness of a norm. Acculturation explains conformance with 
international norms through a ‘general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behaviour 
patterns of the surrounding culture.’115 This is the result of pressures to assimilate, both self-imposed 
and emanating from external actors. It is unnecessary for our current purposes to engage in the 
debate about which of these models best reflects the empirical reality. Under all three models, 
derogations from the Refugee Convention or international human rights norms, particularly by liberal 
democracies, have the potential to seriously undermine the international protection regime. States 
that violate international refugee or human rights laws would leave themselves open to charges of 
hypocrisy if they attempted to coerce other states to conform to those very same principles. Moreover, 
such hypocrisy would completely undermine their moral authority to persuade other states to conform 
to such norms. On the acculturation model, non-compliance may itself spread through a process of 
acculturation as states adopt the beliefs and behaviour of the surrounding culture.  
We see a number of these issues playing out in the response to Rohingya asylum seekers attempting 
to travel to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia by sea. The decision of each of these jurisdictions to 
undertake push-back operations was fuelled at least in part by competitive interdependence. This was 
based on a view that if one jurisdiction was to grant entry to the asylum seekers, while the others 
continued to deny such access, then this would act as a pull factor for future arrivals. The resulting 
stalemate saw thousands of asylum seekers adrift at sea with nowhere to go. The fact that a liberal 
democracy like Australia has engaged in push-backs provides legitimacy to operations which in reality 
raise serious concerns under international law. As Human Rights Watch Deputy Director in Asia, Phil 
Robertson has noted: 
Australia's shameful actions on boat people seeking asylum in Australia has given the green light to 
other countries in the region to believe that they can get away with pushing boats back. It's undermined 
humanitarian protection and refugee protection throughout the region. The Abbott Government should 
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be ashamed of themselves and their example is part of the reason that these governments are going 
ahead with this kind of policy.116 
There is nothing inherently wrong with drawing on the practice of other jurisdictions when developing 
domestic policy responses. On the contrary, it makes sense for policy and law makers to look abroad 
for inspiration when grappling with domestic policy challenges. Why reinvent the wheel when there 
are tried and tested models in existence abroad? For transfers to be successful, however, policy and 
law makers need to do more than simply copy and paste foreign legislation. Rather, they need to 
undertake a holistic examination of the legal, political and social context in the sending and receiving 
state. They must consider the potential harms that may result from the imported policy, and weigh 
these up against the perceived benefits. 
It is not only law and policy makers that should be looking abroad. Writing in 360 BC, Plato called 
upon all citizens to learn from foreign laws, stating that:  
It is always right for one who dwells in a well-ordered state to go forth on a voyage of enquiry by land 
and sea so as to confirm thereby such of his native laws as are rightly enacted and to amend any that 
are deficient.117  
I echo Plato’s call in encouraging all engaged citizens to look abroad for best practice policies in 
dealing with asylum seekers and irregular migration, and to advocate for their implementation in their 
home jurisdictions. In this way, it is hoped that we will see a shift towards transfers of measures that 
seek to provide durable solutions for the international refugee crisis, rather than cruel and harmful 
measures aimed at deterrence.  
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APPENDIX A: 
INTERVIEW METHODOLOGY 
A.1  Sample Selection 
The interview sample consists of key policy makers (including politicians, bureaucrats and non-
government actors) involved in developing and implementing interdiction and extraterritorial 
processing policies in Australia and the United States. Interview subjects were selected using a 
reputational snowballing approach. This sampling method is well suited for obtaining information 
about well-defined and specific events and processes involving elite actors, such as politicians and 
senior policy makers.1 The method draws a purposive sample that includes the most important 
players who have participated in the event being studied.2  
The first stage of sample selection involved identifying a subset of relevant respondents through an 
examination of evidence on the public record relating to the policy process in question. Relevant 
sources examined include government press releases, media reports, conference proceedings, 
parliamentary speeches, explanatory memoranda and other parliamentary and departmental reports.3 
This initial sample was used to initiate a snowballing/chain-referral process whereby each interview 
respondent was asked to provide a list of people they felt were influential in the suspected transfer 
under study. This procedure was repeated with each round of new nominees, until respondents 
began repeating names. This method has the additional advantage of assessing the level of influence 
of each interview subject, as the number of nominations each person receives provides an indication 
of their stature within the law and policy making process.4 
A.2 Sample Size 
Using the sampling method outlined above, 35 Australian and 25 US policy makers were identified as 
being potentially involved in the case study transfers. Of these, a total of 16 Australian, and nine US 
policy makers agreed to be interviewed. The break down between politicians, bureaucrats, and others 
is set out in Table 5 below. Confidentiality for interview subjects was guaranteed so as to maximise 
participation and encourage full and frank disclosure. Each interview respondent is referred to in the 
study with reference to a codename. The first two letters of the code indicate which country the policy 
maker is from: AU (Australia) or US (United States). The third letter indicates if the policy maker is a 
politician (P), bureaucrat (B) or other (O). This latter category consists mainly of academics and NGO 
                                                   
1  Oisin Tansey, 'Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability Sampling' (2007) 40 
PS: Political Science and Politics 765, 765. 
2  Ibid 770; Karen Farquharson, 'A Different Kind of Snowball: Identifying Key Policymakers' (2005) 8 
International Journal of Social Research Methodology 345, 349-50. 
3  These are what I identify as sources of ‘physical evidence’ in my framework for identifying transplants 
set out in Chapter Two, Part 2.2. 
4  Farquharson, above n 2, 349-50. 
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actors. The last two digits are randomised numbers from 01-99 which are used to provide a unique 
identifier for each respondent. 
Table 5: List of Interview Subjects 
 
Code Country Type 
AUB41 Australia B 
AUO40 Australia O 
AUP11 Australia P 
AUB01 Australia B 
AUB15 Australia B 
AUB77 Australia B 
AUP35 Australia P 
AUB19 Australia B 
AUP50 Australia P 
AUP49 Australia P 
AUB67 Australia B 
AUB30 Australia B 
AUB80 Australia B 
AUB27 Australia B 
AUB96 Australia B 
AUO12 Australia O 
USO62 USA O 
USB19 USA B 
USB21 USA B 
USB79 USA B 
USB06 USA B 
USB98 USA B 
USB33 USA B 
USO11 USA O 
USO82 USA O 
 
Politician (P), Bureaucrat (B), Other (O) 
A.3  Issues with Reliability  
Data collected in elite interviews can provide a valuable insight into the processes behind policy 
decision making. However, there are a variety of factors which could lead to such data being 
misleading or inaccurate. Interviewees may misrepresent their own positions in ways that raise 
questions over the reliability of their statements. Mark Kramer observes that politicians may attempt to 
slant their accounts and inflate or minimise their own role in an event or process depending on 
whether there is political capital to be gained or lost.5 Others have noted that civil servants in some 
                                                   
5  Mark Kramer et al, 'Remembering the Cuban Missile Crisis: Should We Swallow Oral History?' (1990) 
15 International Security 212, 213; Tansey, above n 1, 767 
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countries are prone to under-representing their role in political decision making.6 George and Bennett 
observe that policy makers may slant their accounts in order to portray a ‘careful, multi-dimensioned 
process of policy-making’ to the public.7 Inadvertent memory lapses can also affect the reliability of 
data collected from interview subjects, with this problem being more acute in circumstances where the 
events of interest have taken place sometime before the interview.8 
In order to address these issues of reliability, I triangulate the data collected in my interviews 
wherever possible. This involves cross-referencing with data from other primary and secondary 
sources.9 As Webb et al argue, ‘the most fertile search for validity comes from a combined series of 
measures, each with its own idiosyncratic weaknesses, each pointed to a single hypothesis.’10 The 
primary sources used to triangulate data collected in the interviews include parliamentary speeches, 
media releases, explanatory memorandum, parliamentary reports and other policy documents. 
Secondary sources used to triangulate include press reports, published interviews with policy makers 
carried out by other authors, and academic books and articles. In situations where interviews alone 
are the available source for a particular item, a minimum of two independent interview sources were 
required before the item was relied on as fact. When interviews conflicted with each other or 
documentary sources, the uncertainty was reported in the footnotes.  
  
                                                   
6  Anthony Seldon and Joanna Papworth, By Word of Mouth: 'Elite' Oral History (Methuen, 1983); Tansey, 
above n 1, 767. 
7  Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences 
(MIT Press, 2005) 102. 
8  Kramer et al, above n 5, 213. 
9  Phillip Davies, 'Spies as Informants: Triangulation and the Interpretation of Elite Interview Data in the 
Study of Intelligence and Security Services' (2001) 21 Politics 73, 78. 
10  Eugene J Webb et al, Unobtrusive Measures: Nonreactive Research in the Social Sciences (Rand 
Mcnally, 1966) 179. 
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APPENDIX B: 
SUPPLEMENTARY DATA 
Table 6: US Coast Guard Migrant Interdiction, 1982-2014 
Fiscal Year Haitian Dominican Chinese Cuban Mexican Ecuadorian Other Total 
2014 949 293 0 2,059 48 0 29 3,378 
2013 508 110 5 1,357 31 1 82 2,094 
2012 977 456 23 1,275 79 7 138 2,955 
2011 1,137 222 11 985 68 1 50 2,474 
2010 1,377 140 0 422 61 0 88 2,088 
2009 1,782 727 35 799 77 6 41 3,467 
2008 1,583 688 1 2,216 47 220 70 4,825 
2007 1,610 1,469 73 2,868 26 125 167 6,338 
2006 1,198 3,011 31 2,810 52 693 91 7,886 
2005 1,850 3,612 32 2,712 55 1,149 45 9,455 
2004 3,229 5,014 68 1,225 86 1,189 88 10,899 
2003 2,013 1,748 15 1,555 0 703 34 6,068 
2002 1,486 177 80 666 32 1,608 55 4,104 
2001 1,391 659 53 777 17 1,020 31 3,948 
2000 1,113 499 261 1,000 49 1,244 44 4,210 
1999 1,039 583 1,092 1,619 171 298 24 4,826 
1998 1,369 1,097 212 903 30 0 37 3,648 
1997 288 1,200 240 421 0 0 45 2,194 
1996 2,295 6,273 61 411 0 2 38 9,080 
1995 909 3,388 509 525 0 0 36 5,367 
1994 25,302 232 291 38,560 0 0 58 64,443 
1993 4,270 873 2,511 2,882 0 0 48 10,584 
1992 37,618 588 181 2,066 0 0 174 40,627 
1991 2,065 1,007 138 1,722 0 0 58 4,990 
1990 871 1,426 0 443 1 0 95 2,836 
1989 4,902 664 5 257 30 0 5 5,863 
1988 4,262 254 0 60 11 0 13 4,600 
1987 2,866 40 0 46 1 0 38 2,991 
1986 3,422 189 11 28 1 0 74 3,725 
1985 3,721 113 12 51 0 0 177 4,074 
1984 1,581 181 0 7 2 0 37 1,808 
1983 511 6 0 44 0 0 5 566 
1982 171 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 
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Source: US Coast Guard, Alien Migrant Interdiction: Total Interdictions – Fiscal Year 1982 to Present (1 May 
2015) <http://www.uscg.mil/hq/cg5/cg531/AMIO/FlowStats/FY.asp>  
  
291 
 
Table 7: Asylum Seeker Boat Arrivals in Australia, 1991-2014 
Calendar 
Year 
Number of 
arrivals 
2014  157 
2013 20,587 
2012 17,202 
2011 4,565 
2010 6,555 
2009 2,726 
2008 161 
2007 148 
2006 60 
2005 11 
2004 15 
2003 53 
2002 1 
2001 5,516 
2000 2,939 
1999 3,721 
1998 200 
1997 339 
1996 660 
1995 237 
1994 953 
1993 81 
1992 216 
1991 214 
 
Source: Data for the years 1990-2013 is sourced from Janet Phillips, ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia: A Quick Guide to 
the Statistics’ (Research Paper, Parliamentary Library, 23 January 2014) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1314/Q
G/BoatArrivals>; data for 2014 is sourced from ABC News (online), Operation Sovereign Borders: Log of Boat 
Arrivals and Other Asylum Seeker Incidents (5 February 2015) <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-10-25/log-of-
boat-arrivals-and-other-asylum-seeker-incidents/5014496> 
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Table 8: US Public Opinion on Immigration – Gallup Polling Data (percentages) 
In your view, should immigration be kept at its present level, increased or decreased? 
Date of Poll Present Level Increased Decreased No opinion 
2014 Jun 5-8 33 22 41 4 
2014 Feb 6-9 35 27 36 2 
2013 Jun 13-Jul 5 40 23 35 2 
2012 Jun 7-10 42 21 35 3 
2011 Jun 9-12 35 18 43 4 
2010 Jul 8-11 34 17 45 4 
2009 Jul 10-12 32 14 50 5 
2008 Jun 5-Jul 6 39 18 39 3 
2007 Jun 4-24 35 16 45 4 
2006 Jun 8-25 42 17 39 2 
2006 Apr 7-9 35 15 47 4 
2005 Dec 9-11 ^ 31 15 51 3 
2005 Jun 6-25 34 16 46 4 
2004 Jun 9-30 33 14 49 4 
2003 Jun 12-18 37 13 47 3 
2002 Sep 2-4 26 17 54 3 
2002 Jun 3-9 36 12 49 3 
2001 Oct 19-21 30 8 58 4 
2001 Jun 11-17 42 14 41 3 
2001 Mar 26-28 41 10 43 6 
2000 Sep 11-13 41 13 38 8 
1999 Feb 26-28 ^ 41 10 44 5 
1995 Jul 7-9 27 7 62 4 
1995 Jun 5-6 24 7 65 4 
1993 Jul 9-11 27 6 65 2 
1986 Jun 19-23 † 35 7 49 9 
1977 Mar 25-28 37 7 42 14 
1965 Jun 24-29 39 7 33 20 
 
^ Asked of a half sample 
† CBS/New York Times Poll 
  
Source: Gallup, Immigration (8 June 2014) <http://www.gallup.com/poll/1660/Immigration.aspx#1>  
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Table 9: Australian Public Opinion on Immigration – Comparable Polling Data, 1954-2014 
(percentages) 
Poll  Date  Increase/Maintain*  Reduce#  DK  
Lowy 2014 (14/47) 61 37 3 
Scanlon 2014 (17/42) 59  35  8 
Scanlon 2013  (13/38) 51  42  7 
Scanlon 2012  (14/42) 56  38  7 
Scanlon 2011 (14/40) 54  39  7 
AES  Aug–Oct 2010a  (9/34) 43  53  3  
AES  Aug–Oct 2010b  (12/32) 46  53  2  
Essential  July–Aug 2010  22  (22/42) 64  14  
Morgan  July 2010  (11/47) 58  40  2  
Nielsen  July 2010  (5/45) 50  47  4  
USSC  July 2010  25  (33/36) 69  6  
Scanlon  June 2010  (10/36) 46  47  7  
Nielsen  April 2010  (6/38) 44  54  2  
Morgan  March 2010  (9/45) 54  41  5  
Nielsen  November 2009  (9/43) 52  43  4  
Scanlon  July 2009  (10/46) 55  37  7  
AES  Dec–Jan 2008a  (15/38) 53  46  2  
AES  Dec–Jan 2008b  (13/45) 58  39  3  
Scanlon  June–July 2007  (12/41) 53  36  11  
Newspoll  Jan–Feb 2007  (23/43) 66  29  5  
AES  Feb–Oct 2006a  (19/47) 66  30  4  
AES  Feb–Oct 2006b  (23/40) 63  34  2  
AuSSA  Aug–Dec 2005  (23/33) 56  39  6  
AuSSA  Aug–Dec 2003  (26/31) 57  38  5  
Saulwick  September 2002  (19/35) 54  42  4  
AES  Nov–Apr 2002a  (18/45) 63  34  4  
AES  Nov–Apr 2002b  (25/37) 62  36  2  
ACNielsen  Aug–Sept 2001  (10/44) 54  41  6  
AES  Oct–Jan 1999a  (10/44) 54  41  5  
AES  Oct–Jan 1999b  (13/38) 51  47  2  
Newspoll  April 1997  (2/26) 28  64  6  
AGB:McNair  November 1996  32  62  6  
Morgan  October 1996  ≤30  ≥66  4  
Newspoll  September 1996  (2/20) 22  71  7  
AGB:McNair  June 1996  (3/30) 33  65  2  
AES  Mar–June 1996a  (6/30) 36  62  2  
AES  Mar–June 1996b  (8/28) 36  63  1  
Saulwick November 1991 (9/16) 25 73 2 
Saulwick May 1990 (8/24) 32 65 4 
Saulwick February 1988 (8/22) 30 68 2 
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Morgan June 1984 (5/25) 30 64 6 
Morgan May 1984 (3/31) 34 59 8 
ANOP September 1981 (11/37) 48 45 7 
McNair March 1977 (14/40) 54 43 2 
Age July 1971 (11/34) 45 53 2 
Morgan August 1970 (12/45) 57 38 5 
Morgan October 1968 (19/45) 64 26 10 
Morgan December 1967 (36/36) 72 18 10 
Morgan August 1964 (30/41) 71 21 8 
Morgan August 1963 (28/43) 61 27 2 
Morgan July 1956 (8/40) 48 45 7 
Morgan July 1955 (10/39) 49 45 6 
Morgan July 1954 (9/40) 49 44 7 
 
Source: Data for 1954-1991 comes from Katherine Betts, The Great Divide: Immigration Politics in Australia 
(Duffy and Snellgrove, 1999) 114-15 (the exact wording of the questions are extracted at 350-2). Data for 1996-
2010 comes from Murray Goot and Ian Watson, ‘Population, Immigration and Asylum Seekers: Patterns in 
Australian Public Opinion’ (Parliamentary Library Pre-Election Policy Unit Report, Parliamentary Library, May 
2011) 23 (the exact wording of the questions asked in each poll are extracted at 24-5). Data for 2011-2014 
comes from Andrew Markus, Mapping Social Cohesion: The Scanlon Foundation Surveys (2014) 
<www.arts.monash.edu.au/mapping-population>; and Alex Oliver, The Lowy Institute Poll 2014 (2014) 
<http://www.lowyinstitute.org/lowyinstitutepollinteractive/2014-Lowy-Poll-web.pdf>. Both polls asked ‘Thinking 
now about Australia’s immigration program. Do you personally think that the total number of migrants coming to 
Australia each year is too high, too low, or about right?’  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
